

From a Special Relationship to a Pluralistic Security Community: A Study of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations

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

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The aim of this thesis is to examine the concept of a special relationship and its links with a pluralistic security community. A special relationship is a close relation between two states founded on two sources of closeness, that of the two states' common identities and shared strategic interests. By contrast, a pluralistic security community is formed by states where neither of them would even consider the use of violence as a means to resolve their disputes. The thesis addresses a central question: under what circumstances could a special relationship lead to the emergence of a pluralistic security community? The thesis develops a theoretical framework based on constructivist theory in order to explain the dynamics of a special relationship, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. It uses the histories of Anglo-American and US-Canada relations from the 1850s to the 1960s to substantiate its arguments. The thesis argues that a special relationship produces double-edged effects - substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts - between the two states concerned. Meanwhile, a special relationship constitutes a security regime, which means two states sharing special ties are committed to avoiding war between them. Because of this commitment, the substantial conflicts in a special relationship will not easily become violent ones. The thesis then argues that based on its existing function as a security regime, a special relationship will transform into a pluralistic security community when a power imbalance exists between the two states involved. In other words, the presence of a power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary, if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. The thesis tests its hypothesis through the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1957 to 2009. It makes four contributions to the existing literature on International Relations: it develops an understanding of a special relationship with theoretical foundations; it clarifies the interrelation between a special relationship and a pluralistic security community; it provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between power and common identities of the states concerned; finally, it strengthens the existing understanding of Indonesia-Malaysia relations by providing an explanation of the interplay of power and common identities in the relationship.

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**From a Special Relationship to a Pluralistic Security
Community:
A Study of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations**

Ying Chan HO

A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy



School of Humanities and Social Sciences
UNSW Canberra

August 2014

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine the concept of a special relationship and its links with a pluralistic security community. A special relationship is a close relation between two states founded on two sources of closeness, that of the two states' common identities and shared strategic interests. By contrast, a pluralistic security community is formed by states where neither of them would even consider the use of violence as a means to resolve their disputes. The thesis addresses a central question: under what circumstances could a special relationship lead to the emergence of a pluralistic security community? The thesis develops a theoretical framework based on constructivist theory in order to explain the dynamics of a special relationship, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. It uses the histories of Anglo-American and US-Canada relations from the 1850s to the 1960s to substantiate its arguments. The thesis argues that a special relationship produces double-edged effects - substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts - between the two states concerned. Meanwhile, a special relationship constitutes a security regime, which means two states sharing special ties are committed to avoiding war between them. Because of this commitment, the substantial conflicts in a special relationship will not easily become violent ones. The thesis then argues that based on its existing function as a security regime, a special relationship will transform into a pluralistic security community when a power imbalance exists between the two states involved. In other words, the presence of a power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary, if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. The thesis tests its hypothesis through the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1957 to 2009. It makes four contributions to the existing literature on International Relations: it develops an understanding of a special relationship with theoretical foundations; it clarifies the interrelation between a special relationship and a pluralistic security community; it provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between power and common identities of the states concerned; finally, it strengthens the existing understanding of Indonesia-Malaysia relations by providing an explanation of the interplay of power and common identities in the relationship.

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LIST OF FIGURES

7.1	GDP per capita of Indonesia and Malaysia, 1970-1985	290
7.2	Contribution of Manufacturing and Agricultural Sectors to Malaysia's GDP in 1981 and 1990	300
7.3	Contribution of Manufacturing and Agricultural Sectors to Indonesia's GDP in 1986 and 1990	301

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	The Conditions of the Existing Bilateral Pluralistic Security Communities	68
4.1	Chronological Transformation of the US-UK and US-Canada Relations	166
5.1	GDP per capita and Total Population of Malaya and Indonesia in the Early 1960s	190
5.2	Comparison of Military Power of Indonesia and Malaya in the 1960s	219
7.1	GDP per capita of Indonesia and Malaysia, 1997-2002	328
8.1	The Conceptual Relations between a Security Regime, a Special Relationship and a Pluralistic Security Community	377

ABBREVIATIONS

AMDA	Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement / Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Bendera	<i>Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat</i> (The People's Democratic Front)
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (People's Representative Council)
EAEC	East Asia Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asian Economic Group
EC	European Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangement
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Aceh Independence Movement)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GBC	General Border Committee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G-15	Group of Fifteen
ICJ	International Court of Justice
Maphilindo	Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia Confederation
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People's Consultative Assembly)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NIC	Newly Industrializing Country
NORAD	North American Air Defense Agreement
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OPSUS	<i>Operasi Khusus</i> (Special Operations)
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Communist Party of Indonesia)
PRRI	<i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i> (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
RELA	<i>Jabatan Sukarelawan Malaysia</i> (The People's Volunteer Corps)
SAF	The Singapore Armed Forces
SEAFET	Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SESKOAD	<i>Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Staff and Command College of Indonesia)
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TPDA	Three Power Defence Arrangement
UK	United Kingdoms
UMNO	United Malays National Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Originality Statement		i
Copyright Statement		ii
Authenticity Statement		ii
Abstract		iii
Acknowledgements		iv
List of Figures and Tables		vi
Abbreviations		vii
Chapter 1	Introduction	
1.1	Central Question	1
1.2	Central Arguments	4
1.3	Research Methodology	5
1.4	Key Definitions	7
1.5	Significance of This Thesis	8
1.6	Structure of This Thesis	9
Part I	Literature Review	
Chapter 2	Literature Review	11
2.1	The Concept of a Special Relationship	11
2.1.1	The Coming about of the Conception of a Special Relationship	12
2.1.2	The Two Sources of Closeness in a Special Relationship	24
2.1.3	The Expressions of a Special Relationship	28
2.1.4	Special Relationship – An Intersubjective Understanding	32

2.1.5	The Problematic Understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship	41
2.2	The Concept of a Security Community and Its Links with a Special Relationship	46
2.2.1	Defining a Security Community	47
2.2.2	Security Community – An Intersubjective Understanding	50
2.2.3	The Two Elements that Breed a Pluralistic Security Community	52
2.2.4	A Special Relationship Leads to a Pluralistic Security Community	57
2.2.5	The Origin of Magnetic Power	62
2.2.6	The Degree of Power	66
Part II	Theoretical Framework of a Special Relationship	
Chapter 3	The Conceptual Foundations for a Special Relationship	69
3.1	Power	70
3.1.1	The Definition of Power	70
3.1.2	States Pursue Power for Survival	71
3.1.3	Survival is Essentially Linked to the Existence of Self	74
3.1.4	Balance of Power – A Cause for Power Competition and A Basis of Order	77
3.1.5	Imbalance of Power – An Accelerator of War or A Basis of Peace	82
3.1.6	Strategic Cooperation	88
3.2	Identity	90
3.2.1	The Basic Dynamics of Self	90

3.2.2	National Identity	91
3.2.3	The Double-edged Effects of Common Identity	94
3.3	Expectation	98
3.4	Norms	101
3.5	Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change	104
Chapter 4	The Evolution of a Special Relationship into a Pluralistic Security Community	106
4.1	The Double-Edged Effects of a Special Relationship	108
4.1.1	Substantial Cooperation	108
4.1.1.1	Cooperation in the US-Canada Special Relationship	109
4.1.1.2	Cooperation in the Anglo-American Special Relationship	112
4.1.2	Substantial Conflicts	116
4.1.2.1	Conflict in the US-Canada Special Relationship	117
4.1.2.2	Conflict in the Anglo-American Special Relationship	126
4.2	A Special Relationship as a Security Regime	132
4.2.1	Security Regime	132
4.2.2	A Special Relationship Constitutes a Security Regime	136
4.3	A Special Relationship Transforms into a Pluralistic Security Community	149
4.3.1	The Overwhelmingly Powerful Counterpart – The Guarantor of Survival	150
4.3.2	The Strategic Importance of the Weaker Counterpart	156
4.3.3	Power Imbalance – A Necessary Condition	161

4.4	With Common Identities – Power of a Strong State Becomes A Magnet for Its Weaker Counterparts	166
4.5	With Common Identities – Power Imbalance Becomes a Basis of Peace	167
Part III	History of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations	
Chapter 5	Not Yet Special: Indonesia-Malaya/Malaysia Relations, 1957-1965	170
	Indonesia-Malaysia Common Identities – the Malay Way of Life	171
	Indonesia-Malaya Similar Strategic Understanding	176
	Indonesia to Assert Its Strategic Preponderance Over Malaya	178
	Malaya Desired for Mutual Strategic Dependence with Indonesia	188
	The First Encounter	190
	The Rebellions	193
	The Friendship Treaty	201
	The Regional Prescriptions	202
	The Fight For West Irian	207
	Time to Confront Malaysia	218
	The Absence of Power Balance between Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia	233
Chapter 6	The Beginning of a Special Relationship: Indonesia-Malaysia Relations, 1966-1984	236
	Indonesia's Understanding of Malaysia Shaped by Power	237
	More than a Basis of Order – The Coexistence of the Two Sources of Closeness	238
	Ending Confrontation and Establishing a Special Relationship	244

	The Forming of ASEAN – An Expression of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship	252
	The Width and the Depth of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship	260
	ZOPFAN – Competitive Cooperation for Regional Autonomy	272
	The Presence of Power Balance and the Absence of a Security Community	283
Chapter 7	No More <i>Serumpun</i>? – Indonesia-Malaysia Relations, 1985-2009	285
	The Solid Presence of the Malay World and the New Stage of Economic Development	286
	Looking Beyond Southeast Asia	302
	Sipadan and Ligitan	320
	Ambalat	327
	Migrant Workers	339
	Anti-Malaysia	352
	No More <i>Serumpun</i> ?	358
Chapter 8	Conclusion	365
8.1	Summary of Key Findings	365
8.2	The Thesis's Contributions to the Study of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations	378
	Bibliography	381
	Archival Sources	404
	List of Interviews	405
	Newspapers and Magazines	407
	Internet Sources	408

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Central Question

The term ‘Special Relationship’ has been used by many states to characterize a specific set of their bilateral ties with other states: for example, the ties between the US and the UK; the US and Canada; the US and Israel; France and the Sub-Saharan African states; and Spain and the Latin American states. The meaning of a special relationship is centered on the term ‘special’. It usually means a quality that is exceptional in a positive sense. Consequently, a special relationship between two states is generally being understood as a close friendship.

The concept of a special relationship remains radically under-defined and under-conceptualized.¹ A large part of the meaning of this concept has been introduced by politicians, which often entails sentimental expressions. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reiterated her understanding of the Anglo-American Special Relationship during her speech in Washington in 1985: “[i]t is Special. It just is. And that’s that!”² she asserted. Margaret Thatcher’s assertion reveals a politician’s instinctive understanding of the concept of a special relationship. Such instinctive tendency contributes to the opacity of the concept. Feldman has pointed out that an obvious reason for the absence of a definition of a special relationship is “the brevity with which journalists are forced to write or with which politicians and government are obliged to speak.”³ Systematic disentangling of what has been said about a special relationship, therefore, is necessary in order to establish an understanding of the concept which best reflects its real meaning.

The essence of a special relationship is reflected by its association with close friendship. As Aristotle had noted, “no one can have complete friendship with many

¹ Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” *International Affairs* 72, no.4 (1996): 737. Also see Jerome B. Elie, “Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no.1 (2005):64.

² Margaret Thatcher’s Speech at British Embassy, Washington, 20 February 1985. See <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105971> (accessed March 15, 2011)

³ Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 4.

people”.⁴ A friendship fundamentally means a relationship that is different from other relations. Friendships are commonly understood as “a relationship satisfying cognitive and emotional needs and characterized by reciprocity, trust, openness, honesty, acceptance, and loyalty”.⁵ In other words, a friendship is an intimate relationship that is “necessarily exclusive”.⁶

The intimate nature of a friendship means that friends depend on each other for creating “a stable sense of Self”, in which they constantly confirm and adapt their ideas of order.⁷ Berenskoetter has pointed out that throughout history, “friendships have been identified as being capable of both strengthening and undermining order”.⁸ For example, the US and the UK had jointly created and are leading the Western World; likewise, France and Germany have been working together to forge European integration.⁹ The dynamics of friendships indicate that a special relationship – which is a friendship between two states – is a force that has a tendency to fashion order.

However, conflicts are discernible in a special relationship. As Kissinger has noted, the close Anglo-American Special Relationship at times experiences “mutual exasperation.”¹⁰ Reynolds, meanwhile, argues that the unique feature of US-UK special ties is that both cooperation and competition have equal weight in the relationship.¹¹ He observes that Anglo-American relations are woven with “complex strands of interest, ideology and emotion”, and describes it as “a relationship of competitive cooperation.”¹²

⁴ Aristotle, NE, Book VIII, 6 and Book IX, 10, quoted in Felix Berenskoetter, “Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International,” *Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 647 (2007): 668.

⁵ Felix Berenskoetter, “Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International,” *Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 647 (2007): 649.

⁶ Laurence Thomas, “Friendship and Other Loves,” in *Friendship: A Philosophical Reader*, ed. Badhwar, 48-64. Marilyn Friedman, *What are Friends For?* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), quoted in Felix Berenskoetter, *Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International*, 649.

⁷ Felix Berenskoetter, *Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International*, 672-673.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Felix Berenskoetter, *Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International*, 672-674.

¹⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, “Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign policy,” *International Affairs* 58, no.4 (1982): 575.

¹¹ David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989):98.

¹² David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 293-294.

The tendency of two states sharing a special relationship to establish their common vision of the world, coupled with the conspicuous presence of conflicts in such a relationship, implies that the relationship might generate impacts on international politics. Viewed in this light, the concept of a special relationship deserves a detailed study.

The association of a special relationship with close friendship means that the relationship is intertwined with peaceful qualities. A relationship between two states is close only when there is a desire for peace between them. For example, the mutual wish for friendly ties between the US and the UK since the 1890s had given rise to a special relationship between the two states in the 1910s.¹³ Similarly, the desire for rapprochement between France and Germany since the end of the Second World War had led to the close ties between all levels of societies of the two states under the framework of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty.¹⁴

The peaceful characters of a special relationship imply that it has the qualities of a pluralistic security community. A pluralistic security community is a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.¹⁵ Dependable expectations of peaceful change means the ability of the actors concerned to know that neither of them would prepare or even consider to use violence as a means to resolve their disputes.¹⁶ The peaceful nature of a pluralistic security community coincides with the traits of peace in a special relationship. In this sense, there is an inseparable link between a special relationship and a pluralistic security community.

Yet, while a special relationship has the qualities of a pluralistic security community, it is not necessarily a pluralistic security community. The US and Britain continued to engage in their rivalries for naval supremacy throughout the 1920s even though they had begun to share a special relationship since the 1910s.¹⁷ The US and Canada each continued to develop war plans directed at each other well into the late 1930s despite of

¹³ Bradford Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement – England and the United States, 1895-1914* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1969), 6-10. For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 15-20.

¹⁴ Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 284-285.

¹⁵ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 47-49

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 15-21, 51-52. Also see Chapter 4, pg 126-132.

the existence of special ties between them since the 1910s.¹⁸ The fact that a special relationship is not necessarily a pluralistic security community denotes that certain conditions need to be in place before the relationship can become such a community. This observation brings about the central question of this thesis: under what circumstances could a special relationship lead to the emergence of a pluralistic security community?

1.2 Central Arguments

The central arguments of this thesis aim to explain what is a special relationship, its dynamics, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. The arguments are as follows:

Two states share a special relationship when two sources of closeness – that of the two states' common identities and common strategic interests – coexist between them. Common identities of two states are derived from their shared culture, common language, historical ties or shared political values and institutions. Common strategic interests of two states, on the other hand, mean that the two states rely on each other's material presence for survival. A state's strategic interest means a material presence which is fundamental to its survival.

A special relationship is distinguished by its double-edged effects. It produces substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts between the two states involved.

Substantial cooperation mean cooperation between two states that are deeper than those established in their other bilateral relations, which are the strategic cooperation in a special relationship. Substantial conflicts, on the other hand, mean conflicts between two states that are more intense than those happen in their other bilateral ties, which are characterized as friendly or normal relations. In other words, while a special relationship engenders substantial conflicts between the two states concerned, it is fundamentally not a hostile bilateral relation.

A special relationship constitutes a security regime. A security regime refers to the war avoidance norms around which expectations of the states involved converge. Each of the states observes the norms in the belief that others will reciprocate. In other words, two states in a special relationship are committed to avoiding war between them.

¹⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 4, pg 123-125, 143.

Because of the presence of war avoidance norms in a special relationship, the substantial conflicts in the relationship will not easily become violent ones.

Founded on a special relationship's existing function as a security regime, the relationship will transform into a pluralistic security community when power imbalance exists between the two states involved. In other words, the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary, if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community.

1.3 Research Methodology

This thesis develops a theoretical framework of a special relationship based upon the constructivist theory in order to address the central question of the thesis.

The histories of Anglo-American and US-Canada relations from the 1850s to the 1960s have been used by the framework to substantiate its arguments. The basic idea of the framework is as follows:

A state's survival essentially concerns its existence of self. The will to survive of a state hence is rooted in its awareness of self. States' understandings of self shape, and are shaped by, their identities and power, namely, material capacities, in the form of identifications with one another.

A state's understanding of self is the basis for its intersubjective understandings. Intersubjective understandings of states are a stable set of identities and interests which are founded on their understandings of self.¹⁹ States apprehend the world through the lenses of their intersubjective understandings.²⁰ Intersubjective understandings are essentially the cognitive collective knowledge of states, yet they are experienced as having an independent and real existence, hence confront the states as social reality.²¹

The central arguments of this thesis – which include the thesis's theoretical framework – are being tested through the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1957 to 2009.

¹⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 397-399.

²⁰ Ibid. 396-397. Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no.2 (1998): 326.

²¹ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 399. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (1997): 327.

Indonesia-Malaysia relations provide a strong test of this thesis's central arguments. The notion of a special relationship is originated from the West. Also the most studied special relationships in international politics are those formed by Western and developed states, such as the Anglo-American and the US-Canada special relationships. These are the reasons why this thesis has decided to incorporate the histories of Anglo-American and US-Canada relations into its theoretical framework. The examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, therefore, will reveal whether the thesis's central arguments are able to predict the forming of a special relationship, its dynamics, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community, considering that Indonesia and Malaysia share common identities, yet they are neither Western nor developed states. In other words, if the central arguments apply to Indonesia-Malaysia relations, the arguments' ability to predict will be significantly proven. They can then be generalized as a theory of a special relationship.

This thesis relies on primary and secondary sources. The relationship between the thesis's central arguments and the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations indicates that this study is not a comprehensive historical account. It is instead an original synthesis, designed to substantiate the central arguments of this thesis.

The secondary sources used in this thesis are composed of books, journal articles, government publications, official report of parliamentary debates, official statistics, memoirs and speeches of states' leaders, remarks made by heads of states in their joint press conferences, and sources of mass media such as newspapers, magazines and internet sources (including those in Malay and Indonesian languages). The primary sources, on the other hand, include archival materials, the private papers of Tun Dr. Ismail A. Rahman (the Deputy Prime Minister under the Tun Abdul Razak administration of Malaysia) and interviews.

Interviews were conducted during author's field research trip to Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Jakarta between 17th September and 19th October 2012. The interviewees included a former Malaysian Foreign Minister; a former Secretary General of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Malaysian and Indonesian diplomats; Indonesia's members of parliament; Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean academics who have in depth knowledge in Indonesia-Malaysia relations; top level officials in the mainstream newspapers of Indonesia and Malaysia; and a prominent Malaysian

columnist for Malaysia's and Indonesia's mainstream newspapers, who specializes in the study of politics in Indonesia and Malaysia. A total of 22 interviews had been conducted by author during the field research.

The archival materials that are being used in this thesis were mainly collected from WikiLeaks. The materials from WikiLeaks are important for this thesis. They reveal the confidential communications of Indonesian, Malaysian and sometimes Singaporean policy makers with American diplomats. In contrast to governments' press releases and public statements, the confidential communications provide perhaps more accurate insights into the hidden dynamics of international politics. While these information from WikiLeaks should be treated with the standard measure of skepticism, they, however, have the advantage of functioning as the advanced release of archival materials.

1.4 Key Definitions

This thesis adheres to the following definitions of a nation, a state and a government:

Nation:

A nation is a "named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."²²

State:

A state is the organizational apparatus under a political authority which can claim or compel the compliance of its citizens to its laws. It enjoys a monopoly of legal violence within its borders.²³

Government:

A government is the political institution that normatively makes and implements decisions for the citizens of its state. While governments come and go, the state persists.

²² Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 14.

²³ *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), 77-128.

1.5 Significance of This Thesis

This thesis makes four contributions to the existing literature on International Relations.

First, it conceptualizes the idea of a special relationship. As indicated in earlier section, such an idea remains under-defined and under-conceptualized. This thesis, through the conceptualization, develops an understanding of a special relationship with theoretical foundations. In other words, it provides a clearer understanding of a special relationship and its transformation into a pluralistic security community, in which the understanding is generally applicable to other such relationships in international politics. A thorough appreciation of a special relationship is crucial, in view of the fact that it has the potential to create impacts on international politics.

Second, it clarifies the interrelation between a special relationship and a pluralistic security community. While some scholars are aware of the links between the two concepts, they, however, either use the two concepts interchangeably without thinking through the relationship between the two or have made a fundamental mistake in explaining the causal link between the two concepts.²⁴ It is necessary to clarify that it is a special relationship that leads to a pluralistic security community – which will be confirmed by this study. The clarification of such causal link serves as the logical basis for the understanding that a special relationship has the qualities of a pluralistic security community, and can become such a community under certain circumstances.

Third, it provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between power and common identities. It confirms the general observation in the existing literature that a strong state's power becomes a magnet for weaker states, when they share common identities. The thesis also confirms that power imbalance between states functions as a basis of peace among them when these states share common identities. Such an observation is further substantiated by the thesis's revelation that, those states in which their power imbalance functions as an accelerator of war between them, do not share common identities. This thesis explains why a strong state's power will become a magnet, and why power imbalance will serve as a basis of peace, when the states involved share common identities.

²⁴ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 59-62.

Finally, this thesis makes significant contributions to the study of Indonesia-Malaysia relations by providing an explanation of the interplay of power and common identities in the relationship.

Most of the existing studies of this bilateral tie have been focusing on the factor of identity in the relationship. Joseph Liow's study "The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – One Kin, Two Nations", for example, employs the concepts of kinship and nationalism to explain the dynamics of Indonesia-Malaysia relations.²⁵ Likewise, Ahmad Nizar Yaakub's study "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" offers an analysis of the impacts of the ideational factors or non-material factors – such as culture, ethnicity and religion – on the ties between Indonesia and Malaysia.²⁶ The joint study of Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch "Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration" too does not look at the influence of power in the bilateral tie.²⁷ The study seeks to explain Indonesia-Malaysia relations by examining their cultural overlaps and historical experiences.²⁸

There is no doubt that common identities are a defining feature in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Yet, power is one of the most important means – if not the means – for a state to safeguard its survival.²⁹ One therefore should take into account the influence of power in Indonesia-Malaysia relations when analysing the relationship. By incorporating the factors of power and identity in its explanation of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, this thesis serves to strengthen the existing understanding of the relations.

1.6 Structure of This Thesis

This thesis comprises three parts: Literature Review, Theoretical Framework of a Special Relationship, and History of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations.

²⁵ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), xi, 1.

²⁶ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 1-2.

²⁷ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 1-17.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 21.

The Literature Review – Chapter 2 – identifies the essence of a special relationship, the relationship's expressions, and the circumstances in which such a relationship will emerge. It also confirms that a special relationship and a pluralistic security community are essentially interlinked. Both the concepts are intersubjective understandings shared by the two states concerned, and both denote a relationship of common identities as well as power between the two states.

The second part – Chapter 3 and 4 – constitutes the theoretical framework of a special relationship which explains the dynamics of a special relationship, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community.

The third part – Chapter 5 to 7 – tests the central arguments of this thesis by examining Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1957 to 2009. Chapter 5 argues that there was no special relationship between Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia from 1957 to 1965. Chapter 6 – Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1966 to 1984 – explains that the two states began to share a special relationship shortly after the fall of the Sukarno-regime. Chapter 7 – Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1985 to 2009 – reveals the double-edged effects of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship, and shows that the relationship is not a security community but remains as a security regime owing to the absence of power imbalance between Indonesia and Malaysia.

The Conclusion – Chapter 8 – outlines the key findings of the whole thesis and discusses the thesis's contributions to the study of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter examines the existing literature on special relationships and security communities. It contains two major parts. The first discusses the understanding of special relationships; followed by that of security communities in the second part. While examining the concept of a security community, emphasis has also been put on disclosing its underlying links with a special relationship. On the whole, the purpose of this chapter is to reveal the essence of a special relationship and a security community; through the process, establish the understanding of the characters and elements which form the two concepts' connections, and the understanding of the causal link between the two concepts. The thesis will thus address its central question – under what circumstances could a special relationship lead to the emergence of a pluralistic security community?

2.1 The Concept of a Special Relationship

This section first discusses the coming about of the concept of a special relationship. Based on the history of the US-UK relations, it observes that the mutual sense of closeness between the two states was naturally and consistently generated by their common identities. Yet, the presence of common identities alone did not result in substantial friendship between the US and the UK. It was not until the emergence of their common strategic interests in the late nineteenth century that friendship between the two states began to grow considerably. The perceived mutual strategic dependence had its root in their common identities. Accordingly, the coexistence of the two sources of closeness in the US-UK relations – that of their common identities and shared strategic interests – brought the two states closer than their other bilateral ties; eventually led them to coin their relations as Anglo-American Special Relationship.

This section then shows that the existing literature acknowledges the existence of the twin sources of closeness in a special relationship. It also presents the literature's discussion of the expressions of a special relationship. A special relationship's expressions include: the sentimental expressions of closeness between the two states concerned; the two states' shared understanding in which they share a closer relation

than their other bilateral ties; their mutual expectations; and a higher intensity of interactions between the two states as compared with that of their other bilateral ties.

This section subsequently moves to outline the theories that have been adopted to explain the nature of a special relationship, namely, the realist and the identity schools. It points out their respective limitations in explaining the essence of such a relationship. It argues that a special relationship is essentially an intersubjective understanding shared by the two states involved. The intersubjective understanding is spawned by their common identities-induced mutual sense of closeness, combined with their reciprocal positive identifications generated by them sharing common strategic interests. The two states' common strategic interests are founded on their similar strategic understandings rooted in common identities, and produced by their necessary amount of power. As such, it is the constructivist theory that is able to explain the nature of a special relationship.

Finally, this section discusses the existing literature of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The discussion demonstrates that the literature acknowledges the presence of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. It subsequently reveals that some discussions of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship discern the existence of the two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – in this relationship. The discussion then points out that the studies of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship are mostly in the identity school. It reveals that while there has been a significant scholarly development in the understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship, the literature, however, has not been able to address a fundamental puzzle: why Indonesia and Malaysia had plunged into armed conflict between them from 1963 to 1966 despite the supposedly existence of a special relationship between the two states? In other words – the discussion will subsequently indicate – the understanding of the essence of a special relationship in the literature of Indonesia-Malaysia relations has been inadequate. The problematic understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship in the literature, the discussion maintains, illuminates the need to re-examine this special relation.

2.1.1 The Coming about of the Conception of a Special Relationship

The concept of a special relationship is generally being understood as a closer friendship between two states when compared to their other bilateral relations, where such a relationship is founded on the two states' closely shared interests and their

sentimental assertion of shared identities. The idea of a “Special Relationship” entered into the discussion of international relations when the term was coined by Winston Churchill in his ‘iron curtain’ speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. Churchill in his speech warned that permanent peace would not be achieved without “the fraternal association of the English Speaking People. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States.”¹

The notion of a special relationship between Britain and the United States was a century in the making, amid the ripening of their friendship since late eighteenth century.² The sense of closeness between the two states was naturally and consistently generated by their common identities, rooted in the two states’ shared culture, common language, historical ties and shared political values and institutions. In 1782, after it was reminded by Britain of the possibility of French pursuing deceptive tactics, the US abandoned its treaty with France, which obliged them to not make a separate peace, and went ahead on separate negotiations with Britain to end the American Revolutionary War.³ Such an incident demonstrates the dynamics of common identities, which produced positive associations between the US and Britain, even at a time when Britain had suffered grave military defeat in its war against the US one year earlier.⁴ Allen had observed, the two states pursued “the practice of playing off doubtful friends against open enemies”; the Frenchman, on the other hand, acknowledged “the unusual character of the Anglo-American relationship”.⁵

The sense of closeness, which derived from their shared identities, was openly expressed by the political leaders from the US and the UK towards one another in the 1780s. King George III in the House of Lords on 5th December 1782 said, “Religion, language, interests and affection may, and I hope will, yet prove a bond of permanent union between the two countries.”⁶ On the other hand, the first American Minister to Britain, John Adams, when first met with King George III in 1785 said, “I shall esteem

¹ Randolph S Churchill, ed., *The Sinews of Peace, Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*. (London: Cassell, 1948), 98-99.

² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955). Also see David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 89.

³ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 254-255.

⁴ Ibid. 253.

⁵ Ibid. 255-256.

⁶ Robert Balmain Mowat, *Americans in England (USA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935)*, 54.

myself the happiest of men if I can be instrumental...restoring...the old good-nature and the old good-humour between people who, though separated by an ocean and under different governments, have the same language, a similar religion and kindred blood.”⁷

However, common identities–induced positive identifications between the US and Britain alone, did not result in substantial friendship between them. At the turn of nineteenth century, the two states’ short-lived common strategic interests had exhibited that, substantial friendship between them nearly emerged, when common identities and shared strategic interests almost coexisted in their relationship. In the late 1790s to early 1800s, there had been talks of forging an Anglo-American Alliance to face the common threat exerted by the culturally different other – France.⁸ The natural bonds between the US and the UK cemented by their common identities, led them to look to each other for help, when they were threatened by states of different culture.

Britain realized the value of American friendship amidst its war against France. As the United States moved closer to a war with France in the late 1790s, Britain examined possible common actions with the US to confront France.⁹ The common actions, however, did not materialize; America and France soon achieved peace in 1801.¹⁰ On the other hand, then US President, Thomas Jefferson, made no secret that, the US would seek for the assistance from Great Britain if necessary, in order to quash France’s desire to expand its power in North America, after France’s acquisition of Louisiana from Spain in 1800.¹¹ Yet, such strategic consideration soon evaporated in 1803, when Napoleon proposed to sell Louisiana to the US.¹² America quickly accepted the offer, as it deemed Louisiana was the key to its future.¹³ The coexistence of common identities and shared strategic interests in the US-UK relations, did not eventually come into place; firm Anglo-American friendship therefore had yet to surface.

Similar dynamics of possible cooperation between the US and Britain reemerged in the 1820s. The French invasion of Spain in April 1823 had raised talks of Anglo-American cooperation to prevent France from acquiring Spanish colonies in Latin

⁷ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 266.

⁸ Ibid. 304-306.

⁹ Ibid. 302-305.

¹⁰ Ibid. 305.

¹¹ Ibid. 306.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

America.¹⁴ Such cooperation, however, did not take place, as both states held fundamentally different strategic concerns. The US, with its prime aim of preventing European Powers from interfering in American continent's affairs, therefore its fear of Britain's intention to annex Spanish colonies in America, requested Britain to recognize the independence of Spanish American colonies, before both states could cooperate to contain France.¹⁵ Britain, on the other hand, rejected such demand, as it deemed the revolutions of the Spanish American was contradictory to its political system of monarchy, and it had recently been an ally of Spain.¹⁶ Above all, Britain was fearful of American annexation in Latin America, especially the Spanish lands of Texas and Cuba.¹⁷ Once again, the divergence of their respective strategic interests, prohibited the two states from forging substantial friendship, despite sharing common identities.

Since the 1850s, the US power had grown consistently.¹⁸ Henry Adams observed, "The revolution since 1861 was nearly complete, and, for the first time in history, the American felt himself almost as strong as an Englishman."¹⁹ The growing American power spawned structural changes in the US-UK relations. Allen wrote, "Anglo-American friendship grew in strength almost exactly in proportion as American world interests expanded."²⁰ The increasingly powerful US found itself in growing need of British friendship, while it was expanding its power abroad in the 1890s.²¹ Britain as a world power, on the other hand, was in strong desire for American friendship; it was increasingly conscious of its isolation in international affairs, especially in the face of the threats from Russia and Germany.²² In short, both states needed each other to preserve their respective interests overseas. The growing of American power, matched with Britain's existing power, produced the mutual need for strategic cooperation between them; in which such perceived strategic dependence was a function of their sense of closeness, derived from their common identities. Mahan wrote in 1897,

¹⁴ Ibid. 372-373.

¹⁵ Ibid. 359, 366, 372-375.

¹⁶ Ibid. 366-367, 374-375.

¹⁷ Ibid. 369.

¹⁸ Ibid. 425, 436.

¹⁹ Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (USA: Sentry Edition, 1961), 235.

²⁰ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 562.

²¹ Ibid. 568.

²² Ibid. 425, 525, 568.

“When we begin really to look abroad, and to busy ourselves with our duties to the world at large in our generation – and not before – we shall stretch out our hands to Great Britain, realizing that in unity of heart among the English-speaking races lies the best hope of humanity in the doubtful days ahead.”²³

The coexistence of shared identities and common strategic interests in Anglo-American relations during the 1890s, intensified positive identifications between them. As a consequence, their friendship grew substantially. Policy makers of this time advocated the idea of “Anglo-American understanding”. Mahan in his first published work in 1890 avowed a “cordial understanding with Britain”.²⁴ Then US Secretary of State, John Hay, proclaimed, “As long as I stay here no action shall be taken contrary to my conviction that the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with England. But an alliance must remain, in the present state of things, an unattainable dream.”²⁵ The idea of “understanding”, according to Allen, means both states held “a tone of general agreement on broad principles”, but avoided concrete cooperation, let alone the forming of an alliance between them.²⁶

Both states’ policies during the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the Boer War in 1899, exemplified the idea of Anglo-American understanding. The British government adhered to the policy of benevolent neutrality, when the US was at war with Spain in 1898. While such policy meant the absence of concrete cooperation between the US and Britain, it actually reflected British friendly approach towards America. As British did not share the anti-American feeling of other European states, it practically protected the US from the threats exerted by hostile European powers, since it was Great Britain that controlled the seas.²⁷ On the other hand, British neutrality enabled the effective blockade in the Atlantic battle area by the US during the war.²⁸ After America had won the war, Britain welcomed its annexation of Spanish colonies in the Pacific and the

²³ A.T. Mahan, *The Interest of America in Sea Power – Present and Future* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, Limited, 1897), 258-259.

²⁴ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 563.

²⁵ Robert Balmain Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and The United States* (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1925), 284.

²⁶ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 549, 581.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 575.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 576-577.

Caribbean, as America's expansion would check the power of Britain's potential enemies, hence allowed Britain to concentrate in other more vital-danger areas.²⁹ Likewise for the Boer War in 1899, the practice of the policy of impartial neutrality by the US government, in effect served as a crucial force to hamper other powers from interfering in this war. Without American participation, no effective interference could be possible.³⁰ Such policy came as an important assistance to Britain. It essentially allowed Britain to decisively defeat the Boer Republics, at a time when Britain was isolated in Europe.³¹

At the turn of the twentieth century, because of the steadily growing strength of the US, mutual strategic dependence between America and Britain continued to solidify, hence friendship between them consistently intensified.³² In the early 1900s, British policy of friendship with America had become the essential complement of Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Anglo-French Entente Cordiale.³³ The US, on the other hand, was determined to maintain an intimate understanding with Britain.³⁴ A letter sent by then US President, Theodore Roosevelt, to Spring-Rice, a British diplomat during this period reflects the friendly sentiment between the two states in the early 1900s,

“I feel so perfectly healthy myself and the Americans and Englishmen for whom I care...seem so healthy, so vigorous and on the whole so decent that I rather incline to the view of my beloved friend, Lieutenant Parker... whom I overheard telling the Russian naval attaché at Santiago that the two branches of Anglo-Saxons had come together, and ‘together, we can whip the world, Prince’.”³⁵

Having understood the true extent of American power, British realized the benefits of pursuing American friendship, and the disastrous outcome of provoking American enmity.³⁶ The increasing number of culturally different Great Powers during the early 1900s, led Britain to view American friendship as the promising answer to its

²⁹ Ibid. 581-583.

³⁰ Ibid. 592-593.

³¹ Ibid. 590, 593.

³² Ibid. 549.

³³ Ibid. 607.

³⁴ Ibid. 610.

³⁵ Forrest Davis, *The Atlantic System: The Story of Anglo-American Control of the Seas* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1943), 142.

³⁶ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 441, 581.

international problems.³⁷ Meanwhile, the supremacy of British navy, and the emergence of America's naval power, gave birth to the mutual complementary functions of their navies, particularly in addressing the two states' shared fear of Germany, which looked set to construct a great fleet.³⁸

In the late 1900s, the Anglo-American friendship had become an indispensable factor in each of their foreign policy.³⁹ The mutual strategic dependence of the two states in international affairs led them to realize the increasing importance of maintaining a good understanding between them. Spring-Rice, after visiting the US in 1905, where he represented Britain to discuss with the US on the settlement of Russo-Japanese War in the Far East, said,

“In England, of course, as Chamberlain told me very earnestly, every thinking man is convinced of the absolute necessity for England of a good understanding with America...”⁴⁰

Roosevelt in his letter to King Edward VII in 1905 wrote,

“I absolutely agree with you as to the importance, not only to ourselves but to all the free peoples of the civilized world, of a constantly growing friendship and understanding between the English-speaking peoples.”⁴¹

The mutual good understanding engendered the two states' parallel actions in international politics.⁴² Both states sided with Japan during its war with Russia in the Far East; both supported the Open Door Policy in China.⁴³ Then British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, assured Washington in 1903, Britain was “prepared to follow the United States step by step up to any point that may be necessary for the protection of our common interests in China.”⁴⁴ When, in 1905, asked by the Japanese if America would join the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Lansdowne replied, “...I should

³⁷ Ibid. 607-608.

³⁸ Ibid. 560, 601, 607-608.

³⁹ Ibid. 614.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 616.

⁴¹ Lionel M. Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898-1906* (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1938), 185.

⁴² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 614.

⁴³ Ibid. 615-616.

⁴⁴ Lionel M. Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship: A Study in World Politics, 1898-1906*, 167.

expect to find them moving upon parallel lines with us, I doubted whether they were likely to do more.”⁴⁵

Turning into the 1910s, the policy of American friendship, according to Allen, had become the traditional foreign policy of Britain.⁴⁶ Such a tradition was especially obvious, when Britain’s strategic dependence on the US turned salience during the First World War. As America’s power had the deciding impact on the outcome of the war, Britain was determined to ensure its friendship with the US.⁴⁷ Then British Prime Minister, Herbert Henry Asquith, said to the US ambassador to Britain, Walter Hines Page, “Mr. Page, after any policy or plan is thought out on its merits my next thought always is how it may affect our relations with the United States. That is always a fundamental consideration.”⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the presence of the threat exerted by the culturally different hostile power – German during the war, intensified the common identities–induced positive identifications between Britain and the US. Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador, reported to the British government of his conversation with then US President, Woodrow Wilson,

“I knew that you believed the hope and salvation of the world lay in a close and cordial understanding between the free nations, more especially between those who were of the household of our language...we could almost endure with equanimity all the horrors of this terrible struggle if they led in the end to a close, sure and permanent understanding between the English-speaking peoples. If we stood together we were safe. If we did not stand together nothing was safe.”⁴⁹

Wilson in other occasions said, “if Germany won it would change the course of our civilization and make the United States a military nation...”, “England is fighting our fight.”⁵⁰

⁴⁵ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 619.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 637.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 630, 637.

⁴⁸ Burton J. Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page Volume II* (London: William Heinemann, Ltd, 1923), 169.

⁴⁹ “From April 1917 to January 1918,” in *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice – A Record, Volume II*, ed. Stephen Gwynn (New York: Books For Libraries Press, 1972), 425.

⁵⁰ Edward Mandell House, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House Volume I – Behind the Political Curtain, 1912-1915* (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1926), 299. Also see H. C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War: The Campaign against American Neutrality, 1914-1917* (US: Kennikat Press, 1968), 181.

Underpinned by the coexistence of their shared identities and common strategic interests arose since the end of nineteenth century, Anglo-American relations evolved into a bilateral relationship with special characters in the 1910s. Policy makers and government officials of the two states during this period shared an understanding where their friendship was closer than their other bilateral ties. Walter Hines Page, then US ambassador, described his relationship with then British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, “Now the relations that I have established with Sir Edward Grey have been built up on frankness, fairness and friendship. I can’t have relations of any other sort nor can England and the United States have relations of any other sort.”⁵¹ Recounted on his friendship with then US Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, the British Ambassador, Spring-Rice wrote, “whatever may be said of the relations, politically speaking, of England and America, one thing is absolutely certain – in no other country can an Englishman make such friendships”.⁵² Allen observed, by 1910s, Britain understood America deeper than it understood any other power of the time; its understanding of America was hitherto the deepest in history.⁵³

Meanwhile, Anglo-American economic interdependence had grown extensively in the 1910s.⁵⁴ The economic links between America and Britain during this period were far stronger than those either state had with any other state.⁵⁵ On the other hand, while the US joined the Allies as an “Associated Power”, not an ally, to fight against Germany during World War One, the Anglo-American military cooperation was, nonetheless, intimate.⁵⁶ The two states’ navies, under the command of the British Admiral Bayley, were operated in the chain of common based on seniority, not nationality, the same courts of inquiry were shared, and the admiral flew his flag indifferently in either state’s

⁵¹ Burton J. Hendrick, *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page Volume I* (London: William Heinemann, Ltd, 1923), 382.

⁵² “*The End of Service*,” in *The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice – A Record, Volume II*, ed. Stephen Gwynn (New York: Books For Libraries Press, 1972), 432. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 634.

⁵³ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 654.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 670.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 656.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 693-694.

ships.⁵⁷ In sum, by the 1910s, America and Britain, in substance, shared a special relationship.

As the relationship continued to evolve into the 1920s, the British survival at sea had become essentially depended on its good relations with the United States – a newly emerged world power.⁵⁸ Britain had accepted its naval equality with the US and the superiority of America's economy.⁵⁹ The policy of American Friendship since then, became the fundamental basis of British foreign policy.⁶⁰

The friendship between the US and Britain eventually gave birth to the alliance between them in World War Two. It was a time where Anglo-American friendship reached its climax.⁶¹ Ties between them during the war were far stronger than any alliance, and unprecedented in the history of war.⁶² The catastrophic threat of Nazi Germany amplified the combination of common identities and shared strategic interests in Anglo-American relations. Both states became the “sole bastion of Western civilization against the onslaughts of Nazi might”, thus depended on each other for survival.⁶³ Then British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, said to Parliament on 18th June 1940,

“I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization...Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war...if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known or cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age...”⁶⁴

Churchill's speech made plain the mutual strategic dependence between Britain and America in defending the existence of their common civilization. The US also

⁵⁷ Ibid. 693.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 728.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 723.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 728.

⁶¹ Ibid. 781.

⁶² Ibid. 835.

⁶³ Ibid. 781.

⁶⁴ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War Volume II – Their Finest Hour* (London: Cassell & Co Ltd, 1949), 198-199.

understood that, defending Britain against Nazi Germany concerned the very survival of America, and its way of life.⁶⁵

The Anglo-American friendship during the war became exceptionally special. The two states together established a unique common machinery for conducting the war, especially the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.⁶⁶ It was a joint body responsible to the US President as Commander-in-Chief, and to the British Prime Minister as Minister of Defence; in which it served to ensure the unity of command during the war.⁶⁷ Amidst the establishment of this committee, then US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, rejected a proposal for an Inter-Allied Supreme War Council, which would involve other allied powers; for he deemed that “only Britain and the United States could really frame the strategy of the war and execute it.”⁶⁸ So close was their relationship where in McNeill’s words, “After 1942 it would have been almost beyond the power of either nation to disentangle itself from the alliance with the other, even had anyone considered such a step desirable.”⁶⁹

The decades of growing closeness between the US and Britain, which was bolstered by their common struggle against the deadly Axis in the Second World War, nurtured the idea of special associations with the United States among British policy makers. In July 1940, amid facing the greatest threat ever from Nazi Germany, then British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, wrote in an official letter - “the possibility of some sort of special association” between the US and Britain.⁷⁰ Such an idea was later adopted by then British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. In September 1943, he “instructed postwar planners that nothing should prejudice ‘the natural Anglo-American special relationship’”; in February 1944, he told the Foreign Office, “It is my deepest

⁶⁵ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 797,800.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 837-838.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 838.

⁶⁹ William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (New York & London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), 17.

⁷⁰ Halifax to Hankey, 15 July, 1940, FO 371/25206, W8602/8602/49, quoted in David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 94.

conviction that unless Britain and the United States are joined in a special relationship...another destructive war will come to pass.”⁷¹

The term “special relationship” went public when Churchill, while addressing the House of Commons in November 1945, advocated the need to preserve Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States over the atomic bomb.⁷² The persistent contemplation of special ties with America culminated in Churchill to elaborate publicly the notion of Anglo-American Special Relationship in his ‘iron curtain’ speech at the US in 1946.

Since then, “Special Relationship” becomes a notable term in international politics. Policy makers use this term to describe close ties between states. Former US President, Jimmy Carter, claimed “We have a special relationship with Israel.”⁷³ Former German Ambassador to Israel said, “Germany’s relationship to Israel was never as normal as its ties to any other country. Relations were always special.”⁷⁴ Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, said, “The United States remains Canada’s most important ally, closest friend and largest trading partner and I look forward to working with President Obama and his administration as we build on this special relationship.”⁷⁵

The Anglo-American Special Relationship emerged through the ripening of their generations of growing friendship. Yet, such an evolution was triggered, buttressed and sustained by two underlying sources of closeness – that of the coming together of common identities and shared strategic interests in the relations. There was no substantial friendship between Britain and the US, despite their constant common identities-induced sense of closeness towards one another, until the emergence of their common strategic interests in the late nineteenth century; in which, the two states’ perceived mutual strategic dependence had its origin in their common identities. It is

⁷¹ Telegram of 24 September, 1943, quoted in Elisabeth Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War* (London: Macmillan, 1978), 199. Also see Churchill, minute M. 125/4, 16 February, 1944, PREM 4/27/10, quoted in David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 94.

⁷² Winston S. Churchill, “*The Anglo-American Alliance, November 7, 1945, House of Commons*,” in *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963 Volume VII 1943-1949*, ed. Robert Rhodes James (New York and London: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), 7248.

⁷³ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 65.

⁷⁴ Welt am Sonntag, January 6, 1980, quoted in Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 176.

⁷⁵ Stephen Harper, Statement on the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States of America, 20 January 2009. See <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=3&id=2391> (accessed 7th March 2012)

these combined two sources of closeness that establishes intimacy between the US and the UK, and produces cooperation between them. Thus, for a special relationship to exist, the coexistence of common identities and shared strategic interests in the ties of the two states involved, appears to be necessary.

2.1.2 The Two Sources of Closeness in a Special Relationship

Most of the policy makers and scholars, who have discussed the concept of a special relationship, acknowledge the existence of the twin sources of closeness, namely, two states' common identities and shared strategic interests. Common identities of two states are derived from their shared culture, common language, historical ties or shared political values and institutions. Common strategic interests of two states, on the other hand, mean the two states rely on each other's material presence for survival. A state's strategic interest means a material presence which is fundamental to its survival.

Churchill's conception of a special relationship was founded on the "fraternal association" between the US and Britain, coupled with the strategic calculation where such partnership would strengthen "shared security interests and interlinked global economic interests."⁷⁶ Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, argued, Britain should remain an ally of the US, not simply because it is powerful, "but because we share their values."⁷⁷ His assertion explains that, while the special ties with the US are essential for Britain's security, such an association is also a result of their shared values.⁷⁸ Former US President, Bill Clinton, in a speech to both houses of the British Parliament in November 1995 said, "Today the United States and Britain glory in an extraordinary relationship that unites us in a way never before seen in the ties between two such great nations...our relationship with the United Kingdom must be at the heart of our striving in this new era, because of the history we have lived, because of the

⁷⁶ Randolph S Churchill, ed., *The Sinews of Peace, Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*. (London: Cassell, 1948), 98-99. Also see Patrick Porter, "Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special Relationship," *International Affairs* 86, no.2 (2010): 358.

⁷⁷ Samuel Azubuike, "The 'Poodle Theory' and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship,'" *International Studies* 42, no. 2 (2005): 132.

⁷⁸ Former British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin once contented, "Now is the time to build up the strength of the free world, morally, economically and militarily with the United States, and at the same time to exert sufficient control over the policy of the well-intentioned but inexperienced colossus on whose co-operation our safety depends..." See David Reynolds, "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations," *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 97.

power and prosperity we enjoy...”⁷⁹ Clinton’s speech indicates that, the US-UK Special Relationship is vital for both states’ survival, owing to their historical ties, combined with the amount of power that each of them possesses.

Kissinger, in his article “Reflections on a partnership: British and American attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy” later suggested that common values and geopolitical consideration were complementary elements in US-UK relations.⁸⁰ Reynolds argues that Anglo-American relation is a “relationship of culture as well as power”, and that its special quality is derived from the two states’ common interests, shared values and close personal ties “in the face of common threat.”⁸¹ Dumbrell, on the other hand, argues that the combination of inertia, gluing effect of shared culture and the refashioning of interests serve to ensure the sustainability of the US-UK Special Relationship.⁸² The refashioning of interests entails the changing of their common threat from the Nazism in the Second World War, Soviet communism in the Cold War, to the terrorism in the War on Terror; coupled with their continued mutual reliance in achieving respective basic strategic needs.⁸³

The discussions of other so-called special relationships also see a combination of identities and strategic drivers. Former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, while describing the US-Israel relations in 1993 said, “...the relationship between the United States and Israel is a special relationship for special reasons. It is based upon shared interests, shared values, and a shared commitment to democracy, pluralism and respect for the individual.”⁸⁴ A former French government official described France’s special ties with its ex-colonies in Africa as “the partner closest historically, closest geographically and culturally, surest sentimentally, and – last but not least – in the

⁷⁹ *Public Papers of the Presidents – 1995, Vol. 2*, Remarks to the Parliament of the United Kingdom in London, November 29, 1995, quoted in Steve Marsh and John Baylis, “The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no.1 (2006): 184.

⁸⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, “Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign policy,” *International Affairs* 58, no.4 (1982): 587.

⁸¹ David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 104.

Also see David Reynolds, “A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War,” *International Affairs* 62, no.1 (1985-86): 5-6.

⁸² John Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no.3 (2004):448.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 438, 444-445, 449.

⁸⁴ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 64.

medium term, the most useful economically.”⁸⁵ Such a statement highlights the combination of shared identities and common strategic interests as the reasons for the France-Sub-Saharan Africa Special Relationship.

Reich in his article “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship” contends that the US-Israel Special Relationship is founded on “ideological, emotional and moral pillars and on a commitment to democratic principles buttressed by strategic and political factors.”⁸⁶ Both states view each other as a truly reliable strategic asset in preserving the peace and stability in the Middle East.⁸⁷ Haglund and Dickey hold similar understanding of the US-Canada Special Relationship. Both respectively contends that the relationship is rooted in historical ties, geographical proximity and close security and economic ties.⁸⁸ Both observe the demographic intermingling between the two states, and their unparalleled interdependence in homeland security and in economy.⁸⁹ The West Germany and Israel Special Relationship, Feldman attributes to historical intertwining between Germany and the Jewish people, coupled with their mutual strategic dependence.⁹⁰ Israel needed West Germany for economic assistance, and West Germany needed acceptance from Israel to affirm its clean break with old Nazi Germany.⁹¹

While examining the Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Special Relationship, Momsen maintains that the relationship is founded on their common resistance to “British imperialism and American economic hegemony”, shared histories and

⁸⁵ Jacques Ferrandi, “La politique africaine de la France et la Communauté ‘économique européenne’,” in *La France et l’Afrique: quelle politique africaine pour la France?* ed. Jacques Baumel (Paris: La Fondation du Futur, 1985), 52, quoted in Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no.2 (2002): 282.

⁸⁶ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 65.

⁸⁷ Ibid. 66, 69-72.

⁸⁸ David G. Haglund, “The US-Canada relationship- How ‘Special’ is America’s Oldest Unbroken Alliance?” in *America’s ‘Special Relationships’- Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 61-69. Also see John Sloan Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence- The United States Interest in an independent Canada* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 180.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 1-28.

⁹¹ Ibid.

geographical proximity.⁹² Both Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean are “two British Commonwealth members in the western hemisphere”, both have “long-standing trade links, colonial traditions and similar political systems.”⁹³ Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz, in their article “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations” argue that “only identity” explains why the European states like France, Spain and Britain, sustain special relationships with their ex-colonies.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, the authors do acknowledge the existence of strategic considerations in these relationships. For example, France maintains special ties with its former colonies in Africa, so as to “bolster itself strategically against other Great Powers.”⁹⁵ For Britain, the continuation and strengthening of its ties with the Commonwealth has its “great potential future value.”⁹⁶ And from Spain’s perspective, the importance of Spain at the international level rests on its role as a “bridge between the EU and Western hemisphere”, as well as the status of its former colonies in Latin America.⁹⁷

A few scholars who have attempted to conceptualize the notion of a special relationship confirm the existence of the two sources of closeness in such a relationship. According to Feldman, “historical intertwining” and/or “intense history of mutual preoccupation” “constitute an essential background” for a special relationship’s creation.⁹⁸ She claims that “a major catalyst for the creation of a special relationship is the existence, for both partners, of a specific need that both perceive only the other country capable of fulfilling.”⁹⁹ Somewhat differently, Liow maintains that “the concept of ‘special relationships’ describes relations between states whose populations share historical and sentimental bonds, and whose leaders impute meaning into their relations on the back of these bonds. Such relationships warrant an almost immutable belief (on the part of their leaders and populations) that they, at least in theory, are meant to share

⁹² Janet Henshall Momsen, “Canada-Caribbean Relations: Wherein the Special Relationship?” *Political Geography* 11, no.5 (1992): 501.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no.2 (2002): 268.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 278.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 295.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 285, 288.

⁹⁸ Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 262.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 265.

a relationship driven by more than purely material factors.”¹⁰⁰ Feldman and Liow respective observation indicates that, the intertwining of two states’ mutual material needs and shared identities spawns the emergence of a special relationship between them.

2.1.3 The Expressions of a Special Relationship

Literature on special relationships also demonstrates the characters of such relations in terms of their expressions.

The sentimental expressions of closeness are apparent in a special relationship. British policy makers’ response to September 11 terror attacks exhibits their emotional bonds with the US. In April 2002, Former British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister, Denis MacShane, stressed, September 11 “was an attack on us all...It was an attack on our shared values and a test of our integrity.”¹⁰¹ At the same month, then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, asserted, “When America is fighting for those values, then, however tough, we will fight with her. No grandstanding, no offering implausible but impractical advice from the comfort of the touchline, no wishing away the hard choices on terrorism and WMD, or making peace in the Middle East, but working together, side-by-side.”¹⁰² Later when he addressed the US Congress in July 2003, Blair pledged, “our job is to be there with you.”¹⁰³ An additional example of the sentimental expressions in a special relationship is that existing between the United States and Israel. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, while addressing US President, Barack Obama, on the issue of Iranian nuclear threat in March 2012, said, “...we are you, and you are us, we are together...Israel and America stand together.”¹⁰⁴

The sentimental expressions of closeness in a special relationship are stemming from the common identities of the two states involved. As for Anglo-American relations,

¹⁰⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

¹⁰¹ Statement by FCO Minister, Denis MacShane, Westminster Hall, London, April 25, 2002, www.britainusa.com, quoted in Steve Marsh and John Baylis, “The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no.1 (2006): 188.

¹⁰² Former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library, April 7, 2002, www.fco.gov, quoted in Steve Marsh and John Baylis, *The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations*, 188.

¹⁰³ David Coates and Joel Krieger, *Blair’s War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 9.

¹⁰⁴ The US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Press Conference at White House, Washington, US, 5th March, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/03/05/president-obama-s-bilateral-meeting-prime-minister-netanyahu-israel>

Marsh and Baylis observe, the “Churchillian rhetoric of the fraternal association” between the two states is imbued with “a natural, reflexive, and unique emotional underpinning.”¹⁰⁵ Wallace and Phillips argue, the sentimental assertions in the US-UK Special Relationship are derived from their shared values.¹⁰⁶ Reich, on the other hand, maintains, “shared ideals and values sustain a strong psychological bond between American and Israeli peoples.”¹⁰⁷ In a more general sense, Feldman contends, the “historical intertwining and/or intensity” between two states who share a special relationship, results in their mutual “psychological resonance”.¹⁰⁸

The sentimental associations between two states sharing a special relationship, combine with their mutual positive identifications arising from their common strategic interests, give rise to the two states’ mutual understanding that they share a special relationship, which means a relationship that is *closer* than other bilateral relations either of them enjoys. Haglund has argued, ‘special’ denotes a distinctive normative judgement in positive sense.¹⁰⁹ The functioning of a special relationship begins with both states involved sharing such normative understanding, in which it necessarily entails the comparisons with their other bilateral ties, so as for the two states to apprehend the distinctiveness of their relationship. As Danchev maintains, ‘special’ is “a matter of comparison” and “evaluation makes reference to others.”¹¹⁰ Two states’ shared perception of having a special relationship is exemplified by Dobbs’s observation on the US-UK relations in facing the issue of Iraq War in 2003. He writes, “For us to be on the other side of Britain on an issue like Iraq would be very hard for an American president. It is one thing for France and Germany to be on the other side, but if Britain was on the other side, that would create doubts among the American

¹⁰⁵ Steve Marsh and John Baylis, “The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no.1 (2006): 173.

¹⁰⁶ William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship” *International Affairs* 85, no.2 (2009): 263.

¹⁰⁷ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 65.

¹⁰⁸ Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 264-265.

¹⁰⁹ David G. Haglund, “The US-Canada relationship- How ‘Special’ is America’s Oldest Unbroken Alliance?” in *America’s ‘Special Relationships’- Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 61.

¹¹⁰ Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” *International Affairs* 72, no.4 (1996): 744.

people.”¹¹¹ Such a remark demonstrates the understanding of the American people, in which the US-UK relationship is closer than their other bilateral ties, owing to the special associations between the two states.

The shared understanding held by two states with special ties, in turn, stirs up their respective *expectation* that their relationship *should be* closer than their other bilateral ties. As Danchev has argued, the ‘specialness’ in a relationship is “a process of interaction, laced with *expectation*.”¹¹² Also he maintains, “A special relationship is never fully achieved. At any given moment it is not as pliant or as potent – not as special – as one partner would wish.”¹¹³ His observation reflects that, a special relationship is suffused with the dynamics of expectation. Reynolds’s examination of Anglo-American relations in the late 1930s vindicates the expectation dynamics. He discerns, the two states’ relationship was mainly characterized by British “tendency to expect assistance in the long term and in time of war” from the United States.¹¹⁴ The sense of closeness towards the US, prompted British to believe that it could count on America for effective cooperation.¹¹⁵ Churchill had admitted, one of the most powerful forces which sustained him during the early period of World War Two, was his expectation that the United States would come to rescue Britain from the onslaught of Nazi Germany.¹¹⁶

The *expectations* in a special relationship lead to a *higher intensity of interactions* between the two states concerned as compared with that of their other bilateral ties. As Reich observes, “relationships between friends and allies vary in quality and intensity.”¹¹⁷ Since the quality of a bilateral relationship is built upon the intensity of their interactions, therefore, the closeness of a special relationship which distinguishes it from other bilateral relations is, at the first instance, illustrated by its *higher intensity of*

¹¹¹ Michael Dobbs, “Old Alliance, New Relevance,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2003, quoted in Samuel Azubuike, “The “Poodle Theory” and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship,” *International Studies* 42, no. 2 (2005): 136.

¹¹² Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” *International Affairs* 72, no.4 (1996): 748.

¹¹³ Alex Danchev, *On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations* (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), 154.

¹¹⁴ David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 10.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* 12.

¹¹⁶ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 725.

¹¹⁷ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 78.

interactions, instead of deeper quality of interactions. This observation is confirmed by Brysk's, Parsons's and Sandholtz's understanding, in which they monitor the intimacy of the special relationships between the European states and their former colonies in terms of the intensity of their interactions.¹¹⁸ More often than not, preferential treatments are the expression of such a higher *intensity of interactions*. Feldman observes, a special relationship is frequently associated with the pursuit of preferential policies in a bilateral relationship.¹¹⁹ In her survey of characterizations of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, Feldman notes that prominent commentators, Churchill, Kissinger, Bell and Turner, all view the pursuit of preferential policies as the concrete expression of a special relationship.¹²⁰ Preferential treatments are a state's policies interlace with substantial benefits which only offer to a particular other state. For example, Britain enjoys uniquely privileged access to US nuclear technology; no other America's allies could have similar access.¹²¹ France's, Spain's and Britain's respective national foreign aid directed to their ex-colonies greatly exceed the OECD states' average level of aid to these destinations.¹²²

The *intensity of interactions* between two states can be measured in terms of the *extent* and the *degree* of interactions. As Reynolds writes, the closeness of the Anglo-American Special Relationship can be gauged in terms of the degree and the extent of their cooperation against the relationships between the United States and its other close allies.¹²³ In a special relationship, its *higher intensity of interactions* means – the *extent* of interactions between the two states involved is *wider*, and/or the *degree* of their interactions is *deeper*, than in their other bilateral relationships. The *deeper degree* of interactions indicates the existence of preferential treatments in such a relationship. For example, when compared to their other bilateral relationships, the special relationship between the US and the UK has a *wider extent* of interactions, extending from deep

¹¹⁸ Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, "After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no.2 (2002): 296.

¹¹⁹ Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 4.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.* 247-252.

¹²¹ David Reynolds, "A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War," *International Affairs* 62, no.1 (1985-86): 12.

¹²² Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, *After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations*, 277.

¹²³ David Reynolds, *A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War*, 4.

economic cooperation, to close consultative relationship between the two bureaucracies, intimate global division of labour in signals intelligence, close collaboration between the military forces, and unparalleled nuclear technology sharing.¹²⁴ And the relationship has a *deeper degree* of interactions, in which the depth of intimate collaborations between the two states could not be matched by other America's allies.¹²⁵ Likewise, the US-Israel Special Relationship has a *higher intensity of interactions*, when compared to their other bilateral relations in the Middle East, with a *wider extent* of interactions covering the area of defence, economics, science and technology, cultural exchange, and diplomatic support; and a *deeper degree* of interactions evidenced by the US being Israel's "principal arms supplier" to ensure Israel "a qualitative military edge over its neighbors", and by Israel's privileged access to US president and other senior American officials.¹²⁶

2.1.4 Special Relationship – An Intersubjective Understanding

In the literature, there are two schools in explaining the nature of a special relationship – the realist school and the identity school. The realist school argues, the concept of a special relationship is a tool used by either of the two states involved to pursue their respective strategic needs, in which their common identities, encapsulate in the term of a special relationship, have been the facilitator for achieving such aims. Reynolds and Baylis are among the scholars in this school.

Reynolds maintains, the notion of an Anglo-American Special Relationship has been "a deliberate British creation – a 'tradition' invented as a tool of diplomacy."¹²⁷ In realists' view, Britain manipulates its common culture and close historical ties with the United States in the name of 'special relationship', to try harness America's massive

¹²⁴ David Reynolds, "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations," *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 98, 110. Also see Jerome B. Elie, "Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand The Continuity of The Special Relationship," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no.1 (2005):66. Also see "In 2004, Britain was the largest foreign investor in the US and vice versa," John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship- Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 220.

¹²⁵ Samuel Azubuike, "The 'Poodle Theory' and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship,'" *International Studies* 42, no. 2 (2005): 129.

¹²⁶ Bernard Reich, "Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship," *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 65-66. Also see Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, "How Special is the US-Israel Relationship?" *Middle East Quarterly*, June (1997): par.7, <http://www.meforum.org/349/how-special-is-the-us-israel-relationship>.

¹²⁷ David Reynolds, "A 'special relationship'? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War," *International Affairs* 62, no.1 (1985-86): 2.

power, so as to serve British interests, in particular, to manage its decline in power.¹²⁸ Similarly, in an article written by Baylis and Marsh, both maintain that the US-UK Special Relationship is the product of Britain's purposive cultivation by consistently reclaiming their shared roots, especially the common experience of World War Two.¹²⁹ Such cultivation, they contend, is due to Britain's determination to remain as a global actor, and its realization of America's power, which combined culminates in its belief that, to best promote British interests, it is to closely align with the US.¹³⁰

Dickie, on the other hand, argues that, while sentiment has been employed in moulding the relations, the US-UK Special Relationship is essentially founded on the two states' common strategic interest, namely, their mutual reliance in facing the Communist threat.¹³¹ In his view, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fundamental reason for Anglo-American intimate friendship thus vanishes, and the relationship, as a consequence, becomes "'Special' no more".¹³² As Dickie writes, "[w]hen there was no longer a Communist threat requiring Britain to be the alliance standard-bearer in Europe for the Americans, the principal *raison d'être* of that relationship had gone."¹³³ Similarly, Elie maintains, amid the manipulation of their natural affinity, strategic interests have been the root for Anglo-American Special Relationship, in which he describes the relations as "a valuable tool of foreign policy for both partners."¹³⁴ Both states need each other in international politics. From facing the common threats of then Nazi Germany, Communist Russia and now international terrorism, to serving their respective basic political needs.¹³⁵ In his view, Britain maintains its special ties with the US premises on its real aim of preserving the UK's

¹²⁸ Ibid. Also see David Reynolds, "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations," *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 95-96, 98, 111. Also see John Baylis, "The 'Special Relationship'- A Diverting British Myth?," in *Haunted by History – Myths in International Relations*, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998), 119-120, 134.

¹²⁹ Steve Marsh and John Baylis, "The Anglo-American 'Special Relationship': The Lazarus of International Relations" *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no.1 (2006): 174, 201.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 174, 200-201.

¹³¹ John Dickie, *'Special' No More – Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), x, xiv, 257.

¹³² Ibid. 276.

¹³³ Ibid. xiv.

¹³⁴ Jerome B. Elie, "Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand The Continuity of The Special Relationship," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no.1 (2005):77.

¹³⁵ Ibid. 65, 72, 77.

status as a prominent power on international stage.¹³⁶ The United States, on the other hand, values the strategic importance of the assets possessed by Britain.¹³⁷ Being a UN Security Council permanent member, an important player in NATO, the staunchest ally of the US, and its geostrategic location in Europe, Britain's support has been crucial for US's policies on the world stage, as a source of legitimacy, in particular, as the guardian of America's interests in the European integration process.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, the US cherishes British friendship, owing to its "military, intelligence and diplomatic capabilities and expertise".¹³⁹

The identity school disagrees with realists' argument. In their view, common identities are central in a special relationship; instead of merely facilitating the two states involved towards achieving their real aim – that of the fulfillment of respective strategic needs, as realists argue.

Dawson and Rosecrance describe the Anglo-American Alliance: "[h]istory, tradition, affinity have been crucial to the alliance, rather than peripheral."¹⁴⁰ They argue, "[t]he relationship is special in one notable sense: the theory of alliances does not explain it..."¹⁴¹ In their view, although it seems apparent that common interests are the basis for Britain and America to maintain their special bonds, yet such an assumption does not address the fundamental question – why the two states believe the connection is 'logical' and 'necessary' as "it is to learn that they deemed it so."¹⁴²

For identity school, a special relationship is the natural consequence of cultural affinities, historical ties as well as common political traditions shared by the two states involved. Churchill had put it, "the natural Anglo-American Special Relationship", "the fraternal association of the English Speaking People."¹⁴³ Such natural harmony,

¹³⁶ Ibid. 66, 77.

¹³⁷ Ibid. 71-73, 77.

¹³⁸ Ibid. 72, 76-77.

¹³⁹ Ibid. 71, 77.

¹⁴⁰ Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, "Theory and Reality in The Anglo-American Alliance," *World Politics* 19, no.1 (1966): 51.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid. 47-48.

¹⁴³ Telegram of 24 September, 1943, quoted in Elisabeth Barker, *Churchill and Eden at War* (London: Mcmillan, 1978), 199. Also see Randolph S Churchill, ed., *The Sinews of Peace, Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*. (London: Cassell, 1948), 98-99.

according to identity school, set the US-UK relations “apart from ‘normal’ relations between states in the international system.”¹⁴⁴

Similarly, Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz maintain, it is the shared historical bonds that lead France, Spain and Britain to maintain special ties with their respective ex-colonies.¹⁴⁵ Material calculation does not explain such motivations.¹⁴⁶ They observe, the common historical ties between these former imperial powers and their ex-colonies result in third party states to acknowledge the special associations among them.¹⁴⁷

Both realist and identity schools respectively does not adequately explain the essence of a special relationship. The realist’s argument of such a relationship being a strategic tool for the two states involved, necessitates the understanding of why states perceive certain material interest as strategic/fundamental to them. If states view material interest in pure material terms, then the realist school exhibits its limitation in explaining why the Anglo-American Special Relationship continue to survive in the post-Cold War era, since the fundamental rationale of their partnership, as some realists have argued – the Soviet threat – no longer exists.¹⁴⁸ Also realist school could not convincingly explain why time and again, the promising US’s partnership with other states ultimately could not prevail over its special ties with the UK, even though these alternative partnerships seemed to assure greater material benefits for America. For example, the prospect of friendship between the two superpowers – America and Russia, in the 1940s, did not eventually occur; although for the US, its friendship with Russia appeared to be materially more valuable than its partnership with Britain, owing to their vast power that constituted the foundation of world affairs.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the emergence of a united

¹⁴⁴ John Baylis, *Anglo-American Relations since 1939 – The Enduring Alliance* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 9.

¹⁴⁵ Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no.2 (2002): 268, 270-271.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. 271.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 270-271.

¹⁴⁸ John Dickie, *‘Special’ No More – Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), xiv. Also see John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship- Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 5-6, 14. Also see John Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no.3 (2004), 437-438.

¹⁴⁹ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 875-879. Also see David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 106. Also see Jerome B. Elie, “Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand The Continuity of The Special Relationship,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no.1 (2005):74.

Germany as a powerful European state at the end of the Cold War, attracted the US to view Germany as its main European partner, which was portrayed as “partnership in leadership”.¹⁵⁰ Yet, such a possible better alternative to Britain friendship again did not come into existence.¹⁵¹

As such, the material existence itself does not explain whether it is a state’s strategic interests. The realist school’s assertion – states utilize a special relationship to pursue their strategic interests – is credible; yet its inability to explain why those material interests are “strategic” for them, reveals the theory’s problematic interpretation of a special relationship. Constructivist theory seems able to fill in this gap.

Two fundamental principles underpin constructivism. First, people react to the reality based on the meanings that the reality has for them; which means humans apprehend the world through the lenses of their intersubjective understandings.¹⁵² Actors’ intersubjective understandings denote a stable set of identities and interests which are founded on their conceptions of self.¹⁵³ Such understandings are fundamentally the cognitive collective knowledge of actors, namely, “a function of what actors collectively ‘know’”; yet they are experienced as having an independent and real existence, hence confront individuals as social fact.¹⁵⁴ Second, intersubjective understandings, namely, the normative structure, emerge out of mutually constitutive interactions among actors and their intersubjective understandings.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship- Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 123-124. Also see William Wallace, “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy,” *International Affairs* 82, no.1 (2005): 54. Also see Jerome B. Elie, “Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand The Continuity of The Special Relationship,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no.1 (2005):74. Also see John Dumbrell, “The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no.3 (2004), 439.

¹⁵¹ Jerome B. Elie, *Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand The Continuity of The Special Relationship*, 74.

¹⁵² Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 396-397. Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no.2 (1998): 326.

¹⁵³ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 397-399.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 399. Also see Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (1997): 327.

¹⁵⁵ Wendt notes that constructivists “share a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction.” See Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 394, 399, 403. Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, *The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory*, 326. Also see Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 267. Also see Emanuel Adler, *Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism*

Constructivist insights therefore point out that, actors apprehend the material presence based on the meanings furnished by their intersubjective understandings. As such, it is a state's intersubjective understandings that inform them why certain material interests are "strategic"; in which the knowledge of strategic interests is originated from a state's identities, as intersubjective understandings are founded on actors' conceptions of self. The US's understanding of strategic interest confirms the observation.

America defines its strategic interests based on the core ideas of its nationhood – that of the principles of liberty.¹⁵⁶ Central to American idea of liberty is "anticollectivism – the independent individual can be a republican".¹⁵⁷ The liberty notion is "connected with the very concept of modernity", in which the US believes that, the only way of becoming modern is the American way – "to 'liberate' productivity and innovation from 'ancient' cultures and ideologies".¹⁵⁸ For America, defending its own liberty means safeguarding its survival.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, any material existence which could support its freedom is of strategic importance to the US; any which undermines it presents as a strategic threat to the US.

America protects the capitalist world system, as it is an extension of the principles of liberty, and for fear that the international market might be taken over by other ideologies which ultimately threaten the American liberty.¹⁶⁰ The United States fought in the two world wars, and confronted the Soviet Union in the Cold War, all with one aim – to defeat the alternative forms of modernity, promised by German imperialism, Nazism, Japanese militarism and Soviet Communism, which America interpreted as threatening its very survival, namely, its way of life, if left unchecked.¹⁶¹

America's example shows that a state's identities, in the form of intersubjective understandings, inform its appreciation of whether a material presence has strategic value for them. As identity gives birth to one's strategic apprehensions, therefore,

in *World Politics*, 330. Also see Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 350. Also see Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, "After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no.2 (2002): 269.

¹⁵⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10, 17.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 11.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 11, 12.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. 8,11,16,20-21.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. 12, 15.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. 17-19, 20-21, 25.

common identities shared by two states produce their similar understanding of strategic interests. British felt betrayed by the United States when it waged a war against the United Kingdom in 1812, as Britain, at that time, was amid fighting another war against France, which in British view, they were fighting the similar cause of America – to defend “the liberty of mankind against the very real menace of Napoleonic tyranny”.¹⁶² In the 1940s, Americans discerned more similarities between British and US values than their differences in a world with a powerful presence of “totalitarianism”.¹⁶³ “Both were liberal, capitalist democracies, sharing common beliefs in the rule of law and the principle of peaceful change.”¹⁶⁴ Likewise, the shared values of US and Israeli breed their similar strategic vision of a Middle East with political order that coincides with the interests of Western democracy.¹⁶⁵ Shared historical and cultural bonds between the European states and their respective former colonies also bring about their analogous strategic thinking. Former French Minister of Cooperation, Jacques Godfrain said, “At the United Nations, thanks to Africa, we carry more weight than our population, our land area or our GDP...Our small country, with its small strengths, can move the planet because we have relations of amity and intimacy with fifteen or twenty African countries.”¹⁶⁶ Such a remark reflects that both France and its ex-colonies in Africa similarly view the support from the counterpart as important in international politics. Likewise, for Spain and its former colonies in Latin America, the alike strategic mindset is shown by both parties’ assumption of Spain’s position as a bridge between Europe and the Western hemisphere, and where cooperation between them is vital to balance against US dominance.¹⁶⁷

The realist scholar, Baylis, has indeed acknowledged the ability of common identities in generating similar strategic outlook of the states involved. For Anglo-American relations, he writes, “...there is little doubt that ideological affinity has been an asset of

¹⁶² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 301

¹⁶³ David Reynolds, “A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War,” *International Affairs* 62, no.1 (1985-86): 5.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 66, 72, 80-81. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) , 127-128, 197.

¹⁶⁶ Jacques Godfrain, *L’Afrique, notre avenir* (Paris: Lafon, 1998), 15, quoted in Alison Brysk, Craig Parsons and Wayne Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of Nations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no.2 (2002): 283.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. 286-288.

some importance which has contributed to the common perception of security problems...”¹⁶⁸ As such, common identities is not the facilitator in a special relationship, as realists have argued; instead, they are crucial in such a relationship. Common identities result in two states bound by a special relationship sharing similar strategic understandings.

However, similar appreciation of strategic interests does not necessarily mean the two states involved share “common” strategic interests. Although the shared identities of Britain and the US give rise to their alike strategic apprehensions, yet both states did not view each other sharing common strategic interests up until the late nineteenth century, which subsequently led to the emergence of their special relationship.¹⁶⁹ Likewise, despite sharing a similar vision of political order in the Middle East, which is informed by their shared identities, the US did not immediately see the strategic value of Israel right after its independence in 1948, until Israel had decisively defeated its Arab foes in the 1967 Six Day War.¹⁷⁰ Thereafter, the US forges special ties with Israel.¹⁷¹ These historical evidences indicate that, apart from sharing similar strategic understandings which stem from their common identities, certain element needs to be in place for the two states involved to share common strategic interests, and consequently, spawn a special relationship between them. Therefore, contradictory to the identity school’s argument, common identities are crucial in a special relationship, but not certainly central.

Two states sharing common identities each needs to own a certain amount of power, namely, the material capacity, in order to shape their similar strategic outlook into their “common” strategic interests. As discussed in earlier section, America saw its mutual strategic dependence with Great Britain only after the US had emerged as a major

¹⁶⁸ John Baylis, “The Anglo-American Relationship and Alliance Theory,” *International Relations* 8, no.4 (1985): 378.

¹⁶⁹ For more discussion see pg 12-24. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 301.

¹⁷⁰ Bernard Reich, “Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship,” *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 66, 68-69. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 127-128. Also see Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, “How Special is the US-Israel Relationship?” *Middle East Quarterly*, June (1997): par.6-7, <http://www.meforum.org/349/how-special-is-the-us-israel-relationship>.

¹⁷¹ Bernard Reich, *Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship*, 66, 68-72. Also see Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, “How Special is the US-Israel Relationship?” *Middle East Quarterly*, June (1997): par.6-7, <http://www.meforum.org/349/how-special-is-the-us-israel-relationship>.

power in the late nineteenth century.¹⁷² Both states, because of the necessary amount of material capacity that each possesses, need each other to preserve their similar vision of order in international politics.¹⁷³ The US-Israel relations present the same evidence. Before 1967, the United States' policy in the Middle East was dominated by its strategy of rallying the support of the Arab states to confront the Soviet Union, and to secure its access to Middle East oil.¹⁷⁴ Israel, as a consequence, had been generally excluded, and that the US had restrained from entangling in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to prevent provoking the Arabs' anger.¹⁷⁵ The growing of Israel's material capacity prompted the fundamental change in the US's Middle East policy.¹⁷⁶ Through its astounding victory in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel had demonstrated to the US that it is capable of imposing its strength in the Middle East, thus able to fashion an order in the region which is parallel with the US's strategic interests.¹⁷⁷ The strategic value of Israel was particularly salient in the late 1960s, a time when America, due to its defeat in Vietnam, was in need for partners which could check the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East.¹⁷⁸ Henceforth, the US needs the support from Israel – a powerful state in the Middle East – to maintain a strategic landscape in the region which both similarly prefer, and Israel deepens its need for America's power to ensure its survival.¹⁷⁹

The necessity for two states with similar understanding of strategic interests, which stem from their common identities, to own a certain amount of material capacity, so as to produce their common strategic interests, and consequently, enable the creation of a

¹⁷² For more discussion see pg 12-24.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Bernard Reich, "Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship," *Israel Affairs* 1, no.1 (1994): 68. Also see Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, "How Special is the US-Israel Relationship?" *Middle East Quarterly*, June (1997): par.6, <http://www.meforum.org/349/how-special-is-the-us-israel-relationship>. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 128.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 128, 194-197. Bernard Reich, *Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship*, 66, 68-70.

¹⁷⁸ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 194-197.

¹⁷⁹ Bernard Reich, *Reassessing the United States-Israel Special Relationship*, 66, 68-72, 80-81. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 128, 194-197. Also see Mitchell G. Bard and Daniel Pipes, "How Special is the US-Israel Relationship?" *Middle East Quarterly*, June (1997): par.7, <http://www.meforum.org/349/how-special-is-the-us-israel-relationship>.

special relationship between them, indicates that power plays a crucial role in such a relationship. Once again, constructivist theory seems able to explain the role of power in a special relationship.

As Adler has explained, “[c]onstructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world”.¹⁸⁰ Actors’ intersubjective understandings inform their appreciation of the material existence, in turn, the material world shapes and is shaped by their conceptions of self. As such, founded on their similar understanding of strategic interests, which is perceived through their intersubjective understandings, when power owned by the respective two states involved have reached to a certain level, they produce the two states’ mutual strategic needs, and therefore, generate positive identifications between them.

Viewed in this light, a special relationship is not a tool with common identities of the two states involved being the facilitator of this relationship. It is also not the natural consequence of the two states’ common identities. A special relationship between two states is produced, when their common identities-induced mutual sense of closeness, combined with their reciprocal positive identifications generated by them sharing common strategic interests, lead to their understanding that both states share a closer relation than their other bilateral relationships.¹⁸¹ In which, the two states’ common strategic interests are founded on their similar strategic apprehensions rooted in common identities, and created by their necessary amount of power. That said, a special relationship is an intersubjective understanding.

2.1.5 The Problematic Understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship

Scholars in the field of Indonesia-Malaysia relations as well as the two states’ policy makers acknowledge that Indonesia and Malaysia share a special relationship.

Liow in his study “The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations - One Kin, Two Nations” notes that “...both [Indonesia and Malaysia] sides agree that they share a ‘special relationship’...”¹⁸² Yaakub’s study “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign

¹⁸⁰ Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (1997): 322.

¹⁸¹ For more discussion see pg 12-24, 29-30.

¹⁸² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations - One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 7.

Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" argues that clearly "Malaysia and Indonesia have a 'special relationship'".¹⁸³ Clark, meanwhile, maintains that "Relations between Indonesia and Malaysia are generally characterized by diplomatic pleasantries, with reference often made to 'shared values', 'special relationship' and 'common cultural traditions'...".¹⁸⁴

A report produced by the Malayan government in 1963 titled "Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963" clearly acknowledges the special qualities of the ties between Indonesia and Malaya. The report states that "There has always been a strong desire on the part of the Malayan people for very close and friendly relations with the people of Indonesia..."¹⁸⁵ The report, meanwhile, reveals that forging the "closest links with Indonesia" was a basic principle in Malaya's foreign policy after its independence.¹⁸⁶ The Malayan government's desire to establish very close ties with Indonesia reflects its perception of sharing a special relationship with Indonesia.

Two important studies of Indonesia's foreign policy also recognize the presence of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. Leifer in his study "Indonesia's Foreign Policy" noticed that since the end of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, there was "a progressive convergence of outlook" between the two states "on the question of regional order expressed in an evident special relationship within the wider framework of ASEAN"¹⁸⁷ Anwar's study "Indonesia in ASEAN - Foreign Policy and Regionalism", on the other hand, observes that Indonesia's commitment in the 1980s to assist Malaysia militarily "underlined the special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia".¹⁸⁸

The Indonesian and Malaysian policy makers often mention about the special ties between the two states. The first Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, once wrote: "...our [Malaya] only hope for security was to live in close association with

¹⁸³ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 88.

¹⁸⁴ Marshall Clark, "The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 396.

¹⁸⁵ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 1.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 144-145.

¹⁸⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 145-146.

Indonesia in particular, and other countries in Southeast Asia in general."¹⁸⁹ The Tunku realized that Malaya relied on its special ties with Indonesia in the realm of security. When Malaysia offered 20,000 tons of rice to Indonesia to help mitigate the rice shortage in Indonesia in the early 1970s, Suharto – the President of Indonesia – declared that "this was how brothers should act".¹⁹⁰ In the eyes of Suharto, Indonesia and Malaysia were brothers, which indicated that the two states were bound by their special ties – a relationship that was closer than their other bilateral ties.

Some discussions of Indonesia-Malaysia relations discern the existence of the two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – in this special relation.

The 1963 Malayan government's report argues that Malaya wanted to forge very close ties with Indonesia not only because the two states were bound by their "sentimental and blood ties", but also because Indonesia was Malaya's "nearest neighbour" "with which close cultural and economic relations existed".¹⁹¹ Similarly, Baroto in his study "Similarities and Differences in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations: Some Perspectives" identifies "a common history, Malay ethnicity, Islam and geographical proximity as the roots" of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship.¹⁹² Also, Khalid's and Yacob's study "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-state Actors" maintains that the special ties between Indonesia and Malaysia are defined by "racial and religious affinity (Islam), linguistic commonality, geographical proximity in the Malay Archipelago, and a common history".¹⁹³ Baroto's, Khalid's and Yacob's studies and the 1963 report each has indicated that apart from sharing common identities, Indonesia and Malaysia are strategically dependent on each other owing to their geographical proximity.

¹⁸⁹ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 113.

¹⁹⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations - One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 118.

¹⁹¹ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 1.

¹⁹² A. Baroto, "Similarities and Differences in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations: Some Perspectives," *Indonesian Quarterly* 21, no.2 (1993): 151-170, quoted in Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 16-17.

¹⁹³ Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 358.

The studies of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship are mostly in the identity school. As discussed in the previous section, identity school argues that a special relationship is the natural consequence of the two states concerned sharing common identities. Liow argues that kinship between Indonesia and Malaysia gives rise to the special relationship between them.¹⁹⁴ He defines kinship as affinities between people based on their biological ties and commonalities in language, religion, custom and history.¹⁹⁵ Similar to Liow, Khalid and Yacob claim that Indonesia's and Malaysia's kinship results in the emergence of their special relationship.¹⁹⁶ Yaakub, on the other hand, maintains that the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship is defined by the *serumpun* concept, in which *serumpun* means the two states are originated from the same family, group, stock or race.¹⁹⁷ Likewise, Clark's and Pietsch's study "Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration" deems that the special tie between Indonesia and Malaysia is the outcome of the two states' common origins and culture.¹⁹⁸

The attempts to explain the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship through the lens of the identity school show that there has been a significant scholarly development in the understanding of this special relation. Nonetheless, the literature is inherently problematic. It is unable to explain why Indonesia and Malaysia had plunged into armed conflict between them from 1963 to 1966 despite the supposedly existence of a special relationship between the two states.¹⁹⁹

Liow's study of Indonesia-Malaysia relations argues that the two states with their special ties were heading towards confrontation between them during the 1960s.²⁰⁰ Indonesia launched its policy of confrontation against Malaysia in January 1963 to prevent the formation of Malaysia, which was a new Federation that would merge the British colonies – Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah) and Brunei – with

¹⁹⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations - One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 3, 25-26.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 16-17.

¹⁹⁶ Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 358.

¹⁹⁷ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 88, 104.

¹⁹⁸ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 8, 20.

¹⁹⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations - One Kin, Two Nations*, 97-104.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 79-106, 166.

Malaya.²⁰¹ The confrontation campaign involved a series of Indonesian armed incursions into Sabah, Sarawak and peninsula Malaysia.²⁰² These incursions had been effectively defeated by the British and Malaysian armed forces.²⁰³ Indonesia ended its confrontation campaign against Malaysia when the two states reached a peace accord in August 1966.²⁰⁴ Liow described the post-confrontation reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia as the re-building of their special relationship, indicating that special ties of the two states had been in place well before armed conflict broke out between them.²⁰⁵

In a similar vein, Yaakub maintains that the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship has been a foundation of this bilateral relation “since both countries gained independence”.²⁰⁶ Just like Liow, Yaakub is of the view that a special relationship existed between Indonesia and Malaysia even though the two states had not been able to avoid armed conflict between them in the 1960s. Clark and Pietsch too deem that Indonesia and Malaysia shared a special relationship right after their independence, which implies that the two states’ special ties did not prevent Indonesia from executing its policy of confrontation against Malaysia.²⁰⁷

Liow’s, Yaakub’s, Clark’s and Pietsch’s common understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship reflects that the appreciation of the nature of a special relationship in the literature of Indonesia-Malaysia relations has been inadequate. These scholars’ respective study of Indonesia-Malaysia relations is one of the most comprehensive in the literature. Their studies are being plagued by a fundamental puzzle: why Indonesia and Malaysia had resorted to force in sorting out their dispute despite the supposedly existence of their special relationship?

In fact, states sharing a special relationship will not easily tumble into armed conflicts between them. The US-UK, US-Canada and US-Israel special relationships, for

²⁰¹ Ibid. 97-106.

²⁰² Ibid. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 82, 93, 100. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 54-57.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations - One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 102-103.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. 107-118.

²⁰⁶ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 88.

²⁰⁷ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 8, 20.

example, do not lead to war between the respective two parties since the establishment of these special ties.²⁰⁸ The problematic understanding of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship in the literature, therefore, indicates that this special relationship requires a re-examination.

2.2 The Concept of a Security Community and Its Links with a Special Relationship

Based on the existing literature, this section first defines a security community. It subsequently outlines the reasons why this research focuses on examining bilateral pluralistic security communities. It then shows that only constructivist theory can explain the dynamics of a security community. It explains that a security community is essentially an intersubjective understanding shared by the political units involved. Nevertheless, it points out that a pluralistic security community is basically different from a special relationship, despite the fact that both the concepts represent intersubjective understandings which entail positive identifications between the states concerned.

This section subsequently shows that, apart from states' interactions, power of the states concerned, and their common identities, has been identified by the existing literature as crucial in breeding the emergence of a pluralistic security community. Scholars notice, a strong state's power has the magnetic pull effects, in which pluralistic security communities develop around powerful states. On the other hand, states' common identities have to be peaceful in nature, in order to spawn such a community. This section then observes that, because a special relationship and a pluralistic security community both respectively represents a relationship of common identities as well as power between two states, both the concepts are thus interlinked. It confirms that, under certain circumstances, a special relationship leads to a pluralistic security community.

Based on the proven causal link, this section then indicates that the understanding of power in a pluralistic security community requires further clarification, without which the apprehension of a special relationship's transformation into a security community, is

²⁰⁸ For more discussion see pg 12-41, 57-59. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 54. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 348.

bound to be problematic. It reveals that the existing literature does not explain why a strong state's power can generate the magnetic pull effects. In other words, why its power can become attractive for others. Based on the existing defective or general observations made by scholars, coupled with the observation on power in a special relationship made in earlier section, it appears that founded on common identities of the states concerned, power owned by the strong one among these states, become attractive for its weaker counterparts.

Finally, this section points out, the existing literature does not explain how powerful a strong state should be, so as to give rise to a bilateral pluralistic security community. Among the bilateral ties that have been identified as a pluralistic security community, only the US-UK and US-Canada relations are special relationships, and only the two bilateral pluralistic security communities operate in the context of apparent power imbalance between the respective two parties. As such, for a special relationship to evolve into a security community, the presence of marked unequal power between the two states involved seems to be necessary.

2.2.1 Defining a Security Community

The concept of a security community appears to be well-thought through and well-theorized. The term "Security Community" was first coined by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, and later being developed into a conceptual framework in 1957 by Deutsch and associates in their pioneering study of such communities.²⁰⁹ Founded on constructivist theory and four decades of empirical studies of security communities, this conceptual framework had been refined by Adler and Barnett in the late 1990s.²¹⁰

A security community, according to Deutsch, "is a group of people which has become *integrated*".²¹¹ By integration he means "the attainment, within a territory, of a *sense of community* and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread

²⁰⁹ Donald J. Puchala, *International Politics Today* (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1971), 165. Also see Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

²¹⁰ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in theoretical perspective," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3-28. Also see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 29-65. Also see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 413-441.

²¹¹ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 5.

enough to assure, for a *long* time, dependable expectations of *peaceful change* among its population”.²¹² In this sense, a group of people is integrated whenever they are bound by a shared sense of community which induces dependable expectations of peaceful change among them.²¹³ Dependable expectations of peaceful change means the ability of the actors concerned to know that neither of them would prepare or even consider to use violence as a means to resolve their disputes.²¹⁴

Deutsch explains that sense of community is “a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of *we-feeling*, trust, and consideration; of at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of ability to predict each other’s behaviour and ability to act in accordance with that prediction.”²¹⁵ Sense of community, therefore, denotes an understanding of collective-self. Each of the actors involved view the other as part of self. They can understand each other just as they understand themselves.²¹⁶ As a consequence, sense of community, when reaches to a certain degree, generates dependable expectations of peaceful change among the actors involved. Because they understand each other in collective terms, actors involved identify each other’s needs, goals and fate as those of their very own; hence, they view violent conflict between them as unthinkable, for waging a war against each other means threatening their own identity.²¹⁷

The integration of a group of people, Deutsch explains, can be categorized into two different types. A security community is *amalgamated* when two or more previously independent political communities formally merge into a single political entity and achieve integration among them.²¹⁸ The United States is an example of amalgamated

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid. 32, 84.

²¹⁴ Ibid. 5, 56-57. Also see Emaduel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for The Study of Security Communities,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 34.

²¹⁵ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 129.

²¹⁶ Ibid. 57.

²¹⁷ Emaduel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for The Study of Security Communities,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 47. Also see Emaduel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 434. Also see Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” *Journal of International Studies* 26, no.2 (1997): 264.

²¹⁸ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 6.

security communities.²¹⁹ On the other hand, it is *pluralistic*, when two or more states constitute a security community while retaining their respective independence and sovereignty.²²⁰ The relationship between the US and Canada is an example of pluralistic security communities.²²¹

This study is concerned with pluralistic security communities which are formed by two sovereign states. According to Adler and Barnett, a pluralistic security community is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”²²² As such, the key distinguishing feature of a pluralistic security community is not the absence of conflict in the community per se, but rather its members’ ability to manage disputes within the group without resort to violence or contemplate to use any such means.²²³

There are two reasons that necessitate this research to focus on bilateral pluralistic security communities. First, the earliest emergences of pluralistic security communities are those of bilateral, which include the security community between: US-Canada since the 1870s; US-UK since the 1890s; Denmark-Sweden and Denmark-Norway since the 1900s; Norway-Sweden since 1907; Britain-Norway, Britain-Denmark, and Britain-Sweden since the 1910s; Britain-Belgium and Belgium-Netherlands since 1928; Britain-Netherlands; France-Belgium.²²⁴ These historical evidences show that pluralistic security communities are originated from the bilateral relations of two sovereign states.

Second, bilateral pluralistic security communities form the basis of a multilateral one. For example, although the transatlantic states constitute a multilateral pluralistic security community, it is in fact preceded by a cluster of bilateral one, which include the

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid. 6. Also see Emdaduel Adler and Michael Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 16.

²²¹ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 6.

²²² Emdaduel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for The Study of Security Communities,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 30.

²²³ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 16.

²²⁴ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 29-30, 65-66.

above mentioned bilateral pluralistic security communities.²²⁵ Meanwhile, Deutsch's definition of a security community, which requires at least two political units to constitute such a community, reflects that bilateral relations of two political entities serve as the fundamental fabric of any security community.²²⁶ As a pluralistic security community, either bilateral or multilateral, is essentially spawned by the bilateral ties of two states, therefore, the examination of the concept of pluralistic security communities should necessarily begin with those of bilateral, particularly with regard to the emergence of such a community.

2.2.2 Security Community – An Intersubjective Understanding

The central tenet of a security community is that the political units involved share a sense of community – that of an understanding of self in collective terms. Actors involved view each other as part of self. That said, the conception of self entails the dynamics of identification with one another. Such a phenomenon demonstrates the limitation of realism and liberalism in explaining the concept of a security community.

Both the theories are founded on a fundamental principle, that is – an actor's conception of self is constant and exogenously given.²²⁷ Through the lenses of realism and liberalism, actors invariably view self in egoistic terms, consequently, they merely change their behavior, but not identities and interests.²²⁸ Therefore, both the theories explain only the behavior of actors; exclude the possibility where appreciations of self are endogenous to interactions, that allow actors to identify with each other, and may result in certain actors sharing a collective-self understanding.

²²⁵ Ibid. 10, 29-30, 65-66, 118. Also see Ole Waever, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 69-70, 79, 81, 104. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 119-120. Also see Vincent Pouliot, "Security Community In and Through Practice: The Power Politics of Russia-NATO Diplomacy" (PhD diss. University of Toronto, 2008), 46-47.

²²⁶ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 6, 122.

²²⁷ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 391. Also see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 384.

²²⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 391-392. Also see Alexander Wendt, *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, 384. Also see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 11.

The constructivist theory, on the other hand, explains the phenomenon where actors' conceptions of self are endogenous to interactions. As outlined in earlier section, constructivism observes that actors perceive the world through the lenses of their intersubjective understandings, in which such understandings are founded on their appreciations of self, and are emerged from the mutually constitutive interactions among actors and their intersubjective understandings.²²⁹ As such, constructivism essentially recognizes that actors' conceptions of self are socially constructed, hence are subjected to the dynamics of identification among actors; consequently allow for the possibility of the emergence of an understanding of collective-self shared by the actors involved.

Collective-self, an understanding which produces a security community, indicates that such a community is, in essence, an intersubjective understanding shared by the political units involved. As explained in earlier section, actors' intersubjective understandings denote a stable set of identities and interests which are founded on their conceptions of self.²³⁰ However, a pluralistic security community should be distinguished from a special relationship, which is also an intersubjective understanding shared by two states.²³¹ Despite the fact that both the concepts represent intersubjective understandings which entail positive identifications between the states concerned, they are basically different from one another.

A special relationship denotes two states sharing an understanding that their relationship is *closer* than their other bilateral ties.²³² A closer relation, however, does not necessarily mean both the states concerned share a collective-self understanding. While two states perceive a close relation among themselves, they could, at the same time, entrench in a situation where they apprehend each other in egoistic terms. For instance, in the 1910s, although the US and Britain had begun to share a relationship with special characters, they, during this period, continued to hold egoistic understanding of one another, thus pursued competitive politics between them.²³³ In the late 1910s, the two states were engaged in rivalry for naval supremacy, and were

²²⁹ For more discussion see pg 36-37

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ For more discussion see pg 32-41.

²³² For more discussion see pg 41.

²³³ For more discussion see pg 19-21.

suspicious of each other's maritime power.²³⁴ The US was apprehensive of British supreme naval power, which they perceived could anytime threaten their national interests.²³⁵ The UK was anxious with America's naval expansion, as this would challenge Britain's maritime superiority which had guaranteed its greatness for three centuries.²³⁶

Viewed in this light, a special relationship should not be assumed as tantamount to the two states concerned sharing a collective-self understanding, namely, a security community; nevertheless, the two states at least intersubjectively recognize that their relation is closer, when compared to other bilateral ties either state enjoys.

2.2.3 The Two Elements that Breed a Pluralistic Security Community

A pluralistic security community, as a socially constructed phenomenon, emerges out of the interactions among states. Yet, interaction itself is not adequate to explain how certain states would share a collective-self understanding. In the literature of security communities, apart from states' interactions, two elements have been pointed out as crucial in spawning the emergence of a pluralistic security community – that of the material capacity, namely, power, of the states involved; and their common identities.

Deutsch has pointed out, the material capabilities and the compatibility of major values of the states involved, play vital roles in forging a pluralistic security community between them.²³⁷ He defines major values as values which are important within each of

²³⁴ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 704-705, 733.

²³⁵ Ibid. 701,704-705, 733-734.

²³⁶ Ibid. 703-705, 733, 743.

²³⁷ Deutsch outlines three crucial conditions for the establishment of a pluralistic security community, namely, the material capabilities of the states concerned, the compatibility of their major values, and mutual predictability of behaviour shared among them. According to Deutsch, mutual predictability of behaviour is first based on familiarity of the states concerned on each other's conduct, and could eventually founded on their collective-self understanding. In other words, states sharing mutual predictability of behaviour could mean they constitute a security community. As such, mutual predictability of behaviour should be first understood as an outcome of the interactions of the states concerned; owing to the fact that, mutual predictability of behaviour is the states' *shared understanding* produced by their interactions. Based on this first understanding, mutual predictability of behavior can subsequently be understood as an element that shape and shaped by the interactions of the states involved, just like the other two conditions. Therefore, mutual predictability of behavior should not be viewed as one of the crucial conditions that breed a pluralistic security community. It is in fact fundamentally an outcome spawned by the material capabilities and the compatibility of major values of the states concerned amid the mutually constitutive dynamics between these two elements and the states' social interactions. See Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic*

the political units concerned, and are also important for the relations among them.²³⁸ In other words, major values are those which the political units involved, respectively owns, and collectively share; namely, their common identities. Similarly, Adler and Barnett observe, states' power and their cognitive structures form the structural girders for the development of a pluralistic security community.²³⁹ Cognitive structure, according to them, is a regional system of meanings which is made up of people who share common identities.²⁴⁰ For example, Australia and Canada, the English-speaking states, constitute a cognitive region/structure.²⁴¹

The elements of power and common identities shape and are shaped by social interactions among states, which amid such mutually constitutive dynamics, engender the rise of a pluralistic security community.²⁴²

In terms of power, Deutsch discerns that, a pluralistic security community grows around a group of powerful states, in which they constitute the core area of the community.²⁴³ He writes, "larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed."²⁴⁴ For example, France and Germany, two of the most powerful states in the European Union, together has been the engine for the integration process of this security community.²⁴⁵

Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 38, 46-49, 56-58, 66-67, 70, 118, 123-129. For more discussion see pg 36-37.

²³⁸ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 123.

²³⁹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 39-41.

²⁴⁰ Ibid. 40-41. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Journal of International Studies* 26, no.2 (1997): 252-255.

²⁴¹ Emanuel Adler, *Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations*, 254.

²⁴² Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 38-39. Also see Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 38, 70.

²⁴³ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 37-39.

²⁴⁴ Ibid. 38.

²⁴⁵ Douglas Webber, "Introduction," in *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*, ed. Douglas Webber (USA and Canada: Routledge, 1999), 1. Also see David P. Calleo, "Introduction," in *Europe's Franco-German Engine*, ed. David P. Calleo and Eric R. Staal (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 1. Also see Gisela Hendriks and Annette Morgan, *The Franco-German Axis in European Integration* (UK&USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2001), 4-7. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of

Likewise, the North Atlantic security community had emerged around its core state – superpower America.²⁴⁶ Meanwhile, according to Deutsch, founded on their existing material capacities, the further growth of power owned by the strong political units also furnishes major contributions in breeding the establishment of a security community.²⁴⁷ He observes, the developments of pluralistic security communities are usually accompanied by the substantial increases in the power of the states involved.²⁴⁸ In sum, Deutsch notices that, a strong state's power has the attractive effects, which brings together a group of states towards forming a security community.

Adler and Barnett confirm Deutsch's observation of power. They argue that, because of its attractive effects, power can be a magnet.²⁴⁹ Adler explains, "powerful states, or cores of strength, are necessary for the development of security communities because, like a magnet, they attract weaker states that expect to share the security and welfare associated with them."²⁵⁰ Magnetic power, according to them, is "the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the 'we-feeling' and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members."²⁵¹ The magnetic pull effects of strong states' power thus indicate that, power leads to the weaker states to identify positively with the powerful ones; consequently, allows for the possibility of the emergence of collective-self shared among them.

In the realm of common identities, the Kantian school's liberal interpretation of the Deutschian notion of a security community is rather inaccurate. Deriving from Deutsch's study which chooses the North Atlantic area, for it covers all major powers of

Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119-120.

²⁴⁶ Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, no.54 (1984): 64-69, 81-82. Also see Emanuel Adler, "*Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model*," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 119-120. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Journal of International Studies* 26, no.2 (1997): 256.

²⁴⁷ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 38-41.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. 38-41.

²⁴⁹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 39-40.

²⁵⁰ Emanuel Adler, *Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations*, 276

²⁵¹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 39

the free world, as the case to examine his concept of a security community, the Kantians advocate liberal democracy as a necessary condition for the establishment of such communities.²⁵² This misunderstands Deutsch's study. Deutsch does not regard liberal democracy *per se* as essential to produce a security community; rather, he sees it as "an example" of common identities shared by certain political units, which, in his view, shared identities are crucial for them to constitute a security community. In short, Deutsch is referring to political entities' common identities, not democracy.

In his study, Deutsch deliberately refrains from adopting a definition of North Atlantic area which only includes the democracies located within this region.²⁵³ He makes explicit, such an attempt is to avoid the conclusion where democracy is a requirement for the forming of a security community.²⁵⁴ He, instead, views North Atlantic area as a region constituted by the non-Soviet-dominated states situated in this territory, which hence includes the then two nondemocracies in the area – Portugal and Spain.²⁵⁵ That said, Deutsch intends to examine the effects of "common political values" shared by certain political units in spawning a security community, not democratic values specifically. The conclusion of Deutsch's study vindicates his attempt to look at political communities bound by common political values.

As mentioned earlier in this section, Deutsch concludes that compatibility of major values of the states concerned is essential in engendering a security community among them; in which such values are those they individually own and collectively share. That said, major values, according to Deutsch's definition, are common values of the political units concerned; and that he views "basic political ideology" as one of the elements of such values, namely, common political values.²⁵⁶ Thus, for the case of North Atlantic area, "democracy and non-communist economics" have been outlined by Deutsch as the two crucial common political values shared by the political units within

²⁵² Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 9. Also see Christopher B. Roberts, "ASEAN's Security Community Project – Challenges and Opportunities in the Pursuit of Comprehensive Integration" (PhD diss., The University of New South Wales, 2008), 22. Also see Amitav Acharya, "Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 198-199.

²⁵³ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 9-10.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 9-10, 126.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 123-124.

this region.²⁵⁷ Deutsch subsequently assesses the region in terms of the compatibility of major values which, with the presence of the two common values, the North Atlantic area rates high.²⁵⁸ As such, Deutsch's emphasis on non-Soviet-dominated states in his definition of North Atlantic area, his definition of major values, and his attempt to appraise the North Atlantic area in terms of its compatibility of major values, make plain that the Deutschian concept of a security community stresses the essentiality of political units' common identities in such communities. Democracy is an example of common identities.

Adler's and Barnett's understanding of states' common identities coincides with Deutsch's observation. Adler discerns that, "people who are territorially and politically organized into states, owe their allegiance to states, and act on their behalf", will also at the same time, bound by a transnational cognitive structure/region which is constituted by them sharing common identities.²⁵⁹ A cognitive region transcends states' boundaries and any territorial base.²⁶⁰ Because of their shared identities, people within a cognitive region identify positively with one another thus preserve the existence of this regional intersubjective understandings.²⁶¹ Under certain circumstances, according to Adler, a cognitive structure/region will foster a collective-self understanding shared by states within the region, hence forge a security community among them.²⁶² In other words, a pluralistic security community is founded on the common identities shared by the states involved. Nonetheless, Adler does acknowledge that, liberal cognitive structure/region is conducive to producing a pluralistic security community.²⁶³ It, however, as he argues, remains one of many cognitive structures that could give rise to such a community.²⁶⁴ Adler and Barnett make plain in their study, it is their aim to explain that liberalism is *not* a necessary condition for the development of a pluralistic security community; other

²⁵⁷ Ibid. 124-126.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. 124-129.

²⁵⁹ Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Journal of International Studies* 26, no.2 (1997): 250, 252-254.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. 254.

²⁶¹ Ibid. 253-254. Also see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 40-41.

²⁶² Emanuel Adler, *Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations*, 254-255.

²⁶³ Ibid. 250, 258.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

cognitive structures, namely, states' common identities, also possess such capabilities.²⁶⁵

Nevertheless, Deutsch and Adler respectively observes, states' identities should endow with one basic character, in order to breed a pluralistic security community. That is, such identities have to be peaceful in nature. Deutsch explains, as long as a state's identities are, in essence, militaristic, expansionist or ideological crusading, the establishment of a security community between it and other states would not be likely.²⁶⁶ Since these values are violent in nature, the adoption of military means by a state who possesses such values, to settle its interstate disputes remains possible. Adler explains further, even though states share common identities, these shared identities will not produce a pluralistic security community, if they are fundamentally brutal.²⁶⁷ He points out, the emergences of security communities are most unlikely among states bound by totalitarian ideologies, as such ideas permit all possible means to achieve state goals, including violent ways.²⁶⁸

Therefore, within the framework of a pluralistic security community, common identities of the states involved can be defined as those derived from their shared culture, common language, historical ties or shared political values and institutions; in which these identities are peaceful in nature. As such, liberal democracy is one of the above defined states' common identities. It represents a culture of peaceful settlement of conflicts, and a culture which encourages community bonds.²⁶⁹ In short, liberal democracy is by nature peaceful.

2.2.4 A Special Relationship Leads to a Pluralistic Security Community

While a special relationship and a pluralistic security community are basically different from one another, they are yet interlinked.²⁷⁰ Both the concepts represent a

²⁶⁵ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 40-41. Also see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 425.

²⁶⁶ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 124-126.

²⁶⁷ Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Journal of International Studies* 26, no.2 (1997): 257-259.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. 250, 258-260.

²⁷⁰ For more discussion see pg 50-52.

relationship of common identities as well as power between two sovereign states.²⁷¹ Several bilateral relationships function as a special relationship-cum-security community. For instance, the relationship between: United States-Britain, and United States-Canada.²⁷²

As presented in Chapter 1, the peaceful traits of a special relationship imply the qualities of a pluralistic security community which is by essence peaceful. The aspiration for peace recurrently appears in a special relationship. For example, amid the emergence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship in the 1890s, a steadily growing number of elites from the US and the UK had expressed their compelling conviction that war should be “unthinkable” between the two states.²⁷³ Similar robust conviction could hardly be found in their other bilateral ties at the time, “certainly not with such regularity and vigor”.²⁷⁴ Likewise, Churchill’s statement on Anglo-American relations in 1956 exhibited such aspiration for peace,

“It is our duty to remove misunderstandings...these are the things to which we should do well to devote constant attention and undiminishing enthusiasm. I earnestly hope that we have reached the end of misunderstanding and that we shall move forward steadily together...”²⁷⁵

However, the exceptional wish for peace which regularly emanates from a special relationship, does not warrant the relation to have the capacity to maintain peace between the two states involved, without them prepare or even consider to use violence as a means to resolve their disputes. Such a capability constitutes the defining characteristic of a pluralistic security community.

²⁷¹ For more discussion see pg 24-41, 52-57.

²⁷² For more discussion see pg 12-26, 49.

²⁷³ For more discussion see pg 15-21. Also see Srdjan Vucetic, M.A, “The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations” (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008), 92.

²⁷⁴ Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 320-321; Anne Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain: the United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956* (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1996), 24; Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 29-62; Stephen R. Rocke, *Appeasement in International Politics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 29; Bruce M. Russett, *Community and Contention- Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 4-39, quoted in Srdjan Vucetic, M.A, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations*, 92.

²⁷⁵ Winston S. Churchill, “The Benjamin Franklin Medal,” in *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963*, vol VIII, ed. Robert Rhodes James (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), 8671.

The emergence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship at the turn of the twentieth century did not immediately give birth to their capacity to settle their bilateral conflicts without contemplating or preparing to employ violent means.²⁷⁶ After 1905, the US Navy Department regularly exercised its Red Plan, a war plan designed to deal with possible conflicts with the British fleet.²⁷⁷ On the other hand, as late as 1926, Canada, where its defence was still closely intertwined with the responsibility of the Royal Navy, developed military plan aimed at preventing American invasion.²⁷⁸ Such war planning indicate that, despite sharing special ties, the United States and Great Britain during this period still considered war between them as possible.

It was not until 1937 when the US decided to officially withdraw the Red Plan thus marks a permanent end to the two states' consideration or preparation to adopt military means in dealing with their bilateral disputes.²⁷⁹ The decades taken by the Anglo-American Special Relationship to eventually equip itself with the ability to completely abandon the thinking of or preparation for engaging in an armed conflict directed at each other, demonstrates that, certain conditions and processes need to be in place, before a special relationship can be equated with a pluralistic security community.

There are very few studies which examine the links between a special relationship and a pluralistic security community. Storatz and Bially incorporate the two concepts in their analyses of Anglo-American relations. Storatz in his study "Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration" argues that "over time Great Britain and the United States achieved special forms and an exceptional degree of political integration."²⁸⁰ He maintains, it is the concepts of political integration that

²⁷⁶ For more discussion see pg 15-21.

²⁷⁷ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 347. Also see Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign policy," *International Affairs* 58, no.4 (1982): 575-576.

²⁷⁸ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 336, 347.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. 347. Also see David G. Haglund, "The US-Canada Relationship- How 'Special' is America's Oldest Unbroken Alliance?" in *America's 'Special Relationships' – Foreign and Domestic Aspects of The Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 64. Also see Henry A. Kissinger, *Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign policy*, 576.

²⁸⁰ Richard Lawrence Storatz, "Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1981), 4.

explain the absence of war between the two states since the Inter-State War of 1812.²⁸¹ Storatz frames the political integration between the US and the UK in evolutionary terms, observing that over decades the Anglo-American relationship had evolved from the attainment of a pluralistic security community to the forging of an alliance with special status.²⁸²

Despite the outlining of a clear causal link between the concepts of a pluralistic security community and a special relationship, Storatz's logic, however, exhibits a fundamental flaw. He argues that Anglo-American relations had transformed into a pluralistic security community since 1914.²⁸³ After two and a half decades of existence, the security community had served as the foundation for the establishment of the Anglo-American Special Relationship in 1939.²⁸⁴ Such an assessment is rather problematic. The US-UK relations had yet to constitute a pluralistic security community between 1914 and the late 1930s.

During these years, the US's and the UK's war planning directed at each other were still active.²⁸⁵ Meanwhile, both states were suspicious of each other's naval power.²⁸⁶ Britain was alarmed by America's desire to expand its navy in the late 1910s.²⁸⁷ As Storatz has pointed out, with the absence of any other comparable navies, and the still limited strategic commitments of the US, Britain feared that America's naval expansion was in fact directed at them whom at that time possessed the world's greatest navy.²⁸⁸ In the meantime, the US, on the other hand, worried that Britain, with its supreme naval power, could exert its will on America as it wished, particularly with the existence of British alliance with another great naval power – Japan.²⁸⁹

²⁸¹ Ibid. 3-4.

²⁸² Ibid. 679.

²⁸³ Ibid. 297-298, 303-384, 480.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. 145, 480, 544, 557-559.

²⁸⁵ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 347.

²⁸⁶ For more discussion see pg 51-52.

²⁸⁷ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 704, 733. Also see Richard Lawrence Storatz, "Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1981), 403.

²⁸⁸ Richard Lawrence Storatz, *Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration*, 403-404.

²⁸⁹ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 703-705, 733-734.

These evidences reveal that, between 1914 and the following two decades, both the military power of the US and the UK remained in each other's mind as a plausible threat, hence Anglo-American relations during this period did not accord with the defining feature of a pluralistic security community. As Storatz has defined, which is also coincided with Deutsch's, Adler's and Barnett's understanding, a pluralistic security community exists, when the states concerned neither expect nor prepare to use violence as a means to settle their disputes.²⁹⁰ While Storatz argues a psychological no-war community existed between the US and the UK since 1895, in which the populations of the two states increasingly regarded war between them as illegitimate and unpopular; yet, until the late 1930s, armed conflicts of the two states continued to be likely, at least in the minds of their people.²⁹¹

As such, Storatz's logic, namely, a special relationship is predicated upon the existence of a long-established pluralistic security community, is invalid.²⁹² By "long-established", he means at least two generations.²⁹³ In almost the whole period of the two and a half decades before the establishment of the US-UK Special Relationship, which Storatz views this happened in 1939, there was no Anglo-American security community, let alone a long-established one.²⁹⁴ Therefore, based on historical evidences, one can conclude that, it is a special relationship, which has emerged for a significant number of years, that leads to the rise of a pluralistic security community; not the opposite situation.

In Bially's study "The Power Politics of Identity", the focus is on examining the Anglo-American Special Relationship during and after the Suez crisis of 1956 with the aim of exploring the role of power in identity.²⁹⁵ As the US and the UK has completely

²⁹⁰ Richard Lawrence Storatz, "Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1981), 128-132, 485. Also see Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5-6, 65-69. Also see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Communities," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30-34.

²⁹¹ Richard Lawrence Storatz, *Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration*, 128, 296-298. Also see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 197.

²⁹² Richard Lawrence Storatz, *Anglo-American Relations: A Theory and History of Political Integration*, 145, 474-475, 480, 544, 559.

²⁹³ *Ibid.* 145.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 544.

²⁹⁵ Janice Lisa Bially, "The Power Politics of Identity" (PhD diss., Yale University, 1998), 1-36.

ruled out violence as a means to settle their disputes since America's withdrawal of the Red Plan in 1937, the Anglo-American Special Relationship was by the 1950s also a pluralistic security community. Bially is therefore able to use the concepts of a special relationship and a pluralistic security community interchangeably in her study without having to specifically disentangle the relationship between the two notions.²⁹⁶ This study does not provide any clue for understanding the causal link between the two concepts.

2.2.5 The Origin of Magnetic Power

Under certain circumstances, a special relationship would lead to a pluralistic security community. The connection between these two concepts is underpinned by them representing a relationship of common identities as well as power between two states. Nevertheless, the understanding of power in a pluralistic security community requires further clarification, without which the apprehension of such an evolution is bound to be problematic.

Deutsch, Adler and Barnett observe that a pluralistic security community forms around powerful states.²⁹⁷ Weaker states are attracted by the political and economic benefits associated with the powerful ones, thereby engenders their cooperative dynamics, consequently, foster the creation of a security community between them.²⁹⁸ Adler and Barnett hence maintain, power can be a magnet.²⁹⁹ Such an observation brings forth a fundamental question: under what conditions, power of a strong state would generate the magnetic pull effects?

Numerous evidences have shown that power is not necessarily a magnet; it could in fact generate the exact opposite effects. Power can be repulsive. Gonzalez and Haggard have pointed out, the main barrier to the security cooperation between the US and its Latin American neighbours has been the high asymmetry of power between them.³⁰⁰ Skepticism dominates Latin American states' perception of America's superpower.³⁰¹

²⁹⁶ Ibid. 23-36.

²⁹⁷ For more discussion see pg 52-54.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 296-298.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

Gonzalez and Haggard observe, the US's mighty power has bred its tendency to intervene in the affairs of its Latin American and Caribbean neighbours.³⁰² As a consequence, Latin American states distrust the United States, and have shown a firm commitment to international law, multilateral institutions, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in their foreign policies, so as to check America's power.³⁰³ Power, therefore, in the case of the US-Latin America relations, becomes a source that generates repulsive effects among them; consequently, hinders the formation of security communities between America and its southern neighbours.³⁰⁴

The US-Latin America relations reveal that, for a strong state's power to produce the magnetic pull effects, certain conditions need to be in place. Deutsch's study furnishes some rudimentary understandings of the circumstances under which power can become a magnet. He discerns, in the absence of other essential background conditions for successful amalgamation, the material capacities of powerful political units would "arouse fear" and "provoke counter-coalitions on the principle of the balance of power".³⁰⁵ With the presence of these conditions, an amalgamated security community develops around powerful political units.³⁰⁶ While Deutsch is meant to explain the dynamics of power in the creation of an amalgamated security community, his account essentially entails the power relationship between political units, which therefore, is also applicable to understanding the power relationship between states.³⁰⁷

The essential background conditions which would give rise to the attractive effects of power owned by strong political units include, the presence of compatibility of major values of the political units involved, their owing of a distinctive way of life, deep and wide mutual interactions among them, and the existence of their mutual predictability of behaviour.³⁰⁸ These conditions, however, can be basically categorized into three different types of circumstances: one which has existed before the forming an amalgamated security community, such as compatibility of major values and mutual

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid. 297-298, 315-316.

³⁰⁴ Ibid. 295-298.

³⁰⁵ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 6, 46, 72.

³⁰⁶ Ibid. 38-41, 50-51, 72.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. 6, 46, 72.

³⁰⁸ Ibid. 46-59.

predictability of behaviour; one which denotes the required state of interactions between the political units concerned towards forming their security community; and one which only exists when an amalgamated security community has been formed, such as a distinctive way of life shared by the political units involved.³⁰⁹

Deutsch has pointed out, an amalgamated security community comprises of a distinctive way of life shared among the political units concerned.³¹⁰ It is distinctive as it represents a way of life which is “different from those which existed in the area during the recent past”.³¹¹ For example, a unique perception of America had emerged between 1750 and 1790, amid the course of establishing the United States of America by the thirteen British colonies in North America.³¹² Such a perception was distinct from that of the respective thirteen colonies which constitute the security community.³¹³ That being the case, a distinctive way of life denotes the expression of collective identity that makes up a security community, hence it can only exist with the presence of such a community.

The three different natures of the background conditions lead to one confusion – whether the magnetic pull effects of power emerge before the establishment of a security community or they are in fact produced by a security community. As such, Deutsch is not entirely certain of how power owned by a strong political unit could generate attractive effects.

Nonetheless, Deutsch’s observation does suggest some clues. Given the historical evidences which show that security communities form around cores of powers; magnetic power hence should have existed before the forming of a security community.³¹⁴ On the other hand, given that mutual predictability of behaviour shared by the political units concerned, and their deep and wide mutual interactions, are in essence outcomes of the units’ social interactions, in which these outcomes are founded on other essential conditions for the development of a security community; there is therefore only one essential condition, namely, the compatibility of major values, to coexist with power before the process of the attainment of a security community takes

³⁰⁹ Ibid. 46-49, 56-58, 118, 123-129.

³¹⁰ Ibid. 48.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid. 48, 84.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid. 29, 38-41, 50-51.

place.³¹⁵ Viewed in this light, since Deutsch observes that the attractive effects of power owned by a strong political unit are based on the presence of other essential conditions, power as a magnet thus is linked to the compatibility of major values, namely, the common identities of the political units concerned.

Adler and Barnett have furnished their general observation on the relationship between power and common identities of the states involved. Because of the contrasting situation between the US-Canada and US-Mexico relations, in which America's massive power has been a barrier for its cooperation with Mexico, and was not an obstacle to the forming of the US-Canada security community; they broadly suggest that, the material capacity of a powerful state may become magnetic "only when accompanied by cultural affinities between greater and lesser powers".³¹⁶ Gonzalez and Haggard, on the other hand, notice that, Mexico's skepticism on the US's immense power, and the absence of common political values between them, have been the main obstacles that prevent the two states from forging a security community like that of between the US and Canada.³¹⁷ Such an observation implies that, a strong state's power become repulsive for the weaker states, when they do not share common identities.

These existing defective or general observations made by scholars result in an extrapolation – founded on common identities shared by the states concerned, power owned by the strong one among these states, would generate the magnetic pull effects project among its weaker counterparts.

The said supposition is reinforced by the observation on the dynamics of power in a special relationship made in earlier section. Common identities of the states involved, in the form of intersubjective understandings, spawn their similar appreciations of the material world.³¹⁸ Founded on their common identities-induced similar worldview, when power owned by the respective states involved have increased to a certain level, they produce their mutual material needs, hence engender positive identifications

³¹⁵ Ibid. 38. For more discussion see reference 237.

³¹⁶ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 424.

³¹⁷ Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 295-299, 303, 308, 314-317, 322-326.

³¹⁸ For more discussion see pg 36-41.

between them, which means, the magnetic pull effects of their power.³¹⁹ The observation where magnetic power has its root in common identities of the states concerned will be examined in detail in the following chapters.

2.2.6 The Degree of Power

While strong powers are crucial for the developments of security communities, one question remains unanswered: how powerful a strong state should be, so as to give rise to a bilateral pluralistic security community?

According to Deutsch, security communities function not on the basis of balance of power, since such communities emerge around cores of powers.³²⁰ However, evidences of existing bilateral pluralistic security communities render one to wonder, whether the presence of a state, which is significantly more powerful than its counterpart, would be sufficient to precipitate the rise of a security community between them; or its power should be immense in degree, in order to produce the outcome.

Among the bilateral ties that have been identified as a pluralistic security community, only the US-UK and US-Canada relations are special relationships.³²¹ Meanwhile, among the bilateral ties that have been identified as a pluralistic security community, several of them operate in the context of apparent power imbalance between the states

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 27-28.

³²¹ For more discussion see pg 12-28. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 333-367. Also see Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 27-30, 65-66. Also see Ole Waever, "Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 69-118. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 119-160. Also see Michael Barnett and F.Gregory Gause III, "Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State and the Development of a Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 161-197. Also see Andrew Hurrell, "An Emerging Security Community in South America?," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 228-264. Also see Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 295-332. Also see Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 191.

concerned.³²² This category of security communities includes the relationship between: US-Britain, US-Canada, and US-Mexico.³²³

Although Deutsch considers the US-Mexico relations as a security community, Gonzalez's and Haggard's examination on the relationship, however, indicates that the two states are far short of constituting an established security community.³²⁴ Collective identity can hardly be discerned in the US-Mexico relationship, and distrust prevails between them.³²⁵ Mexico's suspicion on America's vast power persists.³²⁶ The US, on the other hand, clings on to its "right" to intervene in its southern neighbours' affairs; strengthens the militarization of its border with Mexico, so as to curb the problems of drug trafficking and immigration externalized by Mexico.³²⁷ As such, the US-Mexico relations can hardly be recognized as a security community. That being the case, power imbalance between partners appears to be the unique character of those security communities which are founded on special relationships.

Both the US-Britain and US-Canada special relationships evolved into security communities during the late 1930s and early 1940s – the time when obvious power imbalance between them came into existence.³²⁸ Viewed in this light, for a special

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid. While Deutsch observes that power imbalance exists in Norway-Sweden security community, the evidence, however, shows that balance of power has been preserved between them. In 2010, Norway's GDP (US\$ billions) is 414.5; Sweden's GDP (US\$ billions) is 455.8. Therefore, Norway-Sweden security community is not one of those which operate in the context of apparent power imbalance between the two nations involved. See World Economic Forum, "The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012," <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-2011-2012/> (accessed May 26, 2012). Also see David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 292. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 901.

³²⁴ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 27-28, 65-66. Also see Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 295, 309, 326.

³²⁵ Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 295-298, 325-326.

³²⁶ Ibid. 296-298, 303, 308, 314-317.

³²⁷ Ibid. 295-296, 299, 317-322.

³²⁸ For more discussion see pg 24-26, 58-59. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 355. Also see David G. Haglund, "The US-Canada Relationship- How 'Special' is America's Oldest Unbroken Alliance?" in *America's 'Special Relationships' – Foreign and Domestic Aspects of The Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 64. Also see David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-*

relationship to transform into a security community, the presence of marked unequal power between the two states involved seems to be necessary. This observation will be examined thoroughly in the following chapters.

Table 2.1: The Conditions of the Existing Bilateral Pluralistic Security Communities

Bilateral tie	Pluralistic Security Community	Special Relationship	The Presence of Power Imbalance
US-UK	Yes	Yes	Yes
US-Canada	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norway-Sweden	Yes	No	No
Denmark-Sweden	Yes	No	No
Denmark-Norway	Yes	No	No
UK-Netherlands	Yes	No	No
UK-Belgium	Yes	No	No
UK-Norway	Yes	No	No
UK-Denmark	Yes	No	No
UK-Sweden	Yes	No	No
France-Belgium	Yes	No	No
Belgium-Netherlands	Yes	No	No

Source: Compiled from Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996); David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 292; and H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 901.

41- *A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 292. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 901.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

A theory needs concepts to formulate its explanations. To develop a theoretical framework of a special relationship, this chapter seeks to outline the definitional concepts that constitute such relationships. Based on the review of literature in Chapter 2, this study defines a special relationship as follows:

A special relationship exists between two states when two sources of closeness, that of the two states' common identities and shared strategic interests, coexist in their relations.

Common identities of two states are derived from their shared culture, common language, historical ties or shared political values and institutions. Common strategic interests of two states, on the other hand, mean the two states rely on each other's material presence for survival.

Common identities of two states sharing a special relationship spawn their mutual sentimental expressions of closeness. The sentimental associations, combine with the two states' mutual sense of closeness engendered by their common strategic interests, result in the two states sharing an understanding that their relationship is *closer* than their other bilateral ties. The shared understanding, in turn, stirs up the two states' respective *expectation* that their relationship *should be* closer than their bilateral ties with others. Such an expectation leads to a higher intensity of interactions between the two states as compared with that of their other bilateral relations.

The above definition brings to light the key conceptual components that constitute a special relationship: the concepts of power, identity and expectation. This chapter hence begins with the explanations of the three concepts.

As this thesis looks at how a special relationship could evolve into a pluralistic security community, the defining feature of such a community, namely, dependable expectations of peaceful change, therefore also stands as one of the key conceptual components of a special relationship.

The most obvious characteristic of a pluralistic security community is the absence of war among the states involved. As such, such a community is founded on the war avoidance norms shared by the states involved. States have to learn to avoid war

between them before being able to renounce their defense gesture against each other. Viewed in this light, the concept of norms has to be among the key conceptual components of a special relationship.

Norms and dependable expectations of peaceful change are the other two conceptual components that will be explained in this chapter.

The understandings of the five conceptual components put forward by this chapter form the foundation for the explanation of the dynamics of a special relationship and its transformation into a pluralistic security community, which will be established in the following chapter.

3.1 Power

Survival is the fundamental need of every state. Anything will be meaningless for a state if it could not survive at the first place. Hence, regardless of how a state might evolve, one principle remains unchanged – its will to exist. This tenet underscores the essentiality of power for a state. Power is commonly understood as the best means to ensure the survival of a state.

This section first defines what is power. It then addresses the question of why a state pursue power. This section subsequently moves to explain the meanings of power balance and power imbalance between states. It argues that power balance between states is a cause for power competition and a basis of order between them; power imbalance between states, meanwhile, is an accelerator of war or a basis of peace between them. Finally, this section explains the reason behind the strategic cooperation between two states, and the dynamics of such cooperation.

3.1.1 The Definition of Power

This study defines power as the material capacity of a state. The elements of a state's material capacity include the state's: size of population and territory, natural resources, economic strength and military force.

The wealth of a state reflected its economic strength.¹ A state's wealth can be measured in terms of its GDP per capita.² For example India – a developing state – is

¹ "The World's Richest Countries," *Forbes*, February 22, 2012.

² *Ibid.*

less wealthy than Switzerland – a developed state.³ In 2010, India's GDP per capita was US\$ 1265, which was lower than that of Switzerland. Switzerland's GDP per capita was US\$ 67,246 in 2010.⁴

3.1.2 States Pursue Power for Survival

Power has crucial meaning for a state. It indicates a state's ability to create or destroy. In an anarchical international system where there is no central authority above all the sovereign states, a state needs power to realize its goal as no authority could restrict its aspiration and ensure its security. While power undoubtedly is indispensable for a state, one question remains debatable – whether power serves as a means or an end for a state? This question can be fundamentally addressed by answering the question – why states pursue power?

The arguments of realism have been surrounded on explaining why states pursue power. Classical realism argues that it is the human natural will to power that account for a state's need for power.⁵ Because human by nature are power hungry, a state which is formed by human beings thus always has “a limitless lust for power”⁶. Such a tendency denotes that a state will not stop looking for power and invariably seek to expand its power when opportunities arise. As Frederick the Great had put it, “the permanent principle of rulers”: “to extend as far as their power permits.”⁷ Structural realism, on the other hand, argues that it is the anarchical structure of international system that forces states to compete for power so as to maximize their security.⁸ As there is no overarching authority above all sovereign states, no one can guarantee the security and well-being of a state but a state itself. A state therefore needs power to ensure its survival. Hence, in structural realists' perspective, it is the human natural will to survive, not the will to power, that explain why states need to pursue power.

³ World Economic Forum, “The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012,” <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-2011-2012/> (accessed September 22, 2011).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 19.

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 194.

⁷ Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address – Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 89-90.

⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 19. Also see Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 166.

Despite classical and structural realists hold different understanding of human nature, such a difference, however, is built on an irrefutable truth – human after all need to first secure its survival. Dunne and Schmidt have explained, “Survival is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or merely independence.”⁹ Classical realists’ attempt to explain international politics by linking it to the cornerstone character of human nature, in fact, does not seize the fundamental essence of human nature. Beneath human’s innate propensity for power, lies a deeper root of human nature – its raw desire to survive. How could a human be power hungry, if it could not exist at the first place? That being so, human inherent aspiration for power is always founded on the assumption that its very survival is not fundamentally at stake. As Waltz writes, “in crucial situations...the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security.”¹⁰ A state’s desire for power is founded on, and preceded by its concern for security.

Classical realism’s challenge to defensive realism (structural realism) has been on defensive realism’s view of how a state would pursue power, not on the fundamental principle that shores up defensive realism, namely, human inherent will to survive. From classical realists’ perspective, it is always problematic for defensive realists to assume that all states learn the same lessons from the past – expansion always lead to failure – which consequently result in states to aim at maximizing their security by pursuing a limited amount of power sufficient to preserve, not upset, the balance of power among the states.¹¹ Classical realists argue, states operate according to human nature – power hungry, not in conformity with lessons that they should learn from history.¹² They maintain, history has shown that most great powers are expansionist, and states rarely derive any lesson from the past which points out that expansion is bound to be futile.¹³

⁹ Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 174.

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 40.

¹¹ Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith, 170. Also see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 20. Also see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power – The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 28.

¹² Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power – The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role*, 10, 31.

¹³ Ibid.

Moreover, classical realists contend that, one can never be certain of a state's real intention to pursue power; whether it is power or security-maximizer. History has shown that states often concealed their desire for hegemony with the name of preserving national security.¹⁴ As Zakaria writes, "It is difficult to think of Napoleon's expansion as motivated by insecurity, yet he claimed it was just that."¹⁵ Hence, classical realists believe that a state will seek for more power whenever it has the capability to do so, and will not satisfy with the amount of power which it deems necessary to preserve its security as defensive realists have maintained.¹⁶ In other words, classical realism's criticism on defensive realism has been to justify that states' appetite for power is not restricted by their sense of security. Yet, for such an argument to be valid, it must share the same principle in which defensive realism has embraced – human aims to survive – as without survival, it is impossible for a state to start longing for power beyond the amount which it deems needed for its security.

However, there is no one conclusive explanation on a state's appetite for power. Both classical and structural realisms find evidences in the real world that match with their respective arguments. Some states seek for expansion because they can, and some will not even they can.¹⁷ This difference is largely attributed to the international environment that a state is embedded in. Zakaria has pointed out, "the situation in which states find themselves vis-à-vis their fellows is the most powerful force shaping international outcomes."¹⁸ Whether a state becomes an expansionist or remains status quo is to a large extent shaped by its external conditions apart from decided by its own preferences.

Moreover, one could not be certain of what precisely the word "survival" means for a state. The meaning of survival is not mutually exclusive with the meaning of well-being. A state usually equates its very survival not just with the state's basic security, but also with the state's well-being. The fierce competition among states in the global economy indicates that the well-being of a state has crucial meaning in policy makers'

¹⁴ Ibid. 26.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid. 21, 28.

¹⁷ As Zakaria observed, "...most great power have been expansionist"; on the other hand, "history furnishes many examples of rising states that did not correspondingly extend their political interests overseas". See Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power – The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 10, 32.

¹⁸ Ibid. 34.

understanding of “state’s survival”. As David Cameron, British Prime Minister, said, “There is no national security, unless you have economic security.”¹⁹ That said, the power-maximalist behaviour of states is not just simply for the sake of wanting power, but also there is a basis of wanting to survive.

In short, classical and structural realisms contradict each other in terms of the explanation of the strategy that a state would adopt in its pursuit of power – whether it seeks for a limited or limitless amount of power, not in terms of the principle that underpins a state’s power-seeking behaviour. Both types of realisms are built on the tenet that human has a raw will to survive. Therefore, a state pursues power fundamentally is for survival.

3.1.3 Survival is Essentially Linked to the Existence of Self

Survival essentially concerns the existence of self. Hence, one’s will to survive is rooted in its awareness of “self”. The desire of oneself to exist generates its natural tendency to be self-interested. An actor is self-interested inherently means it has an ultimate goal of wanting to survive. In this sense, for every state, its national interest is fundamentally about its aim to survive.²⁰

An actor’s understanding of self is founded on two identities, namely, corporate identity and self-identity.²¹ The corporate identity, which is essentially about the intrinsic consciousness of individual security and well being, furnishes the actor motivational energy to engage in action, which means it is prior to interaction.²² By participating in social interactions, actor forms its self-identity in which such an identity is based on the relationship of self to the others.²³ As such, the concept of self-identity entails the dynamics of identification with other. According to Wendt, “identification is a continuum from negative to positive – from conceiving the other as anathema to the

¹⁹ The US President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron, Press Conference at Lancaster House, London, UK, May 25, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2011/05/25/president-obama-prime-minister-cameron-joint-press-availability>.

²⁰ As Dunne and Schmidt writes, “the core national interest of all states must be survival”. See Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 164.

²¹ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 385 .

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid. 385 - 386.

self to conceiving it as an extension of the self.”²⁴ The nature of identification determines the extent to which the boundaries of the self are drawn.²⁵ Yet, because of the differentiating dynamics that derive from actors’ corporate identities, positive identification among actors will rarely lead to the perfect match between their respective conceptions of self.²⁶

Owing to the fact that this research is essentially the study of bilateral relations between two states, the corporate identity of an actor hence refers to the individualistic character of a state, and an actor’s self-identity, on the other hand, means a state’s appreciation of self in relations to other states.

Actors acquire their self-identities through the mutually constitutive dynamics of their conceptions of self and their intersubjective understandings, namely, the normative structure, in which such understandings shape and are shaped by the dynamics of identification between actors.²⁷ As discussed in earlier chapter, intersubjective understandings denote a stable set of identities and interests which emerge out of mutually constitutive interactions among actors and their shared intersubjective understandings.²⁸ Such understandings are expressed in terms of norms and practice.²⁹ Although intersubjective understandings are essentially the cognitive collective knowledge of actors, they are experienced as if they exist independent of the actors.³⁰ Hence, intersubjective understandings define actors’ social reality.³¹ The fact that intersubjective understandings emerge out of the process of social interactions does not mean that such understandings are in a state of flux. Once a set of intersubjective

²⁴ Ibid. 386.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 397-399. Also see Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 267.

²⁸ Wendt notes that constructivists “share a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction.” See Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 394, 399, 403. Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no.2 (1998): 326.

²⁹ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23, no.1 (1998):173. Also see Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 399. Also see Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (1997): 327.

³⁰ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 399. Also see Emanuel Adler, *Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics*, 327.

³¹ Ibid.

understandings have been institutionalized – which means the internalization of new identities and interests by the actors involved – such understandings would stand as a social fact which resists change, and often persists beyond the lives of the actors as they are constantly reproduced through norms and practices.³²

The identifications among actors amid the mutually constitutive dynamics between actors and their intersubjective understandings indicate that, under the material structure of anarchy and the distribution of power, social interactions could generate cooperative or conflictual intersubjective understandings founded on actors' respective appreciations of self.³³ The conceptions of self hence understandably impose meanings on the objective presence of anarchy and the distribution of power, in turn, the material existence shapes and is shaped by the understandings of self.³⁴ For example, Britain owning 500 nuclear weapons is less threatening to the US than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because Britain is a friend of the US (an extension of the US's self) and North Korea an enemy to the US (an anathema to the US's self).³⁵ Two states identify with each other negatively when they are embedded in conflictual intersubjective understandings in which each view the other's power as a threat and a source of conflict/competition. On the other hand, two states identify positively with one another when they share cooperative intersubjective understandings in which each perceive the other's power as an opportunity and a source of cooperation.

In short, a state after all is self-interested owing to its instinctive will to survive, namely, the existence of self. Yet, the dynamics of identification lead to different understandings of self hence different meanings of one's power has for a particular self. A state will pursue power with its friend (an extension of the self) to achieve their collective-self interests, and will compete for power with its foe (an anathema to the self)

³² Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 399, 407. Also see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no.3 (1997): 327. Also see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 388.

³³ Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 399.

³⁴ Ibid. 399-400. Also see "Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world." Emanuel Adler, *Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics*, 322.

³⁵ Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no.1 (1995): 73.

to secure their respective self interests, all of which, to achieve one ultimate goal – striving for survival.

3.1.4 Balance of Power – A Cause for Power Competition and A Basis of Order

The presence of power balance between states is a cause for power competition among them.

When power balance exists between states, no one is in a dominant position.³⁶ Hence, the states concerned compete with each other for dominance, prevent the counterparts from becoming a dominant power, aiming to secure their respective survival.³⁷

The tendency to compete spawns negative identifications between the states involved, as power competition denotes “more for one actor means less for another”.³⁸ As Wendt writes, “conceptions of self and interest tend to ‘mirror’ the practices of significant others over time.”³⁹ When a party acts in ways that the receiving party perceives as threatening, driven by its intrinsic consciousness of survival which stems from its corporate identity, the receiving party will react in a similar way so as to protect itself from being threaten.⁴⁰ As Waltz observes, “competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors” as failure to imitate would jeopardize its very survival.⁴¹ This dynamics of ‘competition breeds competition’ reflect the mutually reinforcing effect of the negative identifications between competing states, which motivates them to understand each other in egoistic terms.

Power balance between states, meanwhile, serves as a basis of order among them. Order is “peaceful coexistence under conditions of scarcity”.⁴² By peaceful coexistence, it means states coexist without a war in a significant period of time.

³⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 173, 215. Also see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 21.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, “Realism,” in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 172.

³⁹ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 404.

⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 385. Also see Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, 404-407.

⁴¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Canada: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1979), 127-128.

⁴² I. William Zartman, “The Quest for Order in World Politics,” in *Imbalance of Power – US Hegemony and International Order*, ed. I. William Zartman (US: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 3.

Because of the presence of power balance between the states concerned, no one among them has the military capacity to prevail over the others, yet each of them is able to defend itself against the attack of the counterparts. As a result, the states concerned would find it very costly to turn their conflicts into a war between them.⁴³ The power balance, therefore, furnishes a basis of order between the states concerned. It hinders them from launching a war against each other, they in consequence coexist peacefully.

The following examples demonstrate that power balance between states is a cause for their power competition as well as a basis of order between them:

Power Competition between India and China and A Basis of Order between Them

The relationship between India and China has been defined by their deep and enduring competition.⁴⁴

Power balance exists between the two states.⁴⁵ India and China both are one of the largest and most populous states in the world. Also the two states each is one of the most powerful military Powers in the world.⁴⁶ Both, in the meantime, are nuclear Powers.

As neither China nor India is in a dominant position vis-à-vis the other, the two neighboring states compete with each other to become the dominant Power in their region, with the goal of securing their respective survival.⁴⁷

India seeks to exclude China from South Asia and Indian Ocean in order to establish its dominant position in the region.⁴⁸ India believes that its existence can be best protected by acquiring such dominance.⁴⁹ It sees itself as the guarantor of peace and

⁴³ Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 361-362. Also see Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, "Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no.1 (1990): 63-64. Also see Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 180.

⁴⁴ John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest – Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (US: University of Washington Press, 2001), 4-5.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 11.

⁴⁶ "The 'Power Index' Measures The 10 Most Powerful Militaries in the World," *Business Insider Australia*, June 13, 2013, <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/10-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-2013-6?op=1#3-china-8> (accessed 9th July 2014)

⁴⁷ John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest – Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, 11, 14, 16, 29-30.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 16-18, 21.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

stability of the entire South Asian region.⁵⁰ The security of India's South Asian neighbours is perceived by India as its own security.⁵¹ India has been trying to restrict its South Asian neighbours' ties with China.⁵² It, meanwhile, forges a set of close relations with states in the Himalayan region – Nepal and Bhutan – aiming to deny China access to the region.⁵³ Nepal and Bhutan both are economically and militarily dependent on India.⁵⁴ In 1998, India had succeeded in becoming a nuclear Power. India needs such a status to deter China's expansion into South Asia.⁵⁵

China, on the other hand, seeks to prevent India from becoming the dominant Power in South Asia, which was part of its efforts in striving to become the prominent Power in Asia.⁵⁶ China wants to establish its dominance in Asia so as to ensure that its survival would not be threatened by other Powers.⁵⁷ China believes that an Indian-dominated South Asia would become a threat to its southwestern territories.⁵⁸ It maintains a strategic partnership with Pakistan, aiming to weaken India's standing in South Asia.⁵⁹ Pakistan has been receiving crucial military assistance from China.⁶⁰ Also China makes use of the smaller South Asian states' resistance to India's domination to undermine India's influence in the region.⁶¹ It develops close military ties with these smaller South Asian states, providing military technology to these states.⁶²

The prolonged rivalries between India and China had led to a war between them in 1962 and a series of their militarized confrontations and intense political conflicts.⁶³

The presence of power balance between India and China, however, functions as a basis of order between them. The two states have not plunged into a war between them

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid. 31.

⁵³ Ibid. 5.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 30.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 8, 14, 30-31.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 14-15, 29-30.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 5.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid. 17, 19, 30.

⁶² Ibid. 21, 30.

⁶³ Ibid. 3-5.

since their war in 1962.⁶⁴ Both parties have been struggling to preserve their peaceful coexistence as war between them is very costly.⁶⁵

Franco-German Competition and A Basis of Order between Them

A unified German state was established in January 1871 after Prussia defeated France in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.⁶⁶ Prussia annexed the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine at the end of the war, making them part of the new Germany.⁶⁷ The southern German states, in the meantime, had decided to join the newly unified German state.⁶⁸ From 1870 onwards, Germany emerged as a powerful state on the European continent.⁶⁹

Power balance existed between Germany and France after 1870 even though Germany had become a powerful state. While Germany possessed the strongest army in Europe, the French army, however, was not substantially weaker than the German army.⁷⁰

As no one was in a dominant position in Europe, France and Germany competed with one another to become the dominant Power in the region.⁷¹ Germany was consistent in striving to expand its industrial might and military capacity.⁷² It established an alliance with Russia and Austria in 1873, aiming to permanently prevent France from becoming the dominant Power in Europe.⁷³ The triple alliance collapsed in 1875.⁷⁴ In that same year, Germany threatened to go to war with France when France was moving towards

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 3, 9.

⁶⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 183.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Paul R. Hensel, "The Evolution of The Franco-German Rivalry," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson (US: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 100-101.

⁶⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 183-186.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Paul R. Hensel, "The Evolution of The Franco-German Rivalry," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson, 101. Also see T.G. Otte, "From 'War-in-Sight' to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 4 (2006): 701-703.

⁷² John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 188.

⁷³ T.G. Otte, *From 'War-in-Sight' to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898*, 695-696.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

expanding its armed forces.⁷⁵ France sought for Britain's and Russia's assistance to deter Germany's aggression.⁷⁶

France embarked on an aggressive military expansion since 1886, talking about its revenge against Germany.⁷⁷ Germany in response openly warned of a war with France and strengthened the momentum of its military expansion.⁷⁸ It signed a treaty with Russia in 1887, aiming to forestall a military alliance between France and Russia.⁷⁹ Years later, France and Russia had moved to form an alliance against Germany.⁸⁰

Despite the intense competition between Germany and France following the unification of Germany, there was no war between the two states in the four decades since 1871.⁸¹ The power balance between them furnished a basis of order in their relations.

Germany's desire to invade France had been deterred by the military power of France alone as well as that of Russia and Britain.⁸² Germany understood that it had yet to be powerful enough to secure a victory in its annexation of French territories, even if the territories were defended by French alone.⁸³ Germany was also aware that Britain and Russia would come to France's assistance if it invaded France.⁸⁴ Britain and Russia would not accept Germany's emergence as the dominant Power in Europe.⁸⁵

France's intention to attack Germany, on the other hand, had been effectively hampered by the fact that Germany's military power was relatively stronger than that of France.⁸⁶

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid. Also see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 184.

⁷⁷ T.G. Otte, "From 'War-in-Sight' to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 17, no. 4 (2006): 701-703. Also see Paul R. Hensel, "The Evolution of The Franco-German Rivalry," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson (US: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 101.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Also see John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 184-186.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 183-188.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ T.G. Otte, *From 'War-in-Sight' to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898*, 696.

⁸⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 186.

The presence of power balance between Germany and France generated great cost for them if they were to engage in a war with one another. The two states, as a consequence, coexisted peacefully from 1871 to 1914.⁸⁷

Started from early 1900s, the balance of power between Germany and France began to tilt towards Germany.⁸⁸ The German army was the world's most powerful one by the early 1900s.⁸⁹ Germany became the strongest industrial Power in Europe during the same period.⁹⁰ Germans were increasingly convinced that their nation-state would become the dominant Power in Europe. Since then Germany began to pursue an aggressive and expansionist policy.⁹¹ It decided to build a formidable navy that would challenge Britain's naval supremacy.⁹² Germany's expansionism persisted until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.⁹³

3.1.5 Imbalance of Power – An Accelerator of War or A Basis of Peace

The presence of power imbalance between states will lead to two different outcomes. Either power imbalance will become an accelerator of war between the states concerned or it will serve as a basis of peace between them.

Power Imbalance – An Accelerator of War:

When power imbalance exists between states, the weaker ones view the immense power of their overwhelmingly powerful counterpart as a threat to their survival. They therefore intensify their defense against their mighty counterpart with the goal of securing their existence. In the face of its weaker counterparts' resistance to its expression of dominance over them, the overwhelmingly powerful state – among the states concerned – in consequence will turn the dominant behaviours into confrontational ones.

The weaker states' determination to confront the dominance of their overwhelmingly powerful counterpart and the subsequent response of the powerful one to turn the

⁸⁷ Ibid. 183-188. Also see Paul R. Hensel, "The Evolution of The Franco-German Rivalry," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson (US: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 101.

⁸⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (US: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2001), 188.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid. Also see Paul R. Hensel, "The Evolution of The Franco-German Rivalry," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson, 101.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

dominant behaviours into its confrontations against its weaker counterparts intensify the hostilities between the two parties. The intensification of hostilities often leads to a war between the strong and the weak. In other words, the power imbalance between the states concerned is an accelerator of war between them.

Power Imbalance – A Basis of Peace:

When power imbalance exists between states, the weaker ones fundamentally rely upon the immense power of their overwhelmingly powerful counterpart to safeguard their survival. In the meantime, the overwhelmingly powerful one – among the states concerned – is strategically dependent on its weaker counterparts to form its international strategic preponderance, which ultimately protects its very existence.

Because the weaker states – among the states concerned – need their overwhelmingly powerful counterpart to protect their survival, they therefore have to accept the dominance of their mighty counterpart and cease their confrontational behaviours against the counterpart. In other words, the overwhelmingly powerful state – among the states concerned – is able to express its dominance over its weaker counterparts. Such dominant behaviours, in the meantime, have been partially defused by the overwhelmingly powerful state's strategic reliance on its weaker counterparts. Consequently, the overwhelmingly powerful state's dominant behaviours towards its weaker counterparts will not become confrontational ones.

In short, the power imbalance between the states concerned ensures the absence of confrontation among them. It serves as a basis of peace between these states.

The following examples show the two different outcomes of the presence of power imbalance between states:

Power Imbalance between China and Vietnam – An Accelerator of War:

China had always been unequally stronger than Vietnam.⁹⁴ Historically, China had shown a tendency to dominate Vietnam.⁹⁵ The resistance to China's dominance has been a key feature of Vietnamese national consciousness.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 2, 9-10, 191, 193, 209.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 24, 191. Also see Nguyen Nam Duong, "Vietnamese Foreign Policy Since Doi Moi – The Dialectic of Power and Identity" (PhD diss., The University of New South Wales, 2010), 61.

Because of China's immense power vis-à-vis Vietnam, Vietnam is always fearful and suspicious of China – its northern neighbour.⁹⁷ It perceives China as its principal rival and a threat to its survival.⁹⁸ Vietnam was always determined to confront China's dominance, aiming to safeguard Vietnam's existence.⁹⁹ As China was facing resistance from Vietnam amidst its expression of dominance over Vietnam, such dominant behaviours turned into confrontational ones. Vietnam's refusal to become a deferential client to China after the end of the Vietnam War had contributed to China's decision to invade Vietnam in 1979.¹⁰⁰

Vietnam's determination to confront China's dominance and China's subsequent response to turn the dominant behaviours into confrontational ones intensified the two states' hostilities towards each other, which often led to a war between them.¹⁰¹ In other words, the power imbalance between China and Vietnam was an accelerator of war between them.

In January 1974, China's navy attacked the South Vietnamese troops stationed on the Paracels Islands and took control of the islands since then.¹⁰² In February 1979, China invaded Vietnam and captured five capitals of Vietnam's provinces bordering China.¹⁰³ China announced its withdrawal from Vietnam shortly after it had succeeded in occupying all of the five capitals.¹⁰⁴ The withdrawal was completed by 16th March 1979.¹⁰⁵ In early 1988, a fierce battle broke out between China's and Vietnam's navies in area around the Spratly Islands.¹⁰⁶ The two states each had claimed sovereignty over these islands.¹⁰⁷ Vietnam's navy was quickly defeated by China's in the battle.¹⁰⁸ Seventy Vietnamese sailors had been killed in the battle.¹⁰⁹

⁹⁷ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 10. Also see William R. Thompson, "Why Rivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries Can Tell Us about World Politics," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson (US: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 12.

⁹⁹ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry*, 2, 9-10, 209.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 187-188, 192-194, 209.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 26-27, 191-194, 209.

¹⁰² Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled- Indochina and the China-Vietnam War* (US: An East Gate Book, 1992), 125.

¹⁰³ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry*, 192, 200.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled- Indochina and the China-Vietnam War*, 130.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 124-131.

Power Imbalance between Russia and Finland – An Accelerator of War:

For centuries, Finland was under the domination of Russia.¹¹⁰ It was part of Russia since the early eighteenth century.¹¹¹ Finland declared its independence on 6th December 1917 shortly after the revolution of Russia, which took place in March that year.¹¹² Getting rid of the Russian troops on Finland's soils was the prime goal of the Finnish government during the first years of Finland's independence.¹¹³

Russia was overwhelmingly stronger than Finland.¹¹⁴ In the eyes of Finland, Russia was its traditional enemy and the prime threat to its survival.¹¹⁵ Since its independence, Finland had been finding ways to confront Russia's dominance with the goal of protecting Finland's existence. It proposed the formation of some kind of alliance between Finland, Sweden and the three Baltic states within the framework of the League of Nations to confront the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union.¹¹⁶ Finland associated with the Western Powers – Britain and France – and Germany, hoping that they would protect the existence of Finland.¹¹⁷ Finland also sought to establish a defensive alliance with Sweden.¹¹⁸ In the early 1930s, the Soviet proposed the formation of an eastern security system.¹¹⁹ It tried to include Finland in this architecture.¹²⁰ Finland was hostile to the Soviet proposal.¹²¹ It responded by declaring its solidarity with the Nordic neutrals.¹²²

Russia was facing Finland's resistance to its move to dominate Finland. Finland's attempt to form an alliance within the League of Nations against the Soviet prompted the Soviet hostilities towards Finland.¹²³ Confronted with Finland's resistance, Russia's expression of dominance over Finland began to turn into confrontational ones. In 1935,

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 130.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Eloise Engle and Lauri Paananen, *The Winter War – The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940* (US: Stackpole Books, 1992), xiii-xiv.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ D.G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century* (US: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 122.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. 106-108, 115.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 112-113.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 107, 110-111, 115-116

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 112-113, 116.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 115-116.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid. 115.

Russia informed Finland that it might have to occupy parts of Finland to fortify the security of Russia should war break out between the Soviet and Germany.¹²⁴

The Soviet continued to sought ways to incorporate Finland into its sphere of influence to safeguard its own survival. In the face of an increasingly aggressive Nazi Germany, Russia began to demand territorial concessions from Finland since 1938.¹²⁵ Russia wanted to set up its military bases in these territories, aiming to prevent Germany from invading Russia through Finland.¹²⁶ Russia's demand for territorial concessions was accompanied by its offer of economic and military assistance to Finland.¹²⁷

Finland adamantly rejected Russia's demand.¹²⁸ It perceived such demand as Russia's attempt to dominate Finland.¹²⁹ Finland was fully aware of the risk of a war with Russia – its giant neighbour – which would be brought about by its decision to deny Russia access to its territories.¹³⁰ It moved to mobilize its army to prepare for a possible war with Russia.¹³¹

Finland's determination to confront Russia's dominance led to Russia's decision to confront Finland.¹³² The two states' hostilities towards one another had been intensified as a result.¹³³ Russia invaded Finland in November 1939.¹³⁴ The power imbalance between the two states had been an accelerator of war between them. The world's largest military Power – Russia – had invaded one of the world's smallest states – Finland.¹³⁵ Finland capitulated in March 1940.¹³⁶ Russia in the end had acquired more territories from Finland than it previously demanded.¹³⁷

¹²⁴ Ibid. 117.

¹²⁵ Ibid. 117-121.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 109-110, 117-121.

¹²⁷ Ibid. 117-121.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 121-122.

¹²⁹ Ibid. 118.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 121-122.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid. 119-122.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid. 122.

¹³⁵ William R. Trotter, *A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940* (US: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1991), 3.

¹³⁶ D.G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century* (US: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 128-129.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Power Imbalance between the United States and Western Europe – A Basis of Peace:

The states in Western Europe relied on the overwhelmingly powerful America – a Superpower – for their basic security in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union – the other Superpower.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, America was strategically dependent on its weaker counterparts in Western Europe to constitute its strategic preponderance in the region in order to contain the Soviet aggression.¹³⁹ Such strategic preponderance ultimately served to secure America's very survival.¹⁴⁰

As the Western European states needed America to protect their survival, they therefore had to accept America's dominance and cease their confrontational behaviours against America. In other words, America was able to express its dominance over the Western European states. Such dominant behaviours, meanwhile, had been partially defused by America's strategic reliance on these states. Consequently, America's dominant behaviours towards the Western European states did not turn into confrontational ones.

The Western European states allowed America to dictate their defence policy.¹⁴¹ They hosted American troops and allowed America to locate its strategic weapons on their soils.¹⁴² Because of America's dominance, violent conflicts among the Western European states had been prevented.¹⁴³

In other words, the power imbalance between America and Western Europe ensured the absence of confrontation between them as well as within Western Europe. The power imbalance, therefore, functioned as a basis of peace among America and Western Europe.

Peace prevailed in Western Europe since the end of World War II.¹⁴⁴ There was no war in Western Europe and no border in the region had been changed by force.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁸ Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, no.54 (1984): 67-69, 72, 74, 81-82.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.* 67, 81-82.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* 68, 72.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* 78, 82.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 66, 73-74.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 66.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

3.1.6 Strategic Cooperation

Two states will cooperate with each other when they share common strategic interests.¹⁴⁶ As Walt writes, states will align with each other for survival when they face common external threats.¹⁴⁷ Both states need each other for survival, hence both see its counterpart's interest as its own interest, when their survival are being threaten. For example, driven by their shared perceptions of the threats posed by India, China and Pakistan each sees threat exerted by India on its counterpart as its own threat.¹⁴⁸ China assisted Pakistan in its development of nuclear weapons when Pakistan was threatened by India's emergence as a nuclear power.¹⁴⁹

The mutual positive identifications between two states, which derive from them sharing common strategic interests, lead to the two states' shared understanding that their tie is closer than their other bilateral relations. For example, the strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan had led the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shaukat Aziz, to assert that the two states "enjoy all weather friendship based on complete trust and confidence".¹⁵⁰ Similarly, China's policy makers view Pakistan as their traditional old friend.¹⁵¹ Such an understanding – that their tie is closer – generates aspiration for peace between the two states concerned while stirring up their mutual expectation that their relationship should be more intimate than their other bilateral ties owing to their shared strategic interest. The desire for peace between two states bound by strategic ties can be observed from a remark made by a Chinese top military officer on China's relations with Pakistan, "...no matter what changes may take place in international situation and in each other's country, the two peoples always support each

¹⁴⁶ As defined in this thesis, common strategic interests of two states mean the two states rely on each other's material presence for survival. A state's strategic interest means a material presence which is fundamental to its survival.

¹⁴⁷ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17-33, 147-148, 262-263.

¹⁴⁸ Swaran Singh, "Introduction," in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2007), 17.

¹⁴⁹ Satyabrata Sinha, "China in Pakistan's Security Perceptions," in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 93.

¹⁵⁰ Swaran Singh, "Introduction," in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 17-18. Also see Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Shaukat Aziz's Inaugural Speech to the International Conference on 'China and the Emerging Asian Century' at Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, on 27 September 2005, quoted in Swaran Singh, "Introduction," in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 22.

¹⁵¹ Anindyo J. Majumdar, "The Changing Imperatives," in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 40.

other, sympathize with each other and help each other.”¹⁵² On the other hand, the expectation dynamics between two states with strategic cooperation are illustrated by the expectation of Pakistani policy makers and experts that their state remains central to China’s strategic vision of South Asia.¹⁵³

The strategic cooperation-induced positive identifications between the two states involved may eventually result in the extension of their respective conceptions of self to each other in which both view the counterpart as part of self, namely, as a friend, hence sharing cooperative intersubjective understandings. For example, despite experiencing significant changes in the environment of world politics such as China’s new rapprochement with India and improving India-Pakistan relations, China-Pakistan strategic cooperation remains astonishingly durable and comprehensive which continues to underwrite the politico-strategic dynamics in South Asia.¹⁵⁴ As Garver writes, “China’s cooperative relation with Pakistan is arguably the most stable and durable element of China’s foreign relations”.¹⁵⁵ The enduring character of strategic ties between China and Pakistan indicates that such cooperation has been spawned and sustained by their shared cooperative intersubjective understandings.

However, two states’ shared cooperative intersubjective understandings that are produced by their strategic cooperation alone are not fundamentally long-lasting. As strategic interest is a state’s material interest, there is always a possibility that two states’ common strategic interest will no longer exist due to the disappearance of a material presence. Once the common strategic interest vanishes, the strategic cooperation-induced positive identifications between the two states involved will come to a halt, their egoistic tendency driven by their respective corporate nature will emerge, and ultimately, weaken if not eliminate their shared cooperative intersubjective

¹⁵² ‘Pakistan President meets Chinese Military Delegation’ *Xinhua* 6 May 1997, quoted in Srikanth Kondapalli, “Pakistan in China’s Security Perceptions,” in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2007), 53.

¹⁵³ Swaran Singh, “Introduction,” in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 21.

¹⁵⁴ Swaran Singh, “Introduction,” in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 17-18. Also see Anindyo J. Majumdar, “The Changing Imperatives,” in *China-Pakistan Strategic Cooperation - Indian Perspectives*, ed. Swaran Singh, 35, 39-40.

¹⁵⁵ John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest - Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (US: University of Washington Press, 2001), 187.

understandings.¹⁵⁶ For example, the intimate friendship between China and Vietnam since the 1950s had turned into implacable hostility in the mid-1970s when their common threat – the US – had ended its war in Vietnam, which subsequently gave rise to their strategic competition, namely, the two states’ respective desire to dominate Indochina.¹⁵⁷

3.2 Identity

This section first explains the basic dynamics of identity. It spells out that a state’s understanding of self is constituted by its corporate and self identities, in which an actor’s sense of self underpins, and spawns its will to survive. As such, an actor constantly seeks to protect and enhance its identity so as to secure a stable sense of self, which also means securing its survival. This section then reveals that national identity, founded on a nation’s pre-existing ethnic community, consists of civic and ethnic elements. It explains that national identity needs to be unique, so as to mark a nation’s existence vis-à-vis the world of nations. National identity, therefore, denotes a state’s intrinsic consciousness to exist. It generates a state’s tendency to appreciate self in egoistic terms. This section then moves to explain the double-edged effects of common identities of two states that derive from their shared ethnic pasts. While generating a shared perception among the two states concerned that they share a closer relation than their other bilateral ties, such common identities, on the one hand, serve as a source of conflicts between the two states, hence breeds negative identifications between them; on the other hand, as a source of cooperation, which is interweaved with positive identifications between the two states.

3.2.1 The Basic Dynamics of Self

As mentioned in the previous section, corporate identity and self-identity constitute an actor’s understanding of self. Driven by its corporate nature, which is its intrinsic consciousness of individual security and well-being, a state has a natural tendency of “in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination” hence is “cognitively predisposed to

¹⁵⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 385, 387.

¹⁵⁷ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-2, 25-27. Also see Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled- Indochina and the China-Vietnam War* (US: An East Gate Book, 1992), xv-xvi, 29-31.

be self-interested” when it comes into interaction with other states.¹⁵⁸ Viewed in this light, the corporate nature of a state generates its tendency to understand self in egoistic terms. Yet, such a tendency does not render immutable group egoism of a state, as self-identity entails identifications with others, therefore “the boundaries of the self are not inherently limited to corporate identity”.¹⁵⁹

An actor’s sense of self serves as the foundation of its natural will to survive. By referring identity as ‘ego identity’, Erikson observed that, “...in the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of ego identity.”¹⁶⁰ An actor will read its survival as under threat when its sense of self is in jeopardy. As a consequence, an actor constantly seeks to protect and enhance its identity, so as to acquire a stable sense of self which equally means securing its very survival.¹⁶¹ Such dynamics can be observed from the fact that millions of people in the past two centuries were willing to die for their “nation”, an identity which is founded on the fraternal association of a particular population.¹⁶² In sum, the in-group or inter-groups identification of a state essentially concerns its sense of self which underpins, and spawns its will to survive.

3.2.2 National Identity

According to Smith, a nation is a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”¹⁶³ Such a definition reflects the dualistic nature of national identity in which every nation is constituted by civic and ethnic elements in “varying degrees and different forms”.¹⁶⁴ A nation is civic in the sense that it is a political-legal community with well-defined territories, a mass public culture and a common economy.¹⁶⁵ It has its ethnic basis because pre-existing

¹⁵⁸ Jonathon Mercer, “Anarchy, Self-Help, and Relative Gains,” *Stanford University*, Typescript (1993), quoted in Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 387.

¹⁵⁹ Alexander Wendt, *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, 387.

¹⁶⁰ Erik H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle: Volume I* (US: Indiana University Press, 1959), 89.

¹⁶¹ William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 37-40.

¹⁶² Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities- Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1991), 7.

¹⁶³ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 14.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 13.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 12-15, 40.

ethnic community forms the grounds for a claim to nationhood, in which such community provides the answer to the question of 'who is the nation'.¹⁶⁶ The culture of an ethnic community which forms a nation is usually being inculcated into its national culture through the nation's public education system, where such a public culture is ethnic as well as civic.¹⁶⁷

Smith defines an ethnic community as a population with cultural collectivity that emphasizes the myths of common ancestry and shared historical memories, consists of one or more elements of shared culture, with a mythical association to specific territories and a sense of solidarity among the population.¹⁶⁸ Such a definition reveals the subjective nature of an *ethnie* in which it is the myths, not the facts, of common ancestry that underpin the foundation of an *ethnie*.¹⁶⁹ The mythical tie of an *ethnie* is essential for its survival as it is its fictive descent that generates the sense of ethnic identification.¹⁷⁰

Smith observes that many modern nations have been formed around pre-existing dominant *ethnies*, for such communities, like nations, are founded on common myths and memories, and are closely associated with specific territories.¹⁷¹ The boundaries and identities of a nation hence are often determined by the myths and memories of its pre-existing dominant *ethnies*.

National identity is vital for every individual. It allows people to define and locate individual self in a world of nations.¹⁷² This explains the necessity of every nation's identity to be distinctive. As Anderson writes, "no nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind".¹⁷³ A nation needs its own character so as to ensure its existence against other nations. Such a requirement underpins the importance of a community's ethnic

¹⁶⁶ Anthony D. Smith, "Theories of Nationalism: Alternative Models of Nation Formation," in *AsianNationalism*, ed. Michael Leifer (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 7.

¹⁶⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 13, 40, 61. Also see Anthony D. Smith, "Theories of Nationalism: Alternative Models of Nation Formation," in *AsianNationalism*, ed. Michael Leifer, 7.

¹⁶⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, 20-23.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 22.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.* 38-40. Also see Anthony D. Smith, "Theories of Nationalism: Alternative Models of Nation Formation," in *AsianNationalism*, ed. Michael Leifer, 12-13.

¹⁷² Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, 17. Also see Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in A Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 154.

¹⁷³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities- Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, New York: Verso, 1991), 7.

past, as it furnishes the reservoir of historical culture for the population to rediscover their collective identity that is unique and authentic, thereby marks their existence as a nation in the modern world.¹⁷⁴

The essentiality of cultural uniqueness for a claim to nationhood underscores the indispensability of fictive common ancestry of a nation's pre-existing ethnic community. Such mythical descents allow nationalists to return, rediscover and reinterpret the *ethnie's* glorious and moral pasts which, in turn, furnish the present generations with cognitive maps of the community's history, place and destiny that inspire and mobilize them into forming a nation based on their ethnic ties.¹⁷⁵

The transformation of a pre-existing ethnic community into a modern nation takes place in the form of nationalism. Nationalism is a political ideology centered on cultural doctrine that preaches the cultural distinctiveness of an actual or potential nation.¹⁷⁶ Such an ideology, by reinventing an *ethnie's* pasts into irreplaceable national identity, evokes the fraternal association of its people, summons and elevates them to the centre political stage to quest for a nation, and legitimizes the continued existence of such a nation.¹⁷⁷ As Smith defines, nationalism is "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'."¹⁷⁸ This understanding reveals that, by pursuing autonomy, unity and identity which are essentially founded on cultural differentiation, nationalism not only mobilizes people towards forming a nation, it also ensures people's sustained efforts in perpetuating the existence of the nation. In other words, nationalism, which realizes and legitimizes a nation, also serves as a principle that informs the nation-state's foreign policy. Through the fraternal identification, the people of a nation will preserve, defend and enhance their distinctive national identity such that the nation will not become invisible vis-à-vis the world of nations.¹⁷⁹ This being said, national identity constitutes the corporate identity of a state as, founded on distinctive qualities of a nation, national identity denotes a state's intrinsic

¹⁷⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 64, 70, 75.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 64-69.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 73, 74, 84.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 78, 84. Also see Anthony D. Smith, "Theories of Nationalism: Alternative Models of Nation Formation," in *Asian Nationalism*, ed. Michael Leifer (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 1.

¹⁷⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, 73.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. 70. Also see William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 26, 79.

consciousness to exist. The dynamics of national identity generate a state's tendency to appreciate self in egoistic terms.

3.2.3 The Double-edged Effects of Common Identity

The nature of a pre-modern ethnic community has crucial impacts on relations between states who originated from the same *ethnie*. An *ethnie* emphasizes on its myths of common ancestry and historical memories which form its mythical attachments to specific stretches of territory. Yet, instead of its actual residence on a land, it is the community's fictive associations with the land that contribute to ethnic identification.¹⁸⁰ A nation, on the other hand, is founded on myths of common descent and memories of its pre-existing *ethnie*, and possesses physical control of the territories which it considers as homeland.¹⁸¹ The close relationship between a nation and an *ethnie* reveals a phenomena in which a pre-modern ethnic community continues to spawn bonds between nation-states who are founded on the *ethnie*, and possess the actual territorial control of lands within the *ethnie*'s associating sacred territories. As Huntington had pointed out, a civilization usually stretches across several nation-states as in the case of Latin American and Arab civilizations.¹⁸²

Because of their mutual positive identifications that stem from their common ethnic ties, two nation-states who originate from the same *ethnie* share an understanding that their relationship is closer than their other bilateral relationships. For example, states that associate with each other based on cultural affinities such as Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Latin-Americanism, where through such associations advocate their cultural closeness, and in turn, set them apart from the culturally different others.¹⁸³ Such an understanding – that their relationship is closer – generates aspiration for peace between the two nation-states who share common ethnic pasts while stirring up their mutual expectation that their relationship should be more intimate than their relations with culturally different others. For example, at the peak of Pan-Arabism between 1940s to late 1960s, such cultural closeness evoked the desire for peace among

¹⁸⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 23.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. 40.

¹⁸² Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993): 24.

¹⁸³ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in A Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 119-120.

Arab states where they advocated Arab unity as their transcendent goal.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, the expectation dynamics between nation-states with cultural affinity are exemplified by the breaking-off of relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt shortly after Egypt had reached a peace agreement with Israel in 1979.¹⁸⁵ Saudi felt betrayed and was infuriated by Egypt as it did not match with Saudi's expectation that, as a member of the Arab World, Egypt should stand together with its culturally affiliated Arabian states in their struggle against Israeli, their common enemy with different culture, instead of having a separate peace with Israel.¹⁸⁶

However, although two nation-states originating from the same *ethnie* share the perception of having a close relationship, their common identity spawns paradoxical impacts on their bilateral relations. Such common identity, which rests on their common ethnic pasts, is a source of conflicts as well as a source of cooperation for the two states involved.

As every national identity needs to be unique for the sake of a nation-state's existence vis-à-vis other nations, nation-states, even though founded on the same *ethnie*, have to explain their respective cultural distinctiveness based on their common mythical ethnic pasts. As a consequence, the inevitable similarities in their national identities due to their common origins strengthen the need of the nation-states involved to emphasize their respective distinctive qualities. In other words, because they are similar hence they, in fact, need to enhance their difference. Such necessities of differentiating self from the sameness spur conflicts between the nation-states involved.

This phenomenon can be observed from the relationships between the United States and Canada and the relations among the Arab states. Underpinned by their common identity which derives from their shared Anglo-Saxon heritage, and facilitated by their geographical proximity, the United States and Canada have experienced "unparalleled

¹⁸⁴ Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 96. Also see Elie Chalala, "Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 18.

¹⁸⁵ Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East- From Interstate War to New Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 134, 141.

¹⁸⁶ Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East- From Interstate War to New Security*, 139-141. Also see Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 108. Also see Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, "Stress and Disintegration in the Arab World," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 170-173.

cultural and commercial integration of two national societies”.¹⁸⁷ The high degree of integration and similarities between the two states pose great concerns among Canadians on their existence vis-à-vis the ubiquitous presence of predominantly powerful Americans.¹⁸⁸ Such worries are exemplified by a Canadian who wrote about Australia with envy: “They (Australians) worry not at all about the preservation of their national identity. Who could ever mistake an Australian?”, in which the underlying meaning of the writing is: who could not mistake a Canadian as an American?¹⁸⁹ As a consequence, anti-Americanism becomes the premise of Canadian Nationalism.¹⁹⁰ Canada seeks for its uniqueness by emphasizing its difference with its culturally similar neighbour. Bothwell has described the Canadians’ sentiments about the US in the 1960s, “For Canadians, relations between the two countries were not a means of expressing similarities but of defining and even amplifying differences”.¹⁹¹ Such conscious efforts to draw distinctions culminate in Canada and the US to routinely embroil in myriad of policy disputes such as Canadian government’s insistence to maintain its peacekeeping role in Vietnam instead of joining the war with the US in Vietnam during the 1960s, and its criticisms on the US’s efforts to escalate this war; Canadian government’s decision to not participate in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the basis that such a military intervention should not be implemented without a UN mandate, and the criticisms by

¹⁸⁷ Sean M. Shore, “No fences make good neighbors: The Development of the Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 335. Also see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), 363. Also see Srdjan Vucetic, M.A., “The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations” (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008), ii. Also see Stephane Roussel, *The North American Democratic Peace – Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958* (Montreal&Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 78. Also see John Sloan Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence – The United States Interest in an independent Canada* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 180.

¹⁸⁸ John Sloan Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence – The United States Interest in an independent Canada*, 80.

¹⁸⁹ Speech to Hamilton Canadian Club, April 29, 1964. In Arnold D.P. Heeney Papers, MG 30 E144, Vol. 10, NAC, quoted in Srdjan Vucetic, M.A., *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations*, 183.

¹⁹⁰ John Sloan Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence – The United States Interest in an independent Canada*, 72. Also see Srdjan Vucetic, M.A., *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations*, 182.

¹⁹¹ Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion- Canada and The World, 1945-1984* (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2007), 215.

the majority members of the then ruling Liberal Party that such an invasion was unnecessary.¹⁹²

For the Arab states, on the other hand, the dynamics of common identity in the name of Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism have prompted some of them to emphasize on their unique national identities so as to assert their respective existence amid the cultural similarities in the Arab World.¹⁹³ Consequently, the differentiating dynamics between nationalisms and Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic identity have become the sources of tensions among the Arab states.¹⁹⁴ For example, Iraq's accentuation on its sovereignty rather than embracing Arab unity in the late 1950s had resulted in the escalation of its tensions with Egypt.¹⁹⁵ Similarly, Egypt's advocacy of "Egyptianism" against Pan-Islamism in the late 1970s had led to its serious conflicts with Saudi Arabia.¹⁹⁶

In sum, because of a nation-state's basic need to be unique, nation-states' common identities which derive from their shared ethnic pasts become a source of conflicts between them. The nation-states concerned consciously seek to enhance their differences out of their sameness in the form of national identities, consequently, breed negative identifications between them, strengthening their respective tendency to understand each other in egoistic terms.

Paradoxically, such common identities, on the other hand, spawn positive identifications between the nation-states involved. As Huntington has observed, groups or states who come from the same civilization naturally associate positively with each other, in which civilization commonality underpins cooperation between them

¹⁹² David G. Haglund, "The US-Canada Relationship- How 'Special' is America's Oldest Unbroken Alliance?" in *America's 'Special Relationships' – Foreign and Domestic Aspects of The Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 68. Also see Srdjan Vucetic, M.A, "The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations" (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008), 207-210, 220, 229-230, 279.

¹⁹³ Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, "Stress and Disintegration in the Arab World," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 171-173. Also see Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 98.

¹⁹⁴ Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, "Stress and Disintegration in the Arab World," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 167, 171-173.

¹⁹⁵ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 74-75.

¹⁹⁶ Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat, "Stress and Disintegration in the Arab World," in *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism- The Continuing Debate*, ed. Tawfic E. Farah, 171-173. Also see Bassam Tibi, *Conflict and War in the Middle East- From Interstate War to New Security* (New York: St.Martion's Press, 1998), 139-141.

particularly amid the coexistence with other civilizations.¹⁹⁷ The cultural affinity-induced positive identifications may eventually result in the extension of the appreciations of self of the two states involved to each other, which ultimately lead them to understand the counterpart as part of self, hence sharing cooperative intersubjective understandings. For example, because of their shared identity founded on common Anglo-Saxon heritage, the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand view each other as collective-self, in which violent conflict between them is unthinkable, namely, they constitute a security community, and cooperation among them are deep, which entail the “most sensitive areas of state sovereignty”.¹⁹⁸

The cultural affinity-induced positive identifications between the states involved will intensify when they coexist with other states founded on different *ethnies*, especially when these culturally different states pose threats to them. As Huntington has pointed out, the increasing interactions between different civilizations intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of commonalities within a civilization and differences between civilizations.¹⁹⁹ Such intensification of positive identifications between the states who share common identities enhances the saliency of their common strategic outlook, hence results in the deepening of their cooperation when confronting with perceived threats posed by culturally different others. For example, during the Cold War, the US and Canada, bound by their common Anglo-Saxon identity, had forged between them one of the closest military alliance in the world to resist their perceived common external threat exerted by the culturally different Soviet Unions.²⁰⁰

3.3 Expectation

As mentioned in previous sections, when two states perceive that they share a closer relation than their other bilateral ties, it consequently stirs up their mutual expectation that both should be more intimate than their relationships with others. Such an

¹⁹⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993): 35.

¹⁹⁸ Srdjan Vucetic, M.A., “The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations” (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008), 2, 22.

¹⁹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?*, 25.

²⁰⁰ David G. Haglund, “The US-Canada Relationship- How ‘Special’ is America’s Oldest Unbroken Alliance?” in *America’s ‘Special Relationships’ – Foreign and Domestic Aspects of The Politics of Alliance*, ed. John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 61, 64-65. Also see John Sloan Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence – The United States Interest in an independent Canada* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), 77.

expectation often produces paradoxical effects on the relations between the two states involved.

An expectation is an assumed result.²⁰¹ Because of them sharing a perception of having closer relations than their other bilateral ties, the two states concerned logically assume that the counterpart should act in ways which are consistent with such a perception. For example, in the early 1940s, because of their common culture and historical ties, Britain perceived its relations with the US as a relationship of family ties.²⁰² Such view produced Britain's tendency to expect that the US should help them in facing the threat from Nazi Germany, and would eventually join Britain in its war against Nazi Germany.²⁰³ The expectation held by Britain on the US was illustrated by Churchill's firm determination to fight on against Nazi Germany amid pressure that called for a compromise peace as he assumed that the US, because of their intimate ties, would eventually join them to fight the Nazi Germany.²⁰⁴

Owing to the fact that expectation is an assumed but not an actual result, it hence leads to one outcome or another, namely, match or mismatch of expectation. Such different outcomes produce virtually opposite effects. As Leahy has observed, when expectation is met, a person will experience happiness, and when expectation is not met, a person will experience disappointment.²⁰⁵ Fairlie, on the other hand, discerns that in the atmosphere of high expectation, people's unmet expectation would turn into forces rife with frustration.²⁰⁶ As relations among states are essentially operated by human, such expectation dynamics apply to the relationships between two states.

For two states sharing a perception of having closer relations than their other bilateral ties, when either of the states' expectation on its counterpart has been matched by the counterpart's intention, substantial cooperation between them will be produced and the positive identifications among them will be reinforced. For example, between 1950s to 1975, because of their close ties that derives from revolutionary comradeship of

²⁰¹ James P. Leahy, *Bridging the Expectation Gap: The Key to Happiness* (US: AuthorHouse, 2006), xi.

²⁰² David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 287, 293.

²⁰³ David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation*, 10, 287, 293.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ James P. Leahy, *Bridging the Expectation Gap: The Key to Happiness*, x.

²⁰⁶ Henry Fairlie, *The Kennedy Promise – The Politics of Expectation* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), 13-15.

communist parties, Vietnam expected lavish aid and advice from China in its struggle against France and later the US for independence.²⁰⁷ Such an expectation was matched by China's intention to provide unrestricted support to Vietnam owing to their communist fraternal ties, China's desire to export its model of successful revolution and to extend its influence abroad.²⁰⁸ As a consequence, the cooperation between the two states in these years was intense and intimate, to an extent where their relationship was often being described as - "as close as lips and teeth", and Vietnam expressed its gratitude for China's friendship and wholehearted support.²⁰⁹

On the other hand, when either of the states' expectation on its counterpart does not match with the counterpart's intention, the positive identifications that come with the expectation quickly turn into acute negative identifications between them and substantial conflicts among them ensued. For example, after Vietnam's victory in the Vietnam War and the subsequent reunification of the state, China expected Vietnam to be a grateful and deferential client, willing to forswear its ties with China's rival – the Soviet Union, and request less aid from China.²¹⁰ Such an expectation did not match with Vietnam's intention. Vietnam intended to be an independent power and had the desire to consolidate its sphere of influence in Indochina, thus, declined to join China in its struggle against the Soviet Union, instead, forged closer ties with the Soviet. ²¹¹ As a consequence, the unfulfilled expectation led China to interpret Vietnam's uncooperative behavior as a sign of hostility, consequently, refused to provide new aid to Vietnam in response to such perceived hostility.²¹² Vietnam subsequently moved to alliance with the Soviet Union which culminated in China's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979.²¹³

In sum, the dynamics of expectation generates double-edged effects on relations between the two states involved. The matching of expectation results in substantial

²⁰⁷ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 162-163.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. 162-163, 187.

²¹⁰ Ibid. 186, 188.

²¹¹ Ibid. 188, 192-193. Also see Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled- Indochina and the China-Vietnam War* (US: An East Gate Book, 1992), 34-35.

²¹² Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry*, 190-192. Also see Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled- Indochina and the China-Vietnam War*, 34.

²¹³ Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam – The Politics of Asymmetry*, 190-192. Also see Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled- Indochina and the China-Vietnam War*, 34-35, 50-51.

cooperation between them. The mismatch of expectation, on the other hand, leads to substantial conflicts between them.

3.4 Norms

Norms are “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”.²¹⁴ Norms hence understandably are derived from an actor’s identity. For example, as Berger has observed, antimilitarism, which constitutes the integral part of Germany’s and Japan’s national identities after their disastrous defeat in the Second World War, has rendered the two states to be very reluctant in resorting to the use of military force in pursuing national objectives.²¹⁵ They have adhered to such norms despite experiencing tremendous changes in post-1945 international environment and the augmentation of their respective power, which periodically required the two states to reconsider their antimilitary stands.²¹⁶

Once established, Acharya writes, “norms have a life of their own”.²¹⁷ They produce independent effects that shape an actor’s behaviour, and redefine its identity and interest.²¹⁸ In other words, established norms become the intersubjective understandings shared by the actors involved, in which norms shape and are shaped by their conception of self.²¹⁹ For example, in the mid-1980s, rooted in new collective understandings about international politics and their evolving identities, the reformers in the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, had ushered in new political order to the Soviet that envisioned the USSR as a democratic and peaceable state which believed in values common to all mankind.²²⁰ Such norms, encapsulated in the term - “New

²¹⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), 5. Also see Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 54.

²¹⁵ Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 317-318, 330-333.

²¹⁶ Ibid. 317-318, 332, 355.

²¹⁷ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 24

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 397-399. Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no.2 (1998): 327- 328.

²²⁰ Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 271-275, 311.

Thinking”, generated independent effects once they were incorporated in the reformative policy prescriptions introduced by the Soviet leaders. The implementation of the “New Thinking” norms precipitated more radical reforms in the Soviet, and later resulted in the collapse of Warsaw Pact regime, where such norms triggered the popular uprisings in the Soviet’s Eastern European allies, and rendered Moscow to adhere to the new norm of not imposing its will, especially by using force, on its Warsaw Pact allies, so as to crush these anticommunist movements.²²¹ The dramatic events that ensued following the introduction of the “New Thinking” norms had shown that, although it was the Soviet leaders that initiated the establishment of the new norms, once being formed, such norms by themselves able to engender effects which were independent of, and well beyond the control of the Soviet leaders.

Norms generate either regulative or both regulative and constitutive effects on actors. Norms, on the one hand, regulate the behaviours of an actor by prescribing standards of proper behaviours of a defined identity.²²² The regulatory effects of norms can be discerned from relations among states which constitute a security regime. The behaviours of states in a security regime are restricted by discernable war avoidance norms, in which each member state expect others to reciprocate.²²³ However, such norms in a security regime are yet to constitute the collective-self identity among its member states, which would ensure the total absence of possible violent conflict among them as each view others as part of self. In a security regime, despite the presence of war avoidance norms, member states are still engaged in competitive military build-up.²²⁴ On the other hand, norms define an actor’s identity by specifying actions which reflect that particular identity.²²⁵ For example, in a security community, the practicing

²²¹ Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), 305-307.

²²² Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 5. Also see Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 54.

²²³ Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?” in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 180, 191.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 5. Also see Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National

of peaceful change habit by the member states constitute their extension of self-conception to each other, thereby, reinforce the mutually identifying “we-feeling” among them.²²⁶

Norms can be categorized into social and legal norms. Social norms spawn informal social controls.²²⁷ While legal norms, which are the formal laws, “become most effective when informal social controls break down”.²²⁸ As Acharya has pointed out, a security community is essentially founded on social norms instead of the legal ones.²²⁹ Deutsch has described, the presence of peaceful change among states in a security community is rooted in them sharing a sense of community where each view others as part of self.²³⁰ This point to the fact that the norm of peaceful change that constitutes a security community is by nature social, as the norm is fundamentally upheld and sustained by the social bonds shared among the member states.

As mentioned in previous sections, when two states share a perception where their relationship is closer than their other bilateral ties, such a perception spawns aspiration for peace among them. The aspiration for peace indicates their tendency to eschew from possible violent conflict between them, hence serves as the foundation for the emergence of war avoidance norms shared by the two states. For example, since the late 1970s, the desire for peace between Argentina and Brazil, which stems from their similar Latin American culture, has contributed to them sharing war avoidance practices such as confidence building measures, arms control agreements, defensive military posture and reduction in military spending.²³¹ However, the war prevention norms

Security,” in *The Culture of National Security – Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 54.

²²⁶ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5, 129. Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50, no.2 (1998): 327- 328. Also see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 400-401. Also see Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no.2 (1994): 386.

²²⁷ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 25.

²²⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security – Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 43.

²²⁹ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, 25.

²³⁰ Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, 5, 129.

²³¹ Andrew Hurrell, “An Emerging Security Community in South America?” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 228-261.

spawned by the aspiration for peace between two states do not mean the permanent elimination of possible armed conflict between them, namely, the existence of a security community. States might still engage in competitive military practices while adhering to war avoidance norms. For example, despite sharing war prevention practices, Brazil's and Argentina's military practices are still essentially competitive, as exemplified by Brazil's rejection to Argentina's idea of early notification to each other their respective new arms purchases and military exercises.²³² As such, although the presence of war avoidance norms founded on the aspiration for peace between two states is essential for them to become a security community, the existence of such norms, however, do not indicate their status as a security community.

3.5 Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change

Dependable expectations of peaceful change forms the key distinguishing feature of a security community.²³³ It is stable expectations among member states in a security community where neither side would prepare or even consider to use organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.²³⁴ As such, the presence of collective-self among the states involved is necessary in order for them to entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change.²³⁵ This is because armed conflict is unthinkable among states who view each other as part of self.

The requirement of the existence of collective-self for the practicing of dependable expectations of peaceful change indicates that such peaceful change functions between states who share cooperative intersubjective understandings. Cooperative intersubjective understandings are founded on the states involved sharing the conception of collective-self.²³⁶ States embedded in such understandings view their respective interests in collective-self terms, hence pursue among them altruistic security practices, which means they do not defend themselves against each other.²³⁷

²³² Ibid. 254-255.

²³³ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "A Framework for The Study of Security Community," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 34.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid. 38-39, 45.

²³⁶ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 400-401.

²³⁷ Ibid.

States practicing dependable expectations of peaceful change entail three distinctive features. Among the states involved, there is the absence of war, absence of the preparation for war against each other, and absence of the consideration of waging a war against one another.²³⁸ Viewed in this light, war avoidance norms are the foundation for the presence of dependable expectations of peaceful change among states.²³⁹ States involved at least need to avoid war before they could learn to forswear competitive security measures directed at each other. In this sense, dependable expectations of peaceful change are built on norms and they, in fact, by themselves are norms. As Wendt has pointed out, intersubjective understandings are usually expressed in terms of shared norms.²⁴⁰ The emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change between states denotes the consolidation of the war avoidance norm shared by the states into their shared norm where they would not even consider using force against each other.

²³⁸ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 16.

²³⁹ Christopher B. Roberts, "ASEAN's Security Community Project – Challenges and Opportunities in the Pursuit of Comprehensive Integration" (PhD diss., The University of New South Wales, 2008), 73-74, 76.

²⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992): 399-401.

CHAPTER 4

THE EVOLUTION OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP INTO A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY

This chapter explains the dynamics of a special relationship and its transformation into a pluralistic security community.

The first section of this chapter reveals the double-edged effects of a special relationship. A special relationship produces substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts between the two states involved. This section explains that the intertwined three sources of conflict in a special relationship – power competition between the two states involved; their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart; and the mismatch of expectation between them – breed and enhance the negative identifications between the two states involved, which lead them to understand one another in egoistic terms. In other words, the two states share conflictual intersubjective understandings, despite having special ties with each other.

The second section of this chapter reveals a special relationship's characteristic as a security regime. It first explains the nature of a security regime. A security regime refers to the war avoidance norms around which expectations of the states involved converge. Each of the states observes the norms in the belief that others will reciprocate. It then points out that states in a security regime share reasonable expectations of peaceful change: war between them is unlikely, not unthinkable; each of them is convinced that the counterpart will not use force to settle their disputes, yet no one is certain about it.

This section then moves to explain that a special relationship constitutes a security regime. It reveals that the war avoidance norms in a special relationship that come with the emergence of the relationship are produced by the two sources of closeness of the two states involved – common identities and shared strategic interests. The two sources of closeness generate the two states' mutual aspiration for peace, which subsequently give rise to their shared war avoidance norms. As both states in a special relationship observe their shared war avoidance norms, the substantial conflicts between them, therefore, will not easily turn into violent ones.

Finally, this section points out that a special relationship – as a security regime – where the two states involved share reasonable expectations of peaceful change, serves

as the foundation for the two states to transform into a pluralistic security community. Yet, one element needs to be in place, without which the transformation could not take place.

The third section of this chapter reveals that the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. It explains that the two states in a special relationship start to share an understanding of collective-self, namely, they constitute a pluralistic security community, when one of them has become overwhelmingly powerful.

The weaker state in a special relationship fundamentally relies upon its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart for survival, namely, for securing its way of life; hence, it views its mighty counterpart as part of self. The immense power of the strong state in a special relationship protects its way of life, which covers that of its weaker counterpart. The two states share similar way of life, which is derived from their common identities. Their similar way of life continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics.

On the other hand, the overwhelmingly powerful state in a special relationship views its weaker counterpart as part of self, for two reasons. First, it is able to express its dominance over its weaker counterpart, owing to its role as the weaker counterpart's security guarantor; consequently, such dominant behaviours will not turn into confrontational ones. In other words, its negative associations with its weaker counterpart have been prevented. Second, it is strategically dependent on its weaker counterpart to constitute its international strategic preponderance, which would ultimately safeguard its survival, namely, its way of life. Such preponderance continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers.

This section then explains the consolidation of the reasonable expectations of peaceful change shared by the two states in a special relationship, into their mutual dependable expectations of peaceful change, make happened by the presence of power imbalance between them. Dependable expectations of peaceful change is the defining feature of a pluralistic security community. With the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship, the two states involved no longer view armed conflicts between them as unlikely; for them, such conflicts have become unthinkable. The two states' mutual aspiration for peace, produced by their two sources of closeness, have been

translated into their capacity to maintain peace between them – that of their ability to know that neither side would even contemplate using force against one another.

The fourth and the fifth sections of this chapter clarify the relationship between power and common identities. The fourth section concludes that power of a strong state becomes a magnet for its weaker counterparts, when they share common identities. The fifth section, on the other hand, concludes that power imbalance among states serves as a basis of peace between them, when they share common identities.

4.1 The Double-Edged Effects of a Special Relationship

As explained in Chapter 2, two states' common identities give birth to their similar strategic understandings.¹ Yet, both the states respectively need to own a certain amount of power in order to shape their similar strategic understandings into their common strategic interests.² Once each of the two states starts to own the necessary amount of power, they would be able to forge between themselves a special relationship.³ That said, a special relationship is produced, when, at the very least, power balance exists between the two states involved.

The presence of power balance and the twin sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – in a special relationship, gives birth to the relationship's double-edged effects. A special relationship produces substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts between the two states involved.

By substantial cooperation, it means, cooperation between two states that are deeper than those established in their other bilateral relations. Whereas by substantial conflicts, it means, conflicts between two states that are more intense than those happen in their other bilateral ties, which are characterized as friendly or normal relations. In other words, while a special relationship engenders cooperation and conflicts between the two states concerned, it is fundamentally not a hostile bilateral relation.

4.1.1 Substantial Cooperation

This section outlines the dynamics of the substantial cooperation in a special relationship. Such dynamics would be demonstrated in the following two sections.

¹ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 36-41.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

The substantial cooperation in a special relationship are strategic partnerships between the two states involved. Such cooperation are the outcomes of the combination of the three sources of cooperation in the relationship, that of the two states' common identities, shared strategic interests, and the matching of their mutual expectation with their respective intention. As explained in Chapter 2, two states bound by a special relationship share an expectation that their relationship should be closer than their other bilateral ties.⁴

When the presence of common identities and shared strategic interests between the two states concerned, gives rise to their mutual need for strategic cooperation, both expect the other's move for such cooperation. The expectation is matched by the counterpart's intention to collaborate, hence substantial cooperation between the two states take place.

The strategic partnerships reinforce the two states' mutual positive identifications which stem from their common identities and shared strategic interests.

The US-Canada and US-UK special relationships respectively demonstrates the presence of substantial cooperation in a special relationship.

4.1.1.1 Cooperation in the US-Canada Special Relationship

The Presence of Common Identities and Common Strategic Interests

In the mid-1930s, both the US and Canada shared similar strategic apprehension of ways to improve international difficulties amidst the Great Depression. Founded on their common identities which are rooted in the principles of liberty, both democracies intersubjectively viewed freer trade relations as the means to set forth an era of economic recovery, hence the preservation of world peace.⁵ The necessary amount of power that each possessed, allowed the US and Canada to rely on each other in forging a freer trade regime.⁶ The US was Canada's largest trading partner.⁷ Canada, on the other hand, was an economic power that America had to cooperate with, in its efforts to

⁴ Ibid. 29-30.

⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 104-106, 110-111, 115.

⁶ Ibid. 112, 120.

⁷ Ibid. 92, 109-110.

establish a US-dominated North America economy.⁸ Both needed each other to forge freer trade in North America, so as to preserve the prosperity and peace in the region.⁹

Canada's Expectation was Matched by the US's Intention

The combination and interactions of common identities and shared strategic interests with the US, ushered in Canadians' good-will towards it and the solidarity spirit between the two states. Canada argued for a united front with the US, politically and economically, for the well-being of both states, and to show case to the world, amid the rise of militarism in Europe and in the Far East, how the two North America democracies would stand together and resolved their differences peacefully.¹⁰ The need for strategic cooperation strengthened the expectation among Canadians of a close relation with the US. They were optimistic about the two states towards establishing a cooperative relation, and believed that Canada and the US were bound by fundamental unity.¹¹

The expectation for cooperation was expressed by then Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, in his proposal to lower the trade barriers between the US and Canada.¹² Such expectation was matched by the US's intention of wanting reciprocal tariff cuts.¹³ As a result, the two states signed a trade agreement on 15th November 1935, their first commercial accord in over seventy years, which ended the unofficial trade war between them.¹⁴ The collaboration reinforced the mutual positive identifications between Canada and the US. Then US President, Franklin Roosevelt, commented on the trade agreement: "The power of good example surpasses preachments; it excels good resolutions; it is far better than agreements unfulfilled."¹⁵ King, on the other hand, said, "What possible tribute to the date could be greater than the cause...[of] international

⁸ Ibid. 46-47, 108-109.

⁹ Ibid. 108-109.

¹⁰ Ibid. 105-111.

¹¹ Ibid. 110-111.

¹² Ibid. 105-106.

¹³ Ibid. 105-106, 115. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 144.

¹⁴ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 108. Also see Richard N. Kottman, "The Canadian-American Trade Agreement of 1935," *The Journal of American History* 52, no.2 (1965): 275.

¹⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 107.

good-will, as against international hate, should receive an enduring monument.”¹⁶ Canadian major newspapers, meanwhile, reacted favorably with the trade agreement.¹⁷

Substantial Cooperation

The trade pact was substantial cooperation between the US and Canada. It was an agreement that embraced a freer trade regime, at a time when protectionism and economic nationalism were rampant in the world.¹⁸ It addressed the two states’ fundamental security concern of an increasingly chaotic world, in which the agreement solidified the US-Canada solidarity to weather such international uncertainties, and served as a force to reorient the world towards freer trade and peace.¹⁹ Most importantly, the trade pact facilitated the emergence of the close political and security cooperation between the US and Canada in the subsequent years.²⁰

The US’s Expectation was Matched by Canada’s Intention

The steady rise of fascism and militarism in Japan, Italy and Germany, precipitated the US to move closer to Canada.²¹ The US-Canada relations had become essential for the US in protecting North America from the aggression of these European or Asian powers.²² The US-Canada common strategic threat posed by the fascist powers led Roosevelt to expect for closer security cooperation with Canada. Leveraged on their recent economic collaboration, in 1936, he started to discuss defense matters with his Canadian counterpart.²³ On several occasions, Roosevelt called for the US-Canada solidarity to safeguard their mutual freedoms from foreign threats.²⁴ While speaking at Quebec in 1936, Roosevelt asserted, “Americans and Canadians are not foreigners to one another, and amid the grave problems that face the world today, it is time to tighten

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Richard N. Kottman, “The Canadian-American Trade Agreement of 1935,” *The Journal of American History* 52, no.2 (1965): 295.

¹⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 106. Also see Richard N. Kottman, *The Canadian-American Trade Agreement of 1935*, 296.

¹⁹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 109. Also see Richard N. Kottman, *The Canadian-American Trade Agreement of 1935*, 275, 296.

²⁰ Richard N. Kottman, *The Canadian-American Trade Agreement of 1935*, 275.

²¹ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 145.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 103.

the close bonds which already unite our two peoples.”²⁵ In August 1938, at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, he pledged, “The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you the assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.”²⁶ Such appeal for cooperation was matched by Canada’s equivalent desire to deter foreign invasion. King made a reciprocal pledge: Canada would ensure its soil “as a homeland for free men in the western hemisphere”, and prevent enemies from invading the US through Canadian territory.²⁷

Substantial Cooperation

The demonstration of the US-Canada solidarity was substantial cooperation between them. The commitment of these two powerful democracies of North America, to each other’s security, served to deter the threats exerted by the fascist powers.²⁸ The goodwill which stemmed from this mutual security commitment, smoothed the way for the signing of the US-Canada trade agreement in November 1938.²⁹ The trade accord further reduced the trade barriers between the two states, while reinforced their unity aimed at curbing the aggressive Nazi Germany.³⁰ Both states were aware, “they were in a grand enterprise together”.³¹

4.1.1.2 Cooperation in the Anglo-American Special Relationship

The Presence of Common Identities and Common Strategic Interests

The strategic environment in the late 1920s was uncertain for the two English-Speaking World Powers, Great Britain and the United States.³² The rivalries between

²⁵ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 145.

²⁶ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 103-104.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid. 104, 120. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 147.

²⁹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 116.

³⁰ Ibid. 116-118. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 146-147.

³¹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 117-118.

³² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 549. David P. Rapkin, “*The Emergence and Intensification of*

France and Italy, the two relatively weak naval powers, threatened British security in the Mediterranean; and Japan's ambition to gain naval parity with Britain and the US, jeopardized the two states' interests in the Far East.³³ Chief among these challenges, was the Japanese attempts to upset the naval balance in the Western Pacific.³⁴ The two English-Speaking Powers were determined to prevent this from happening.³⁵

The Anglo-American common identities led to their similar understanding of interests abroad. Both needed each other's capacity to ensure an international order that preserved such interests, especially at a time when a culturally different Power sought to challenge that order.³⁶ The comment made by the US Ambassador to Great Britain in the late 1920s, Alanson Bigelow Houghton, reflected the dynamics of mutual strategic dependence of the two Powers, which had its root in their common identities: "...being what we are, it is inevitable that we should look out on the world and its affairs from much the same point of view...We certainly think in much the same terms. We have much the same scale of values. We want the same kind of world. Consciously or unconsciously, we are seeking the same kind of future."³⁷

Great Britain's Expectation was Matched by the US's Intention

Presented with the common need to contain Japan's naval expansion, coupled with the necessity for the US to reduce its arms spending, and Great Britain's desire to be more focused on its other international threats; the two English-Speaking Powers had come to a conclusion: they should end their naval rivalries, and shifted their attention

U.S.-Japan Rivalry in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 359.

³³ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43, 46, 60, 62, 184. Also see Phillips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 213, 245. Also see David P. Rapkin, "The Emergence and Intensification of U.S.-Japan Rivalry in the Early Twentieth Century," in *Great Power Rivalries*, ed. William R. Thompson, 354.

³⁴ Phillips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936*, 213, 245. Also see B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 43.

³⁵ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 60. Also see Phillips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936*, 213, 245.

³⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 2, 15-24, 37-41.

³⁷ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 732.

towards consolidating their shared interests abroad.³⁸ Both Powers expected each other's move for such cooperation.

In July 1929, then British Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, demonstrated his desire for Anglo-American cooperation by cancelling the building of three small auxiliary vessels and slowing down construction of two cruisers, expecting that the US would reciprocate.³⁹ The expectation coincided with America's intention to cooperate. Before long, then US President, Herbert Hoover, responded. He decided to suspend three vessels authorised by the fifteen cruiser bill.⁴⁰ These good-will gestures paved the way for the consensus reached between the two states, in which they would end their naval rivalries by accepting parity between their fleets.⁴¹

Substantial Cooperation

The consensus reached was substantial cooperation between the US and Great Britain. It practically ended the naval competition between the two Powers since the Great War; it became the foundation for Britain to call for a naval conference in London in January 1930, and the conference would serve as a platform for the two English-speaking Powers to curb Japan's naval ambition.⁴² Meanwhile, the fact that other naval Powers were suspicious of the Anglo-American understanding reached prior to the conference, demonstrates the close cooperation between the two states.⁴³ The French argued, instead of making preparations for the convening of the London Naval Conference, which aimed to limit naval armament, what the preliminary Anglo-American discussions had really achieved, was the acceptance of parity between the two navies.⁴⁴

While moving towards the start of the London Naval Conference, the US and the UK worked closely to deal with Japan's determination to increase the navy ratio from 100:60 to roughly around 100:70, each for the Royal Navy and United States Navy vis-

³⁸ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 50, 58-59, 61-62.

³⁹ Ibid. 37.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid. 35, 51, 60.

⁴² Ibid. 39, 42, 51, 60, 62.

⁴³ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 749.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Also see B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 43.

à-vis Imperial Japanese Navy.⁴⁵ Both the Western Powers consulted with each other closely on their respective naval discussions with Japan prior to the conference, so as to ensure the effectiveness of their joint efforts to contain Japan.⁴⁶ On the eve of the naval conference, the two English-speaking Powers had colluded to confront Japan. They wanted to force Japan to relinquish its original plan for naval expansion.⁴⁷ As then US Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, told British Prime Minister, MacDonald, of how they should respond, if Japan refused to budge and withdrew from the conference:

“We might make a treaty without them and they know that in that case they ran a great danger of having two cruisers laid down to their one by both the United States and Great Britain and that if it was done under those circumstances those four cruisers would be more likely than not to be used against their one in case of trouble.”⁴⁸

Presented with such a prospect, Japan eventually capitulated.⁴⁹ It accepted the terms proposed by Britain and America – “an overall fleet ratio of 100 for the United States, 102.4 for Britain (owing to weaker gun power in her smaller vessels), and 63.6 for Japan.”⁵⁰

The Anglo-American joint effort to contain Japan was substantial cooperation between them. Both Powers confronted a culturally different Power with the complementary effects of their navies; the Anglo-American naval supremacy in the Far East had been preserved as a consequence.

The strategic cooperation between the US and Great Britain since 1929, which was produced after the matching of their mutual expectation for collaboration, reinforced the

⁴⁵ Phillips Payson O’Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 213. Also see B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 43, 46.

⁴⁶ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 43, 46-47.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 51-52.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 52.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 58.

⁵⁰ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 749-750.

positive identifications between them. The partnership ushered in sustained cooperation between the two English-speaking Powers that lasted until 1933.⁵¹

4.1.2 Substantial Conflicts

This section outlines the dynamics of the three sources of conflict in a special relationship. Such dynamics would be demonstrated in the following two sections.

There are three sources of conflict in a special relationship: power competition between the two states involved; their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart; and the mismatch of expectation between them. These three sources of conflict, through their mutual reinforcements, produce substantial conflicts between two states who share a special relationship.

Balance of Power – A Cause for Power Competition⁵²:

Power competition in a special relationship is essentially caused by the presence of power balance between the two states involved. When power balance exists in a special relationship, no one in the relationship is in a dominant position. Hence, the two states concerned compete with each other for dominance, prevent its counterpart from becoming a dominant power, so as to ensure their respective survival.

Power Competition and the Assertion of the Superiority of National Identity:

The respective national identity of two states bound by a special relationship is founded on their pre-modern common identities.⁵³ As a consequence, there are inevitable similarities in the national identities of the two states concerned. Both the states, therefore, need to emphasize their difference based on their common identities, so as to ensure their respective distinctive existence in the world of nations.⁵⁴ The differentiation is expressed in superiority sense.

The power politics between two states who share a special relationship, combined with the sense of distinctiveness of their respective national identity as opposed to the counterpart, create the two states' sense of superiority of their respective national

⁵¹ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 38, 59-60.

⁵² For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 77-82.

⁵³ Ibid. 91-98.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart. The superiority complex has the element of power politics because it is founded on the power politics-induced mindset of comparison.

When two states bound by a special relationship compete with one another for power, their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart, will be strengthened. At the same instant, these superiority sentiments toughen the two states' respective will to compete against each another.

Power Competition and the Mismatch of Expectation:

Power Competition between two states with special relations leads to the mismatch of expectation between them.

When one of the states in a special relationship demonstrates competitive behaviours against the counterpart, they run counter to the counterpart's expectation where it should not receive such treatments, since they share a relationship which is closer than their other bilateral ties.⁵⁵

The mismatch of expectation produces resentments on the side of the state, who is being treated competitively, towards its counterpart, and its retaliative measures to strengthen its power ensued.⁵⁶

The intertwined three sources of conflict that are embedded in a special relationship, breed and enhance the negative identifications between the two states involved. Consequently, both states understand each other in egoistic terms, hence, sharing conflictual intersubjective understandings.

4.1.2.1 Conflict in the US-Canada Special Relationship

This section demonstrates the dynamics of the three sources of conflict in the US-Canada Special Relationship, and shows that the three sources of conflict, through their mutual reinforcements, produced substantial conflicts between the two states. Also this section illustrates that the negative identifications between the US and Canada, which were bred and enhanced by the intertwined three sources of conflict in their special ties, resulted in them sharing conflictual intersubjective understandings.

⁵⁵ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 29-30.

⁵⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 98-101.

America to Expand Its Economic Power

In 1910, then US President, William Taft, proposed to have a reciprocal trade agreement with Canada, which was to forge closer economic ties between the two states through tariff reductions.

The US proposal for reciprocity was largely part of its contemplation for economic power expansion, reinforced by its belief in the ideas of liberty. The presence of power balance between America and the British Empire, prompted the two parties to vie for economic supremacy, so as to ensure their respective survival.⁵⁷ Both Powers sought ways to dominate the world economy. The British Empire maintained its economic preponderance through a system of imperial trade preferences.⁵⁸ The US, on the other hand, strived to expand its economic dominance worldwide, by adopting the open door policy which emphasized equal access to markets and investments.⁵⁹ The concept of open door stemmed from the central idea of America's national identity – the principles of liberty.

Within the context of rivalries between America and the British Empire, by means of reciprocal trade, the US aimed to detach Canada from the empire, and integrate Canadian market into a unified North America economy.⁶⁰ Reciprocity, as the US policy makers saw it, served the broader goal of America to become the world's dominant economic power.⁶¹ The remarks made by President Taft on reciprocity reveal the dynamics of competition between British Imperialism and American Continentalism. In his letter to Theodore Roosevelt, Taft confided,

“The agreement would produce a current of business between Canada and the United States that would make Canada only an adjunct of the United States. It would transfer all their important business to Chicago and New York, with their bank credits and

⁵⁷ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 4, 22. Also see Kathleen Burk, *Old World, New World- The Story of Britain and America* (Great Britain: Abacus, 2009), 461. Also see Frank C. Costigliola, “Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s,” *The Journal of Economic History* 37, no.4 (December 1977): 914. For more discussion see Chapter 3 pg 77-82.

⁵⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 47-48.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 47. Also see Frank C. Costigliola, *Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s*, 916.

⁶⁰ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 47.

⁶¹ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 88.

everything else, and it would increase greatly the demand of Canada for our manufactures. I see this is an argument made against reciprocity in Canada, and I think it is a good one.”⁶²

In another occasion, Taft said, Canada was at the “parting of the ways”, “they must soon choose whether or not to be a member of a developing and necessarily exclusive British Empire economic club or to continue and deepen their commercial friendship with the United States. They could not do both.”⁶³

America’s Desire to Expand and Its Sense of Superiority of Its Liberty

America’s desire to triumph over Imperialism boosted, and was boosted by, its drive to differentiate itself, in superiority sense, from the culturally similar Canada. The power politics between the US and Canada, combined with Americans’ sense of uniqueness of their national identity vis-à-vis Canada, give birth to Americans’ sense of superiority of their identity over that of Canada, in which such superiority complex is founded on the power politics-induced mindset of comparison.

The English concepts of liberty, which constitute the core ideas of the US’s and Canada’s respective nationhood, give rise to the similarities between the two states’ national identities.⁶⁴ The US hence needs to distinguish itself out of the sameness with Canada, so as to ensure the uniqueness and authenticity of America’s existence. Such differentiation is expressed in terms of the superiority of American liberty over that of Canadian.

In America’s understanding, liberty is achieved through revolution.⁶⁵ Canadians’ experience of attaining liberty through evolution in self-government within the British Empire, for Americans, is at odds with the sacred character of liberty; hence the moral significance of Canadian nationhood is not comparable with that of America.⁶⁶ The US’s sense of superiority of their liberty was expressed, when they rejected Canadian experience as real liberty. They thought, Canadian politics were dominated by a small

⁶² Ibid. 90.

⁶³ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 48.

⁶⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are we? America’s Great Debate* (Great Britain: The Free Press, 2005), 47. For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 37-38.

⁶⁵ W.L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 58-59.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 58-59, 84.

group of pro-British elites, that was deceptive and suppressive, which prevented Canada from reaching its true destiny – to forge a union with the United States.⁶⁷ These superiority sentiments motivated, and were motivated by, America's leading politicians' support for reciprocity with Canada. In 1911, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, Champ Clark, said: "I am for it [reciprocity] because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions, clear to the North Pole...I do not have any doubt whatever that the day is not far distant when Great Britain will see all her North American possessions become a part of this Republic."⁶⁸

Canada to Assert Its Power

Canada's connection with the British Empire provided them with a sense where power balance existed between Canada and the United States.⁶⁹ Such an understanding allowed Canadians to always embrace British Imperialism, when they were to remain powerful, and to check America's power, thereby ensured Canada's survival.

The Canadian government's announcement of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States in 1911 sparked widespread resistance among Canadians to America's economic power, triggered their desire to assert Canada's power by riding on the mighty British Empire, with the aim to secure Canada's existence.⁷⁰ Reciprocity was rejected by prominent politicians and businessmen in Canada. They were convinced, Canada would become a powerful state, due to its position in the British Empire, that being so, did not have to become an economic and political dependant of the United States, an outcome which they believed reciprocity was bound to produce.⁷¹ The Conservative party of Canada argued, "We must decide whether the spirit of Canadianism or Continentalism shall prevail on the northern half of the continent...With Canada's youthful vitality, her rapidly increasing population, her

⁶⁷ Ibid. 58-59.

⁶⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 52-53. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 88-90.

⁶⁹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 80.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 48-49.

⁷¹ Ibid. 49-52. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 89-90.

marvellous natural resources, her spirit of hopefulness and energy, she can place herself within a comparatively brief period in the highest position within this mighty Empire. The future lies in a strong Canada within a revitalized British Empire, not in a reciprocity agreement that is bound to lead to political union, whatever its economic consequences.”⁷²

Canada’s Will to be Powerful and Its Sense of Superiority of Its Culture

Canada’s will to consolidate its power in response to America’s tendency to expand its economic clout, mutually reinforced with its impulse to affirm the superiority of Canadian culture over that of America.

The English culture which forms the foundation of the US’s and Canada’s respective national identity, results in close similarities between them.⁷³ Canadians and Americans share virtually identical ideas, habits and lifestyle.⁷⁴ Moffett, a social scientist, described, “The Americans and the English Canadians have been welded into one people. Canadians...are already Americans without knowing it.”⁷⁵ The close similarities of Canadian national identity with America’s, oblige Canada to stress its difference vis-à-vis the United States, by that, to make certain the distinctive existence of Canada in the world.

The differentiation is expressed in superiority sense. Canada’s sense of superiority of its identity over America’s, illustrates the combination of its power politics with the United States, and the politics of its national identity in relation to the United States. The ubiquitous influence of the giant neighbor – the United States – in Canadians’ daily life, triggers Canada’s determination to employ its version of English values and ideals as a shield against America’s influence.⁷⁶ To prevail over America’s influence, Canada

⁷² J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 52.

⁷³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are we? America’s Great Debate* (Great Britain: The Free Press, 2005), 47.

⁷⁴ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 54-55. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 85.

⁷⁵ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 85.

⁷⁶ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 27, 53-54. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 85. Also see James Sturgis, “Learning about Oneself: The Making of Canadian Nationalism, 1867-1914,” in *Kith and Kin: Canada, Britain and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War*, ed. C.C.Eldridge (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), 97. Also see Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 13.

emphasizes the superiority of its culture when compared to that of America. Canadians hold a conviction: they possess authentic English values and ideals, which make them morally superior to, and politically more civilized than, the United States.⁷⁷ For them, American culture is superficial and corrupted; it has to be rejected.⁷⁸

Canada's sense of superiority of its culture over that of America, strengthened its resolve to check America's power. It benchmarked itself against the achievement of the relatively stronger America, with the aim to surpass America, and rejected closer economic ties between them. Such resolve simultaneously toughened Canadians' sense of superiority of their English culture over America's, which was derived from Canada's emphasis of its British connection.⁷⁹ Canadians asserted, "Canada, with its superior political inheritance from Britain, would catch up, and Canadians would build a country materially equal to America and morally superior to it."⁸⁰ Canadian Prime Minister, John Macdonald, who won the election of 1891, while criticizing his opponents' proposition of reciprocity with the United States during the campaign, vowed: "A British subject I was born – a British subject I will die. With my utmost effort, with my last breath will I oppose the 'veiled treason' which attempts by sordid means and mercenary proffer to lure our people from our allegiance."⁸¹

The mutually reinforcing dynamics of Canada's superiority sentiments and its resolution to consolidate its power, prompted the defeat of the Liberal government, who embraced the platform of reciprocity with America, in Canada's general election of 1911.⁸² The election was essentially a referendum on reciprocity, in which Canadians clearly rejected it.⁸³ Canadian commentators noted the sheer scale of Canadians "swept

⁷⁷ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 27, 53, 85, 91. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 125, 196.

⁷⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 53-55, 89-91. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 85. Also see James Sturgis, "Learning about Oneself: The Making of Canadian Nationalism, 1867-1914," in *Kith and Kin: Canada, Britain and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War*, ed. C.C. Eldridge (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), 99.

⁷⁹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 27, 53.

⁸⁰ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 69.

⁸¹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 24-27.

⁸² *Ibid.* 53.

⁸³ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 91.

by a wave of emotion and sentiment” during the election, owing to the implications of America’s annexation through reciprocity.⁸⁴ “In all sincerity many good and loyal souls were seized by a genuine alarm that their nationality was in danger”, they observed.⁸⁵ Canadians’ firm resistance to possible America’s economic expansion in Canada, triggered their strong sense of Canadians’ superiority over Americans. The newly elected Prime Minister, Robert Borden, declared, “In rejecting reciprocity, Canada has simply affirmed her adherence to a policy of national development which she has pursued for many years.”⁸⁶ Borden’s remark demonstrated Canada’s determination to prevent America’s economic expansion in its soil, which strengthened and strengthened by, its affirmation of Canada’s existence vis-à-vis America in superiority sense.

Power Competition and the Mismatch of Expectation

Canadians’ negative identifications with the United States, which were caused by their determination to prevent Canada from becoming a satellite of America, and their assertion of the superiority of Canadian culture, had been escalated by their rejection of reciprocity with America.⁸⁷ The negative identifications contributed to US’s negative understanding of Canada. The negative sentiment towards Canada, coupled with America’s desire to expand its economic power, induced America’s propensity to adopt protective economic policies directed at Canada during the 1920s and early 1930s.⁸⁸

Throughout the 1920s, America started to raise its tariffs, year by year, against Canadian exports.⁸⁹ In 1930, America denied Canada of its preferential immigration treatments, subjecting it to the same immigration requirements as those imposed on migrants from outside the Western Hemisphere.⁹⁰ These protective economic policies

⁸⁴ Ibid. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 53.

⁸⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 53.

⁸⁶ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 91.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 93-94.

⁸⁹ Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 14. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 78, 95. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 129.

⁹⁰ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 128-129.

ran counter to Canada's expectation that it should be treated more friendly by the United States, when compared to other states, since Canada and the US share a special relationship.⁹¹ The mismatch of expectation bred resentments among Canadians towards the US. Canadian journalist, Roberts, noticed a prevalent sense of anti-Americanism in Canadian society, "caused by the thoughtlessness and intolerance of the United States toward its northern neighbor."⁹² In response to America's new immigration restrictions, a Canadian MP lamented, "our boasts of friendship [with the United States] are very extravagant, in fact, our friendship is not as deep as we...are inclined to suggest."⁹³

The introduction of Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which would raise US tariffs to record levels, exacerbated Canadians' discontent at the United States. Canadians' reactions to the Act before its passage, illustrated the expectation dynamics in the US-Canada Special Relationship.

The Canadian media highlighted to American public that the new tariffs should not be imposed on Canada, as the two-way trade between Canada and the US "was the largest between any two nations in the world".⁹⁴ Then Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, reminded the US that Canada "would nudge closer to Britain" if the US insisted on implementing the new tariffs.⁹⁵ From King's perspective, the US-Canada relations were close and should remain close; he expected no drifting apart from each other by means of raising the tariffs.

The eventual passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act into law contradicted with Canadians' expectation. As a consequence, Canada's resentments towards the US intensified; its tit for tat measures to fortify its power ensued.

⁹¹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 54. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 348.

⁹² John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 128.

⁹³ Ibid. 129.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 130. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 56-57, 92.

⁹⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 96.

Canada retaliated with successive countervailing tariffs.⁹⁶ The steady increase of Canada's tariffs in the subsequent years set off the US anger towards Canada, which once again displayed the expectation dynamics in the US-Canada relations. Then US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, described the preferential tariff agreements reached between Canada and other members of the British Empire, at the 1932 Ottawa Conference, as "the greatest injury, in a commercial sense, that has been inflicted on this country [America] since I have been in public life".⁹⁷ America perceived Canada as its special partner; it expected Canada to stay close with America.

Conflictual Intersubjective Understandings

The Canadians' rejection of reciprocity with the United States, and the trade disputes between them in the following decades, were substantial conflicts between the two states. The issue of reciprocity was caused by the combination of power competition between the US and Canada, and their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart. Whereas the trade clashes were the results of the combination of power competition, and the dynamics of mismatch of expectation, between the two states. The three sources of conflict that were embedded in the reciprocity and trade disputes – power competition, the assertion of the superiority of national identity, and the mismatch of expectation – through their mutual reinforcements, deepened the anti-American sentiments that were at the core of Canadian national psyche.⁹⁸ A Canadian newspaper concluded, "Continentalism always and ever must be the enemy and assassin of Canadianism."⁹⁹

The intertwined three sources of conflict bred and enhanced the negative identifications between the US and Canada. They shaped the two states' understanding of each other in egoistic terms, hence, resulted in them sharing conflictual

⁹⁶ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 130-131.

⁹⁷ Robert Bothwell, *Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 14-15.

⁹⁸ James Sturgis, "Learning about Oneself: The Making of Canadian Nationalism, 1867-1914," in *Kith and Kin: Canada, Britain and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War*, ed. C.C.Eldridge (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997), 98. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 54-55. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 128-131.

⁹⁹ James Sturgis, "Learning about Oneself: The Making of Canadian Nationalism, 1867-1914," in *Kith and Kin: Canada, Britain and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War*, ed. C.C.Eldridge, 99.

intersubjective understandings. In almost the first four decades of the twentieth century, the relationship between the US and Canada was fundamentally competitive. War plans of the two states directed at each other were still in place well into the late 1930s.¹⁰⁰

4.1.2.2 Conflict in the Anglo-American Special Relationship

This section demonstrates the dynamics of the three sources of conflict in the Anglo-American Special Relationship, and shows that the three sources of conflict, through their mutual reinforcements, produced substantial conflicts between the two states. Also this section illustrates that the negative identifications between the US and Britain, which were bred and enhanced by the intertwined three sources of conflict in their special ties, resulted in them sharing conflictual intersubjective understandings. The discussion begins as follows:

There was turbulence in the relationship between the United States and Great Britain since the end of the First World War. The presence of power balance between the two states led them to compete with each other for economic and naval supremacy, so as to ensure their respective survival.¹⁰¹

In the early 1920s, the US championed the principles of free competition and equal access to markets and investments, opposed the policies of regulation and special privileges, in its attempt to dominate the world economy.¹⁰² Britain, meanwhile, strived to counter America's economic expansion by aiming to integrate Europe and Russia into a closed door economic system, founded on preferential treatments in trade, and linked to sterling.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 58-59. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 71-72, 127.

¹⁰¹ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 4, 22. Also see B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 172, 202. Also see Kathleen Burk, *Old World, New World- The Story of Britain and America* (Great Britain: Abacus, 2009), 461. Also see Frank C. Costigliola, "Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s," *The Journal of Economic History* 37, no.4 (December 1977): 914. For more discussion see Chapter 3 pg 77-82.

¹⁰² Frank C. Costigliola, *Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s*, 915-916. Also see Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 44-45, 48.

¹⁰³ Frank C. Costigliola, "Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s," *The Journal of Economic History* 37, no.4 (December 1977): 917. Also see Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth*

America's Desire to Compete and Its Sense of Superiority of Its Liberty

The US's motivation to compete with Britain for economic dominance strengthened, and was strengthened by, its drive to assert the superiority of its liberty over that of Britain.

The sense of superiority is an outcome of the combination of the power politics between America and Britain, and the politics of America's national identity in relation to Britain. While the United States had achieved its independence from Great Britain through revolution, Americans and British were essentially one people.¹⁰⁴ They share the same race, ethnicity, culture and language.¹⁰⁵ America hence needed to reinterpret its identity founded on its common identities with Britain, so as to consolidate the existence of this newborn nation, in the midst of an international environment that was with the strong presence of the culturally similar British Empire. Americans believed that they inherited the sacred and authentic English concepts of liberty which Britain itself had deviated from.¹⁰⁶ They were endowed with the responsibility to defend "these traditional English values against the efforts of the British government to subvert them".¹⁰⁷ One of the founding fathers of the United States, Benjamin Franklin, said: "It was a resistance in favor of a British constitution, which every Englishman might share...a resistance in favor of the liberties of England."¹⁰⁸

In the early decades of the twentieth century, America's will to prevail over British imperialism energized Americans' sense of superiority of their liberty over that of British.¹⁰⁹ They consistently criticized British imperialism and showed deep anti-colonialism sentiments.¹¹⁰ Even when the two states were allies during the Second World War, America emphasized its dislike of the British Empire that was at odds with Americans' ideas of liberty, and made clear that it did not join the war to preserve the

Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 49.

¹⁰⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are we? America's Great Debate* (Great Britain: The Free Press, 2005), 47.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. Also see W.L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 59.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ David Reynolds, "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations," *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 102.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. 103. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 826.

Empire.¹¹¹ “I can’t believe that we can fight a war against fascist slavery, and at the same time not work to free people all over the world from a backward colonial policy,” Roosevelt once told Churchill.¹¹² Americans disregarded the British concept of freedom of the seas as “not freedom at all”, as it preserved Britain’s arbitrary power of imposing a blockade.¹¹³ In their views, the British “were incapable of grasping the magnanimity” of American idea of freedom of the seas.¹¹⁴

The US’s sense of superiority of its liberty over that of Britain simultaneously bolstered its determination to compete with Great Britain. America continuously campaigned for breaking up the British Empire’s network of imperial preferences.¹¹⁵ It exerted pressure on Britain to renounce these preferences when opportunity arose.¹¹⁶

As part of its contemplation to triumph over Britain’s economic power, the US demanded the Allied Powers of the First World War, especially Britain, to pay their debts to America, made during the war, in full.¹¹⁷ Throughout the war, the US had lent approximately \$10,000 million to others.¹¹⁸ Britain, on the other hand, had lent approximately \$8,000 million to others, and borrowed approximately \$4,000 million from the US.¹¹⁹ In short, by the end of the war, Britain was being owed more than it owed to America.¹²⁰

Britain’s consideration on its war debts was dominated by its attempt to regain leadership in the world economy.¹²¹ It sought to consolidate its economic clout by extending its sterling-based network of imperial preferences to Europe and Russia, so as

¹¹¹ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 825-826.

¹¹² Ibid. 825.

¹¹³ Phillips Payson O’Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 136. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 702.

¹¹⁴ Phillips Payson O’Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936*, 136.

¹¹⁵ David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” *International Affairs* 65, no.1 (1989): 102-103.

¹¹⁶ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 827.

¹¹⁷ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 47-48.

¹¹⁸ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 752.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 752.

¹²⁰ Ibid. Also see Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 47.

¹²¹ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 52.

to strengthen its bargaining position against the US on the debt issue.¹²² It wanted to prevent default on its debts to America, so as to preserve its reputation as trustworthy debtor – a necessary condition for Britain to acquire leadership role in the world economy.¹²³

As Britain's war debts payment would weaken its economy dearly, it thus strived to nullify the debts through an all-round cancellation of inter-Allied indebtedness, or to reduce them by paying the debts only with the reparations that it would receive from Germany.¹²⁴ The US rejected all such proposals and insisted full payment of the war debts.¹²⁵

America's determination to collect the war debts in full hardened, and was hardened by, its disdain for the imperialistic attitudes of the Allies, who attempted to expand their respective empire through their peace treaty with Germany.¹²⁶ Then US Treasury Secretary, David Houston, in his explanation to Austen Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, about America's insistence on the full repayment of debts, wrote,

“This nation has neither sought nor received substantial benefit from war. On the other hand Allies, although having suffered greatly in loss of life and property, have, under terms of treaty of peace and otherwise, acquired very considerable accessions of territories, populations, economic and other advantages. It would therefore seem that if a full account were taken of these and of whole situation there would be no desire or reason to call upon Government of this country for further contributions.”¹²⁷

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 47. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 757.

¹²⁴ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 752-753, 756-757. Also see Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 47, 53.

¹²⁵ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 752-753, 756-757. Also see Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 48.

¹²⁶ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 48.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

Power Competition and the Mismatch of Expectation

Upon America's resolute rejection of any cancellation or reduction of war debts, Britain acceded to make full payment of its debts in 1923.¹²⁸

The US's policy on Britain's war debts contradicted Britain's expectation that it should be treated more friendly by the US, when compared to other states, owing to their special relationship. While Britain had to unconditionally honour its debts to the United States, the other European Powers were able to make such payments with more generous terms.¹²⁹ These terms included interest rates lower than that imposed on Britain, and some escape or postponement provisions of which Britain did not enjoy.¹³⁰ Whereas these European Powers were allowed to finance most of their debts to America with German reparations and their other debts, Britain's debt payments to the US far exceeded its receipts from German reparations and from its debtors.¹³¹ In a nutshell, Britain accounted for 41 percent of the total war debts to America, yet it had contributed 74 percent of all the war debt payments received by the US.¹³²

The mismatch of expectation produced resentments among British towards the United States.¹³³ Despite being a special partner of America, Britain would have to meet its war debt payments to the US at a cost higher than that other Powers were subjected to, let alone receiving preferential treatments from the US. Then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, denounced America's policy as selfish, extortionate, and that it was the outcome of avarice.¹³⁴ Americans were "sunk in selfishness", he lamented.¹³⁵ Such resentments stirred up Britain determination to compete with the US. Churchill asserted, Britain needed "to have the power to resist American dictation".¹³⁶

¹²⁸ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 757.

¹²⁹ Ibid. 758.

¹³⁰ Kathleen Burk, *Old World, New World- The Story of Britain and America* (Great Britain: Abacus, 2009), 462. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 758.

¹³¹ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 758.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid. 757, 760.

¹³⁴ Phillips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 196.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

As a result, Britain decided to reaffirm its naval supremacy.¹³⁷ In the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference, Britain rejected America's demand for naval parity.¹³⁸ Churchill, who dominated the naval policy of the British government, wrote in his memo,

“There can really be no parity between a Power whose navy is its life and a Power whose navy is only for prestige...It always seems to be assumed that it is our duty to humour the United States and minister to their vanity. They do nothing for us in return, but exact their last pound of flesh.”¹³⁹

Britain deemed that it was time to stand up against the United States.¹⁴⁰ Its refusal to accept naval parity resulted in the collapse of the conference.¹⁴¹

Conflictual Intersubjective Understandings

The economic and naval rivalries between the United States and Great Britain throughout the 1920s constituted substantial conflicts between them. America's demand for Britain to honour its war debts to America in full, was part of its efforts to prevail over Britain's economic power. Such an attempt to compete, mutually bolstered by Americans' drive to affirm the superiority of their liberty over that of British. Britain's subsequent decision to reassert its naval supremacy, was the result of the combination of its antipathy towards the US – due to the unmet expectation by the US – and its will to compete with the US.

The underlying three sources of conflict, which gave rise to the rivalries between the two states – power competition, the assertion of the superiority of national identity, and the mismatch of expectation – reinforced with one another, and prompted the exacerbation of Anglo-American relations in the late 1920s.

In July 1927, amid the disputes over the issue of naval parity, Churchill assessed, “No doubt it is quite right in the interests of peace to go on talking about war with the United States being “unthinkable”. Everyone knows that this is not true.”¹⁴² Then head of the American Department of the British Foreign Office, Robert Craigie, in his analysis of

¹³⁷ Phillips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 188, 192-194.

¹³⁸ Ibid. 193-194.

¹³⁹ Ibid. 184, 188, 192-193, 195.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. 193.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. 193-194.

¹⁴² Ibid. 179.

Anglo-American relations, concluded that, “Except as a figure of speech, war is *not* unthinkable between the two countries. On the contrary, there are present all the factors which in the past have made for wars between states.”¹⁴³ Meanwhile, comparisons were drawn between Anglo-American relations of this period, and Britain-Germany relations in the run-up to the First World War.¹⁴⁴ In the US, enraged by Britain’s refusal to accept naval parity in the Geneva Conference, Americans became deeply suspicious of Britain.¹⁴⁵ They were more determined than before to press for America’s naval supremacy.¹⁴⁶

The intertwined three sources of conflict bred and enhanced the negative identifications between America and Great Britain. Both states, as a consequence, were entrenched in egoistic understanding of self, when they interact with one another. In other words, they shared conflictual intersubjective understandings. Not until the late 1930s, Anglo-American relations remained fundamentally competitive. For the whole of the 1920s, Great Britain was the most formidable potential foe for Americans.¹⁴⁷ War plans of the two states directed at each other endured, up to the late 1930s.¹⁴⁸

4.2 A Special Relationship as a Security Regime

4.2.1 Security Regime

A security regime refers to the war avoidance norms around which expectations of the states involved converge.¹⁴⁹ Each of the states observes the norms in the belief that others will reciprocate.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴³ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 62.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Phillips Payson O’Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 195, 198-200.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Phillips Payson O’Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936*, 181-182.

¹⁴⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 58-59. Also see Phillips Payson O’Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936*, 181-182.

¹⁴⁹ Janice Gross Stein, “Detection and Defection: Security ‘Regimes’ and the Management of International Conflict,” *International Journal* 40, no.4 (1985): 603. Also see Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 357. Also see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 493. Also see Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, “Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no.1 (1990): 56. Also see Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?” in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 180, 191. Also see

Aspiration for Peace

The establishment of a security regime is spawned by the aspiration for peace of the states concerned against one another. States which form a security regime share the belief that security can be maintained through restraining themselves from resorting to violence, when they are to settle their disagreements.¹⁵¹ The aspiration for peace was discernible in the Concert of Europe – a security regime from 1815 to 1823.¹⁵² Then British Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, when advising his officials about the diplomacy in the Concert, wrote,

“His [Royal Highness’] only desire is, and must be, to employ all His influence to preserve the peace, which in concert with His Allies he has won.

To this great end you may declare that all His Royal Highness’ efforts will be directed; to this purpose all minor considerations will be made subordinate; wherever His voice can be heard, it will be raised to discourage the pursuit of secondary and separate interests at the hazard of that general peace and goodwill, which, after so long a period of suffering it should be the object of all the Sovereigns of Europe to preserve to their people.”¹⁵³

The presence of aspiration for peace in a security regime indicates that the member states identify with each other positively. A security regime is essentially the member states’ normative consensus of refraining from using force against each other.¹⁵⁴ It thus reveals the positive identifications between the states involved, as the consensus is their shared intersubjective understanding interweaves with the wish for peace.¹⁵⁵ In other words, a security regime is a form of cooperation, in which the states involved do not understand each other in pure egoistic terms.¹⁵⁶

Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 399.

¹⁵⁰ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 357.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. 360-361.

¹⁵² Ibid. 362-363.

¹⁵³ Charles Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-1822* (London: G.Bell, 1963), 2: 510-511, quoted in Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 363-364.

¹⁵⁴ Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, “Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no.1 (1990): 57.

¹⁵⁵ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 74-76, 101-104.

¹⁵⁶ Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, 357, 364.

Jervis has pointed out, the restraints observed by the US and Soviet Union, which prevented them from launching a war against one another, is a form of cooperation, but not a security regime.¹⁵⁷ Such restraints mostly stemmed from their fear of retaliation, as both sides possessed the ability to punish the other.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, the US-Soviet security cooperation did not entail positive identifications; it was rooted in their respective pure egoistic understanding of self vis-à-vis the other.¹⁵⁹

While states in a security regime identify with each other positively, their understandings of one another, however, are basically egoistic. The member states view each other as partners as well as rivals.¹⁶⁰ It is in their shared interest to adhere to the war avoidance norms, hardly because they are concerned about the counterparts' security, but essentially because such adherence ensures their respective security.¹⁶¹ A state in a security regime might still resort to the use of force, if it deems its key interests are threatened by the counterparts.¹⁶² That said, a security regime mostly restricts the behaviours of the states involved, it does not alter the fundamentally competitive relations between them.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, states in such a regime at least intersubjectively recognize that their security relations are closer, when compared to their security ties with states who are not in the regime.¹⁶⁴

More than a Basis of Order

The emergence of a security regime is built on the existence of power balance between the states involved.

As explained in Chapter 3, while power balance between states is a cause for their competition, it also serves as a basis of order between them.¹⁶⁵ Order is “peaceful

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. 357.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 372.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. 357, 371-372. Also see Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 375.

¹⁶⁰ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 364.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. 364-365.

¹⁶² Ibid. 362-364.

¹⁶³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes*, 399. Also see Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, “Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no.1 (1990): 70. For more discussion see Chapter 3, 101-104.

¹⁶⁴ Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, 366-367. Also see Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, *Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures*, 55-56, 67.

¹⁶⁵ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 77-82.

coexistence under conditions of scarcity”.¹⁶⁶ By peaceful coexistence, it means states coexist without a war in a significant period of time.¹⁶⁷

Because of the presence of power balance between them, states in a security regime find it very costly to turn their conflicts into violent ones.¹⁶⁸ Each of them does not possess the capacity to prevail over the others, yet each has the capacity to defend itself against the attack of the counterparts. The power balance, therefore, furnishes a basis of order between the states in the regime. It hinders them from plunging into a war against one another, hence allows them to coexist peacefully.¹⁶⁹

Yet, a security regime is more than a basis of order. The order engendered by a balance of power entails no positive identifications between the states involved. The power balance simply generates great cost for the states to be involved in an armed conflict between them. In other words, in a balance of power international system, it is the member states’ respective plain egoistic-self consideration that leads to the absence of war between them. On the other hand, Nye points out, if the US-Soviet peaceful coexistence can already be explained on the basis of pure self-interest, in which such coexistence is obviously caused by the power balance between them, regime then becomes a redundant explanation.¹⁷⁰ His observation indicates, a security regime can explain a power balance-induced cooperation, yet a balance of power is insufficient to explain a regime-based cooperation. That said, a security regime is more than a balance of power. States in a security regime, based upon their peaceful coexistence, observe war avoidance norms that are interweaved with positive identifications between them.

Convergence of Expectations – Reasonable Expectations of Peaceful Change

A security regime demonstrates the expectation dynamics in the security relationship of the states involved. As each of them intersubjectively acknowledges that they share a closer security relation than their other security ties, each expects that the counterparts

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 361-362. Also see Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, “Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures,” *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no.1 (1990): 63-64. Also see Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?” in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 180.

¹⁶⁹ Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, 361-362. Also see Joseph S. Nye, Jr, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 375.

¹⁷⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes*, 375.

would commit to preserving their peaceful relations, as an expression of the closeness of their security ties.¹⁷¹ The states' shared war avoidance norms provide a point for each of them to live up to the expectation, while expecting others to reciprocate; consequently, engendering the convergence of their mutual expectations around the war avoidance norms.¹⁷²

The convergence of expectations means that states in a security regime share reasonable expectations of peaceful change. It is reasonable as the regime introduces a measure of certainty to the member states, of which war is unlikely between them; nevertheless, war remains possible between them.¹⁷³ It is reasonable as the regime renders the member states' behaviours against one another fairly predictable; still, they do not possess the ability to predict each other's action.¹⁷⁴ The prospect of a surprise attack in a security regime has been reduced, not eliminated.¹⁷⁵

4.2.2 A Special Relationship Constitutes a Security Regime

A special relationship constitutes a security regime. It demonstrates the dynamics of a security regime.

A special relationship is built on the existence of power balance between the two states involved. The relationship is produced, only when the two states respectively starts to own a certain amount of power.¹⁷⁶ A special relationship is intertwined with the aspiration for peace of the two states involved against one another.¹⁷⁷ They identify with each other positively, and intersubjectively recognize that their relations, especially their security ties, are closer than their other bilateral relationships.¹⁷⁸ Also, a special relationship contains war avoidance norms that are observed by the two states involved.

¹⁷¹ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 98-101.

¹⁷² Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36, no.2 (1982): 364-367. Also see Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41, no.3 (1987): 399.

¹⁷³ Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes*, 362-364. Also see Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 180, 191.

¹⁷⁴ Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger and Martin Mendler, "Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence-and Security-Building Measures," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no.1 (1990): 66.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 39-41.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 57-59.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 41.

The undefended border between the United States and Canada exemplified the presence of such norms in a special relationship.¹⁷⁹

The war avoidance norms in a special relationship are produced by the two sources of closeness of the two states involved – their common identities and shared strategic interests. Before the coexistence of these two sources of closeness starts to emerge, war avoidance norms do not exist between the two states concerned. Anglo-American relations from the 1850s, demonstrated the absence of war avoidance norms between them; and the subsequent establishment of such norms, when the coexistence of their common identities and shared strategic interests started to emerge.

No War Avoidance Norms with the Absence of the Two Sources of Closeness

In 1850, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had been signed by America and Great Britain, in which both parties agreed not to gain any exclusive control over the possible canal route in Central America that would connect the Atlantic and the Pacific.¹⁸⁰ This treaty did not represent the war avoidance norms between the two states; it was an outcome of expediency. Both parties needed this treaty to defuse their competition in Central America, as they had other more urgent matters to deal with.¹⁸¹ The US was plagued by the increasingly bitter internal cleavage between North and South.¹⁸² Whereas Britain's attention was absorbed by its possible war in Crimea.¹⁸³

Both states therefore compromised to make the treaty.¹⁸⁴ It temporarily shelved their conflicts in Central America; it entailed no aspiration for peace between them.¹⁸⁵ Then US Secretary of States, John Clayton, when pondered upon the reasons for a settlement of disputes over a canal in Central America, wrote, "We are deeply anxious to avoid any collision with the British Government in relation to this matter; but that collision will become inevitable if great prudence be not exercised on both sides."¹⁸⁶ Clayton's

¹⁷⁹ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 341-347.

¹⁸⁰ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 422, 429.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. 424-425.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 429.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. 429, 431.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 427-428.

thought was dominated by his apprehension of the imminent arm clashes between America and Great Britain, not by his goodwill towards Britain.

The difficulties arose between the US and Britain on issues surrounding Central America, in the subsequent years of the signing of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, vindicated the absence of war avoidance norms between them.

The two states held fundamentally different interpretations on the treaty. The US judged that the treaty obliged Britain to withdraw entirely from Central America.¹⁸⁷ Britain, on the other hand, affirmed that the treaty did not apply to its existing possessions in Central America.¹⁸⁸ America's suspicion towards Britain intensified, when Britain included several islands located around the Bay Islands as its colony in Central America in 1852.¹⁸⁹ These disputes were culminated in the US Navy's bombardment of a British protectorate in Central America – Greytown – in July 1854, after the broke out of violent conflicts between American citizens and the local authorities.¹⁹⁰

Until the eighteen-fifties, war avoidance norms did not exist in Anglo-American relations. Throughout the decade, the power owned by the United States, and the power projection of Great Britain in the Western Hemisphere, had yet to engender a basis of order between them. America had shown no restraint to attack a British dominion in Central America. Britain, at the same time, was determined to curb the US's expansion in North and South America, which involved military means.¹⁹¹ Then British Prime Minister, Viscount Palmerston, wrote in July 1857 that the US would undoubtedly expand in South America, "but it is for our interest that this should not happen until the Swarms are prepared to separate from the Parent Hive."¹⁹²

The absence of a basis of order between the United States and Great Britain indicates that the two states still lack the foundation upon which their shared war avoidance norms could emerge. Both states' attacks on each other had not been halted.

Meanwhile, while Britain was already a World Power, the amount of power owned by the United States had not reached to a level that, matched with Britain's existing

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 431-434.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. 433.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. 434-435.

¹⁹¹ Ibid. 423, 437.

¹⁹² Ibid. 437.

power, would kick start the emergence of their common strategic interests; in which such interests are rooted in their common identities-induced similar strategic understandings.¹⁹³ Anglo-American relations until the 1850s were characterized by their explicit strategic competition, rather than mutual strategic dependence. Both states sought to assert their respective strategic preponderance in Central America. In the mid-1850s, Britain strengthened its military presence at the Caribbean; America, in turn, increased its naval forces in the Gulf of Mexico.¹⁹⁴ American filibusterers established a new government in Nicaragua to advance America's interests; Britain, in turn, helped arm Costa Rica to confront this newly formed government.¹⁹⁵

The absence of the emergence of common strategic interests between the United States and Great Britain meant their two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – had yet to coexist between them. As a consequence, the two states' aspiration for peace directed at each other, were not sufficiently strong to produce their shared war avoidance norms, namely, a security regime between them.¹⁹⁶

A Basis of Order Was In Place

The consistent growth of America's power since the 1850s, coupled with the British Empire's consolidation of power in North America during the 1860s, ushered in a basis of order between them since the eighteen-sixties.

In the first years of the 1860s, it was clear for Britain that the United States was bound to become a Great Power.¹⁹⁷ The power possessed by the US since the eighteen-sixties was great enough to halt Britain's tendency to confront America militarily.¹⁹⁸ As a consequence, Britain decided to remove its clashes with the US in Central America. In 1860, it relinquished its control over Mosquito Coast and Bay Islands in Caribbean, and accepted the US's forthcoming expansion in Central America.¹⁹⁹

In the meantime, America's impulse to expand in North America had been effectively thwarted by Britain. Shortly after the Civil war, America's desire to annex Canada had

¹⁹³ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 15-16, 37-41.

¹⁹⁴ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 436-437.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 88-89, 94-95, 103-104.

¹⁹⁷ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 441.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. 438-442.

intensified.²⁰⁰ It decided to purchase Alaska from Russia in March 1867, as a step towards incorporating Canada into the US.²⁰¹ The prospect of being annexed by the US, coupled with Britain's impending decision to withdraw its army from North America, alarmed the colonies of British North America.²⁰² As a consequence, they formed between them a confederation – the Dominion of Canada – in July 1867, so as to defend themselves against America's annexation.²⁰³

The power of Canada had been consolidated through the political integration, and cemented by Britain being its ultimate security guarantor.²⁰⁴ As a result, the British Empire was able to project an amount of power in North America that could terminate America's challenge to Canada's territories.²⁰⁵ Henceforth, a basis of order between the United States and Great Britain had surfaced. Both states respectively possessed the capability to deter each other's attack, hence they started to coexist peacefully.

More than a Basis of Order – The Coexistence of the Two Sources of Closeness Started to Emerge

While the presence of power balance between America and Great Britain since the 1860s furnished a basis of order between them, it also triggered the emergence of their common strategic interests.

In the course of the 1860s, the power owned by the United States, and Britain's projection of power in North America, had respectively increased to a level which

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 503.

²⁰¹ Ibid. Also see George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 257.

²⁰² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 503-505. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 341-342.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 40-41, 47. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342-344. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 4. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 505.

²⁰⁵ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 40. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342-344. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 4.

started to shape their similar strategic understandings into their common strategic interests. Both were already the Great Powers in North America. Each, at the same time, preferred a peaceful North America that reflected its way of life, while serving as a shield for its internal development, and as a footing for it to engage in overseas activities.²⁰⁶

During the 1860s, America had to implement Reconstruction in its southern states following the end of the Civil War.²⁰⁷ 1860s also marked the beginning of America's expansion abroad.²⁰⁸ It ousted the French-installed Emperor of Mexico after the Civil War.²⁰⁹ In Central America, America sought to acquire Virgin Islands, to establish a naval base at Samana Bay, and to build a canal in the area.²¹⁰ It extended its economic clout to Cuba.²¹¹ At the Pacific, America acquired Midway Island, and established its control on Hawaii and Samoa.²¹² As for Britain, it needed to shift its focus to Europe, Africa and Asia during the same period, to confront Germany, which had emerged as a new imperial power.²¹³ Canada, on the other hand, was preoccupied with its internal integration and expansion.²¹⁴

²⁰⁶ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 510-512. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 341. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 39. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 11-12. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342.

²⁰⁷ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342.

²⁰⁸ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 442. Also see George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 255, 259, 263.

²⁰⁹ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342.

²¹⁰ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*, 256-257, 259-260.

²¹¹ *Ibid.* 261

²¹² *Ibid.* 257, 261-263.

²¹³ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 39, 41. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 341-342.

²¹⁴ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342-343. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-*

Since they were compelled to coexist peacefully due to the presence of power balance between them, coupled with the fact that both share similar way of life, the US and Britain therefore wanted their friendly coexistence in North America. Such coexistence would ease their defense against one another, in the context of a peaceful North America, which largely reflected their respective way of life rooted in their common democratic values and English culture.²¹⁵

The two parties' desire for friendly coexistence was expressed in their aspiration for peace directed at each other. In 1868, America's minister to the UK, Reverdy Johnson, wrote to then US Secretary of State, William Seward, that he observed "the strongest evidence" of friendly feelings expressed by the British Government and British people towards the United States.²¹⁶ Around 1869, the impressive goodwill gestures demonstrated by J.L. Motley, then America's ambassador to the UK, towards Britain, prompted British Foreign Secretary, George Clarendon, to declare that "he could contemplate the possibility of war between Great Britain and any other foreign Power, but war with America inspired him with abhorrence."²¹⁷ The existence of power balance between the United States and Great Britain since the 1860s, therefore, was more than a basis of order between them. It engendered their mutual positive identifications. In other words, founded on their common identities, by the time where power balance existed between the two states, each party's power was great enough to generate magnetic pull effects upon the counterpart.

It should be noted that America's and Great Britain's desire for friendly coexistence directed at each other, did not constitute their common strategic interest. Such a desire at most indicated the emergence, not the presence, of their common strategic interests. The sense of mutual strategic dependence between them with regard to North America's security order was not yet discernible. Their desire for friendly coexistence merely accounted for their respective need for a peaceful North America, which guaranteed their separate way of life, and where each could immerse in its internal matters and

1952), 505. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 38-39.

²¹⁵ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 335, 338, 348-349, 354.

²¹⁶ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 506.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.* 507.

external engagements. It would take several decades for the emergence of Anglo-American common strategic interests to complete.

By the 1910s, it was clear for America and the British Empire that they were strategically dependent on each other.²¹⁸ Americans and Canadians, by then, view North America as their common region that was distinct from war-ridden Europe.²¹⁹ A region that was permanently peaceful, breed by their common democratic values and English culture.²²⁰ Both parties had come to view their pacific politics as “North American values”.²²¹

War Avoidance Norms Surfaced

Nevertheless, the emergence of Anglo-American common strategic interests, combined with the presence of their common identities, produced aspiration for peace between them, which were suffice to give rise to their shared war avoidance norms.²²² The 1871 Treaty of Washington marked the surface of Anglo-American shared war avoidance norms.

Both parties signed the treaty to ensure their friendly coexistence.²²³ They resolved their differences once and for all through the treaty.²²⁴ They settled their tensions accumulated since the American Civil War.²²⁵ They reached agreements on their

²¹⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 15-21. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 54. Also see Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 348.

²¹⁹ Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 335, 348, 354.

²²⁰ Ibid. 335, 338, 348, 354.

²²¹ Ibid. 335.

²²² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 506-507, 515, 517. For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 88-89, 94-95, 103-104.

²²³ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 39. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 510-515. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 11-12.

²²⁴ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 10.

²²⁵ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 510-517. Also see Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 342. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United*

disputes over US-Canada boundaries and the access to fisheries in North America.²²⁶ Those were the differences that might lead them to war, of which if remained unresolved, they would be preoccupied with the tasks of defending themselves against one another.²²⁷

The 1871 Treaty of Washington reflected the basis of order between America and Great Britain. It confirmed America's acceptance of Canada's borders, which essentially meant the US-Canada peaceful coexistence in North America.²²⁸ The treaty also represented the beginning of America's and Great Britain's commitment to avoid war between them.²²⁹ The 1871 Treaty of Washington, therefore, marked the establishment of a security regime between the United States and Britain/Canada. Henceforth, war avoidance norms began to characterize the US-Britain/Canada relations.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Washington, the US and Canada decided to demilitarize their border.²³⁰ Such demilitarization, which produced the undefended US-Canada border, was an outcome of their shared war avoidance norms.²³¹ The undefended border demonstrated the two parties' gestures to defuse their defense against each other, hence reduced – not eliminated – the possibility of war between

States to the 1990s, 10-13. Also see George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 255.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 509-517.

²²⁸ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 40. Also see George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*, 255.

²²⁹ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 517. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 13. Also see Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 359. Also see George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower – U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*, 255.

²³⁰ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 333, 341-343, 349. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 13.

²³¹ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 344, 349.

them.²³² Both sides' war planning against one another remained active, while they rendered their border to be undefended.²³³

In the early twentieth century, the US-Canada war avoidance norms gave birth to their bilateral bureaucratic institutions, charged to resolve the two states' disputes over boundaries.²³⁴ These mechanisms included the International Boundary Commission and International Joint Commission.²³⁵ The bilateral bureaucratic institutions depoliticized the two states' border conflicts by concentrating their minds upon hammering out technical solutions for these complicated differences via negotiation.²³⁶ As a result, these mechanisms encouraged the nonconfrontational character of the US-Canada relations, thereby hindered them from turning their sovereignty disputes into violent disagreements.²³⁷

Convergence of Expectations – Reasonable Expectations of Peaceful Change

A special relationship, as being a security regime, engenders the convergence of expectations of the two states involved, around their shared war avoidance norms.²³⁸ As each observes the norms in the belief that the counterpart will reciprocate, the war avoidance norms hence ensure the two states' mutual expectations – that the counterpart would commit to maintaining their peaceful ties – to be persistently matched by their respective intention to preserve a peaceful relation between them.²³⁹ While a special relationship produces substantial conflicts between the two states concerned, the convergence of their expectations around their shared war avoidance norms, serves to prevent the conflicts from easily turning into violent ones. In other words, two states bound by a special relationship share reasonable expectations of peaceful change.²⁴⁰ War between them is unlikely, not unthinkable. Each of them is convinced that the counterpart will not use force to settle their disputes, yet no one is certain about it.

²³² For more discussion see pg 132-136.

²³³ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 347. For more discussion see pg 125-126.

²³⁴ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 72-76.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ For more discussion see pg 132-136.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

The Anglo-American and US-Canada special relationships demonstrate the dynamics of the convergence of actors' expectations around their shared war avoidance norms.

Shortly after both states demilitarized their border, the US-Canada war avoidance norms – in the form of their undefended border – became a point around which their mutual expectations for friendly coexistence converged. Both sides began to view that peace prevailed in their relationship.²⁴¹ In 1880, Canadian Prime Minister, John Macdonald, revealed his evaluation: “My opinion is, that from the present aspect of affairs, and from a gradual improvement in the feeling between the people of the United States and the people of Canada, that the danger of war is annually decreasing...”²⁴² Macdonald's assessment was based upon the fact that the US-Canada border had been demilitarized for years.²⁴³

The strength of their shared war avoidance norms, which warrant the convergence of their expectations, became evident, when the two parties – US-Britain/Canada – were confronted with a crisis between them.

In December 1895, then US President, Grover Cleveland, issued a message to Congress stated that Great Britain would have to accept arbitration on the border dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela.²⁴⁴ He threatened to use force, should Britain refused to accept the outcome of the arbitration.²⁴⁵ Both Houses provided their unanimous support to the president.²⁴⁶ While America contemplated using force against Britain, the fact that America embraced arbitration as the basis of its actions, demonstrated its tendency to avoid war with Britain.²⁴⁷ The arbitration was the expression of war avoidance norms observed by the US and Great Britain.²⁴⁸

British leaders' responses to US's threat of war clustered around the Anglo-American war avoidance norms. They exhibited their commitment to preserving a peaceful

²⁴¹ Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 344.

²⁴² Ibid. 346.

²⁴³ Ibid. 342-346.

²⁴⁴ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 532-537.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. 537.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. 540.

relation with the US, in the belief that the US would also assume the same obligation.²⁴⁹ Prince of Wales, in response to the event, broke the convention of royal silence: “I earnestly trust, and cannot but believe, that the present crisis will be arranged in a manner satisfactory to both countries, and will be succeeded by the same warm feeling of friendship which has existed between them for so many years.”²⁵⁰

Canadians, on the other hand, remained convinced that the US’s threat of war should not be taken seriously.²⁵¹ They dismissed Cleveland’s message as a political gesture meant for domestic consumption amid America’s election season.²⁵²

Restrained by their shared war avoidance norms, America and Britain decided to jointly conduct the arbitration on the British Guiana-Venezuela border dispute, so as to ensure an outcome that could prevent a war between America and Britain.²⁵³ Both parties compromised through the process. Britain in the end was able to secure most of its preferred boundary with Venezuela.²⁵⁴ America, meanwhile, compelled Venezuela to accept the result of the arbitration.²⁵⁵ A war therefore had been averted through the two parties simultaneously adhered to their shared war avoidance norms.

By the 1920s, the strength of the Anglo-American war avoidance norms was unmistakable. While Anglo-American rivalries during the 1920s prompted some British ministers and advisors to conclude that war had become likely between the two states, such a conclusion had been effectively curbed by the firmly established war avoidance norms of the two states.²⁵⁶ British policy remained anchor around the norms.²⁵⁷ The British government reiterated publicly its unwavering commitment to preserving

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 539.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 346.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin’s Press INC, 1955), 539-540.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ For more discussion see pg 126-132. Also see Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 62-63. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 748.

²⁵⁷ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*, 63.

peaceful ties with America.²⁵⁸ In February 1928, British Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, announced in the House of Commons: “preparation for a war with the United States has never been and never will be the basis of our policy in anything.”²⁵⁹

Reasonable Expectations of Peaceful Change – the Foundation for a Pluralistic Security Community

A special relationship, as being a security regime, where the two states involved share reasonable expectations of peaceful change, reveals its quality of constituting the foundation for a pluralistic security community.

A pluralistic security community comprises of sovereign states who maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change among them, namely, their capacity to know that neither of them would prepare or even consider to use violence as a means to resolve their disputes.²⁶⁰ The most obvious characteristic of such a community, therefore, is the absence of war among the states involved.²⁶¹ As such, war avoidance norms – a security regime – are the foundation for the presence of a pluralistic security community.²⁶² States involved choose to avoid war, before they could learn to forswear competitive security measures directed at each other.²⁶³

War avoidance norms, as established norms in a special relationship, while mostly regulating the behaviours of the two states concerned, generate constitutive effects on their respective understanding of self vis-à-vis the counterpart.²⁶⁴ Such norms engender reasonable expectations of peaceful change between the two states, and are interwoven with the two states’ mutual positive identifications.²⁶⁵ The war avoidance norms thus mark the beginning of the consolidation of peaceful change between the two states, into dependable expectations of peaceful change between them.²⁶⁶ States involved maintain among them dependable expectations of peaceful change, when they share a collective-self understanding, which emerges through their positive identifications.²⁶⁷ That said, a

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 47-49.

²⁶¹ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 104-105.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 74-77, 90-91, 103-105. Also for more discussion see pg 132-136.

²⁶⁴ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 101-104. Also for more discussion see pg 132-136

²⁶⁵ For more discussion see pg 132-136.

²⁶⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 104-105.

²⁶⁷ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 47-52.

special relationship, which forms a security regime, serves as the basis for the two states involved to transform into a pluralistic security community. States in a pluralistic security community are bound by their collective understanding of self in relation to one another.²⁶⁸

In 1914, Theodore Roosevelt wrote in his private letter,

“I cannot help hoping and believing that in the end nations will gradually get to the point that, for instance, Canada and the United States have now attained, where each nation, as a matter of course, treats the other with reasonable justice and friendliness and where war is unthinkable between them.”²⁶⁹

The US and Canada, bound by their special relationship, discerned the prevalent peaceful character in their relations, and began to view them sharing North American identity.²⁷⁰ They had arrived at a position, which looked set to establishing their shared collective-self understanding, in the form of North American identity – that of the US-Canada Security Community. However, one element remained absent, without which they could not transform into a security community.

4.3 A Special Relationship Transforms into a Pluralistic Security Community

The Anglo-American and US-Canada special relationships evolved into security communities around the late 1930s and early 1940s.²⁷¹ It was at a time when America had emerged as a dominant power among them, and that obvious power imbalance between them came into existence.²⁷² The presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary, if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community.

²⁶⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 47-50.

²⁶⁹ Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 354.

²⁷⁰ Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940,” in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 335, 348, 354. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 54.

²⁷¹ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 67-68.

²⁷² Ibid.

4.3.1 The Overwhelmingly Powerful Counterpart – The Guarantor of Survival

Britain's survival suddenly rested upon America's immense power

The Anglo-American Special Relationship epitomizes the mutual strategic dependence between the two states. Both rely on one another to preserve their similar vision of international order, which is rooted in the English concepts of liberty, hence ultimately safeguard their similar way of life.²⁷³ However, from March 1939 onwards, Britain found itself increasingly relied on the US to ensure its very survival.

The balance of power in Europe started to tilt towards Nazi Germany – a totalitarian Power – after it annexed Prague in March 1939.²⁷⁴ Britain, as a consequence, began to realize its reliance on America's immense latent power, in the face of existential threat posed by German expansion.²⁷⁵ Nazi Germany with its totalitarian nature, also threatened America's strategic interests.²⁷⁶ Thereafter, Britain intentionally sought for Anglo-American cooperation to guarantee its survival.²⁷⁷ Britain's growing dependence on the US was conspicuous, when Roosevelt responded to British urge for help by saying: as long as Britain "took that attitude of complete despair, the British would not be worth saving anyway."²⁷⁸

The surrender of France to Nazi Germany on 22th June 1940 marked the emergence of power imbalance between the US and Great Britain.²⁷⁹ After the collapse of France, Nazi Germany suddenly commanded the preponderant position in Europe.²⁸⁰ Britain, on the other hand, unexpectedly had to fight for its survival all alone, against the onslaught

²⁷³ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 12-25, 37-41. Also For more discussion see pg 119-120, 126-127.

²⁷⁴ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 267-269, 271, 277.

²⁷⁵ Ibid. 267-268, 270-271. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 743.

²⁷⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 37. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, 797.

²⁷⁷ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 267-268, 271.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. 274.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. 280-281, 288-289, 296.

²⁸⁰ David Reynolds, *The Creation of The Anglo-American Alliance 1937-41- A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), 293.

of Germany.²⁸¹ Along the course of defending its survival, Britain quickly lost its global preeminence.

Britain was essentially bankrupted in its efforts to withstand German invasion.²⁸² It had to rely on external assistance, without which it could not weather the war. At that juncture, Britain looked to its brother across the ocean – America – for help. Britain realized that the rapid shrinking of its power meant that its survival would be inevitably rested upon America's power.²⁸³ It needed America's power to uphold its existence, even though it consequently had to accept America's dominance.²⁸⁴ For Britain, rallied around the powerful America amid the Nazi threat, meant safeguarding the American way of life, which also largely entailed British way of life, as both are founded on the English concepts of liberty.²⁸⁵

After the fall of France, the United States was determined to confront Nazi Germany.²⁸⁶ With such determination, America converted its immense potential strength into real economic and military power, which dwarfed that possessed by Britain.²⁸⁷ Meanwhile, Britain's power continued to shrink in favour of the US, when it adamantly tied its fundamental security around America's immense power.

Britain had to transfer its political, economic and strategic capital to America's hands, in order to secure America's assistance in its fight against the Axis Powers.²⁸⁸ Britain's gold and dollar reserves depleted massively, due to its purchased of goods from the US to support its war effort.²⁸⁹ It had to allow the US to build eight military bases in British possessions in Newfoundland and the Caribbean, under the ninety-nine year leases, in exchange for fifty outdated US destroyers.²⁹⁰ Britain had to renounce substantial economic interests at America's advantage, during their negotiation for the Lend-Lease

²⁸¹ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 288-289, 296, 299, 302.

²⁸² Ibid. 300.

²⁸³ Ibid. 289,291,300,302, 342-343.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. 289,291,300,301-302, 308-311, 343.

²⁸⁵ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 784, 797, 826. Also see B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 281.

²⁸⁶ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 281, 296.

²⁸⁷ Ibid. 281, 296, 335-336, 339, 343.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. 302.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. 284-286.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. 296-297.

agreement, so as to secure America's supply of war materials.²⁹¹ It had to pass its interests in East Asia to the US, because of the need to fight for its survival in Europe.²⁹²

The power imbalance between the US and Great Britain became indisputable after June 1940. Britain right away accepted this fact.²⁹³ Shortly after becoming the British Foreign Secretary in December 1940, Anthony Eden concluded: "I accepted the fact that the United States must in time become the dominant partner in Anglo-American councils."²⁹⁴ Henceforth, Britain irrevocably relies upon America for its basic security. Britain, which has declined into a second rank Power, needs America's immense power to preserve an international order which ultimately secures their similar way of life.²⁹⁵ Such an order continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics.

Britain fundamentally relied upon the US to confront the totalitarian Superpower – Russia – soon after the end of the Second World War. It allowed US nuclear bombers to be based in the UK to deter the Soviet Union.²⁹⁶ It accepted America's supreme command role in the NATO naval forces of the Atlantic, which was also responsible for the security around Britain's coastline.²⁹⁷ The US navy was by then the largest navy in history, as large as all the other navies combined.²⁹⁸

Britain's fundamental reliance on America for security renders it to understand America as part of self. Because America's immense power constitutes the guarantor of British way of life, America's power hence becomes a magnet for Britain. It intensifies Britain's positive identifications with the US. Britain rallies around the overwhelmingly powerful America to ensure its very survival.

²⁹¹ Ibid. 300-301.

²⁹² Ibid. 306.

²⁹³ Ibid. 310.

²⁹⁴ Ibid. 311.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. 308, 310-311, 335, 343.

²⁹⁶ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 106-107.

²⁹⁷ H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 750, 901.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

America's Immense Power Halts Britain's Confrontational Behaviours against America

As Britain – a second rank Power – needs the Superpower America to secure its basic survival, it thus has to accept America's dominance, and cease its confrontational behaviours against America.

America demanded Britain's concessions, of which would strengthen America's strategic preponderance, while it was providing material support for Britain's war effort against Nazi Germany.²⁹⁹ These demands sparked widespread discontent among British elites towards the US.³⁰⁰ Britain nevertheless complied with America's terms. It understood that it needed to do so, since its survival was rested upon America's power.³⁰¹

Britain accepted with equanimity America's leadership in NATO naval forces, despite it had been the world's strongest naval power for three centuries.³⁰² It was obliged to forswear its sense of supremacy and follow America's lead, as the overwhelmingly powerful United States guaranteed its security against the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union.³⁰³

Canada's Security Guarantor – From Great Britain to the United States

Britain's preoccupation in facing German invasion after the collapse of France in June 1940, and its subsequent swift decline in power, presented a basic problem for Canada: it could no longer count on Great Britain as its ultimate security guarantor.³⁰⁴

Canada – an enormously smaller Power relative to America – in consequence looked to its southern giant neighbour for protection against the possible invasion of Nazi

²⁹⁹ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 301-302, 309-310.

³⁰⁰ Ibid. 301-302.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 743, 750, 901.

³⁰³ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 339.

³⁰⁴ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 336, 344. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 184.

Germany.³⁰⁵ Shortly after the fall of France, then US minister to Canada, Pierrepoint Moffat, observed, “there has been a growing public demand throughout Canada for the conclusion of some form of defence understanding with the United States...the old fear that co-operation with the United States would tend to weaken Canada’s ties with Great Britain has almost entirely disappeared.”³⁰⁶

Canada needed the US to replace Britain as its security guarantor, precisely for the same reason of which its mother country had decided to rely upon the US for survival: America’s immense power protects American way of life – which largely entails Canadian way of life – from the challenge of culturally different Powers. While Canadians had been emphasizing their British connection so as to distance themselves from Americans, the threat exerted by Nazi Germany and the reality of Britain’s sharp decline, compelled Canada to embrace the mighty America for protection.³⁰⁷ Like its mother country, Canada needed to secure its way of life by rallying around America, who was determined to use its overwhelming power to preserve the American way of life against German aggression.³⁰⁸ Canadian way of life, like those of America and Britain, is founded on the English concepts of liberty.³⁰⁹

Facing the Nazi threat, Canada decidedly placed its fundamental security under the protection of the overwhelmingly powerful United States.³¹⁰ It agreed to transfer the strategic control of Canadian forces to the US, if North America was under attack.³¹¹ The drastic decline of Britain and the emergence of America as a Superpower – the US-UK power imbalance – prompted Canada to irrevocably rest upon America for its basic

³⁰⁵ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), xvi, 133-134. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 69, 152-155.

³⁰⁶ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 133.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 27, 53, 133-134, 143. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 152-155.

³⁰⁸ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 133-134.

³⁰⁹ For more discussion see pg 121-123, 142-143.

³¹⁰ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 140-141. Also see John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 152-153.

³¹¹ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 159. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 142.

security.³¹² For the same reason that it had previously clung to Great Britain, Canada relies on America's immense power as the shelter for its way of life, amidst the presence of culturally different Powers, which seek to fashion an international order that reflects their own values.³¹³

Canada further consolidated its dependence on America for basic security, when they were confronted with the Soviet threat. Canada's armed forces had been placed under America's command through NATO and NORAD, North American Air Defense Agreement, as Canada needed America's protection against possible Soviet attack.³¹⁴ Canada's armed forces are equipped with American weapons, and its air defense system is largely provided by the US.³¹⁵

The United States being the guarantor of Canada's basic survival, results in Canadians to understand the US as part of self. Because the US's immense power constitutes the shelter for Canadian way of life, the US's power hence becomes a magnet for Canada. It intensifies Canada's positive identifications with the US. Canada rallies around the mighty America to secure its very existence.

America's Immense Power Halts Canada's Confrontational Behaviours against America

Like its mother country, Canada accepts America's dominance and halts its confrontational behaviours against America, owing to the fact that it counts on the Superpower America for basic security.

Former Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, once admitted, "if the Americans felt security required it, they would take peaceful possession of part of Canada."³¹⁶ King's remark reflected Canadians' understanding. They would accept America's possession of Canada, if America deems it necessary, and do not see it as an act of invasion. They understand, Canada's security is founded upon America's power. If America is to acquire part of Canada, Canadians know that such acquisitions are essential for preserving Canada's existence.

³¹² John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 184.

³¹³ Ibid. 155, 199-200. Also see J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 143.

³¹⁴ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 188.

³¹⁵ Ibid. 188, 197.

³¹⁶ Ibid. 166.

During the Cold War, Canada did not resist America's dominance in deciding Canada's defense gesture against external threats.³¹⁷ It understood that "defense cooperation with the United States was desirable and inevitable".³¹⁸ Without America, Canada alone was unable to secure itself against the Soviet threat.³¹⁹

4.3.2 The Strategic Importance of the Weaker Counterpart

The emergence of power imbalance between Britain and Canada versus America, necessitates the two states to irreversibly count on America's immense power for basic security. America's rise as a Superpower, however, makes explicit the strategic importance of Britain and Canada to America.

The American way of life was confronted with the prospect of a world dominated by totalitarian Powers, after Nazi Germany annexed France in June 1940.³²⁰ The US was determined to prevent this from happening. It exercised its immense power to achieve strategic preponderance worldwide, so as to defeat Nazi Germany, hence secure the American way of life.³²¹ Thereafter, America attained its global predominance.³²² It needs this status to preserve its preferred international order, which ultimately safeguards its survival – its way of life, in the face of culturally different Powers, which seek to challenge that order.³²³

America's move towards acquiring its global preponderance crystallized its need for partners in international affairs. It needs the power of these partners to constitute its global preponderance. With the partners' cooperation, the US will then be able to project and impose American values worldwide.

It will be remembered that a special relationship is produced, after the two states involved start to share common strategic interests.³²⁴ The two states' common strategic

³¹⁷ John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 197.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 280-281.

³²¹ Ibid. 281, 309, 343. For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 37.

³²² B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 289, 336, 339, 343.

³²³ Ibid. 280-281, 309, 337, 339, 343. For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 37.

³²⁴ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 37-41.

interests are founded on their similar strategic understandings rooted in common identities, and created by their necessary amount of power.³²⁵

While Britain's and Canada's survival is rested upon America's overwhelming power, each of them continues to possess the necessary amount of power which produces their strategic standing in US foreign policy. America's survival is not fundamentally depended on Britain and Canada, yet, it remains necessary for America to forge strategic partnerships with them, in order to preserve its strategic preponderance worldwide, which ultimately secures its very survival. In other words, despite being the junior partner in the Anglo-American and US-Canada special relationships, the power owned by Britain and Canada sustains their respective ability to project an amount of cost that would cripple America's status as a global Superpower, if America does not seek strategic cooperation with them. Without Britain's and Canada's cooperation, an American-defined world order, which is founded on the English concepts of liberty, would be in peril.³²⁶

America's own assessment makes plain its strategic dependence on its special junior partners. The policy analysis of the US State Department in June 1948 concluded that "the partnership with Britain was a requirement of American national interest".³²⁷ It explained, because of the power that Britain possessed, "British friendship and cooperation is not only desirable in the United Nations and in dealing with the Soviets; it is necessary for American defence".³²⁸ America needed British democracy, the analysis revealed, to become a leading force in the unification of a democratic Western Europe, amidst the aggressiveness of Soviet totalitarianism.³²⁹ In other words, America relies on Britain to preserve a Europe that it preferred – a Europe that reflects the principles of liberty.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ For more discussion see pg 150.

³²⁷ "The Search for a New Relationship, 1945-50," in *Anglo-American Relations since 1939 – The Enduring Alliance*, ed. John Baylis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 49.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid. 49-50.

Britain Projects an Unbearable Amount of Cost

Upon Britain request, America provided its firm material support to Britain's fight against Nazi Germany in Europe.³³⁰ America understood, the lack of strategic cooperation with Britain would cost America dearly. It would mean the likely defeat of Britain, hence a Europe controlled by totalitarian Powers. Such an outcome meant America lost its strategic buffer against totalitarianism, thus having to defend its democracy, by itself.³³¹

America unmistakably foresaw the cost of not cooperating with Britain, when it was confronted with the decision of whether to deepen its nuclear partnership with Britain in the 1960s.

The US's decision to cancel the development of its air-launched missile – Skybolt – in 1962 essentially deprived Britain of its nuclear deterrent.³³² Skybolt was a nuclear delivery vehicle of which America had agreed to supply to Britain.³³³ It would be the only delivery vehicle for Britain's nuclear weapons.³³⁴ Britain subsequently requested the supply of Polaris – America's nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile – from the US, to replace Skybolt.³³⁵ America was reluctant to consider the request, as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe seemed best serve its interest.³³⁶

Faced with the prospect of losing its nuclear deterrent, Britain presented America with the cost that America would have to bear, if it chose to end its nuclear partnership with Britain. When meeting with President Kennedy in December 1962, British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, made clear that Britain would only accept an agreement that guaranteed America's supply of Polaris to Britain, or there would be no agreement

³³⁰ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 291, 294, 296-297, 300-301. Also see H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and The United States – A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)* (New York: St Martin's Press INC, 1955), 813.

³³¹ B.J.C. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945*, 273.

³³² "Challenges to The Nuclear Partnership, 1960-63," in *Anglo-American Relations since 1939 – The Enduring Alliance*, ed. John Baylis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 118.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Ibid.

at all.³³⁷ He told the President, “Let us part as friends...if there is to be a parting, let it be done with honour and dignity.”³³⁸ Macmillan went further. He warned Kennedy that the failure to reach an agreement on Polaris could give birth to an anti-American government in the UK, which would mean “the end of the close and harmonious relationship between the two countries”.³³⁹

Kennedy gave in having confronted with such a prospect. The US at last agreed to provide Britain with its most advanced nuclear weapon system of the time – the Polaris.³⁴⁰ Kennedy’s capitulation is understandable. The US could not afford to lose Britain as its special junior partner, who is obviously much weaker than the US, yet retains the power that has decisive impacts on America’s global preponderant standing.³⁴¹

Britain is all too aware, that it has to be powerful enough, if it is to preserve its strategic value to the United States. A major review conducted by the British Foreign office in March 1949 concluded, while close partnership with the US was essential for Britain’s security, Britain should “remain a major European and world Power” and “sustain its own independent military capacity”, so that it is “independent enough to influence US policy”.³⁴² “Britain must be the partner, not a poor relation, of the United States”, the review asserted.³⁴³

Canada Projects an Unbearable Amount of Cost

America yielded to Canada’s resistance, when Canada firmly stood by its judgement on the security arrangements in Canada.

The US-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) produced their second joint defence plan in 1941, which proposed the transfer of Canadian forces’ strategic control to the United States, once the US had joined the Allies’ fight against the Axis

³³⁷ “Challenges to The Nuclear Partnership, 1960-63,” in *Anglo-American Relations since 1939 – The Enduring Alliance*, ed. John Baylis (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 118-119.

³³⁸ Ibid. 119.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid. 118-119.

³⁴¹ “The Search for a New Relationship, 1945-50,” in *Anglo-American Relations since 1939 – The Enduring Alliance*, ed. John Baylis, 39.

³⁴² Ibid. 38-39.

³⁴³ Ibid.

Powers.³⁴⁴ Canada vehemently refused to accept the proposal.³⁴⁵ America, in consequence, retracted its demand to control Canadian forces.³⁴⁶ Canada's refusal, however, did not account for its confrontation against the US. Such response was not essentially linked to the use of force against the US. Both states at last agreed to coordinate their military efforts through mutual consultations.³⁴⁷ Each would retain full control of their own armed forces.³⁴⁸

America was obliged to give way to Canada's adamant resistance. It recognized the consequences of having an uncooperative Canada as its neighbour. While being the very junior special partner of the US, Canada remains sufficiently strong to exert its influences towards realizing a North America that reflects its democratic values and English culture.³⁴⁹ Put simply, Canada persists as a Power that has regional impact. Without Canada's cooperation, America's strategic preponderance in North America would be at stake.³⁵⁰ America needs to secure cooperation with Canada, if it is to preserve an American-defined regional order of North America, which is founded on the English concepts of liberty.

Canada is well aware, that it needs to be powerful enough, so as to ensure America's strategic reliance on Canada, amidst America's effort to preserve its dominance in North America. In response to the US's declaration of its commitment to protect Canada against foreign aggression in 1938, Canada reaffirmed its determination to defend itself, which would therefore prevent an invasion on the US soil through Canadian territory.³⁵¹ Then Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, put forward a question to members of Parliament, "Is it likely that Canada would be able to maintain friendly relations with the United States if we do nothing to defend our own coasts but simply take the attitude that we shall look to them for our defence?"³⁵² King understood, Canada needed to remain sufficiently strong, without which the US-Canada relations

³⁴⁴ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1991), 140-143.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid. 112, 119-120. For more discussion see pg 142-143.

³⁵⁰ J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s*, 46-47, 108-109, 119-120.

³⁵¹ Ibid. 103-104, 126.

³⁵² Ibid. 126-127.

would be defined by the US's outright dominance over Canada, rather than its strategic reliance on Canada.

America Views Its Special Junior Partners as Part of Self

America identifies positively with Britain and Canada owing to its strategic reliance on the two weaker counterparts to constitute its global preponderance – an American-defined world order founded on the English concepts of liberty – of which would ultimately secure its very survival. America, meanwhile, is able to express its dominance in its relations with Britain and Canada, owing to its role as their security guarantor; hence, prevents such dominant behaviours from turning into confrontational ones. In other words, the US's negative associations with Britain and Canada have been prevented.

Because America is able to express its dominance over Britain and Canada, coupled with the fact that it is strategically dependent on the two weaker partners, America – the overwhelmingly powerful counterpart – in consequence views Britain and Canada as part of self.

It is understood that America's strategic reliance on Britain and Canada is produced by the necessary amount of power that Britain and Canada each possesses. As such, despite being the junior partner in their respective special ties with the overwhelmingly powerful America, the power owned by Britain and Canada remains great enough to generate magnetic pull effects upon America. That said, while America's immense power is a magnet for Britain and Canada, America itself has been attracted by Britain and Canada – the two weaker counterparts, who remain adequately strong to preserve America's strategic dependence on them.

4.3.3 Power Imbalance – A Necessary Condition

Britain and Canada – the two weaker counterparts – view America as part of self, as they fundamentally rely upon the overwhelmingly powerful America in securing their basic survival, namely, their ways of life. America's immense power protects the American way of life, which covers that of Britain and Canada, as they are all founded on the English concepts of liberty. The similar way of life shared by America, Britain and Canada, continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics.

On the other hand, America – the overwhelmingly powerful counterpart – views Britain and Canada as part of self, for two reasons. First, America is able to express its dominance over Britain and Canada, owing to its role as their security guarantor; in consequence, such dominant behaviours will not become confrontational ones. Second, America is strategically dependent on Britain and Canada to constitute an American-dominated world order, which is rooted in the English concepts of liberty. Such world order would ultimately safeguard America's survival, and it continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers.

In short, the presence of power imbalance in the Anglo-American and US-Canada special relationships produces the collective-self understanding in each of the bilateral ties; namely, the Anglo-American and US-Canada security communities.³⁵³

As such, the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary, if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. The power imbalance is necessary, as the power of the stronger state in the relationship has to be immense in degree, so as to render the weaker one in the relationship to fundamentally rely on its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart for survival – for protecting its way of life, which continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers. The power imbalance is necessary, as the power of the stronger one in the relationship needs to be massive enough, so that its expressions of dominance would be accepted by the weaker counterpart, hence prevents such dominant behaviours from turning into confrontational ones. It is necessary to have power imbalance, as the overwhelming power of the stronger one gives birth to its international strategic preponderance, of which would make explicit its strategic reliance on its weaker counterpart, to preserve such preponderance. All these effects of the power imbalance combined, enables the two states concerned to apprehend one another in collective terms.

In essence, power imbalance in a special relationship furnishes a basis of peace between the two states involved. The weaker state in the relationship ceases its confrontational behaviours against its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart, as it counts on the counterpart's immense power for basic security. Meanwhile, the dominant behaviours of the powerful one in the relationship have been mostly accepted by its weaker counterpart, and partially defused by its strategic reliance on the weaker

³⁵³ For more discussion see pg 148-149.

counterpart; hence, its confrontational behaviours against its weaker counterpart have been neutralized. The power imbalance in a special relationship, therefore, ensures the absence of confrontation between the two states involved.

From “Reasonable” to “Dependable” Expectations of Peaceful Change

The power imbalance in a special relationship guarantees the absence of confrontation between the two states involved. It also results in the two states sharing a collective-self understanding. Founded on a special relationship’s existing function as a security regime, the effects of power imbalance in the relationship make happen its transformation into a pluralistic security community.

With them viewing each other as part of self, shielded by the absence of confrontation between them, the reasonable expectations of peaceful change shared by the two states in a special relationship, consolidates into their mutual dependable expectations of peaceful change.³⁵⁴ The two states by then no longer view armed conflicts between them as unlikely; for them, such conflicts have become impossible, for an attack on the counterpart means an attack on itself.³⁵⁵ In other words, the power imbalance in a special relationship, transforms the shared war avoidance norms of the two states involved, into their shared intersubjective appreciation, that war between them is unthinkable.³⁵⁶ The two states’ mutual aspiration for peace, produced by their special ties, have been translated into their capacity to maintain peace between them – that of their ability to know that neither side would even consider using force against one another.³⁵⁷ In short, with the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship, the two states involved begin to share cooperative intersubjective understandings, namely, they constitute a security community.³⁵⁸

The Anglo-American and US-Canada Security Communities

Since the late 1930s, Anglo-American and US-Canada relations are each bound by the two states sharing an understanding of collective-self. The US and Canada, in

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

³⁵⁵ For more discussion see pg 132-136. Also for more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 47-49.

³⁵⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 47-49. Also for more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 101-105.

³⁵⁷ For more discussion see Chapter 2, pg 12-28, 47-49, 57-59. Also for more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 88-89, 94-95, 103-105. Also for more discussion see pg 132-136, 148-149.

³⁵⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 104-105.

particular, apprehend each other as part of self, in the form of North American identity.³⁵⁹

For the two states in each of the bilateral relations, the absence of the thought of waging a war against each other, has been intersubjectively recognized as a given fact.³⁶⁰ Most notably, the undefended US-Canada border, which was previously an outcome of the two states' shared war avoidance norms, is now an expression of the US-Canada security community. The undefended border has become a given fact for Americans and Canadians.³⁶¹

While conflicts persist in Anglo-American and US-Canada relations, the presence of dependable expectations of peaceful change in each of the relations, ensures each of the two parties' ability to manage their conflicts without the contemplation to use force.

Throughout the Suez crisis in 1956, the conflict between the US and Britain did not lead to their consideration to turn the conflict into a violent one. Britain and France decided to invade Egypt, after the President of Egypt, Abdul Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956.³⁶² The canal was jointly owned by Britain and France.³⁶³ America imposed strong economic pressure on Britain, aiming to stop its invasion on Egypt.³⁶⁴ As a consequence, Britain accepted America's demand for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt.³⁶⁵

While America exerted pressure on Britain to halt its military operation in Egypt, the thought of pressing Britain with America's military might, however, did not emerge throughout America's dealing with Britain during the crisis.³⁶⁶ On the other hand,

³⁵⁹ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 333, 335, 355.

³⁶⁰ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 74-77.

³⁶¹ Sean M. Shore, "No Fences Make Good Neighbors: The Development of The Canadian-US Security Community, 1871-1940," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 360.

³⁶² Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 117-118. Also see John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship- Anglo-American Relations form the Cold War to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 53-54.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, "Theory and Reality in The Anglo-American Alliance," *World Politics* 19, no.1 (1966): 40.

Britain's anger and sense of betrayal towards the US, borne out of the US's pressure, did not give rise to its consideration to confront the US with force.³⁶⁷

As for US-Canada relations, anti-Americanism endures as the premise of Canadian Nationalism.³⁶⁸ Canada continues to emphasize the superiority of its national identity over that of America. Nevertheless, Canada's anti-American sentiments fall within the understanding of collective-self shared by the US and Canada. They do not transform into fundamental differences between the two states, which would entail their consideration of using force against one another.

The American ambassador to Canada in the 1960s, W.W. Butterworth, noticed Canadians' sense of superiority vis-à-vis the United States.³⁶⁹ He explained to the US State Department that Canadian Nationalism was rooted in "a desire to prove they are not what they suspect, a second-class American."³⁷⁰ Butterworth later criticized Canadian government for what he observed as promoting anti-Americanism in Canada, through a series of TV programs that "carry slanted and venomous attacks on US policy and US society", and that portrayed "American society as welter of fear, hate, depravity, rot, and disintegration."³⁷¹ Butterworth's observation reflected Canada's tendency to express the superiority of its culture over that of America, by viewing Americans having a culture that was corrupted.

Despite the discernible anti-American sentiments in Canada during the 1960s, Canada, however, remained fundamentally aligned with the US.³⁷² The close integration of the US's and Canada's defence measures persisted unscathed.³⁷³

³⁶⁷ Alan P. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in The Twentieth Century- Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 117-119. Also see John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship- Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq* (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 53-54.

³⁶⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 95-97.

³⁶⁹ Robert Bothwell, *Alliance and Illusion- Canada and The World, 1945-1984* (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2007), 215.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ Ibid. 233-234.

³⁷² John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 187.

³⁷³ Ibid.

Table 4.1: Chronological Transformation of the US-UK and US-Canada Relations

Since the 1860s	Since the 1910s	Since the late 1930s
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The emergence of a special relationship between the US and Britain/Canada • The establishment of a security regime – war avoidance norms – between the US and Britain/Canada 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The presence of a special relationship between the US and Britain • The presence of a special relationship between the US and Canada 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Anglo-American Special Relationship evolved into a pluralistic security community • The US-Canada Special Relationship evolved into a pluralistic security community

4.4 With Common Identities – Power of a Strong State Becomes A Magnet for Its Weaker Counterparts

The fact that the weaker state in a special relationship fundamentally relies upon its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart for survival – for securing its way of life, confirms the general observation in the existing literature, that power of a strong state becomes a magnet for weaker states, when they share common identities.

States bound by common identities share similar way of life. Among the states who share common identities, the power of the overwhelmingly powerful one protects its way of life, which largely covers those of its obviously weaker counterparts. The weaker states – among the states concerned – therefore, rally around their immensely powerful counterpart to secure their ways of life – which means to safeguard their survival – in the face of culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics.

The power owned by the overwhelmingly powerful one – among the states who share common identities – constitutes the guarantor of the ways of life – the survival – of its weaker counterparts. It thus intensifies these weaker states' attractions for their mighty counterpart. The immense power of a strong state becomes a magnet for weaker states, because these states share similar way of life, which is derived from their common identities.

Meanwhile, the fact that the overwhelmingly powerful state in a special relationship is strategically dependent on its weaker counterpart indicates that, among the states who share common identities, the overwhelmingly powerful one itself will be attracted by any of its weaker counterparts, when the power of this weaker state has risen to a certain level.

Among the states bound by common identities, the overwhelmingly powerful one needs the power of its weaker counterparts to preserve its international strategic preponderance, of which would ultimately secure its survival – its way of life. They need to align with one another to preserve such preponderance, as it constitutes the shelter for their similar way of life in the presence of culturally different Powers, which seek to challenge that preponderance.

As such, among the states who share common identities, when a weaker state's power has reached to a certain level, the magnetic function of the strong state's immense power directed at this weaker counterpart, will be facilitated by the magnetic pull effects that the power of this weaker counterpart have on the strong state.

In short, the magnetic effects of a state's power directed at its counterparts are rooted in them sharing common identities. Amidst the presence of culturally different Powers, states who share common identities need each other's power to preserve their similar way of life, namely, their very survival.

4.5 With Common Identities – Power Imbalance Becomes a Basis of Peace

A special relationship would transform into a pluralistic security community, under the condition where power imbalance exists between the two states involved. This conclusion leads to the understanding that power imbalance among states serves as a basis of peace between them, when they share common identities.

Among the states who share common identities, the weaker states accept the dominance of their overwhelmingly powerful counterpart and halt their confrontational behaviours against the counterpart, as they rely on the counterpart's immense power for survival, namely, for securing their ways of life. The immense power of the strong state – among the states concerned – protects its way of life, which largely covers those of its obviously weaker counterparts, since they share similar way of life which is derived from their common identities. The similar way of life of these states continues to be

challenged by culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics.

In other words, the overwhelmingly powerful state – among the states who share common identities – is able to express its dominance over its weaker counterparts. Such dominant behaviours, in the meantime, have been partially defused by the overwhelmingly powerful state's strategic reliance on its weaker counterparts. The overwhelmingly powerful state is strategically dependent on its weaker counterparts in maintaining its international strategic preponderance, which ultimately safeguards its survival – its way of life. The preponderance continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers. Because the overwhelmingly powerful state is able to express its dominance over its weaker counterparts, coupled with the fact that such dominant behaviours have been partially defused, the state's dominant behaviours towards its weaker counterparts therefore will not turn into confrontational ones.

In short, power imbalance among states who share common identities ensured the absence of confrontation between them. It therefore functions as a basis of peace between them.

Apart from special relationships, the presence of power imbalance among states who share a broader sense of common identities too functions as a basis of peace between them.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the power imbalance between America and Western Europe served as a basis of peace among them.³⁷⁴ America and Western Europe are bound by their broad common identities, namely, Western Christianity.³⁷⁵ They relied on each other to safeguard their survival – that of their similar way of life deriving from Western Christianity.³⁷⁶ The international order that protected their similar way of life had been challenged by the culturally different Superpower – the Soviet Union.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 87.

³⁷⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993): 29-30. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (UK: The Free Press, 2002), 46-47.

³⁷⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?* 39. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 157.

³⁷⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?* 29, 39. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 157.

Russia's culture is rooted in Orthodox Christianity.³⁷⁸ The Soviet sought to established its own version of global order.³⁷⁹

Power imbalance as being an accelerator of war among the states involved, confirms the observation where power imbalance serves as a basis of peace between states, only when they share common identities.

The examples put forward in Chapter 3 show that, those states in which their power imbalance serves as an accelerator of war between them, do not share common identities.³⁸⁰ For the weaker states – among the states who do not share common identities – the immense power of their overwhelmingly powerful counterpart constitutes a threat to their survival, namely, their ways of life, which are different from that of their mighty counterpart. The weaker states in consequence are compelled to intensify their defense against their immensely powerful counterpart. They need to do so to protect their very survival – their ways of life, which often leads to a war with their powerful counterpart. Finland, for example, had been unyielding in its struggle against Russia – its mighty neighbour – to protect the Finnish way of life.³⁸¹ The Finnish and the Russian ways of life were different.³⁸² Russia was infuriated by Finland's determination to confront its dominance.³⁸³

³⁷⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993): 29-30. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (UK: The Free Press, 2002), 157.

³⁷⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?* 29, 39. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 157.

³⁸⁰ For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 83-86.

³⁸¹ Eloise Engle and Lauri Paananen, *The Winter War – The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940* (US: Stackpole Books, 1992), xiv-xv. For more discussion see Chapter 3, pg 85-86.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

NOT YET SPECIAL: INDONESIA-MALAYA/MALAYSIA RELATIONS, 1957-1965

This chapter explains that a special relationship did not exist between the Sukarno-led Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia.

Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia were bound by their common identities rooted in the Malay way of life. Because of them sharing common identities, both states shared similar strategic understanding of the regional order of archipelagic Southeast Asia. They viewed the region as one entity reflecting the Malay way of life – that of the Malay World or Malay Archipelago. For Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia, the Malay World constituted a shield which protected their respective survival as a state built around the Malay way of life.

However, Malaya did not possess the necessary amount of power that would engender Indonesia's recognition of its strategic reliance on Malaya; whereas the amount of power owned by Indonesia had surpassed a level that produced Malaya's strategic dependence on Indonesia. Besides, Indonesia did not immediately realize its mutual strategic dependence with Malaysia, during the period when Malaya had expanded into Malaysia. In short, the similar strategic understanding of Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia had not been shaped into their common strategic interests by the power owned by Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia. Indonesia aimed for its strategic preponderance over Malaya/Malaysia; whereas Malaya/Malaysia desired for its mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia. Two sources of closeness – common identities and common strategic interests – did not coexist in the relationship between Malaya/Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia. In other words, there was no special relationship between the two states.

Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia emphasized the superiority of their respective nationhood over that of their culturally similar counterpart.¹ Indonesia deemed that Malaysians did not fight for their independence; it was given by the imperialist – Britain; therefore, Malaysia's independence was a fake independence. Unlike Malaysia – Indonesians maintained – Indonesians' independence was truly authentic, because they had fought for it through launching a bloody revolution against

¹ In this paragraph, "Malaysia" would also mean "Malaya".

Dutch colonial rule. Malaysia, on the other hand, stressed its professed wisdom which was perceived as central to its nationhood. Malaysians believed that the Malaysian wisdom was evidenced by their ability to achieve independence with no loss of life, even though – Malaysians emphasized – they did in fact fight for their nationhood. The self-proclaimed wisdom – as Malaysians saw it – was also evidenced by Malaysians' competency in delivering stability and progress in Malaysia. In the eyes of Malaysians, Indonesians lacked such wisdom; in view of the fact that Indonesia was plagued by its chronic social, economic and political disorder.

The three sources of conflict that were embedded in the ties between Malaya/Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia – Indonesia's assertion of its dominance over Malaya/Malaysia and Malaya/Malaysia's attempt to balance against Indonesia's aim for regional dominance; the two states' drive to emphasize the superiority of their respective nationhood over that of their culturally similar counterpart; the mismatch of expectation between them – mutually reinforced with one another, which in consequence prompted the two states to plunge into armed conflicts between them.

Indonesia-Malaysia Common Identities – the Malay Way of Life

The pre-existing dominant ethnic community in archipelagic Southeast Asia forms the basis for the establishments of Indonesia and Malaysia as two sovereign nation-states. The culture of the ethnic community, namely, the Malay way of life, constitutes the central character of the two states' respective national identity.² As such, Indonesia and Malaysia are bound by their common identities rooted in the Malay way of life. The Malay way of life is constituted by the combination of three essential elements – the notion of kingdom, the Malay language and Islam. Within the mindset of kingdom, the people of the dominant ethnic community in archipelagic Southeast Asia speak the Malay language and adhere to Islam.³

² Anthony Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities," in *Contesting Malayness – Malay Identity Across Boundaries*, ed. Timothy P. Barnard (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), 2-3.

³ Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 74, 76, 81, 85, 99, 101. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 31-36. Also see Anthony Reid, "Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities," in *Contesting Malayness – Malay Identity Across Boundaries*, ed. Timothy P. Barnard, 1-24.

Several sources show that scholars and policy makers of Indonesia and Malaysia believe that the notion of kingdom, the Malay language or Islam is the basic similarity between the two states. In Article 160 of the Malaysian Constitution, Malay is being defined as “a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language” and “conforms to Malay custom”.⁴ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub in his study “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” maintains that there are basic similarities in culture, language (the Malay language), and religion (Islam) between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁵ Joseph Liow in his study “The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – One Kin, Two Nations” notes that the history of interactions among kingdoms in the Indo-Malay world, the Malay language and Islam are pillars for the social-cultural construction of relatedness between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁶ Similarly, Anthony Milner in his study “The Malays” observes that “there was a degree of civilizational homogeneity” across much of the archipelagic Southeast Asia, namely, “Islamic, Malay-speaking and structured around *kerajaan* [Kingdom] polities”.⁷

The Malay way of life lies within the notion of kingdom – *kerajaan* or *Negara* – in which *Sultan* or *Raja* is the preeminent ruler of a *kerajaan* or *Negara*.⁸ Such an understanding of kingdom underpins the presence of the Malay civilization that stretches across archipelagic Southeast Asia.⁹ Consequently, the region is being perceived as *Nusantara*, which means the Malay World or Malay Archipelago.¹⁰ As Milner has pointed out, the Malay civilization has its root in the *kerajaan* system.¹¹ J.A.C Mackie’s study “Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966”, meanwhile, demonstrates that policy makers of Indonesia and Malaysia view the ancient kingdoms in the Malay World as the two states’ commonalities. Mackie observes:

⁴ *Federal Constitution* (Petaling Jaya: ILBS, 2006), 198.

⁵ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 13, 102.

⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 29-34.

⁷ Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 3, 85.

⁸ Ibid. 60, 66, 81, 84-85. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 31-32.

⁹ Anthony Milner, *The Malays*, 74, 76, 85, 99.

¹⁰ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 150. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 45.

¹¹ Anthony Milner, *The Malays*, 74, 76, 85, 99.

“Pride in the greatness of the ancient Malay-Indonesian kingdoms is taught in the schoolrooms of both nations without much concern about the boundaries created by the colonial powers – pride in Srivijaya and Majapahit, in the Sultanates of Malacca, Brunei, Atjeh and Mataram, to mention only the most eminent”.¹²

Three most prominent ancient kingdoms in archipelagic Southeast Asia – Srivijaya (683-1377AD), Majapahit (1293-1525AD) and Malacca (1402-1511AD) – crystallize the understanding of this region as the Malay World.¹³ These three ancient Kingdoms are believed to have exerted their authority and influence throughout the Archipelago.¹⁴ Yaakub explains that the ancient empires of Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca are being recognised by Indonesians and Malaysians as “the greatest achievements of their common ancestors”.¹⁵ The mythical glorious pasts of their common ancestors, demonstrated by the reach of the three ancient Kingdoms, render the dominant ethnic community in archipelagic Southeast Asia to view this region as one entity.¹⁶ The understanding of “one entity” forms the geographical basis of Indonesians’ and Malaysians’ perception that archipelagic Southeast Asia is the Malay World – within which the Malay way of life flourishes.

Indonesian and Malaysian nationalists as well as scholars share the view that the supposed reach of the ancient empires of their common ancestors is the territorial basis of the Malay World. Indonesia’s prominent ideologue, Mohammad Yamin, believed that an independent Indonesia known as *Indonesia Raya* should be a modern territorial expression of the Malay World, which was derived from the kingdom of Majapahit.¹⁷ Ibrahim Yaacob, a prominent Malay nationalist, once described: “The aim of *Melayu*

¹² J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 15.

¹³ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 30-31. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 95-97.

¹⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 30-31. Also see Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 49. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 95-96.

¹⁵ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 97.

¹⁶ Ibid. 94-97.

¹⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 45. Also see Frederik Holst, *(Dis-) Connected History – The Indonesia-Malaysia Relationship* (Germany: Regiospectra, 2007), 329.

Raya is the same as *Indonesia Raya* which is the aspiration of the Malay nationalist movement, that is to revive again the heritage of Srivijaya...¹⁸ Yaakub's study, on the other hand, maintains that under the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires, the Malay World was united as one political entity.¹⁹ Somewhat differently, Lily Zubaidah Rahim in her study "Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges" argues that "Singapore was integral to kingdoms within the Malay World such as Srivijaya, Majapahit..."²⁰

Indonesian and Malaysian policy makers speak about the idea of the Malay World. An Indonesian minister once said: "after all, Indonesia and Malaysia are part of the Malay Archipelago [Malay World] and are one big family."²¹ Malaysian Foreign Minister, Ghazali Shafie, said in his speech at the Third Malaysia-Indonesia Colloquium held in Bali in December 1992: "What I am driving at is that the relationship between the peoples of Indonesia and Malaysia goes back to the age of *Rumpun Melayu*. It was colonialism of the West which divided the Malay World and now perforce we are discussing in Bali about the relationship between two people, the people of which belong to the same cluster..."²²

The notion of Kingdom – *kerajaan or Negara* – is inextricably linked to the Malay language.²³ Through the *kerajaan or Negara* polities that were scattered across archipelagic Southeast Asia, and facilitated by trade among them, the Malay language had become the lingua franca of the region.²⁴ With this common language as the medium of communication, Islam had spread throughout archipelagic Southeast Asia since it had been introduced to this region around the thirteenth century.²⁵ Thereafter, Islam emerged as the dominant religion in the Archipelago.²⁶

¹⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 56.

¹⁹ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 95-96.

²⁰ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 150.

²¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 25.

²² Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 382.

²³ Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 81.

²⁴ Ibid. 3, 76, 81, 85, 99. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 33.

²⁵ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 34.

²⁶ Ibid.

Just like the notion of kingdom, the Malay language and Islam are being regarded as the basic similarities between Indonesia and Malaysia. Anthony Reid in his study “Understanding Melayu (Malay) as Source of Diverse Modern Identities” argues that Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei each has a ‘core culture’, which is “a cultural complex centred in the language called Melayu”.²⁷ Melayu – the Malay language – is the national language of the three states.²⁸ Meanwhile, Liow’s study also notes that the Malay language emerged as the national language of both Malaysia and Indonesia.²⁹ The Malay language, according to Liow, is a bonding agent and an avenue of affiliation for the two states.³⁰ He maintains that “the Malay language provided a channel through which the sense of kinship affinity could be better communicated throughout the Malay-speaking Indo-Malay World”.³¹

As for Islam, Marshall Clark’s and Juliet Pietsch’s study “Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration” points out that “Islam has long been promoted as a pillar of cultural connection between Indonesia and Malaysia”.³² They maintain that “Islam has played a cohesive role” between the two states.³³ Likewise, Liow argues that “Islam provided a cultural avenue through which affiliation could be built, whereby the Indo-Malay Archipelago can be broadly viewed as a single religious entity”.³⁴

Indonesian and Malaysian policy makers speak about their basic similarities. When discussing about Indonesian President Sukarno’s decision to launch his policy of confrontation against Malaysia, Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman confided: “We in Malaysia, especially those of his own blood and religion, would have been happy to have worked together with him for peace and economic well-being

²⁷ Anthony Reid, “*Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities*,” in *Contesting Malayness – Malay Identity Across Boundaries*, ed. Timothy P. Barnard (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), 2-3.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 34.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 117.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 34.

throughout Southeast Asia, our regional homelands”.³⁵ In February 1966, eight high-ranking Indonesian Army officers led by Ali Murtopo paid a goodwill visit to Malaysia in an effort to end the confrontation between the two states.³⁶ When meeting with Malaysian Prime Minister, the Indonesian Army officers said: “We pray that friendship and brotherhood in the true spirit of Islam will return to our two countries.”³⁷ When Indonesia and Malaysia had succeeded in reaching a peace accord in August 1966 to end their confrontation, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Adam Malik asserted: “No victor and no vanquished. This is a great victory for the Malay race.”³⁸ In 2002, Amien Rais, the chairman of Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), expressed his disappointment towards Malaysia’s decision to cane Indonesian illegals in Malaysia: “Frankly, I feel disappointed, angry, and unable to accept the fact that Malaysia, a modern country which belongs to the same Malay ethnic group (as Indonesia), has resorted to punishing Indonesian illegal workers in a way that is really inhuman.”³⁹

Indonesia-Malaya Similar Strategic Understanding

On August 31st, 1957, Malaya won its independence from Britain. Because of the sense of closeness which stemmed from their common identities, Malaya’s nearest and largest neighbour – Indonesia – had shown clear enthusiasm for the achievement of Malaya.⁴⁰

Leaders of the two newly independent states shared similar strategic apprehensions of the regional order of archipelagic Southeast Asia. They viewed the region as one entity which reflected the Malay way of life – that of the Malay Archipelago or Malay World. For Indonesian and Malayan leaders, the Malay World served as a shield which safeguarded the survival of their respective state, where each was built around the Malay way of life.

³⁵ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 152.

³⁶ Ibid. 156-157. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 108-109.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories*, 156-158. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 108-109.

³⁹ “Amien Warns KL not to Play with Fire,” *The Jakarta Post*, August 19, 2002.

⁴⁰ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 104.

In June 1945, Sukarno outlined the principles of *Pancasila* – his philosophical basis for Indonesia’s nationalist movement.⁴¹ Amid explaining these principles, Sukarno proclaimed that the unity of Indonesia was rested upon the glory of Srivijaya and Majapahit Kingdoms.⁴² In other words, the geographical expression of Indonesia’s survival should reflect the territories of these ancient kingdoms, which means the entire Malay Archipelago. Indonesia’s prominent ideologue, Mohammad Yamin, perceived the entire Archipelago as the home of Malay civilization, hence the Motherland for the dominant ethnic community in this region.⁴³ He demanded “the Motherland of the people be transformed into the territory of a state”.⁴⁴ For Yamin, the Malay Archipelago – in the form of a state – should be the land for the existence of those of Malay stock, named as Indonesians.⁴⁵

Malaya’s main foreign policy maker, Ghazali Shafie, used the word “*serumpun*” to describe the meaning of the Malay Archipelago. For him, the *serumpun* concept belongs exclusively to the dominant ethnic community in the Malay Archipelago.⁴⁶ *Serumpun* refers to living in togetherness like what the bamboos do.⁴⁷ Bamboos grow from the same root.⁴⁸ While each of the bamboos grows autonomously, they, however, live in togetherness.⁴⁹ Bamboos survive the strong force of turbulent winds, because they live in togetherness.⁵⁰ Shafie deemed that Malay civilization was founded on the bamboo’s way of survival – *serumpun*. He maintained, the people of Malay stock – in the form of states – should live in togetherness in the Malay Archipelago, so that the Malay way of life would not vanish.⁵¹

For the Malays in Malaya and the indigenous people of Indonesia, the Malay World’s function as a shield was made evident by the presence of culturally different others in

⁴¹ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 182-184.

⁴² Ibid. 184-185.

⁴³ Ibid. 190

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ghazali Shafie, *Malay Rumpun and Malaysia Bangsa towards 2020* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2009), 25-26.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 11-12.

⁴⁸ Ismail Hussein, “Malay Studies in the Malay World,” *Malay Literature* 6, no.1 (1993): 12.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malay Rumpun and Malaysia Bangsa towards 2020*, 11-12, 27-28. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 187.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order*, 195.

⁵¹ Ghazali Shafie, *Malay Rumpun and Malaysia Bangsa towards 2020*, 11-12, 25-27.

the region. The dominant ethnic community in archipelagic Southeast Asia feared the political and economic primacy of the Europeans and Chinese in this area.⁵² Such concerns strengthened the positive identifications between the indigenous people of Malaya and Indonesia, based upon the mindset of the Malay World.⁵³ In an attempt to address the perceived Chinese challenge to the Malay in Malaysia, Malay political elite, Abdullah Ahmad, asserted that, “The States that go to make up Malaysia are, in fact, only part of a larger Malayo-Indonesian World...”⁵⁴ For Abdullah, the sheer size of the Malay world, overwhelmingly populated by the people of Malay stock, could effectively curb the Chinese influence in Malaysia, hence, ensure Malaysia’s existence as a Malay nation-state.⁵⁵

Indonesia to Assert Its Strategic Preponderance Over Malaya

While Indonesian and Malayan leaders shared similar strategic understanding, the two states were not bound by common strategic interests. Both parties’ understandings on each other were based on different footings.

The Indonesian elites did not see Malaya as of the same rank with Indonesia. For the great majority of Indonesian leaders, Indonesia was a major Power on the world stage.⁵⁶ A combination of factors gave rise to such an understanding: Indonesia had succeeded in its revolutionary struggle against a major European Power – the Netherlands; it was the largest state in Southeast Asia; it was the fifth most populous state in the world.⁵⁷

Indonesia’s sense of being a major Power was consolidated by the success of Asian-African Conference held in Bandung in April 1955. This conference had brought together the leaders of twenty-nine independent Asian and African states, most notably, India and China.⁵⁸ These states shared a common experience – the struggle against

⁵² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 48. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 149.

⁵³ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 48.

⁵⁴ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 7-8.

⁵⁵ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 105.

⁵⁶ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), xiv, 56. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 189-190, 203-205.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 262-263. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 38-39.

colonialism and imperialism.⁵⁹ The Bandung Conference cemented the concept of the “Third World”, which refers to “former colonial or semicolonial countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were subject to European (or rather pan-European, including American and Russian) economic or political domination”.⁶⁰

Since the conference, two central ideas had emerged to be associated with the Third World concept. First, the Third World states would support each other against imperialist interventions, and assist in liberating those who were still being colonized.⁶¹ Second, the Third World states embraced the principles of nonalignment, which meant they would not choose side in the Cold War.⁶² As such, the Third World states represented a force of its own in international politics.

The Bandung Conference symbolized the emergence of this new force – the Third World; a stand-alone force that worried both the US and the Soviet.⁶³ It also marked Indonesia’s rise as a leader of the Third World.⁶⁴ Together with India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, Indonesia had since been recognized as one of the leaders of the Third World.⁶⁵ President Sukarno’s speech at the Bandung Conference exemplified Indonesia’s acknowledgement of such a leadership role: “we can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes we! We the people of Asia and Africa...far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilize what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace.”⁶⁶

Thereafter, the Sukarno regime perceived Indonesia to be a state of consequence in world affairs, representing the force of the Third World.

Indonesia’s sense as a major Power – a leader of the Third World – provided the basis for its determination to assert its strategic preponderance in archipelagic Southeast

⁵⁹ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 97, 99-100.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 2-3.

⁶¹ Ibid. 104-105.

⁶² Ibid. 98-99, 101.

⁶³ Ibid. 103, 105-107.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 99, 107. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 67.

⁶⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 103-104, 107.

⁶⁶ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 265.

Asia. The assertion was aimed at addressing a fundamental security issue of Indonesia – its disintegration as a state.

Since the end of 1956, Indonesia had been plagued by a series of regional coups in Sumatra and Sulawesi.⁶⁷ These regional discontents were prompted by the regions' demand for greater autonomy and greater share of national wealth; precipitated by the evident decline of Indonesia's economy.⁶⁸ By the mid-1950s, corruptions were rampant in Indonesia, its inflation was mounting, poverty remained obvious, living standards and export continued to fall.⁶⁹

The rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi had been receiving military and logistical supports from the US and Australia.⁷⁰ A widespread support for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had emerged in Indonesia's society after its independence.⁷¹ PKI had been positioning itself as a party that was defending the interests of the poor.⁷² The rise of communism in Indonesia coupled with Indonesia's status as a Third World leader alarmed the Western Powers – the US and Australia.⁷³ The West worried that Indonesia by pursuing its own paths of economic and social development might result in other undeveloped states following Indonesia's example hence created a spread of communism and nonalignment in Southeast Asia as well as the World at large.⁷⁴ Such an outcome posed a direct threat to the US dominance in Southeast Asia.⁷⁵ Consequently, the US and Australia had made a decision that they would strive to break up Indonesia by supporting the rebel movements both in Sumatra and Sulawesi.⁷⁶

President Sukarno and the central command of Indonesian army quickly allied with each other to halt the disintegration of Indonesia.⁷⁷

⁶⁷ Ibid. 269-270, 281, 286.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 272-273. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 38, 42, 46.

⁶⁹ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 267, 271-272.

⁷⁰ Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia, and the Future of West Papua* (Australia: Scribe Publications, 2006), 23.

⁷¹ Ibid. 22-23.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 70-71.

⁷⁶ Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia and the Future of West Papua*, 22-23.

⁷⁷ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 286-287. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 46-47.

Indonesia expressed its strategic preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia, so as to ensure its integrity. For Sukarno and the army leaders, by maximizing Indonesia's sphere of influence in the region, they could then minimize the prospect of Indonesia falling apart.⁷⁸ The Sukarno regime took two actions to establish the preponderant gesture of Indonesia. In March 1957, it declared a nationwide State of War and Siege to curb the regional coups.⁷⁹ Such a declaration centralized the power in Indonesia at the hands of its army with President Sukarno – the Commander-in-Chief – possessed the ultimate authority.⁸⁰ The centralization of power would allow the regime to effectively execute its will of preserving the unity of Indonesia.

In December 1957, the regime declared its Archipelago Doctrine, known as the Djuanda Declaration:

The government declares that all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state....The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 miles) is measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia.⁸¹

The doctrine revealed Indonesia's will to maximize its territory through legal means, based upon its existing structure as an archipelagic state. Most notably, it extended the customary 3 miles breadth of territorial sea to 12 miles.⁸²

In a nutshell, the Sukarno regime centralized the power in Indonesia, which subsequently served as the foundation for it to begin asserting Indonesia's strategic preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia, by declaring its Archipelago Doctrine. These two moves constituted the regime's strategy for preserving Indonesia's integrity.

⁷⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), xiv-xv.

⁷⁹ Ibid. 46-47. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 286-287.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Dino Patti Djalal, *The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 29.

⁸² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 48-49. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 118-119.

Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine reflected its strategic understanding of viewing the Malay World / Malay Archipelago as a shield that protected its survival. The doctrine raised concerns among Indonesia's neighbours. They feared if Indonesia intended to restore the "golden age" boundaries of ancient Majapahit Empire.⁸³

Indonesia's desire to assert its strategic preponderance mutually reinforced with the strong nationalist sentiments in Indonesian society.

Because of the fragmented character of Indonesian state and society, a strong sense of nationhood was needed so as to ensure the unity of its people; in other words, to safeguard the existence of Indonesia.⁸⁴ The common anti-colonial revolutionary struggle against the Dutch for the independence of Indonesia formed the central content of Indonesia's nationalism that fostered the unity of the state.⁸⁵ In an effort to sustain Indonesia's unity, President Sukarno persistently instigated a sense of continuous revolutions against colonialism-imperialism among Indonesian people.⁸⁶ Such instigations also meant to ensure his own political survival.

Sukarno was a force of his own in Indonesia's politics. He was the embodiment of the Republic's unity, hence the source of legitimacy in Indonesia's politics.⁸⁷ Yet, Sukarno got no organized power base.⁸⁸ He depended on public recognition of him as the symbol of national unity to preserve his authority in Indonesia, which was independent of the army and parties in the state.⁸⁹ Consequently, Sukarno had to constantly instill a strong sense of nationhood among the Indonesian mass public, by using his charismatic personalities and great oratory skills.⁹⁰ He needed to do so in order to rally the people around him, embrace him as the symbol of Indonesia, thus sustaining his authority in

⁸³ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 14.

⁸⁴ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 90, 272, 332. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), xiv, 45, 55-56.

⁸⁵ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 80-81, 86, 90, 104-105. Also see Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation – Indonesia Before and After Suharto* (London & New York: Verso, 2008), 7, 21, 26-27.

⁸⁶ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 291, 315, 332. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 45, 56-57.

⁸⁷ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 225, 231, 308. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 54.

⁸⁸ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 297. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 54-55.

⁸⁹ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 270, 275, 297, 307-308.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.* 235, 307-308, 332. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 45, 55-56.

the state.⁹¹ In other words, Sukarno relied on nationalism to perpetuate his political existence in Indonesia. He used it to maintain his power base.

Put simply, the nature of Indonesia's politics guaranteed strong nationalism in its society.

With a combination of the aims of ensuring personal survival and promoting national unity, President Sukarno stirred up Indonesians' national pride by inspiring them with a belief that Indonesia was a leader of the Third World, charged to champion the revolutionary struggles against colonialism-imperialism worldwide.⁹² Such nationalistic aspirations boosted, and were boosted by, Indonesia's resolve to assert its strategic preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia. The immediate manifestation of these mutually reinforcing dynamics was Indonesia's claim of sovereignty over West Irian – a territory where Indonesia had yet to inherit from the former Netherlands East Indies.⁹³

Sukarno described West Irian as “a colonial sword poised over Indonesia”.⁹⁴ He evoked intense nationalist sentiments in Indonesian society on the issue of West Irian.⁹⁵ For Indonesians, the claim of West Irian became a fundamental expression of their struggle against Dutch colonial rule.⁹⁶ The Indonesian mass public had been mobilized to “perfecting their revolution” through incorporating West Irian – the Dutch last possession of the former Netherlands East Indies – into Indonesia.⁹⁷

It was against this background – Indonesia's perception of itself as a world's major Power, charged to lead the Third World, readied to assert its strategic preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia, which were mutually reinforced with Indonesians' strong nationalist sentiments – that the Sukarno regime came to deal with the existence of Malaya.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 55-56. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 163.

⁹³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 29-31.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 61.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 47.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 47-48, 61.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 61. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 291, 315.

Buttressed by its sense where Malaya was only a little state relative to Indonesia, the Sukarno regime aimed to exercise its dominance over Malaya, as part of its efforts to establish Indonesia's regional preponderance.⁹⁸

The regime had shown active interest in shaping the affairs of Malaya.⁹⁹ Such dominant behaviours were fortified by Malaya's weak military capacity and Indonesia's evident influence in Malaya.

Malaya had virtually no armed forces immediately after its independence.¹⁰⁰ It had no air force and navy.¹⁰¹ It possessed only several battalions of the Malay Royal Regiment as opposed to Indonesia's half a million army.¹⁰² Malaya's security was almost entirely depended on the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA).¹⁰³ Under this treaty, Britain would protect Malaya from any external attack and develop Malayan armed forces; in return, Malaya would allow the stationing of British, Australian and New Zealand's armed forces at its bases to defend the Commonwealth and preserve the peace in Southeast Asia; Malaya would also assist Britain if its colonial territories – Hong Kong, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei – were under attack.¹⁰⁴

As for Indonesia's influence, the pro-Indonesian forces in Malaya were powerful enough to exert pressure on Malaya's government. These forces were generally represented by the opposition parties in Malaya's parliament, Malay nationalists within UMNO – the ruling party, and the Indonesian-trained journalists who controlled most of the Malay press in Malaya.¹⁰⁵ Further, many of the Malays in Malaya were

⁹⁸ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 168. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 81.

⁹⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 79-81.

¹⁰⁰ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 49-51.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 37.

¹⁰³ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 48.

¹⁰⁴ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 8-9, 26.

¹⁰⁵ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 82-85, 105. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 19, 37-38.

sympathizers of Indonesia's aspirations.¹⁰⁶ It was estimated that around one third of the Malay population in Malaya were of Indonesian origin.¹⁰⁷

The Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had to withstand strong opposition from these pro-Indonesian forces to the signing of AMDA.¹⁰⁸ They accused Tunku of being pro-West and wanted Malaya to embrace the Bandung model, namely, the Third World.¹⁰⁹ The Tunku's leadership was at risk, when he had to make AMDA an issue of confidence at an emergency UMNO Executive Committee meeting, in the face of the forceful attacks on this treaty mounted by the Malay nationalists in the party.¹¹⁰ He nevertheless succeeded in securing a unanimous vote from the Committee which endorsed the defence treaty.¹¹¹

On the other hand, even though Malaya's basic security was inextricably linked to the West, the Malayan government refused to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in view of the anticipated staunch opposition at home, especially from the pro-Indonesian forces in Malaya's parliament.¹¹² SEATO was a collective defence organization constituted by the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, which aimed at curbing the communist presence in Southeast Asia.¹¹³ Indonesia criticized SEATO as America's imperialist design in Southeast Asia.¹¹⁴

Indonesia's desire to express its dominance over Malaya bolstered, and was bolstered by, its drive to differentiate itself, in superiority sense, from the culturally similar Malaya.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 83. Also see Federation of Malaya, *Parliamentary Debates*, 6th December 1960 (Kuala Lumpur: House of Representatives, 1960), 3413-3414.

¹⁰⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 42.

¹⁰⁸ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 50-51. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 19, 37-38. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 82-83.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 82-83. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 26-27, 62-63. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 37-38.

¹¹³ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 65-66.

¹¹⁴ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 26-27, 33, 62-63.

The Malay way of life, which constituted the central character of Indonesia's and Malaya's respective national identity, resulted in inevitable similarities between the two states. Indonesia hence needed to enhance its difference as opposed to Malaya, so as to emphasize its distinctive existence in the World. Such differentiation was expressed in superiority sense.

The power politics between Indonesia and Malaya, combined with Indonesians' sense of uniqueness of their national identity vis-à-vis Malaya, gave birth to Indonesians' sense of superiority of their identity over that of Malaya. The superiority complex was founded on the power politics-induced mindset of comparison.

The similarities between Indonesians and Malaysians were demonstrated by the closeness between them, which stemmed from their common identities.¹¹⁵ Because of their close identifications with Indonesians, the people of Malaya had provided material and moral support to Indonesians' fight against the Netherlands for independence.¹¹⁶ Hundreds of Malaysians went to Indonesia to join the fight, and many had sacrificed their lives.¹¹⁷ Meanwhile, Indonesians gave their strong moral support to the subsequent independence movement in Malaya.¹¹⁸

Despite the solidarity among the people of Indonesia and Malaya in the course of their respective struggle for independence, Indonesians' insisted on their disdain for Malaya's way of achieving its independence. For most of the Indonesian political and military elites, independence had to be achieved through revolution; in order for their independence to be authentic, people had to fight for it through armed struggle.¹¹⁹ Malaya's independence, from Indonesians' perspective, was given by the imperialist – Britain; Malaysians did not fight for it; hence, Malaya's independence was an inferior one, when compared to that of Indonesia, which was achieved through a bloody revolution.¹²⁰ In short, Indonesia emphasized the superiority of their nationhood over

¹¹⁵ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1963), 1.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 80. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 39-40.

¹²⁰ Ibid. Also see Radio Address by Sukarno, December 1962, quoted in Peter Carey, "Introduction," in *Born in Fire – The Indonesian Struggle for Independence: An Anthology*, ed. Colin Wild and Peter Carey

Malaya's, which was expressed in the language of Indonesians' revolutionary fighting spirit.

Such disdain for Malaya was further reinforced by the fact that Malaya was fundamentally relied on Britain – whom Indonesia regarded as a colonial-imperial Power – for its security.¹²¹ And Malaya upheld the Sultanates as its prime symbol.¹²² For Indonesians, the Sultanates, which represented the feudalistic elements in society, were antithetical to Indonesia's revolutionary spirit that embraced egalitarianism, hence they should be demolished.¹²³ The sultans and traditional elites in Sumatra had been decimated, shortly after Indonesians embarked on their revolution in August 1945.¹²⁴

Indonesia's sense of superiority of its nationhood over that of Malaya strengthened, and was strengthened by, its impulse to dominate Malaya. Among its neighbouring states, the Indonesian elites had "singled out" Malaya as "a state requiring revolutionizing" due to Malaya's "fake independence".¹²⁵ Such predisposition to dominate Malaya prompted President Sukarno to express his superiority sentiments towards the Tunku – then Chief Minister of British Malaya – during a public rally in Jakarta in 1955.¹²⁶ Looking and pointing at the Tunku, Sukarno pronounced: "Here is a man I am trying to persuade to fight."¹²⁷ The Tunku was at the rally.¹²⁸ He was there for his official goodwill visit to Indonesia.¹²⁹

Essentially, in the eyes of the Sukarno regime, there was no common strategic interest between Indonesia and Malaya. Malaya had yet to possess the necessary amount of

(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988), xix. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 363.

¹²¹ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 363-364. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 32-33.

¹²² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 67, 86.

¹²³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 76. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 61-67, 74. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 32.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 – President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation," *Indonesia*, no.2 (October 1966): 37-76. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 79-80.

¹²⁶ Marvin C. Ott, "The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia and the Philippines: 1957-1965" (PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1971), 111.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

power that would secure Indonesia's recognition of its strategic reliance on Malaya. Instead of perceiving its mutual strategic dependence with Malaya, Indonesia desired for its strategic preponderance over Malaya. Such aspiration for dominance coincided with Indonesia's strategic understanding. With Malaya that lay within its sphere of influence, the Malay Archipelago – mainly represented by Indonesia and Malaya – constituted a shield that ensured the survival of Indonesia.

Malaya Desired for Mutual Strategic Dependence with Indonesia

The Malayan leaders, on the contrary, believed that Indonesia and Malaya needed each other for survival.

In a 1963 government report titled “Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963”, the Tunku administration expressed Malaya's desire to “forge the closest links with Indonesia”.¹³⁰ Two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – produced Malayan leaders' wish for intimate ties with Indonesia. From Malaysians' perspective, not only did Indonesia share “sentimental and blood ties” with Malaya, but also they were each other's nearest neighbour.¹³¹

The understanding of geographical proximity with Indonesia indicated Malaya's realization of its mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia. The amount of power owned by Indonesia had surpassed a level that produced its strategic standing in Malaya's foreign policy. Based upon their common identities-induced similar strategic understandings – that of the Malay Archipelago constituted a shield that protected their respective survival – the presence of Indonesia as the largest state in Southeast Asia, created Malaya's need for strategic partnership with Indonesia.

Malayan policy makers were all too aware, that Malaya was a small state in archipelagic Southeast Asia, with Indonesia as its largest and nearest neighbour.¹³² Malaya therefore needed to secure Indonesia's strategic cooperation, so that their shared “regional homelands” – the Malay Archipelago – could serve as a shield that safeguarded their respective survival as a state which was built around the Malay way of

¹³⁰ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1963), 1.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 113.

life.¹³³ Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman confided: “We...especially those of his [President Sukarno] own blood and religion, would have been happy to have worked together with him for peace and economic well-being throughout Southeast Asia, our regional homelands.”¹³⁴ Also he explained: “As we were too small to stand alone, our only hope for security was to live in close association with Indonesia in particular, and other countries in Southeast Asia in general.”¹³⁵

Malaya’s intention towards Indonesia was unmistakable. It wanted to establish a special relationship with Indonesia – a closer relation between Malaya and Indonesia when compared to their other bilateral ties.¹³⁶ The desire for special associations reflected Malaya’s realization of its blood ties with Indonesia, and that both states were strategically dependent on one another.

It should be noted that Malaya emphasized on its mutual strategic dependence with, not its outright reliance on, Indonesia. It wanted the relationship to be equal. In other words, both parties would have to rely on each other for survival. Tunku revealed his conversation with Sukarno, “I made it quite clear that Malaya was only a small country. The Malay people looked to Indonesia for guidance and help, although we maintained that independence and sovereignty were our heritage.”¹³⁷ While acknowledging that it was a small state as compared with Indonesia, Malaya considered itself as a Power to be reckoned with in Southeast Asia.

A combination of factors – the size and the geographical location of Malaya; the resources that it possessed; its greater prosperity against other states in the region; and its military alliance with Britain – rendered the belief among Malaysians that Malaya was a consequential Power in Southeast Asia.¹³⁸ These elements, especially the Anglo-Malayan military alliance and Malaya’s greater wealth as opposed to Indonesia’s, prompted Malaysians to perceive that power balance existed between Malaya and

¹³³ Ibid. 113, 152.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 42.

¹³⁷ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 113.

¹³⁸ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 9, 24, 33.

Indonesia.¹³⁹ Throughout the early 1960s, the GDP per capita of Malaya (later Malaysia) was evidently higher than that of Indonesia. (See Table 5.1)

Table 5.1: GDP per capita and Total Population of Malaya and Indonesia in the Early 1960s

Year	Malaya GDP per capita (constant 2005 US\$)	Indonesia GDP per capita (constant 2005 US\$)	Malaya Total Population	Indonesia Total Population
1960	815	286	8160975	88692697
1961	849	296	8429369	90860197
1962	875	295	8710678	93101152
1963	909	281	8999247	95420835
1964	928	284	9287442	97828538
1965	970	279	9569784	100329810

Source: World Development Indicators

With its solid material capacity, Malaya was ready to take the lead in fashioning its preferred order in Southeast Asia, with the aim of securing Indonesia's cooperation; it was also ready to compete with Indonesia.¹⁴⁰ These attempts were aimed at securing Malaya's survival. In the minds of the Malayan leaders, there was no Indonesia's supremacy in Southeast Asia; there would be only Indo-Malay mutual reliance, which represented the presence of the Malay Archipelago.¹⁴¹

The First Encounter

Indonesia-Malaya relations were put to test in the first days of Malaya's independence.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 25-26. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 20-21, 33, 64.

¹⁴¹ Mubin Sheppard, *Tunku – His Life and Times* (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1995), 116. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 33-34.

In September 1957, Malaya abstained from voting to include the issue of West Irian on the agenda of the Twelfth session of the UN General Assembly.¹⁴² The decision was at odds with Indonesia's expectation. Indonesia expected to receive "absolute support" from Malaya, owing to their close bonds originated from their common roots, and such support would reflect Indonesia's dominance over Malaya.¹⁴³

The mismatch of expectation produced Indonesia's resentment towards Malaya; and its assertion of dominance over Malaya ensued.¹⁴⁴ Indonesia demanded an explanation from Malaya for not supporting its cause at the UN.¹⁴⁵ Malaya explained that it was too preoccupied with its domestic affairs, and would only vote for issues that were directly related to Malaya.¹⁴⁶ Still, Indonesia's show of dominance was real in Malaya.

The Malaya's pro-Indonesian forces put up their criticisms on the Malayan government for not siding with Indonesia at the UN.¹⁴⁷ Besides, the Malay public in Malaya had also voiced their support for Indonesia's struggle for West Irian.¹⁴⁸ Because of the palpable support of the Malay public, together with the pressure exerted by Indonesia and the Malaya's pro-Indonesian forces, the Tunku administration came to realize the fundamental importance of West Irian to Indonesia.¹⁴⁹ The Malays in Malaya and the overwhelming majority of Indonesians wanted West Irian to be part of Indonesia; in other words, they viewed the territory as belonged to the Malay World.¹⁵⁰ The Malayan government thus needed to support Indonesia's claim on West Irian, considering that the territory was inextricably linked to the understanding of the Malay World or Malay Archipelago held by the Malaya's Malays and Indonesians. The

¹⁴² Ooi Kee Beng, *The Reluctant Politician – Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 89-90. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 91.

¹⁴³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 65.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 91-92.

¹⁴⁵ The Tun Dr Ismail A. Rahman Papers, *Drifting into Politics*. Unpublished memoirs Folio 12 (2)/p.50. Courtesy of ISEAS Library, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

¹⁴⁶ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 31.

¹⁴⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 91-92.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. 95. Also see Federation of Malaya, *Parliamentary Debates*, 6th December 1960 (Kuala Lumpur: House of Representatives, 1960), 3413-3414.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. Also see Greg Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi – Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965* (Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 183.

¹⁵⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 30, 48, 61.

presence of the Malay World was crucial to Malaya's security. Malaya saw it as a shield that protected Malaya's existence as a Malay nation-state.

The Tunku administration promptly adjusted its policy. In November 1957, Malaya's Permanent Representative to the UN, Dr. Ismail, set forth Malaya's support for Indonesia's struggle for West Irian, when he spoke before the UN Political Committee.¹⁵¹ According to Dr. Ismail, his speech was "impassioned" and "emotionally in favour of Indonesia".¹⁵² The Indonesian delegates, who heard the speech, "cried with emotion".¹⁵³

Malaya threw its support to the Indonesia's cause since then.¹⁵⁴ Malaya voted for Indonesia when the issue of West Irian was raised again at the UN in November 1957.¹⁵⁵ It publicly backed Indonesia's claim on the territory.¹⁵⁶ It continued to stand behind Indonesia whenever there was a vote for the issue at the UN.¹⁵⁷ Most notably, Malaya consistently denied the Dutch access to the transit facilities in Malaya, amidst Indonesia's fight against the Netherlands for West Irian.¹⁵⁸ This policy remained in place even when the issue of West Irian had already been resolved.¹⁵⁹ Malaya too exerted pressure on the British government to prevent the Dutch troops from transiting through the British Rule Singapore en route from West Irian to Europe.¹⁶⁰ The Dutch army decided not to dock their ships at Singapore partly due to the pressure brought to bear by Malaya.¹⁶¹

The Malayan government, therefore, saw its policy on West Irian as its strategic cooperation with Indonesia.¹⁶² Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman made plain to his British counterpart: should clashes break out between Indonesia and the Netherlands,

¹⁵¹ Ooi Kee Beng, *The Reluctant Politician – Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 90. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 41. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 31.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*, 31.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. Also see Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1963), 11.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 37.

“Malaya...because of her affinity with Indonesia, might have to declare openly her support of Indonesia”.¹⁶³ For the Malayan government, assisting Indonesia to take over West Irian from the Dutch meant consolidating the presence of the Malay World. The support of Malaya – as Malaysians saw it – was crucial to the success of Indonesia’s claim on West Irian, because Malaya was a Power of consequence in Southeast Asia.¹⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the emotional reaction of the Indonesian UN delegates, who burst into tear after listening to Dr. Ismail’s defend of Indonesia’s case for West Irian, did not indicate Indonesia’s acknowledgment of sharing strategic partnerships with Malaya. The reaction was merely the delegates’ sentimental expression which stemmed from their sense of sharing common identities with Malaya. For Indonesia, its fight for West Irian was in fact a Third World leader’s struggle against colonialism-imperialism. Such a fight was accompanied by the support from the Soviet Union and the Third World states.¹⁶⁵ In other words, Indonesia perceived itself as a major Power shaping the events on the world stage. Indonesia’s demand for Malaya’s backing on its pursuit of West Irian, therefore, was not prompted by its realization of being strategically dependant on Malaya. The demand was rather an outcome of Indonesia’s aim for strategic preponderance over Malaya, based upon its sense as a major Power. The demand was too triggered by Indonesia’s close identification with Malaya, owing to their shared cultural ties. In the eyes of Indonesia, Malaya should support its quest after West Irian, because both states shared intimate ties; also because Indonesia demanded so.

The Rebellions

The West was increasingly unnerved by the radicalization of the Indonesian public and their growing support for PKI.¹⁶⁶ It was largely an outcome of President Sukarno’s actions.¹⁶⁷ Since the mid-1950s, President Sukarno began to embrace leftist policies.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ Abdul Rahman to Macmillan, 19 October 1960, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 95-96.

¹⁶⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 97.

¹⁶⁵ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 41, 64. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 91.

¹⁶⁶ Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia, and the Future of West Papua* (Australia: Scribe Publications, 2006), 25-26.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129-131. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 87-89.

Sukarno had been contemplating establishing leftist authoritarian rule in Indonesia.¹⁶⁹ He also wanted to consolidate Indonesia's ties with the Soviet Union and China.¹⁷⁰

By December 1957, the US Secretary of State, Dulles, had informed his deputy that he would like to "see things to a point where we could plausibly withdraw our recognition of the Sukarno government and give it to the dissident on Sumatra".¹⁷¹ Dulles' message was subsequently being conveyed to the rebels in Sumatra.¹⁷² Knowing that they could count on America's support, the rebels announced on 15th February 1958 the formation of a rebel government in Sumatra titled "Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) – Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia".¹⁷³ The PRRI government was constituted by a group of dissident politicians and military officers in Sumatra.¹⁷⁴ They proclaimed PRRI to be the alternative government of Indonesia, which sought to represent all Indonesians.¹⁷⁵ The PRRI rebels were predominantly Sumatran.¹⁷⁶

The rebel movement in Sulawesi, named Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam (Permesta), provided its support to the PRRI.¹⁷⁷ The two rebel movements were all backed by the US in its efforts to break up Indonesia to prevent the rise of communism and nonalignment in the state.¹⁷⁸ The rebels were anti-Communist.¹⁷⁹ They were

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion As Foreign Policy – The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), 132. Also see Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia, and the Future of West Papua* (Australia: Scribe Publications, 2006), 26-27. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129-130.

¹⁷² Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia, and the Future of West Papua*, 26-27.

¹⁷³ Ibid. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 47-49. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 293-295. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 87-89.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 105.

¹⁷⁸ Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia, and the Future of West Papua*, 22-29. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 129-131.

¹⁷⁹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 49-51. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 129-130.

receiving political and military supports from the US and its allies – Britain, Australia, the Philippines and Taiwan – in the region.¹⁸⁰

Malaya announced a policy of non-involvement in the wake of the establishment of PRRI.¹⁸¹ Yet, Malaya was sympathized with the Sumatran rebellion. The PRRI members were allowed to regularly visit Malaya to promote their cause.¹⁸² The Sumatran rebels – who had escaped to Malaya – were granted asylum in Malaya, when the Indonesian army had successfully dismantled the rebel movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi by the end of 1958.¹⁸³

Malaya's covert support for the Sumatran rebellion was motivated by its identity as well as power politics with Indonesia.

While the Malays in Malaya and the indigenous people in Indonesia were bound by their Malay way of life, the Malays and the Sumatrans, however, perceived themselves of sharing greater ties, when compared to the links between the Malaya's Malays and other indigenous people of Indonesia.¹⁸⁴ Facilitated by the geographical proximity between the Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra, most of the Malays in Malaya had their origins in Sumatra.¹⁸⁵ The similarities between the Malays and the Sumatrans were so close that Sumatra was being viewed as the "cradle of the Malay race" by the Malaya's Malays.¹⁸⁶

Meanwhile, for the great majority of Indonesians, the cultural traits shared by the Malays in Malaya and the Sumatrans were essentially tied to certain geographical areas.¹⁸⁷ Indonesian perceived people with such cultural characters as "Suku Melayu", who resided across the coastal areas of Sumatra, the Riau islands and Kalimantan.¹⁸⁸ In the eyes of Indonesians, "Suku Melayu" was a minority in the Republic, which made up

¹⁸⁰ Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Indonesians – Australia, Indonesia, and the Future of West Papua* (Australia: Scribe Publications, 2006), 22-29. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129-131. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 49-51.

¹⁸¹ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4-5.

¹⁸² Ibid. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 89.

¹⁸³ Ibid. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 294-296.

¹⁸⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 40-42, 87.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 90.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 48-49.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. Also see Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 1.

only a small proportion of Indonesia's population.¹⁸⁹ The sense of being "Suku Melayu" in the midst of Indonesia's vast population cemented Sumatrans' leaning towards the Malays in Malaya.¹⁹⁰

The emphasis on the Malay primacy in Malaya's national identity further consolidated the Malay-Sumatran intimacy. The Malays in Malaya were faced with a sizeable presence of ethnic minorities. In 1957, the Malays accounted for almost 50 per cent of the total population in Malaya; followed by the Chinese – 37 per cent; and Indians – 12 per cent.¹⁹¹ More importantly, the economic wealth of the Malayan Chinese was disproportionately greater than that owned by their Malay counterparts.¹⁹² As a result, the Malays in Malaya were plagued with a strong sense of insecurity and disadvantage.¹⁹³ They constantly feared of their "disappearance from the world".¹⁹⁴ The Malays, therefore, strived to preserve their political supremacy in Malaya – that of a Malay-Malaya – so as to safeguard their survival.¹⁹⁵ The roar: "Hidup Melayu!" – Long Live the Malays – had rarely failed to galvanize the Malayan Malays.¹⁹⁶

Such a powerful sense of ensuring the Malays' existence resulted in the Malayan government's commitment to passively assisting and protecting the Sumatran rebels. For the Tunku administration, looking after the Sumatrans meant preserving the existence of the Malays.¹⁹⁷ The Malay elites in the administration apprehended the Sumatrans through the lens of their national identity, namely, the Malay that was at the core of Malaya.¹⁹⁸

Malaya apprehended the unique existence of the Malays in relation to Indonesia by affirming the superiority of Malaya's national identity over Indonesia's. The inevitable similarities of Malayan and Indonesian national identities, which were founded on the

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 40-42, 88-89. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 25.

¹⁹¹ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 79-80.

¹⁹² Ibid. 85-86. Also see Anthony Milner, *The Malays* (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 202. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 5-7.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Anthony Milner, *The Malays*, 16, 202, 237-238.

¹⁹⁵ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 17, 72.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 87-90.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 5-6, 72.

Malay way of life, obliged Malaya to stress its difference vis-à-vis Indonesia, in order to ensure the distinctive existence of Malaya/Malay-Malaya in the world of nations. Because of its sense of uniqueness of its national identity against Indonesia, coupled with its power politics with Indonesia – which were based on comparison, Malaya emphasized the superiority of its nationhood over Indonesia's. The superiority, according to Malaysians, was proven by the wisdom of Malaya.

Malaysians demonstrated their indifference to Indonesians' disparagement where Malaya possessed a fake independence. They were dismissive of the anti-colonial revolutionary fighting spirit vigorously advocated by Indonesians. The Tunku wrote, "...there were people who were mocking Malaya's 'pseudo-independence'... the newly independent countries found it expedient to blow hot air and played up their newly-won independence, unsettling the minds of the people of the country and their neighbours...Malaya went on smoothly and quietly about her business...."¹⁹⁹ Also he wrote, "Some found it fashionable to find fault with everything associated with imperialism and colonial rule, whereas we were quietly pursuing our course for peace and goodwill..."²⁰⁰ The Tunku was most probably expressing his disregard for Indonesians' contempt for Malaya. Indonesia under the Sukarno regime positioned itself to be the champion of the revolutions against colonialism-imperialism worldwide. The regime persistently inculcated in Indonesian people a strong sense of revolutionary spirit.

Malaysians argued that, contrary to Indonesians, who attained their independence through a cruel, bloody and destructive fight, Malaysians, however, achieved theirs "without a drop of blood".²⁰¹ It did not cost people's lives because – as being argued – Malaysians fight for their independence with "tact and diplomacy", and "without making much noise".²⁰² Further, Malaysians underlined their success in engendering stability and progress in Malaya, as opposed to Indonesia, which was stuck in the middle of social, economic and political disorder.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Lest We Forget – Further Candid Reminiscences* (Malaysia: Eastern Universities Press, 1983), 123-124.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. 114.

²⁰¹ Ibid. 33, 36.

²⁰² Ibid. 36-37, 115, 124.

²⁰³ Ibid. 33, 105, 116-117, 185. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 89, 99. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 83.

In short, Malaysians differentiated themselves from Indonesia by accentuating their professed wisdom which was perceived as central to the accomplishments of Malaya. Malaysians believed that the Malayan wisdom was demonstrated by their ability to achieve independence with no loss of life, even though – Malaysians emphasized – they did in fact fight for their nationhood.²⁰⁴ Malaysians too perceived that the self-proclaimed wisdom was exhibited through their competency in ensuring the stability and progress of Malaya. In the eyes of Malaysians, Indonesians lacked such wisdom. Indonesians were enraged by Malaysians' justification that Malaya was "a model for all newly independent nations".²⁰⁵

Malaya's sense of superiority of its nationhood – as represented by the Malayan wisdom – over that of Indonesia, strengthened its resolve to check Indonesia's power. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed his sense of wisdom, when he wrote about Indonesia in his letter to Dr. Ismail dated 24th November 1958:²⁰⁶

Conditions in Indonesia are not too good and...becoming worse and worse every day. How they expect to recover God alone knows...

Subsequently, the Tunku administration firmly adhered to a series of measures that had the effects of curbing the Sukarno regime's attempt to establish Indonesia's regional preponderance. Malaya refused to crush or expel the Sumatran rebels who had already settled in Malaya, despite constant pressure from Jakarta requesting Malaya for doing just that.²⁰⁷ In October 1960, Malaya once again granted asylum to a group of Indonesian rebels; this time, a group of Indonesian diplomats based in Europe, who had

²⁰⁴ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Lest We Forget – Further Candid Reminiscences* (Malaysia: Eastern Universities Press, 1983), 36-37.

²⁰⁵ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 97.

²⁰⁶ Tunku Abdul Rahman to Tun Dr. Ismail, 24th November 1958, IAR/3/2/66, quoted in Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 41-42.

²⁰⁷ Ooi Kee Beng, *The Reluctant Politician – Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 122-123. Also see The Tun Dr Ismail A. Rahman Papers, *Drifting into Politics*. Unpublished memoirs Folio 12 (2)/p.52. Courtesy of ISEAS Library, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 29.

defected to the Sumatran rebel movement.²⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Malaya began to seriously ponder upon the idea of integrating Sumatra into the Federation of Malaya.²⁰⁹

The measures and the contemplation indicated Malaya's resolve to quell the Indonesian central government's aspiration for dominance in archipelagic Southeast Asia.²¹⁰ Specifically, Malaya wanted to prevent the rise of communism in Indonesia.

The Tunku administration was staunchly anti-communist.²¹¹ Malaya's internal security had been threatened by the Chinese-led Communist insurgency.²¹² The Tunku explained the foreign policy of his administration: "Malaya's independent foreign policy was not neutral, the country's fundamental security concerns made it undoubtedly anti-Communist...It was simply to protect our independence."²¹³ He declared in December 1958: "...let me tell you that there are no such things as local Communists. Communism is an international organization which aims for world domination..."²¹⁴ In order to protect Malaya's very survival, the Tunku administration "instinctively" supported any state that faced Communist threats.²¹⁵ It drew on the regional political forces in Sumatra – which were also anti-communist – to contain the central government in Jakarta, which was increasingly pro-Communist.²¹⁶

Malaya's reactions to the Sumatran rebellion, in the meantime, reflected its intention to perpetuate the existence of the Malays – that was to solidify the existence of Malaya – by looking after the Sumatrans, who, in the eyes of Malaysans, were also Malays.

Malaya's will to balance against Indonesia simultaneously boosted Malayans' sense of superiority of their nationhood over Indonesia's, which was characterized by Malayans' self-acknowledged wisdom. The government of Malaya explained, it offered

²⁰⁸ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4-6.

²⁰⁹ Greg Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi – Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965* (Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 174-175.

²¹⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 68, 90.

²¹¹ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 26-27.

²¹² Ibid. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 22-23, 80-81.

²¹³ Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 28 December 1982, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 26.

²¹⁴ *The Straits Times*, December 7, 1958, quoted in Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 52.

²¹⁵ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 22.

²¹⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 68, 90.

asylum to the defected Indonesian diplomats considering the “pathetic plight” of these defectors.²¹⁷ For Malaysians, the Indonesian rebels were pathetic because they had to run away from Indonesia due to its instability and bloodshed, and seek shelter in Malaya, which was stable and free from violence.

Malaya’s responses to the Sumatran rebellion did not match with the Indonesian central government’s expectation. The Indonesian authority expected the Malayan government to take extraordinary measures to help suppress the Sumatran rebels.²¹⁸ It believed Malaya should provide such level of support, as the two states were intimately associated with one another, owing to their blood ties; and it strived for its dominance over Malaya. For the Sukarno regime, Malaya’s active support in crushing the rebels would represent its deference to Indonesia’s wishes.²¹⁹

The mismatch of expectation resulted in the Indonesian central government’s anger towards Malaya.²²⁰ However, the anger did not immediately engender the government’s retaliative measures aimed at preventing Malaya’s attempt to curb the power of Indonesia.²²¹ The central tasks of the Indonesian authority at that period were to eliminate the rebellions at the outer islands and consolidate its internal control, so as to prevent Indonesia from falling apart.²²² These tasks would absorb most of the energy of the Sukarno regime until it had succeeded in dismantling the existing liberal parliamentary democracy in Indonesia, and replaced it with a presidential system on 5th July 1959.²²³ President Sukarno and the Indonesian Army had forged between themselves an effective partnership to form this new political system termed as Guided

²¹⁷ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 6.

²¹⁸ Ibid. 4.

²¹⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 90.

²²⁰ Greg Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi – Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965* (Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 174-175. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 89.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 282, 296-299, 302-305. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 50-51.

²²³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 53-54, 61. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 272, 297-306.

Democracy.²²⁴ The President was the center of this system, possessing strong executive power with no constitutional limit on the President's exercise of arbitrary power.²²⁵

Still, the Indonesian authority's resentment towards Malaya persisted, while being preoccupied with its domestic affairs.²²⁶ The anger would contribute to its intense conflict with Malaya some years later.²²⁷

The Friendship Treaty

It was obvious that the Indonesia-Malaya relations were strained by their respective reactions to the Sumatran rebellion. Nevertheless, despite the tense encounter, the two states continued to discern a measure of goodwill from their counterpart, which was essentially stemmed from their awareness of sharing common identities. The mutual positive associations were expressed in the form of Indonesia-Malaya Treaty of Friendship signed by the two states on 17th April 1959.²²⁸ It was Malaya's first friendship treaty with another state.²²⁹

The signing of the friendship treaty indicated precisely the absence of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaya. The central focus of the treaty was on cooperation in the realm of culture such as the standardization of the use of the Malay language – the common language of the two states; and the cultural and educational exchanges between the two states.²³⁰ The treaty did not entail any strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaya.²³¹ It basically reflected the two states' desire to highlight their close historical, racial and cultural bonds.²³² In other words, the treaty was not a manifestation of the special ties – the coexistence of common identities and shared strategic interests – between Indonesia and Malaya. It was the one source of closeness in Indonesia-Malaya relations – the two states' common identities that bred

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 301, 314-317.

²²⁶ Greg Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi – Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965* (Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 174-175. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 51. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 89-90.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 84-86.

²²⁹ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 8.

²³⁰ Ibid. 3, Appendix II.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

and sustained their mutual sense of closeness – that led to their signing of the friendship treaty.

The result of the implementation of the friendship treaty further corroborated the fact that this treaty was not an expression of the strategic partnership between Indonesia and Malaya. Within the framework of the treaty, Indonesia and Malaya had tried but failed to agree on a standardized Malay language system.²³³ They were unable to succeed in cultural cooperation, let alone strategic collaboration. Indonesia preferred strategic preponderance over Malaya, whereas Malaya wanted mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia. The two states, consequently, did not share common strategic interests, despite sharing a friendship treaty.

The Regional Prescriptions

“...nation-building cannot be confined to home affairs alone; the country must play a role in international affairs,” the Tunku wrote.²³⁴ Malaya with its sound material basis strived to ensure its international presence by strongly committed to the United Nations; and aimed to consolidate its existence by advancing regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.²³⁵

Malaya needed to secure cooperation with other Southeast Asian states, as it was not large enough to shape a regional order all by itself. The shaping of regional order was meant to safeguard Malaya’s survival. In terms of regional environment, Malaya wanted a peaceful external climate so that it could immerse in its internal social and economic developments.²³⁶ It, meanwhile, perceived the preferred peaceful Southeast Asia as fundamentally reflecting the Malay way of life, constituting a protection for Malaya’s existence as a Malay nation-state.²³⁷

Malaya, therefore, made plain that considering the limit of its size, the security of Malaya was depended upon its cooperation with Indonesia – the largest state in

²³³ Ibid. 3-4.

²³⁴ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 84.

²³⁵ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 67.

²³⁶ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Lest We Forget – Further Candid Reminiscences* (Malaysia: Eastern Universities Press, 1983), 116-117. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories*, 152. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 44-45.

²³⁷ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories*, 152.

Southeast Asia – in particular, and with other Southeast Asian states in general.²³⁸ Indonesia and Malaya together represented the presence of the Malay World in Southeast Asia. Dr. Ismail described his task after being appointed as the Foreign Minister of Malaya in February 1959: “The foreign issue that occupied my attention as Minister of External Affairs was to see that our relations with Indonesia remained on the best of terms.”²³⁹

With this strategic equation in mind – cooperating with the states in Southeast Asia, primarily with Indonesia – Malaya embarked on its initiative in establishing a friendly regional environment of Southeast Asia that was rooted in the cultural similarities among the states in the region.²⁴⁰ The preferred regional climate would allow Malaya to ease its defense against other states in Southeast Asia.

In his first visit to the Philippines in January 1959, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman revealed Malaya’s proposal of establishing SEAFET – the Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty.²⁴¹ SEAFET was to be an organization aimed at promoting Southeast Asia’s economic, social and cultural developments through regional cooperation.²⁴² The proposed regional body was officially made known to the public in the joint communiqué of the Tunku and Garcia, the Philippines’ President.²⁴³ Malaya subsequently drafted the treaty and invited Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Burma to participate in the creation of SEAFET.²⁴⁴ Only Thailand and South Vietnam responded constructively.²⁴⁵ Indonesia rejected and was infuriated by Malaya’s proposal.²⁴⁶

Malaya’s embrace of leadership role in the creation of a friendly regional order of Southeast Asia stood against Indonesia’s preference for regional preponderance.

²³⁸ Ibid. 113.

²³⁹ The Tun Dr Ismail A. Rahman Papers, *Drifting into Politics*. Unpublished memoirs Folio 12(2)/p.52. Courtesy of ISEAS Library, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

²⁴⁰ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 78.

²⁴¹ Ibid. 65. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 86, 179.

²⁴² Ibid. Also see Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 25-26, 88.

²⁴³ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 65-66.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

Malaya's proposal of regional cooperation, as a result, triggered Indonesia's assertion of its regional preponderant standing, which mutually reinforced with Indonesians' sense of superiority of their nationhood over Malaya's. The Indonesian press called for its government to "nip in the bud the puerile, vain and flamboyant hopes" of setting up SEAFET, and claimed that such an undertaking would be "a charitable act" of the Indonesian government.²⁴⁷ The Indonesian consul general in Singapore maintained that as long as SEAFET was represented by member states which were "not really independent", there were bound to be splits in the organization.²⁴⁸ Indonesians reminded Malaya of Indonesia's dominant status by demonstrating their confidence in Indonesia, which – in their view – was mighty and able to comfortably dissolve any possible attempt to form SEAFET. The rejection of SEAFET crystallized Indonesians' sense of possessing a real independence vis-à-vis that of Malaya. In the eyes of Indonesians, the idea of SEAFET should be crushed, owing to its "puerility" considering that the idea was a design of Malaysians, who administered a fake independence. Unlike Malaya – Indonesians maintained – Indonesians' independence was truly authentic, because they had fought for it through a bloody revolution.

Malaya understood its mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia. It continued to seek for Indonesia's participation in the creation of a friendly climate of Southeast Asia, despite Indonesia's hostile rejection to Malaya's proposal of regional cooperation. In October 1959, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman once again took the lead in fostering regional cooperation in Southeast Asia.²⁴⁹ This time, Malaya proposed the formation of ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) – a regional body which was built on the idea of SEAFET.²⁵⁰ The Tunku wrote to President Sukarno and leaders of other Southeast Asian states explaining the idea of ASA, and invited their participation in the establishment of this body.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ Niranjana Kumar Hazra, "Malaya's Foreign Relations 1957-1963" (M.A. diss., University of Singapore, 1965), 129, quoted in Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 66.

²⁴⁸ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 66.

²⁴⁹ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4.

²⁵⁰ Ibid. 4, Appendix III. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 83-84. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 25-26.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

The purpose of ASA was to encourage the states of Southeast Asia to live in togetherness in the region, especially through their economic, social and cultural cooperation.²⁵² Malaya believed that through living in togetherness in the form of ASA, the Southeast Asian states would be able to stand on their own feet, decide their own destiny, and prevent them from being exploited by Powers outside the region.²⁵³ In other words, Malaya strived for an independent Southeast Asia through its friendly coexistence with other states in the region – a regional climate that constituted a shield for Malaya’s existence.²⁵⁴

The idea of ASA reflected Malaya’s strategic thinking of *serumpun*: the states of Southeast Asia should live in togetherness in the region like the way bamboos live, so that their respective survival could always be guaranteed. The *serumpun* concept – the bamboo’s way of survival, as Malaya saw it, belonged exclusively to the Malay civilization.

Indonesia rejected Malaya’s proposal to create ASA stated that cooperation among states could instead be implemented through Asian-African solidarity.²⁵⁵ Just like SEAFET, Malaya’s decision to champion the formation of ASA was perceived by Indonesia as a challenge to its desired primacy in archipelagic Southeast Asia.²⁵⁶ Meanwhile, in the eyes of Indonesians, Malaya’s proposal of ASA – which amounted to its prescription for the regional order of Southeast Asia – constituted an affront to Indonesia’s prestige as a world leader based in Southeast Asia.²⁵⁷ Indonesia perceived itself as a leader of the Third World leading the worldwide revolutionary fights against colonialism-imperialism.²⁵⁸ In short, it was the intertwining of Indonesia’s aim for regional supremacy and its national pride vis-à-vis Malaya that prompted the rejection of Indonesia to the idea of ASA.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 179-180.

²⁵⁴ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 22-23.

²⁵⁵ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4, Appendix IV.

²⁵⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 83-84, 102-103.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

Indonesia's repeated rejection to Malaya's ideas of regional cooperation resulted in Malaya's disgruntlement towards Indonesia. The disgruntlement was owing to the mismatch of Malaya's expectation with Indonesia's intention. Malaya considered its relations with Indonesia as closer than their other bilateral ties in Southeast Asia, not only because the two states were bound by their blood ties, but also because Malaya acknowledged that both parties were strategically dependent on each other. Malaya expected Indonesia to be supportive of the creation of SEAFET and ASA, since – as Malaya saw it – the proposed regional bodies were the embodiment of Indonesia-Malaya strategic partnership. In the eyes of Malaya, Indonesia should support Malaya's proposals of regional cooperation, simply because these propositions were the consequences of Malaya's mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia. Yet, Indonesia intended to establish its strategic preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia, not seek strategic cooperation with Malaya.

The Tunku later revealed his discontent at Indonesia's repudiation of SEAFET and ASA. He pointed out that Indonesians tended to think that they “should not play or even appear to play second fiddle”.²⁵⁹ The bad feelings towards Indonesia strengthened Malaya's determination to press ahead with the formation of ASA.²⁶⁰ Together with Thailand and the Philippines, Malaya co-founded the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in July 1961.²⁶¹

Malaya's resolve to institute regional cooperation in the form of ASA bolstered, and was bolstered by, its drive to assert the superiority of its nationhood over Indonesia's, which was expressed in the language of Malayan wisdom. The Malayan press compared ASA with Bandung – that was the occasion that cemented the concept of the “Third World” and marked the rise of Indonesia as a Third World's leader – commenting that: “the one remains what it was at Bandung, the expression of nationalist fervour among ex-colonial territories; the other is an association looking to economic, social and cultural advance.”²⁶² Malaya's intention to weaken the Bandung spirit which signified

²⁵⁹ Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 28 December 1982, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 33.

²⁶⁰ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 4.

²⁶¹ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 66.

²⁶² “Beginning at Bangkok,” *Straits Times*, August 4, 1961, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 86.

Indonesia's influence in Southeast Asia, mutually reinforced with Malaya's underlining of ASA's ability in delivering stability and progress, that was the substance of Malaya's professed wisdom. Unlike ASA – Malaya maintained – the Bandung spirit was no more than spirited anti-colonial sentiments, implying that Indonesia was devoid of the ability to produce stability and progress.

The Fight For West Irian

The establishment of Guided Democracy on 5th July 1959 marked the rise of Sukarno as the central figure of Indonesia's political system.²⁶³ Sukarno, as being the President of Indonesia, became the source of authority in the system of Guided Democracy – a presidential system that was created by the joint efforts of Sukarno and the Indonesian Army.²⁶⁴ Sukarno too remained as the source of legitimacy in Indonesia's politics.²⁶⁵

However, the new political system was essentially built on a balance of power between the competing political forces in Indonesia.²⁶⁶ Sukarno, as a result, had to balance these political forces against one another, so as to preserve his supreme status in the system.²⁶⁷

One party that had survived through the demise of the parliamentary democracy in Indonesia was the Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia).²⁶⁸ Sukarno made use of the forces of PKI to curb the power of the Indonesian Army.²⁶⁹ It had then become clear that the power structure of the presidential system of Guided Democracy was a triangular relationship between President Sukarno, the Indonesian Army and the PKI, with the President settled at the top of the triangular structure.²⁷⁰

While occupying the central position in Indonesia's politics, Sukarno understood that he was a force of his own with no organizational power base vis-à-vis the Army and the

²⁶³ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 309, 311-317.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. 307-308. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 54-55.

²⁶⁶ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 311, 317-318.

²⁶⁷ Ibid. 317-324. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 54-55.

²⁶⁸ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 297, 318-319.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. 318-324. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 54-55.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

PKI, which were the organized political forces in Indonesia.²⁷¹ Sukarno knew that, just like the years before the creation of Guided Democracy, his stature as the preeminent figure of Indonesia would serve as the basis for the existence of his power base.²⁷²

Shortly after the creation of Guided Democracy, President Sukarno, who was the commander-in-chief of the new regime, put the task of recovering West Irian from the colonial control of the Dutch as the prime and central task of Indonesia.²⁷³ The decision was a result of Sukarno's aim to ensure his political survival and to consolidate the integrity of Indonesia.

The forming of Guided Democracy was essentially a response to the regional rebellions in Indonesia.²⁷⁴ The new regime's *raison d'être* therefore was its ability to impose unity in Indonesia. With the power of the Indonesian state centralized at the hands of its President as never before, Sukarno executed the ongoing strategy of keeping Indonesia intact with greater determination and effectiveness. Indonesia under the strong leadership of Sukarno decided to utterly assert its regional preponderance by struggling to restore West Irian.²⁷⁵ The Indonesian government wanted to make use of the struggle to establish its solid internal control throughout Indonesia.²⁷⁶ The struggle was also meant to minimize the prospect of Indonesia falling apart by maximizing its sphere of influence.²⁷⁷

Meanwhile, Sukarno intended to use the issue of West Irian to promote the national unity of Indonesia.²⁷⁸ He had transformed the claim on West Irian into Indonesia's fundamental national demand – a struggle to perfecting the revolution of Indonesia. The struggle for West Irian had evoked a strong sense of nationhood among the people of Indonesia. They rallied around President Sukarno – the preeminent leader of Indonesia – aiming to take possession of West Irian by expelling the Dutch from the territory.²⁷⁹

²⁷¹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 52-55. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 302-303.

²⁷² Ibid. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 307-308.

²⁷³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 52.

²⁷⁴ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 282, 287, 297-305.

²⁷⁵ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 48, 52, 61-63.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ Ibid. 61.

²⁷⁸ Ibid. 52, 55-56, 61.

²⁷⁹ Ibid. 61-62, 73.

Also, Sukarno needed the West Irian issue to safeguard his political survival having operated in the triangular power structure of Guided Democracy. By transforming the claim on West Irian into a fundamental national goal of Indonesia, the two competing political forces – the Indonesian Army and the PKI – were obliged to uphold Sukarno who symbolized Indonesia, and abide by his call to fight for the territory.²⁸⁰ They needed to do so to sustain their respective legitimate existence in Indonesia.

In other words, Sukarno's plan to recover West Irian would entail a combination of Indonesia's outright assertion of regional preponderance and a strong expression of Indonesian nationalist sentiments.

The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio, spelled out Indonesia's policy on its claim on West Irian at the very beginning of the operating of Guided Democracy.²⁸¹ Dr. Subandrio termed the policy as "Confrontation".²⁸² He explained, Indonesia would confront the Dutch in all fields, including the military field if necessary, along its struggle to acquire West Irian from the Dutch.²⁸³

In August 1960, Indonesia demonstrated its resolve to confront the Netherlands by breaking its diplomatic ties with the Netherlands.²⁸⁴ The military capacity of Indonesia continued to expand signaling the Republic's intention to capture West Irian by force.²⁸⁵ Indonesia had been able to secure a steady supply of heavy weapons from the Soviet Bloc shortly after its leaning towards the Communist Camp in the mid-1950s.²⁸⁶ The government of Indonesia purchased these weapons with a series of loans provided by the Soviet Union since 1957.²⁸⁷ From the late 1950s, the military balance between Indonesia and the Dutch in West Irian had started to tilt towards Indonesia.²⁸⁸ It would appear that the new Sukarno regime of Guided Democracy had redefined the central tenet of Indonesian foreign policy – independent and active.²⁸⁹ Independent, for the new regime, referred to the stand alone global force of the Third World that represented the

²⁸⁰ Ibid. 52, 55-56, 61-62, 73.

²⁸¹ Ibid. 63, 65.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid. 62-65.

²⁸⁶ Ibid. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 165-167.

international front of anti-imperialism-colonialism.²⁹⁰ Whereas Active meant Indonesia would take the lead in organizing the Third World to fight against imperialism-colonialism worldwide.²⁹¹

It had become increasingly obvious for the Tunku administration that the West Irian dispute might lead to military clashes between Indonesia and the Dutch.²⁹² Malaya felt obliged to help Indonesia to obtain West Irian peacefully, which was meant to strengthen the existence of the Malay World while preserving a peaceful external climate for Malaya.²⁹³ Malaya's ambassador to Indonesia, Senu Abdul Rahman, time and again wrote to his Foreign Minister – Dr. Ismail, urging Malaya to intervene in the dispute of West Irian.²⁹⁴ Senu was known to have close feelings towards Indonesia.²⁹⁵ His request reflected the view of the Malay public in Malaya, that Malaya should assist Indonesia in obtaining West Irian, as the territory belonged to the Malay World, also because Malaya, as a Power of consequence in Southeast Asia, was capable of providing consequential support to Indonesia. From Malaya's perspective, if it was to intervene in the West Irian dispute, the objective of the intervention was to provide its strategic backing for Indonesia.

On 20th September 1960, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman wrote to President Sukarno, offering to mediate on the issue of West Irian, with the purpose of assisting Indonesia to secure the territory from the Dutch.²⁹⁶ The Tunku had made plain in the letter that Malaya wanted West Irian to become part of Indonesia.²⁹⁷ He confided to the President, in view of the complexity of the dispute, the two states – Indonesia and Malaya – should move in unison, one step after another, towards achieving the goal of incorporating West Irian into Indonesia.²⁹⁸ Obviously, the Tunku saw his participation

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 91.

²⁹³ Ibid. Also see Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 8, Appendix VII.

²⁹⁴ Ooi Kee Beng, *The Reluctant Politician – Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 123-124. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 32.

²⁹⁵ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 64.

²⁹⁶ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963*, 8, Appendix VII.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

in the settlement of the West Irian dispute as practically Malaya's strategic collaboration with Indonesia.

The Tunku outlined in the letter his strategy of securing West Irian from the Dutch. He proposed that West Irian to be first transferred to the United Nations as a trust territory, after which the territory had to be transferred to Indonesia in the shortest time possible.²⁹⁹ On behalf of President Sukarno, Indonesian Prime Minister, Djuanda, accepted Tunku's offer to assist Indonesia in acquiring West Irian by acting as a mediator in the territorial dispute.³⁰⁰

In November 1960, the Tunku with his role as a mediator met with the Dutch Prime Minister, Jan de Quay, in the Netherlands to discuss the issue of West Irian.³⁰¹ Both Prime Ministers signed a joint communiqué at the end of the meeting stated that "the Netherlands Government was willing to subject their policies in Netherlands New Guinea to the scrutiny and judgment of the United Nations".³⁰²

Despite the signing, both parties hold different interpretations on the joint communiqué. The Tunku spelt out his understanding of the communiqué in the press conference that followed: the Netherlands was willing to subject West Irian to the investigation of the UN and would abide by the subsequent judgment of the UN.³⁰³ The Dutch government disagreed with Tunku's interpretation. They later clarified that the joint communiqué did not entail the Dutch sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea whatsoever, and that the Netherlands would only subject its policies in Netherlands New Guinea to the scrutiny and judgment of the United Nations.³⁰⁴

The Netherlands in effect reiterated its sovereignty over West Irian through the joint communiqué. The Dutch assertion of sovereignty struck at the core of Indonesia's concern for survival. It challenged Indonesia's aim to establish its regional preponderance – the Sukarno regime's remedy for Indonesia's survival. It also challenged Indonesians' sense of existence, as Indonesia's possession of West Irian would symbolize the completion of Indonesians' fight against colonialism-imperialism

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid. 8, Appendix VIII.

³⁰¹ Ibid. 8-9, Appendix IX.

³⁰² Ibid. 9. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 92.

³⁰³ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), Appendix IX.

³⁰⁴ Ibid. Appendix IX, Appendix X.

for independence. Crucially, the Dutch assertion posed a direct challenge to Sukarno's political survival, who needed West Irian to preserve his supremacy in Indonesia.

Very quickly, the communiqué was openly rejected by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio – the closest confidant of Sukarno.³⁰⁵ He declared: “We cannot accept anything less than a complete transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia.”³⁰⁶ He dismissed the idea of introducing the UN into the West Irian dispute.³⁰⁷ Dr. Subandrio, in the meantime, publicly criticized the Tunku for not consulting with Jakarta before acting.³⁰⁸

As Indonesians saw it, Malaya's issuing of the joint communiqué with the Netherlands was an affront to the authority of Indonesia. Malaya did not at least inform Indonesia of the communiqué before issuing it, particularly when it concerned the sovereignty of Indonesia. The signing of the joint communiqué was out of Indonesia's anticipation and Indonesia only got to know it through media.³⁰⁹ Indonesia expected Malaya's “unwavering support” for its claim on West Irian, rather than issuing a communiqué that led to the Dutch reiteration of their sovereignty over the territory.³¹⁰ The expectation was the result of Indonesia's aim for dominance over Malaya as well as Indonesia's close association with Malaya, which stemmed from their sense of sharing common roots.

The contradiction of Malaya's action with Indonesia's expectation prompted the launching of a furious attack on Malaya by Indonesia through its media.³¹¹ The bitter attack was permeated with Indonesians' assertion of their primacy over Malaya, which enhanced, and enhanced by, their affirmation of the superiority of Indonesia over Malaya.

³⁰⁵ Ibid. 9, Appendix IX. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 92-93. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 402. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 99.

³⁰⁶ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 65.

³⁰⁷ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 9.

³⁰⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 92-93.

³⁰⁹ Ibid. 92-94. Also see Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963*, Appendix X.

³¹⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 95.

³¹¹ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963*, 9-10.

The Indonesian people came to perceive Malaya as “a colonial stooge”, whose independence was given by the imperialist – Britain.³¹² Unlike Malaya – as Indonesians saw it – Indonesians possessed a real independence, which was achieved through their violent struggle against Dutch colonial rule.

The Indonesian press asserted that the Tunku was “an agent of the British and of SEATO and only the Indonesian people and the Indonesian armed forces could solve the problem”.³¹³ Indonesia sought to impress Malaya of its supreme standing by underlining its people’s and its army’s ability in shaping the outcomes of events. It was understood that Indonesia had a huge population. Indonesia considered Malaya’s attempt to mediate in the West Irian issue as constituting a challenge to Indonesia’s sovereignty and Indonesia’s regional supremacy.³¹⁴ It deemed that the mediation was an insolent act, as Malaya had never struggled for its independence.³¹⁵ Indonesians maintained, the Tunku should not be trusted because he had not led a revolution to achieve national independence.³¹⁶

The Malayan government was confronted with the real effects of Indonesia’s expression of dominance over Malaya. The Malayan pro-Indonesian forces exerted pressure on the Tunku Administration in Malaya’s parliament. The members of parliament of the Malayan opposition parties criticized the Tunku for not consulting with Indonesia before issuing a joint statement with the Netherlands on the issue of West Irian.³¹⁷ They maintained that Malaya was siding with the Dutch in the territorial dispute, since – according to them – Malaya belonged to the Western Bloc.³¹⁸ They expressed their sympathy for the Indonesian media’s vicious attack on the Tunku with regard to his mediation in the West Irian dispute, because – they alleged – the Tunku was obviously biased towards the Dutch.³¹⁹

³¹² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 94.

³¹³ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 9.

³¹⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 95-97.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 65.

³¹⁷ Federation of Malaya, *Parliamentary Debates, 6th December 1960* (Kuala Lumpur: House of Representatives, 1960), 3412-3414.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

Malaya did not expect Indonesians' hostile response to its signing of the joint communiqué with the Netherlands. In the eyes of the Tunku, the communiqué represented his efforts in helping Indonesia to acquire West Irian – that was an expression of Malaya's strategic collaboration with Indonesia.³²⁰ The Tunku expected Indonesia to capitalize on the Dutch acceptance of the UN involvement in the settlement of the West Irian dispute – as indicated in the communiqué – treating it as a step towards the eventual transfer of the territory to Indonesia.³²¹ Such a move – as Malaya saw it – would reflect Indonesia's close strategic coordination with Malaya.

The hostile reaction of Indonesia was exactly the opposite of the Tunku's expectation. The Tunku was incensed as a result. The Tunku's remark in the Malayan Parliament reflected his anger towards Indonesia:³²²

...why should I side, for instance, with the Dutch? ...it would not be in keeping with my own nationality to side with somebody who has got no blood connection whatsoever with us, whereas, on the other hand, the Malaysians and Indonesians are, what we might call, "blood-brothers".

Malaya promptly launched its tit-for-tat measures against Indonesia's condemnation. It protested against Dr. Subandrio's criticism of the Tunku and the Indonesian press's attacks on Malaya.³²³ The Malayan government threatened to reveal the letter from Djuanda – who wrote this letter on behalf of President Sukarno – which indicated Indonesia's approval of Malaya's offer to mediate in the dispute of West Irian, and also Indonesia's acceptance of the UN involvement in the dispute.³²⁴

Indonesia was well aware that the reveal of the letter of Djuanda would significantly undermine its credibility in the world. Indonesia was in need of the Third World states' support for its struggle for West Irian. It could not afford a loss of its credibility which might lead to the weakening of the support of these states. Dr. Subandrio sought to prevent Malaya's disclosure of Djuanda's letter by sending a letter to the Tunku

³²⁰ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 9, Appendix VII, Appendix VIII.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Federation of Malaya, *Parliamentary Debates*, 6th December 1960 (Kuala Lumpur: House of Representatives, 1960), 3412-3414.

³²³ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963*, 10.

³²⁴ Ibid. 9-10, Appendix VIII. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations-One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 93.

expressing Indonesia's gratitude for his previous efforts to mediate in the West Irian dispute.³²⁵ With Indonesia's formal expression of gratitude, Malaya decided not to disclose the letter of Djuanda in consideration of its close ties with Indonesia.³²⁶

It would seem that the tensions between Indonesia and Malaya had been removed fairly quickly, the reality, however, indicated otherwise.

Indonesia was in the thick of its struggle to obtain West Irian. It had pulled all its energies and resources together to implement its confrontation against the Netherlands.³²⁷ It needed to single-mindedly focus on its struggle for the territory – not engage in a conflict with Malaya – as the success of the fight was essential for Indonesia. Without the success, the existence of Indonesia as a state and the political survival of Sukarno – that was the viability of the regime of Guided Democracy – would be in jeopardy. Indonesia had to temporarily succumb to Malaya's challenge, for the sake of preserving the backing of the Third World states for its claim on West Irian. Indonesia's resentments towards Malaya, which had been accumulated throughout Malaya's intervention in the West Irian issue, would resurface several years later, but not at a time when it was confronting the Dutch.³²⁸ Dr. Ismail later recalled: Malaya's mediation in the West Irian dispute was “the foundation of our [Malaya's] strained relationship with Indonesia”.³²⁹

The Tunku wrote a letter to President Sukarno in early December 1960 to detail his efforts at mediating in the West Irian dispute and to officially withdraw himself from being the mediator for the dispute.³³⁰ Sukarno replied by the middle of December 1960, expressing Indonesia's appreciation for the Tunku's initiatives.³³¹ He too stated in the letter:³³²

³²⁵ Ibid. Also see Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 10.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 91.

³²⁸ Ibid. 102-103. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 65.

³²⁹ The Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman Papers, *Drifting into Politics*, Chapter 14, Unpublished Memoirs, quoted in Ooi Kee Beng, *The Reluctant Politician – Tun Dr. Ismail and His Time* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 124.

³³⁰ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963*, Appendix IX.

³³¹ Ibid. Appendix X.

³³² Ibid.

As Your Excellency knows,...the people of Indonesia regard West Irian as an Indonesian territory and do not accept the view that the Netherlands possesses the sovereignty over the territory...the Indonesian people regard the additional statements on the Joint-Communiqué as an attempt to force Indonesia to acknowledge the Dutch sovereignty over West Irian.

Indonesia was determined to incorporate West Irian into part of its territories.

In September 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded in Belgrade.³³³ Indonesia was a key founding member of this movement.³³⁴ NAM was built on the force of the Third World established during the 1955 Bandung Conference.³³⁵ The movement emphasized the Third World solidarity and warned the Superpowers not to spread the Cold War into the Third World.³³⁶ Sukarno introduced his new idea of the Third World during the NAM meeting.³³⁷

In his speech at the meeting, Sukarno declared:³³⁸

There is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man and that is the conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and justice and the old forces of domination, the one pushing its head relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its lifeblood, the other striving desperately to retain all it can trying to hold back the course of history.

Sukarno argued that the key division in the world was that of between the New Emerging Forces and the Old Established Forces.³³⁹ The Third World states represented the New Emerging Forces whereas the old forces were constituted by imperialists and

³³³ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 58-59.

³³⁴ Ibid.

³³⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 97-101, 107.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 58-59. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 333, 343-344. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 6.

³³⁸ Djakarta: Department of Information, 1967, 7, quoted in Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 58.

³³⁹ Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 166-167. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 58-59. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 343-344.

colonialists.³⁴⁰ “The safety of the world is always threatened by the Old Established Order,” asserted Sukarno.³⁴¹ Being a leader of the Third World had a new meaning for Indonesia. Indonesia began to designate itself as the leader of the New Emerging Forces.³⁴² It saw itself leading the world’s progressive forces to confront the reactionary forces of imperialism and colonialism.³⁴³ Confronting the Dutch would demonstrate such leadership of Indonesia, in which the leadership was the national pride of Indonesia.

By December 1961, Indonesia began to threaten to capture West Irian by force.³⁴⁴ Because of the arms supplies from the Soviet Bloc, Indonesia had become a military Power that could launch an attack on West Irian by the time it threatened to do so.³⁴⁵ The Indonesian armed forces had started to infiltrate into West Irian indicating Indonesia’s determination to use force.³⁴⁶

Indonesia’s threat of war posed a direct challenge to the American-dominated regional order of Southeast Asia.³⁴⁷ The US as a result was obliged to intervene in the West Irian dispute.³⁴⁸ The US wanted to prevent another war in Southeast Asia while it was already facing one in Vietnam.³⁴⁹ Meanwhile, it needed to contain the spread of the Soviet influence in the region.³⁵⁰ America did not want to see the Soviet flexing its military muscle in archipelagic Southeast Asia through Indonesia launching a war against the Dutch to take possession of West Irian. With the mediation of the US, a settlement had been reached in August 1962 ending the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian.³⁵¹ Indonesia had gotten what it wanted. West Irian

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² J. D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 333.

Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 58-59.

³⁴³ Ibid. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 166-167.

³⁴⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 62-68.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 70-71.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Ibid. Also see J. D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography*, 360-361.

would be transferred to Indonesia on 1st May 1963, after the initial transfer of the territory to a UN administration on 1st October 1962.³⁵²

Time to Confront Malaysia

Indonesia was at the peak of its sense of power.³⁵³ It had succeeded in taking over West Irian. The victory represented the expansion of Indonesia's sphere of influence through the extension of its territories. For Indonesia, the success in acquiring West Irian signified the basic completion of the establishment of Indonesia's preponderant standing in archipelagic Southeast Asia. As Indonesia saw it, it had been able to create an external climate in which the alleged imperial Powers – the Old Established Forces – had to give way to Indonesia's dominance in archipelagic Southeast Asia.³⁵⁴ Besides, the successful execution of confrontation against the Dutch consolidated Indonesia's sense of being the leader of the New Emerging Forces.³⁵⁵ It was the national pride of Indonesia. The nationalist sentiment motivated, and was motivated by Indonesia's resolve to insist on its perceived regional preponderance.³⁵⁶ In consequence – underpinned by its powerful military capacity which was recently in place – Indonesia came to perceive Malaya as not a Power to be reckoned with.³⁵⁷

Indonesia was a military giant when compared to Malaya during the 1960s. (See Table 5.2)

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 6.

³⁵⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 68.

³⁵⁵ Ibid. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*, 6.

³⁵⁶ Ibid. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 37.

³⁵⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 82. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*, 6. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 37.

Table 5.2: Comparison of Military Power of Indonesia and Malaya in the 1960s

Military Power	Indonesia	Malaya
Army	350,000 personnel	10,000 Regulars; 5000 Reserves
Air Force	20,000 personnel Over 100 jet fighters: MiG-15s, 17s, 19s, 21s Bombers: TU-16s; about 50 IL-28s; B-26s Transports: Some IL-14s and C-130s	30 transport planes
Navy	26,000 personnel 1 Soviet-built heavy cruiser 5 destroyers 4 frigates 15 escort ships 27 light coastal craft 6 landing craft 20 submarines	10 vessels

Source: Compiled from *The Military Balance* 63, no.1 (1963):29-30 and Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 123-124.

On 8th December 1962, an uprising broke out in the British Protectorate of Brunei in opposition to the formation of Malaysia.³⁵⁸ The revolt was led by A.M. Azahari, who had participated in Indonesia's struggle for independence and had close political ties with Indonesia.³⁵⁹

Malaysia was an idea of a Federation that would merge the British colonies – Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei – with Malaya.³⁶⁰ The Federation of Malaysia was publicly proposed by Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on 27th May 1961 at Singapore, when he met with the Foreign Correspondents of Southeast

³⁵⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 75-78. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 97-98. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 89.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

Asia at a luncheon.³⁶¹ Indonesia did not oppose to the Tunku's proposal. In his letter to the *New York Times* on 13th November 1961, Dr. Subandrio made known to the public Indonesia's position on the formation of Malaysia.³⁶²

...we do not show any objection toward this Malayan Policy of merger. On the contrary, we wish the Malayan Government well if it can succeed with this plan.

The Tunku unveiled the plan of forming Malaysia at a time when Indonesia had to allocate most of its attention to the task of acquiring West Irian.³⁶³ Indonesia therefore was unlikely to oppose to the proposed federation since it was unable to be involved in another conflict while it was still confronting the Dutch.³⁶⁴

The Brunei revolt had been effectively crushed by the British authority within a week after the start of the revolt.³⁶⁵ The circumstances, however, were different by the time the uprising took place. Indonesia at that point in time was no longer occupied with any major conflict. Shortly after the crackdown on the Brunei revolt, Indonesia expressed its support for the rebel movement and declared its rejection for the formation of Malaysia.³⁶⁶ In January 1963, Indonesia decided to re-launch its policy of confrontation.³⁶⁷ It would confront the creation of Malaysia to prevent the federation from coming into existence.³⁶⁸

The Sukarno regime deemed that Indonesia's regional preponderance was basically in place after its success in incorporating West Irian into part of Indonesia. It wanted to fortify such preponderance of Indonesia so as to ensure Indonesia's integrity as a state.³⁶⁹ The regime began to hold the view that Indonesia should get to decide the

³⁶¹ Ibid. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 93-94.

³⁶² Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 11.

³⁶³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 75-77. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 79-80.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 78. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories*, 100-101.

³⁶⁶ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 78-81. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 97-98.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 37-39.

territorial changes that had taken place at its door step, especially when the Federation of Malaysia would share borders with Kalimantan of Indonesia.³⁷⁰ Indonesia, consequently, sought to terminate the formation of Malaysia with the goal of consolidating its perceived preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, the preponderance was a shield that protected its existence as a state.

The Sukarno regime read the project of Malaysia as British attempt to encircle Indonesia, in view of the fact that Malaysia's security would be guaranteed by Britain under AMDA.³⁷¹ It saw the British military bases in the proposed federation as real threats to Indonesia.³⁷² These bases had been used to support the rebel movements in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1958.³⁷³ Meanwhile, the regime feared that the establishment of Malaysia would eventually ignite Sumatrans' desire to join the federation, as Malaya was evidently wealthier than Indonesia.³⁷⁴ On the other hand, the Indonesian Army worried that Malaysia might be dominated by the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya which would then encourage the Indonesian Chinese to undertake subversive activities in Indonesia.³⁷⁵ In short, Indonesians perceived the existence of Malaysia as threatening Indonesia's survival, thus had to be crushed through the means of confrontation – the Indonesia's way of claiming its desired regional preponderance.

Indonesia's aim to cement its perceived preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia mutually reinforced with its aspiration to become the leader of the New Emerging Forces – the basis for Indonesia's existence as a nation. The people of Indonesia had been united by their common belief that Indonesia was the champion of the revolutions against colonialism-imperialism happening around the globe.

³⁷⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 78- 80. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 168. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 98.

³⁷¹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 78-82. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 41.

³⁷² Ibid. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto*, 168.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 25. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 103.

³⁷⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 25-26. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto*, 168. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 98.

The Brunei revolt was perceived by Indonesia as the evidence of the Northern Borneo people's rejection to British colonial rule presented in the form of Malaysia – which Indonesia described as the Old Established Forces of neocolonialism.³⁷⁶ Having designated itself as the leader of the New Emerging Forces, Indonesia deemed necessary to fight against the alleged colonial presence at its immediate neighbourhood.³⁷⁷ Because of the need to sustain the fragile national unity of Indonesia and to preserve his supremacy in the triangular power structure of Guided Democracy, President Sukarno was obliged to emphasize Indonesia's standing as the leader of the New Emerging Forces. Sukarno embraced such leadership role of Indonesia to inspire a sense of national pride among the Indonesian people and to ensure that the Indonesian people – including the PKI and the Indonesian Army – continued to rally around him, who was the symbol of Indonesia.³⁷⁸ As a result, the strength of Indonesia's leadership claim – that was to lead the New Emerging Forces – was always strong.

Sukarno's opposition to the idea of Malaysia demonstrated the mutually enhancing dynamics of Indonesia's assertion of regional preponderance and its determination to confront the perceived colonial presence:³⁷⁹

Why do we oppose it? Because Malaysia is a manifestation of neo-colonialism. We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity. We consider Malaysia an encirclement of the Indonesian Republic. Malaysia is the product of the brain and efforts of neo-colonialism...we are determinedly opposed, without any reservation, against Malaysia.

By April 1963, Indonesian guerrillas began to launch regular armed incursions into Sarawak.³⁸⁰

Indonesia's confrontation against Malaya was particularly intense.

³⁷⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 98. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 78-79. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 25.

³⁷⁷ Ibid. Also see J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 1. Also see Greg Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi – Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965* (Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 194.

³⁷⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 56, 73, 79-81.

³⁷⁹ "We are being Encircled," in *The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, ed. George Modelski (Australia: The Australian National University, 1963), 74-75.

³⁸⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 82. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 99.

President Sukarno stressed the superiority of Indonesian nationhood over that of Malaya, when he began to oppose the formation of Malaysia.³⁸¹

We were born in fire. We were not born in the rays of the full moon like other nations. There are other nations whose independence was presented to them. There are other nations who, without any effort on their part, were given independence by the imperialists as a present. Not us, we fought for our independence at the cost of great sacrifice. We gained our independence through a tremendous struggle which has no comparison in this world.

In the eyes of Sukarno, Malaya's independence – when compared to Indonesia's – was an inferior one, because it was a fake independence, as Malaysians did not achieve their independence through armed struggle. Such superiority sentiment toughened Indonesia's resolve to confront Malaya in order to strengthen the supposed regional preponderance of Indonesia.

When announcing Indonesia's policy of confrontation against Malaysia on 20th January 1963, Dr. Subandrio asserted that "Malaya had openly become a henchman of the imperialists and had acted with animosity towards Indonesia".³⁸² President Sukarno, meanwhile, stressed that "if the Prime Minister, and the Federation leadership continued their present policy, Indonesia would have no choice but to face it with political and economic confrontation".³⁸³ For the Indonesian authority, Malaya with its embrace of Malaysia had once again – this time unreservedly – vindicated itself to be a stooge of the imperial Powers, underpinned by the fact that Malaya's independence was given by its colonial master. Indonesia therefore – as the authority saw it – was determined to confront Malaya, because Indonesia was the champion of the revolutions against colonialism-imperialism, owing to its successful armed struggle for independence.

Indonesia's assertion of strategic preponderance was unequivocal. Sukarno issued an order to the Indonesian Army in February 1963.³⁸⁴ He emphasized: "...the enemy is

³⁸¹ Radio Address by Sukarno, December 1962, quoted in Peter Carey, "Introduction," in *Born in Fire – The Indonesian Struggle for Independence: An Anthology*, ed. Colin Wild and Peter Carey (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988), xix.

³⁸² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 78-79.

³⁸³ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 14.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

besieging us. Therefore, keep on the alert and I order you to keep your weapons in your hands.”³⁸⁵ The Commander of the Indonesian Navy at Sumatra ordered his troops to “burn on the spot any Malayan fishing boat caught in Indonesian waters”.³⁸⁶

Indonesia’s resolve to confront Malaya, in the meantime, boosted its sense of superiority of its nationhood over Malaya’s. President Sukarno when expressing Indonesia’s opposition to the creation of Malaysia made it crystal clear: “nations who will become strong and famous nations should be ready to face moments of danger...I have stated that we are standing on a principle of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism.”³⁸⁷

The determination of Indonesia to confront Malaya was further intensified by its resentments towards Malaya, which were resulted from Malaya’s covert support for the Sumatran rebels and Malaya’s intervention in the West Irian dispute.³⁸⁸ Indonesia’s justification for confronting Malaya reflected the effects of the resentments. The Indonesian government maintained that it needed to confront Malaya since Malaya had always been hostile to Indonesia and had sought to annex Sumatra during the PRRI revolt.³⁸⁹

While Indonesia’s confrontation against Malaya had been fierce, it simply did not regard Malaya as a Power to be reckoned with. Indonesia perceived itself as a major Power on the world stage, which was on par with the status of Britain. It insisted that the only possible path to end its confrontation against Malaysia was through negotiations between Indonesia and Britain, without the involvement of Malaya.³⁹⁰

Malaya was infuriated with Indonesia. From Malaya’s perspective, rather than implicating the need of launching a war against Malaya, Indonesia should instead forge friendly ties with Malaya, because they shared common origins and both were strategically dependent on one another. Indonesia’s decision to confront Malaya contradicted with such expectation of Malaya.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 51, 65. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 89-90, 102-103. Also see Greg Poulgrain, *The Genesis of Konfrontasi – Malaysia Brunei Indonesia 1945-1965* (Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998), 174-175.

³⁸⁹ Government of Malaysia, *Malaya-Indonesia Relations 31st August 1957 to 15th September 1963* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1963), 14.

³⁹⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 100.

The Tunku expressed his anger because of the mismatch of expectation.

He responded to Dr. Subandrio's declaration of Indonesia's confrontation against Malaya: "He had completely forgotten, or now preferred to overlook, that less than four years before, in April 1959, Indonesia and Malaya had signed a Treaty of Friendship in Kuala Lumpur."³⁹¹ The Tunku was angry that Indonesia treated Malaya with hostility despite sharing a friendship treaty with Malaya. For the Tunku, the treaty indicated the close ties between Indonesia and Malaya, which meant that their relationship should be friendly.

The comments made by the Tunku decades later still reflected the anger:³⁹²

I wrote to Sukarno about the 'Malaysian Project' and he did not oppose it. Perhaps, it never crossed his mind it would materialize in the first place and hence he asked Subandrio to write that letter to the *New York Times* and make a speech at the UN. We were a sovereign nation and could not do more than that because it was essentially a matter between us, the British and the people of the territories concerned. I did not oppose his taking over West Irian, in fact I tried to help him to get it.

In the Tunku's understanding, Malaya's participation in the West Irian issue was Malaya's throwing of strategic support for Indonesia. It meant that Malaya – as the Tunku saw it – had always sought to maintain its strategic closeness with Indonesia. The Tunku was annoyed that Indonesia chose to confront Malaya in return.

Because of its resentments towards Indonesia – prompted by the mismatch of expectation – Malaya became more steadfast to press ahead with its plan to form Malaysia. The Tunku asserted: "Things were looking pretty grim for us, but in spite of all threats I was determined to go right ahead with Malaysia as planned..."³⁹³

Malaya's affirmation of the superiority of its nationhood – as represented by Malaysians' self-acknowledged wisdom – over that of Indonesia bolstered, and was bolstered by its resolve to fight against Indonesia's attempt to terminate the creation of Malaysia.

³⁹¹ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 106.

³⁹² Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 28 December 1982, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 37.

³⁹³ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories*, 107.

The Tunku emphasized the wisdom of Malaya in response to President Sukarno's efforts to confront Malaysia:³⁹⁴

I tried to appease his [Sukarno] wrath, if wrath it really was, but deep in my heart I knew it was pure jealousy, as all along he had viewed with envy Malaya's rise to prosperity since independence and the progress she had made, as compared with what was happening in his own country – political infighting, overspending, mismanagement and the rupiah sinking in value.

In the eyes of the Tunku, Malaya was better than Indonesia, which was evidenced by its ability in producing stability and progress – the substance of Malaya's professed wisdom.³⁹⁵ Indonesia – the Tunku believed – lacked such wisdom, in view of its internal chaos and instability. The Tunku deemed that Sukarno decided to confront Malaysia because he found hard to accept that Malaya was ahead of Indonesia.

The Tunku explained further:³⁹⁶

...it would have been a tremendous boost to have Sukarno's blessing for the birth of Malaysia...He chose to crush us once he could not get his way. We had to fight him, though reluctantly, to uphold our honour and sovereignty. We are Malays like him who value honour.

Malaya was determined to face up to the threats of Indonesia in order to uphold its national prestige vis-à-vis Indonesia, which was defined by the perceived wisdom of Malaya.

Malaya stood firm to demonstrate itself to be a Power that cannot be ignored. It would not agree to any talk between Britain and Indonesia on the issue of Malaysia.³⁹⁷ Consequently, negotiation between Indonesia and Malaya appeared to be the only option for the settlement of the dispute over the Malaysia Project.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁴ Ibid. 99.

³⁹⁵ Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 14 September 1983, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 39.

³⁹⁶ Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 19 September 1983, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 45.

³⁹⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 100.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

The Philippines had taken the initiative to organize the three parties – Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines – talks with the aim of easing their tensions arising from the issue of Malaysia.³⁹⁹ The Philippines was another party that opposed to the formation of Malaysia.⁴⁰⁰ It insisted that Sabah (North Borneo) was part of its territories.⁴⁰¹

A summit meeting of the three states was held in Manila in July 1963 as a result of the diplomatic efforts of the Philippines.⁴⁰² It should be noted that by July 1963 Brunei had decided to withdraw itself from joining the proposed Federation of Malaysia.⁴⁰³ The tripartite summit meeting had given birth to the Manila Agreement.⁴⁰⁴ There were two central contents in the agreement. First, Indonesia and the Philippines would welcome the formation of Malaysia provided the Northern Borneo people's support for Malaysia was ascertained by the Secretary-General of the UN or his representative – through examining the results of the recent elections in Sabah and Sarawak – prior to the establishment of the federation.⁴⁰⁵ Second, the three states agreed to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphilindo by setting up machinery for frequent and regular consultations among them.⁴⁰⁶

Maphilindo was the proposal of Macapagal, the President of the Philippines.⁴⁰⁷ It was meant to be a confederation of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, which was predicated on their common Malay origins.⁴⁰⁸ President Macapagal hoped that such a confederation could be an alternative to the Federation of Malaysia.⁴⁰⁹ The consensus reached by the three states was that Maphilindo would be a grouping of the three states

³⁹⁹ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 41.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid. 67-68. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 83-84.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 41-45. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 83-88.

⁴⁰³ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 44.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid. 41-45. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 83-88.

⁴⁰⁵ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, Appendix I – Manila Accord, Appendix II – Manila Agreement.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 100.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 86.

of Malay origins charged to advance their close cooperation without requiring them to surrender their respective sovereignty.⁴¹⁰

Maphilindo as a prospective regional body reflected the similar strategic thinking of the three states concerned: the archipelagic Southeast Asia, overwhelmingly populated by the people of Malay blood, served as a shield that safeguard the respective survival of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines as a state which reflected the Malay way of life. Because of the sizable presence of the Chinese in the region, the leaders of the three states became more aware of them sharing such alike strategic apprehension.⁴¹¹ President Macapagal glorified: "...in Maphilindo and through Maphilindo, nourished constantly by their vision and enterprise, the Malay peoples shall be borne upon the true, the vast, the irresistible wave of the future."⁴¹² The implications of Maphilindo alarmed the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, a Singaporean Chinese.⁴¹³ Commentators argued that Maphilindo was bound to become the regional association of Southeast Asia aimed at curbing the influence of the Chinese in the region.⁴¹⁴

Yet – "similar strategic understanding" – that was all Maphilindo was about. The three states' different readings on what Maphilindo should be indicated the absence of "common strategic interests" between them.

Indonesia regarded Maphilindo as a vehicle for it to consolidate its dominance in archipelagic Southeast Asia.⁴¹⁵ It thought that Maphilindo could be used as a means to bring Malaya closer to the movement against the Old Established Forces led by Indonesia.⁴¹⁶ It also hoped to make use of Maphilindo to end the security links of Malaya and the Philippines with the Western Powers thereby enhanced the regional supremacy of Indonesia.⁴¹⁷ Indonesian Army Chief of Staff, General Yani, envisioned

⁴¹⁰ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), Appendix I – Manila Accord, Appendix II – Manila Agreement. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 100.

⁴¹¹ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 165-169.

⁴¹² Ibid.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

that “within the framework of Maphilindo the primary responsibility for the security and stability of Southeast Asia now rested with Indonesia”.⁴¹⁸

Malaya, on the other hand, saw the creation of Maphilindo as a step towards the establishment of strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaya, having acknowledged the two states’ mutual strategic dependence.⁴¹⁹

As for the Philippines, its proposal of Maphilindo was mainly an act of expediency. The Philippines wanted to make use of Maphilindo to create its stronger presence in Asia thus demonstrating its independence from the US.⁴²⁰ The Philippines’ sense of sharing common identities with Malaya and Indonesia was rather weak, in view of the fact that the Philippines was a predominantly Christian state while Islam was central to the Malay way of life. The Tunku raised his concern about the absence of a mosque in Manila when he attended the tripartite summit meeting of July 1963.⁴²¹ In his concluding address at the end of the meeting, the Tunku said: “I came to this country not only to play, but to pray too. Unfortunately, however, there is no mosque in Manila where I can pray.”⁴²² A stark sense of dissimilarity with the Philippines. In other words, the idea of viewing archipelagic Southeast Asia as the Malay World or Malay Archipelago was essentially sustained by Indonesia and Malaya – not the Philippines. The Malay way of life formed the central character of Indonesia’s and Malaya’s national identity. Both states viewed the Malay World as a shield that protected their respective survival as a state built around the Malay way of life.

In short, the idea of Maphilindo – as a prospective regional body – was not an outcome of the mutual strategic dependence between Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines; it was merely an expression of their similar strategic understanding. Indonesia did not see the need of forging strategic partnerships with Malaya and the Philippines, as both for Indonesia were just “little nations”.⁴²³ The amount of power owned by Malaya had not reached to a level that, matched with the power of Indonesia,

⁴¹⁸ Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia’s Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), 187.

⁴¹⁹ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 166-169.

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

⁴²¹ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Viewpoints* (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1978), 136. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 308.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ J.A.C. Mackie, *Konfrontasi – The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963-1966*, 168.

would start to shape their similar strategic understanding into their common strategic interests.

In the eyes of Indonesia, the Manila Agreement basically attested to Indonesia's dominance in archipelagic Southeast Asia. Malaya had been obliged to negotiate with Indonesia and the Philippines with regard to the formation of Malaysia, instead of keeping it a matter solely between Malaya, Britain and the governments of the Borneo territories.⁴²⁴ Through the negotiation, Malaya had been made to accept that the establishment of the new federation would be tied to the investigation of the UN. In Indonesia's understanding, Malaya would have to commit itself to the UN investigation in view of the pressure from Indonesia.⁴²⁵ Upon returning to Jakarta, Sukarno announced that Confrontation would continue despite the conditional settlement reached at the tripartite summit meeting in Manila.⁴²⁶

On 29th August 1963, the Malayan government announced that irrespective of the UN mission's findings, the Federation of Malaysia would be established on 16th September 1963.⁴²⁷ On 13th September 1963, the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, published his report on the issue of Malaysia.⁴²⁸ U Thant found that "there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these (Northern Borneo) territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia".⁴²⁹

Malaya's announcement on 29th August 1963 constituted a direct challenge to Indonesia's perceived regional preponderance. It had declared the date for the formation of Malaysia prior to the publishing of the UN mission's findings. It also stressed that the federation would be formed regardless of the findings. In Indonesia's understanding, such a move had violated the Manila Agreement, of which signified Indonesia's preponderant standing in archipelagic Southeast Asia.⁴³⁰ Indonesia, in consequence,

⁴²⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 86-89.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 47. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 90-91.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 90-91.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. 90-92. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 100-101.

refused to accept the findings of the UN mission in response to Malaya's challenge to Indonesia's perceived regional dominance.⁴³¹

On 16th September 1963, the day when Malaysia was officially formed, Indonesia announced that the newly formed Malaysia would not enjoy diplomatic relations with Indonesia.⁴³² Malaysia responded with the same decision.⁴³³ Before long, President Sukarno declared that Indonesia would "Ganjang Malaysia" – Crush Malaysia.⁴³⁴ Indonesia stepped up its confrontation against Malaysia. The hope for the establishment of Maphilindo quickly faded away.⁴³⁵

Indonesia intensified its military incursions into Sabah and Sarawak, which would be sustained throughout the following years.⁴³⁶ These incursions had been effectively defeated by the British armed forces.⁴³⁷ From August to October 1964, there had been sporadic landings of Indonesian troops – by sea and by air – on the southern part of peninsula Malaysia.⁴³⁸ The Malaysian Armed Forces had successfully cracked down on these operations.⁴³⁹ The meaning of Indonesia's military intrusions was clear: whether it was Malaya or Malaysia, the federation was not a Power that Indonesia deemed should be taken note of. Indonesia's UN representative, Dr. Sudjarwo, had made it clear in the UN Security Council:⁴⁴⁰

I would not deny that our volunteers, our guerrillas with the militant youth of Sarawak and Sabah, some of whom have been trained in our territory, have entered so called 'Malaysian' territory in Sarawak and Sabah. They have been fighting there for some time. This is no secret...And now fighting has spread to other areas in 'Malaysia', such as Malaya.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 91.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Ibid. 92.

⁴³⁵ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 100-101.

⁴³⁶ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 82, 93. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 57.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Government of Malaysia, *Indonesian Agression Against Malaysia, Volume I* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1965). Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 54-56. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 100.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Government of Malaysia, *Malaysia's Case in the Security Council* (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964), 15, quoted in Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 100-101.

Indonesia thought that it could launch military attacks on Malaysia whenever it wanted to. It believed that Malaysia was not strong enough to withstand such attacks.⁴⁴¹

Indonesia, meanwhile, strived to isolate Malaysia from the Third World.⁴⁴² Because of its continuous armed incursions into Malaysia – a sovereign state, Indonesia had failed to secure the international support – including the support of most of the Third World states – for its confrontation against Malaysia.⁴⁴³ Indonesia had become internationally isolated.⁴⁴⁴ It had decided to leave the UN in January 1965 in retaliation for Malaysia's admission to the UN Security Council.⁴⁴⁵

Crucially, the Soviet Union had lost its interest in backing Indonesia with its steady arms supplies.⁴⁴⁶ The Soviet was worried about Indonesia's increasingly close alignment with China that had taken place since the early 1960s.⁴⁴⁷ The Sino-Soviet split was official since 1960.⁴⁴⁸ By 1964, Indonesia would have to proceed with its confrontation against Malaysia without the Soviet's military support.⁴⁴⁹ In other words, the US would no longer had to be concerned much about its dominance in archipelagic Southeast Asia being challenged by the Soviet through Indonesia. In July 1964, the US declared explicitly its support for Malaysia.⁴⁵⁰ The US backed up the support with its offer of military assistance to Malaysia.⁴⁵¹

Indonesia's influence in Malaysia shrank sharply as a result of its confrontation against Malaysia.⁴⁵² The people of Malaysia were united behind the Tunku leadership in the face of Indonesia's confrontation, especially its military incursions into Malaysia.⁴⁵³ The Tunku-led ruling coalition had won a landslide victory in the general election held

⁴⁴¹ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 54.

⁴⁴² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 101-105.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid. 98-99.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid. 68-69. Also see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 185.

⁴⁴⁸ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War – Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, 160-161. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 68-69.

⁴⁴⁹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 98-99. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 50-53.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 107.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

in April 1964.⁴⁵⁴ The need to protect Malaysia against the threats of Indonesia had been the main factor that led to the victory of the ruling coalition.⁴⁵⁵ The fight against Confrontation was the ruling coalition's central platform for the general election.⁴⁵⁶

Indonesia had become isolated because of its confrontation against Malaysia. The Indonesian authority was increasingly impressed with Britain's military might, which was the bedrock of Malaysia's security under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA).⁴⁵⁷ The consistent failure of Indonesia's confrontation against a united Malaysia pointed to one unmistakable reality: Malaysia was here to stay.

A coup mounted by a group of Indonesian army officers and members of the PKI took place in Jakarta in the late night of 30th September 1965.⁴⁵⁸ The Indonesian Army under the command of General Suharto overcame the coup within a day.⁴⁵⁹ The abortive coup prompted the Indonesian Army to take control of Indonesia and the fall of President Sukarno ensued.⁴⁶⁰ On 11th March 1966, President Sukarno was forced to transfer all his executive powers to General Suharto.⁴⁶¹ On 7th March 1967, Suharto succeeded Sukarno as Acting-President and became the second President of Indonesia by March 1968.⁴⁶² The bilateral relations of Indonesia and Malaysia would move into a new phase with the change of leadership in Indonesia.

The Absence of Power Balance between Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia

A basis of order did not exist between Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia before the end of the Sukarno-regime. Indonesia had shown no restraint to launch military attacks on Malaysia. Malaysia, meanwhile, had contemplated launching an airstrike on Indonesia

⁴⁵⁴ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 51. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 96-97. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 100.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 322. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 41, 55-57.

⁴⁵⁸ J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 385-407. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 105-108, 112.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 111.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

in retaliation against such attacks.⁴⁶³ It had requested for a transfer of some sophisticated planes from Britain so that it could perform an attack on Indonesia.⁴⁶⁴

While Malaya had already expanded into Malaysia, Indonesia was not immediately impressed by the power owned by Malaysia. The material capacity of Malaysia had yet to put a stop to Indonesia's tendency to confront Malaysia militarily. Indonesia's sense of being a major Power was at its peak after its success in taking over West Irian.

In other words, there was no foundation – that of the presence of power balance – in the relations between Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia upon which their shared war avoidance norms could emerge. The amount of power owned by Malaysia had yet to engender Indonesia's recognition of its strategic reliance on Malaysia. The similar strategic understanding of Indonesia and Malaysia had yet to be shaped into their common strategic interests. Two sources of closeness – common strategic interests and common identities – did not coexist in the relationship between Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia. Consequently, the two states' aspiration for peace directed at each other, were not sufficiently strong to produce their shared war avoidance norms – that was a security regime between them. The Indonesia-Malaya Treaty of Friendship, for example, was a product of the two states' mutual sense of closeness deriving from their one source of closeness – that of their appreciation of sharing common identities. The treaty contained no restraining effects. Indonesia did not seek to avoid having armed conflicts with Malaysia.

In short, there was no special relationship between Malaya/Malaysia and the Sukarno-led Indonesia. Indonesia aimed for its strategic preponderance over Malaya/Malaysia. Malaya/Malaysia, meanwhile, desired for its mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia.

The intertwined three sources of conflict in Indonesia-Malaya/Malaysia relations – Indonesia's assertion of its dominance over Malaya/Malaysia and Malaya/Malaysia's attempt to balance against Indonesia's aim for regional dominance; the two states' drive to emphasize the superiority of their respective nationhood over that of their culturally similar counterpart; the mismatch of expectation between them – bred and enhanced the negative identifications between the two states, which culminated in the armed conflicts

⁴⁶³ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 56-57.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

between them. Indonesia's and Malaya/Malaysia's understanding of each other was well and truly entrenched in egoistic terms. In other words, they shared conflictual intersubjective understandings.

CHAPTER 6

THE BEGINNING OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: INDONESIA-MALAYSIA RELATIONS, 1966-1984

This chapter explains that a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia had emerged shortly after the fall of the Sukarno-regime.

Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia had been effectively defeated by Malaysia. The power owned by Malaysia had accordingly succeeded in halting Indonesia's tendency to launch military attacks on Malaysia. Indonesia began to share the same understanding held by Malaysia that power balance existed between the two states, which meant a basis of order had emerged between them. Indonesia and Malaysia began to coexist peacefully.

Meanwhile, the presence of power balance between Indonesia and Malaysia also meant that both states possessed the necessary amount of power that shaped their similar strategic understandings rooted in common identities into their common strategic interests. Since then, Indonesia and Malaysia needed each other to form the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia – a shield that protected their existence as states built around the Malay way of life. Two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – henceforth, coexisted in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. A special relationship, therefore, had emerged between Indonesia and Malaysia.

The two sources of closeness in Indonesia-Malaysia relations generated their mutual aspiration for peace, which were strong enough to give rise to the war avoidance norms shared by the two states. In other words, the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship constituted a security regime between them.

Upon the establishment of their special relationship, Indonesia and Malaysia worked together to create a friendly regional climate of Southeast Asia, which essentially reflected the Malay way of life. Such regional climate would allow them to immerse in their respective internal social and economic developments. Together they moved to establish ASEAN so as to forge a friendly order of Southeast Asia through regional cooperation.

The forming of ASEAN was an expression of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship. Both were central to the creation of this regional body. ASEAN's embrace of the notion of regional autonomy was largely a result of Indonesia-Malaysia

cooperation. Among the five ASEAN member states, only Indonesia and Malaysia aimed for an autonomous regional security framework. The two states' strategic thinking of the Malay World - which was a region-wide existence – formed the basis for their longing for regional autonomy. Meanwhile, ASEAN's essence as a security regime was created and sustained by the special relationship of Indonesia and Malaysia. Within ASEAN, only Indonesia and Malaysia defused their defence against one another. The security posture of ASEAN member states vis-à-vis their counterparts – apart from that between Indonesia and Malaysia – were undoubtedly competitive.

While Indonesia and Malaysia identified intimately with each other because of their special ties, their egoistic understanding of one another, nonetheless, persisted. The reordering of the strategic landscape in Southeast Asia, which took place in the late 1960s, revealed such basic qualities of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. In order to respond to the changing strategic environment, Indonesia and Malaysia sought for each other's cooperation, aiming to create an autonomous Southeast Asia that ensured their basic security. In the meantime, they balanced against one another to safeguard their respective survival. The two states, as a consequence, were entangled in a situation of competitive cooperation.

Indonesia's Understanding of Malaysia Shaped by Power

Indonesia's military campaign against Malaysia was repeatedly ended in failure. By 1964, it had become increasingly clear for the Indonesian Army that Malaysia would not be defeated, rather it would endure as a state in Southeast Asia. The expansion of Malaya into Malaysia began to produce Indonesia's realization of its strategic reliance on Malaysia.

In April 1964, the Army Staff and Command College of Indonesia (Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat, SESKOAD) had produced an analysis on Indonesia's foreign policy titled "Indonesia's Free and Active Foreign Policy".¹ The SESKOAD study argued that Indonesia's threat from the north was not the presence of British neo-colonialism in the form of Malaysia; instead it was the communist states from the north, especially China, that were threatening the survival of Indonesia.² The study concluded that Indonesia needed a strong Malaysia. A powerful Malaysia, the study explained,

¹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 29, 124.

² Ibid.

formed a buffer for Indonesia in the face of the communist threat from the north.³ Henceforth, the Indonesian Army began to acknowledge Malaysia as vital to Indonesia's security.⁴ It argued for the need for Indonesia to cultivate friendly relations with its neighbouring states in general, and with Malaysia in particular.⁵ In other words, the Indonesian Army wanted Indonesia to forge a special relationship with Malaysia.

The SESKOAD study stressed the importance of regional cooperation as a way for Indonesia to establish its friendly ties with neighbouring states.⁶ It also emphasized the need for Indonesia to focus on internal stability and economic development.⁷ It would appear that the SESKOAD study played a key role in bringing about Indonesia's decision to end its confrontation against Malaysia.⁸ The study, meanwhile, furnished a framework for the new Suharto regime's contemplation of Indonesia's foreign policy.⁹

It was problematic that the Indonesian Army attributed Indonesia's need for a strong Malaysia to the communist threat from the north. The Indonesian Army's previous attempt to terminate the formation of Malaysia was genuine.¹⁰ Indeed, it was General Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Armed forces, that called for Indonesians' vigilance against Malaysia, which – according to him – represented neo-colonialism aiming to encircle Indonesia.¹¹ In other words, the Indonesian Army actually wanted to crush Malaysia, regardless of the communist threat from the north. Indonesia's inability to dismantle Malaysia, therefore the breakdown of Indonesia's attempt to establish its regional preponderance, prompted a change in the Indonesian Army's understanding of Malaysia. It was in essence Malaysia's demonstration of its power – of which created through Malaya's expansion into Malaysia – that resulted in the Indonesian Army's realization of Indonesia's strategic dependance on a strong Malaysia.

More than a Basis of Order – The Coexistence of the Two Sources of Closeness

Based on the SESKOAD study – an analysis produced largely in response to the debacle of Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia – the Indonesian Army had come

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. 29, 125-126.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. 29, 42-43.

⁹ Ibid. 124.

¹⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 107.

¹¹ Ibid. 78-79.

to the conclusion that the confrontation campaign should be ended.¹² Malaysia's power had succeeded in halting Indonesia's tendency to launch military attacks on it. Indonesia began to share the same understanding held by Malaysia that power balance existed between the two states.¹³ A basis of order had emerged between Indonesia and Malaysia. Both states respectively possessed the ability to deter the counterpart's armed attack. Both found it very costly to plunge into a violent conflict between them. Consequently, they had no alternative other than to coexist peacefully.

An intelligence unit called "OPSUS (Operasi Khusus – Special Operations)" was formed by the head of the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command, General Suharto, in late 1965.¹⁴ OPSUS in essence was an executive agency where "specific people and/or agencies were commissioned for specific intelligence operations, supported by a small permanent central staff".¹⁵ Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo – a close confidant of Suharto – conducted special operations through OPSUS.¹⁶ The initial task of OPSUS was to liaise secretly with Malaysia with the aim of ending Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia.¹⁷ OPSUS was answerable only to General Suharto.¹⁸ Permanent secretary of Malaysia's ministry of foreign affairs, Ghazali Shafie, was appointed by the Tunku administration to get in touch with the members of OPSUS.¹⁹ His mission was to seek ways to end Confrontation.²⁰

A series of secret meeting between OPSUS and Malaysia's officials were held in Bangkok and Hong Kong shortly after the September 30 abortive coup in Indonesia.²¹ Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie were engaged in in-depth discussions between them

¹² Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 28-29, 42-43.

¹³ For more discussion see Chapter 5, pg 185-187.

¹⁴ Clinton Fernandes, *The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism* (Brighton, Portland and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 22.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 29-30, 42.

¹⁸ Ibid. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 149.

¹⁹ Ibid. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 156.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

during the meetings.²² Both acknowledged Indonesia's and Malaysia's mutual tendency of wanting to become close to each other whenever they felt a sense of insecurity.²³ The acknowledgement represented the matching of Indonesia's and Malaysia's expectation of a strategic partnership between them with their respective intention to cooperate with one another. Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie used the Malay word "Berkampung" – to gather together – to express Indonesia's and Malaysia's recognition of their mutual strategic dependence.²⁴

The presence of power balance between Indonesia and Malaysia, therefore, was more than a basis of order between them. While compelling Indonesia and Malaysia to coexist peacefully, the presence of power balance between them also resulted in them sharing common strategic interests.

Indonesia's power had created its strategic standing in Malaysia's security all along. Indonesia, on the other hand, acknowledged its strategic dependence on Malaysia ever since it was compelled to coexist peacefully with Malaysia. Because Malaysia possessed the ability to terminate Indonesia's challenge to its territories, and would remain as the state sharing the longest border with Indonesia in archipelagic Southeast Asia, Indonesia therefore understood: it was strategically dependent on Malaysia. The existence of Malaysia meant that it represented an integral part of the Malay World given the size of the new federation. Indonesia – like Malaysia – viewed archipelagic Southeast Asia as the Malay World. It had to secure Malaysia's strategic cooperation, so that the Malay World could function as a shield that safeguarded Indonesia's existence as a state which was built around the Malay way of life.

That said, by the time where power balance existed between Indonesia and Malaysia – that was the presence of a basis of order between them – the two states each possessed the necessary amount of power that produced their mutual need for strategic cooperation, and consequently, generated positive identifications – magnetic pull effects – between them. A basis of order – peaceful coexistence – alone entails no positive identification between the states concerned.²⁵

²² Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 149-152.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ For more discussion see Chapter 4, pg 132-136.

Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie after the series of secret meeting had come to the conclusion: a special relationship should be established between Indonesia and Malaysia.²⁶ The special relationship – according to them – would be different from the normal diplomatic ties between modern states.²⁷ Both were of the view that “modern state/nation-state” was a Western concept.²⁸ In other words, Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie – who represented their respective state – recognized that Indonesia and Malaysia shared a relation which was closer than their other bilateral ties.

Both of them stressed that streams, seas and straits were not borders that separated people rather they were bridges that united people of a common region.²⁹ It was the understanding of the Malay World. Leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia regarded the lands and the waters in archipelagic Southeast Asia as a single undivided entity.³⁰ They were aware that only the people of Malay civilization incorporated the element of water in their understanding of homeland – a land for their existence.³¹ The Malays in Malaysia and the indigenous people of Indonesia call their homeland as *Tanah Air* – a place of land and water.³² They deem that they are the people of the lands and the seas; waters never separate them; waters always unite them; that is the Malay World.³³ The view of Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie represented the consensus reached between Indonesia and Malaysia, that the two states should stand united; and together they formed the Malay World – a shield that protected their respective survival.

A special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia had emerged. Two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – coexisted in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Both states were bound by their common Malay way of life. They too understood that both were strategically dependent on one another. The common strategic interests of Indonesia and Malaysia are founded on their similar strategic apprehensions rooted in common identities – that of the Malay World/Malay

²⁶ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 149-150.

²⁷ Ibid. 149-150, 190, 382.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid. 150, 190.

³⁰ Interview 925, Kuala Lumpur, 25th September 2012. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata* (Australia: Griffith University, 1996), 10.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Interview 925, Kuala Lumpur, 25th September 2012.

Archipelago was a shield that safeguarded their respective survival – and created by their respective necessary amount of power. Both needed each other's power to ensure that archipelagic Southeast Asia was the Malay World, which ultimately protected Indonesia's and Malaysia's existence as states built around the Malay way of life.

The coexistence of common identities and shared strategic interests in Indonesia-Malaysia relations gave birth to their special ties. The two sources of closeness, meanwhile, generated the two states' mutual aspiration for peace that gave rise to the war avoidance norms shared by the two states.

Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie aspired for “an enduring and durable entente” between Indonesia and Malaysia.³⁴ They proposed that “the principles of détente should be scrupulously observed” by Indonesia and Malaysia whenever a difficult situation arose between the two states.³⁵ They recommended ways to deal with border issues between Indonesia and Malaysia: border disputes should be sorted out at local level through bilateral mechanisms to prevent the disputes from becoming major conflicts between the two states; if there were shared borders fraught with uncertainties, the two sides should together survey and demarcate the shared borders or jointly develop areas around the borders for mutual benefit.³⁶ These recommendations indicated the beginning of Indonesia's and Malaysia's commitment to avoid war between them.

The secret meetings between OPSUS and Malaysia's officials took place at a time when Indonesia began to share the same longing of Malaysia for a peaceful external climate. By 1965, because of its obsession with revolutionary struggles and inattention to economic management, Indonesia was on the brink of economic collapse and in the midst of political chaos.³⁷ Restoring domestic stability and delivering economic progress became the central tasks of the emerging Suharto regime.³⁸ Without the desired outcomes, Indonesia was at risk of breaking apart. The new regime, in the meantime, wanted to make use of the two central tasks to legitimize its rule in Indonesia.³⁹ As a consequence, a peaceful external environment became essential for Indonesia, for its

³⁴ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 158.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid. 150, 190.

³⁷ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 37, 279.

³⁸ Ibid. 35-38, 279.

³⁹ Ibid. 40, 279.

government needed to concentrate on establishing domestic order and creating economic growth in Indonesia.⁴⁰

Based on the realization of Indonesia's mutual strategic dependence with Malaysia, leaders of the emerging Suharto regime understood that a peaceful Southeast Asia that allowed it to immerse in Indonesia's domestic matters was to be created through regional cooperation.⁴¹ The leaders – by embracing regional cooperation – wanted to cultivate Indonesia's friendly ties with other Southeast Asian states, aiming to create a shield of friendship around Indonesia.⁴² Such a friendly regional environment – as the leaders saw it – would serve as a buffer for Indonesia, moving the threats to Indonesia away from its immediate vicinity.⁴³ The idea of a shield of friendship reflected Indonesia's strategic thinking of the Malay World. Indonesia aimed to establish friendly ties with Malaysia in particular, and with other Southeast Asian states in general.⁴⁴ At the core of the shield of friendship lay the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship. Indonesia together with Malaysia formed the Malay World – that was the shield that safeguarded Indonesia's existence.

Upon acknowledging the need for a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, Ali Murtopo and Ghazali Shafie proposed that a regional organization of Southeast Asia to be established in order to create a friendly regional environment of Southeast Asia through regional cooperation.⁴⁵ The stability and peace of Southeast Asia, they argued, were dependent on Indonesia-Malaysia cordiality.⁴⁶ A consensus therefore had been reached: the proposed regional organization should be established only after the brotherly relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia had been resumed, as the two states would be the mainstay of the organization.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ Ibid. 46-47.

⁴¹ Ibid. 29, 46-47.

⁴² Ibid. 29, 46-47, 297.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 150-151, 158-159.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Ending Confrontation and Establishing a Special Relationship

Both OPSUS and its Malaysian counterparts presented their recommendations to their respective masters.⁴⁸ Talks about rapprochement between Indonesia and Malaysia based on their blood brotherhood began to prevail in both states.⁴⁹ Leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia were serious about the idea of Malay regionalism.⁵⁰ As in Indonesia, Suharto moved to consolidate his power.

The Indonesian Army took a few months to wipe out the PKI through mass arrests and mass killings following the abortive coup.⁵¹ Suharto then – while removing Sukarno from power – went on to establish a regime with real power lying outside the representative institutions of Indonesia, and centralized at his hand as the President of Indonesia.⁵² The Suharto regime – known as the New Order government – was dominated by the Indonesian Army under the leadership of President Suharto.⁵³ It emphasized political stability and economic development.⁵⁴ In March 1968, Suharto stressed that Indonesia's most important problem “in this period is development”.⁵⁵ He – as president – named his first cabinet as “First Development Cabinet”.⁵⁶ He made plain in his speech on 1st September 1968: “Successful development is premised on the prior securing of political stability.”⁵⁷

The New Order administration officially abandoned Sukarno's ideology of New Emerging Forces versus the Old Established Forces.⁵⁸ It declared that Indonesia would no longer see itself as a leader of the Third World.⁵⁹ In other words, the new regime had

⁴⁸ Ibid. 158, 190.

⁴⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 107-108.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 30-31. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 398-400.

⁵² Ibid. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 164-165, 182-183, 189, 202.

⁵³ Ibid. 128, 171-174, 178. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 33.

⁵⁴ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 148, 175.

⁵⁵ Kompas, March 21, 1968, quoted in R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 168.

⁵⁶ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 167-168.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 175.

⁵⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 40.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 36. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 117.

decided to remove the spirit of revolutionary struggle against colonialism-imperialism from serving as the basis of Indonesia's national identity.⁶⁰ The revolutionary rhetoric that was prevalent in Indonesia during the Sukarno-era had been replaced by *Pancasila* and the ideas of development and modernization.⁶¹ The Suharto regime employed Sukarno's principles of *Pancasila* as the ideological basis for its establishment of political order in Indonesia.⁶² The regime adopted an anti-democratic political ideology known as Organicism.⁶³ Organicism was associated with anti-Enlightenment Dutch orientalism, Japanese proto-fascism and elitist Javanese political thought.⁶⁴ It had been influential among Indonesian legal scholars who drafted Indonesia's constitution in 1945.⁶⁵ The central idea of Organicism was that the state and society form an organic unity hence there was no room for political competition or a democratic opposition.⁶⁶ To ensure the consolidation of Organicism in Indonesia's society, the Suharto regime implemented a political concept known as "floating mass", aiming to depoliticize the Indonesian mass public.⁶⁷ "Floating mass" meant that the attention of the Indonesian public would be shifted away from political struggles and preoccupied them with the tasks of developments.⁶⁸ In other words, the Indonesian people were a "floating mass", who were not tied to any political party.⁶⁹ "Heroes are needed not only at the time of the independence war, but also in the sphere of development. The struggle for development is a struggle to provide content to the independence that had been achieved so long ago," President Suharto asserted in his speech on the Heroes' Day of Indonesia in 1968.⁷⁰

⁶⁰ Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation – Indonesia Before and After Suharto* (London & New York: Verso, 2008), 38-39, 42-44, 50, 54.

⁶¹ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 159, 174-175.

⁶² Ibid. 160-161, 174-175. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata* (Australia: Griffith University, 1996), 21. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 109.

⁶³ Clinton Fernandes, *The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism* (Brighton, Portland and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 25.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 190.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 175.

Based on the groundwork laid by the meetings between OPSUS and Malaysian officials, Malaysian deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak and Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, began their negotiation in Bangkok in May 1966, to end Confrontation.⁷¹ An agreement had been reached between Tun Razak and Adam Malik on 1st June 1966.⁷² Both parties would end Confrontation and diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia would be established.⁷³ Malaysia, however, had made a symbolic concession that diplomatic relations of the two states would be established only after general elections had been held in Sabah and Sarawak.⁷⁴ It was to demonstrate that the people of Sabah and Sarawak would be given a chance to reaffirm their wish to join Malaysia.⁷⁵ Yet, the prospective elections were by no means a referendum on Malaysia.⁷⁶ The Suharto regime needed the concession to prevent the Bangkok Agreement from being jeopardized by the residual political forces of Sukarno.⁷⁷

Confronted with the residual influence of Sukarno in Indonesia, the Suharto regime announced in April 1966 that Indonesia intended to recognize Singapore as an independent state.⁷⁸ Such a move would demonstrate that Indonesia was not capitulating to Malaysia, while it was entering into peace talks with Malaysia.⁷⁹ Recognizing Singapore – which had recently separated from Malaysia – at the very least carried the

⁷¹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 108-109. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 62.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 108-109. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 62. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 340.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 336-337. Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 108-109. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 30-31. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 139-141.

⁷⁸ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 20. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 94-96.

⁷⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 41. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto*, 336-339. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 62.

meaning of weakening Malaysia, if not breaking up the newly formed federation.⁸⁰ The move, therefore, would offset the political pressure exerted by Sukarno and his followers, who insisted on the continuation of the confrontation campaign.⁸¹

The Malaysian government was enraged by Indonesia's announcement.⁸² It ran counter to Malaysia's expectation that Indonesia should first establish diplomatic relations with Malaysia instead of Singapore. Just a little while back, OPSUS and its Malaysian counterparts had been stressing the need for a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. In response to Malaysia's anger, Indonesia assured Malaysia that it would not accord official recognition to Singapore before a peace agreement had been reached between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁸³ Malaysia's anger had also been moderated by Indonesia's show of commitment to end Confrontation earlier on.⁸⁴ In February 1966, eight high-ranking Indonesian Army officers led by Ali Murtopo paid a goodwill visit to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in his hometown in Alor Star.⁸⁵ The Tunku was moved by the visit.⁸⁶ The officers went all the way to meet him in his hometown.⁸⁷ While meeting the Prime Minister, the officers expressed Indonesia's aspiration for peace with Malaysia: "We pray that friendship and brotherhood in the true spirit of Islam will return to our two countries."⁸⁸

On 6th June 1966, Indonesia officially recognized Singapore as an independent state.⁸⁹ On 11th August 1966, the Bangkok Agreement was signed by Tun Razak and Adam Malik in Jakarta.⁹⁰ Confrontation had officially come to an end.⁹¹ The diplomatic

⁸⁰ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 20.

⁸¹ Ibid. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 336-339. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 94-96.

⁸² Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 94-96. Also see Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, 20.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 108-109.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 156-157.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 41.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto*, 340. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 108-109. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita

tie between Indonesia and Malaysia was practically established.⁹² After the signing, Adam Malik asserted: “No victor and no vanquished. This is a great victory for the Malay race.”⁹³

The Bangkok Agreement marked the establishment of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, which was also a security regime between the two states.

The agreement reflected the basis of order between Indonesia and Malaysia. It represented Indonesia’s official acceptance of the existence of Malaysia, which meant its peaceful coexistence with Malaysia. Indonesia-Malaysia relations were characterized by their shared war avoidance norms after the signing of the Bangkok Agreement.

Almost immediately after the official ending of Confrontation, Indonesia and Malaysia went ahead to defuse their defence against one another.⁹⁴ It was an outcome of their shared war avoidance norms. Both demonstrated their respective commitment to avoid armed conflicts between them, in the belief that the counterpart would reciprocate. Upon Malaysia’s request, Britain and its allies began to withdraw their armed forces from Sabah and Sarawak.⁹⁵ Malaysia’s decision to defuse its defence against Indonesia was also an expression of its special ties with Indonesia.

Ever since Singapore had separated from Malaysia, the relationship between Britain and Malaysia was declining.⁹⁶ Policy makers of Malaysia increasingly felt that Britain was pro-Singapore at the expense of Malaysia.⁹⁷ In the eyes of the Malaysian government, Britain was essentially pro-Chinese, since Singapore was ruled by its majority Chinese.⁹⁸ The Tunku was infuriated by Britain in June 1965, when Britain warned him not to launch a coup against Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore.⁹⁹ Malaysia was also irritated by Britain’s attempt to pressure Malaysia to reach a defence

Publishing, 1985), 62. Also see Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories*, 156-158.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Tunku Abdul Rahman, *Looking Back – Monday Musings and Memories* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 158.

⁹⁴ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 134-135. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 128-131.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 122-123.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 119-123.

agreement with Singapore.¹⁰⁰ Britain had informed Malaysia that its commitments to Malaysia's defence must be based on a defence treaty between Malaysia and Singapore.¹⁰¹

Confronted with the perceived alignment between Britain and Singapore – the two culturally different Powers – Malaysia began to move away from Britain, and embrace its special ties with Indonesia.¹⁰² Together with Indonesia, Malaysia could balance against Britain and Singapore by strengthening the presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia. UMNO – the Malay ruling party of Malaysia – had hinted earlier on: “If Malays were ‘hard-pressed’ and their interests unprotected they would be forced to merge their country with Indonesia.”¹⁰³ The statement was made during the peak of tension between Malaysia and Singapore months before their separation.¹⁰⁴

In order to realize its rapprochement with Indonesia, Malaysia insisted that British troops in Sabah and Sarawak should withdraw from the territories.¹⁰⁵ These troops were protecting Sabah and Sarawak under the Anglo-Malaysia Defence Agreement (AMDA). Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, announced in June 1966: “Obviously with the end of Confrontation, British troops will have to leave Sarawak and Sabah.”¹⁰⁶ The withdrawal of British troops meant not only to avoid wars with Indonesia, it was also Malaysia's gesture of moving closer to Indonesia. It demonstrated that Malaysia and Indonesia were able to take care of their own regional matters without foreign involvement.

The British media expressed Britain's discontent. They stated that British were being forced to leave Sabah and Sarawak.¹⁰⁷

Very quickly, strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia ensued. In September 1966 – about a month after the signing of the Bangkok Agreement – an agreement for security cooperation had been reached between Indonesia and

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 126-128.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid. 122-129.

¹⁰³ Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 1965, 344, quoted in Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 34-35.

¹⁰⁴ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 34-35.

¹⁰⁵ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 128-131.

¹⁰⁶ The Times, June 8, 1966, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 129.

¹⁰⁷ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 129-130.

Malaysia.¹⁰⁸ The two states agreed to undertake joint counter-insurgency operations aimed at eliminating communist insurgents operated along the border areas shared by the two states in Borneo.¹⁰⁹ In May 1967, a Border Crossing Agreement was signed by Indonesia and Malaysia in which they would together set up border checkpoints along their common border in Borneo.¹¹⁰ The main function of these checkpoints was to prevent the communist rebels on both sides of the border from joining forces with one another.¹¹¹ Indonesia's and Malaysia's armed forces regularly shared intelligence and organized joint military operations during their fight against the communist insurgents.¹¹² Meanwhile, Sarawak had been the principal supply base for Indonesian troops who were fighting the insurgents along the Sarawak-Indonesia border.¹¹³ The strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia reinforced their mutual positive identifications. The two states had become a *de facto* alliance since the start of their security cooperation in Borneo.¹¹⁴

The border security cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia entailed two central meanings. It was the military cooperation of the two states against communist insurgency that was threatening their respective survival. The security cooperation also served to shift the focus of Indonesia and Malaysia from defending their border against one another, to cooperating with each other to ensure the stability of their shared border. Essentially, Indonesia and Malaysia were committed to avoid wars between them by advancing border security cooperation.¹¹⁵ An Indonesian Army General revealed years

¹⁰⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 143. Also see Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency," *Modern Asian Studies* 2, no.3 (1968): 257. Also see Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 101.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 122-123. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 108-109.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Justus M. Van Der Kroef, *The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency*, 245-246.

¹¹⁴ Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), 8.

¹¹⁵ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia*, 14, 16, 101.

later that such cooperation allowed Indonesia and Malaysia to overcome difficulties that arose between them.¹¹⁶

The Indonesia-Malaysia security cooperation enabled the two states to ease their defence against each other, in the context of a peaceful archipelagic Southeast Asia that reflected the Malay way of life. In other words, Indonesia and Malaysia had created their friendly coexistence that allowed them to immerse in their respective internal social and economic developments. However, the prospect of an armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia had been reduced, not eliminated. The Tunku had made plain in private that he did not fully trust the Indonesian government despite Indonesia's reconciliation with Malaysia.¹¹⁷ While Indonesia and Malaysia identified positively with one another because of their special ties, their relationship remained fundamentally competitive. The two states continued to understand each other in egoistic terms.

On 16th August 1966 – five days after the signing of the Bangkok Agreement – then General Suharto issued a statement to the Indonesian parliament, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR).¹¹⁸ The statement explained the terms of the Bangkok Agreement which ended Confrontation.¹¹⁹ It, meanwhile, revealed Indonesia's intention to create a regional body of Southeast Asia:¹²⁰

When this 'Malaysia' question has been settled we can step up activities in the field of foreign policy towards the establishment of close cooperation based on mutual benefit between the countries of Southeast Asia. We will then revive the idea of Maphilindo in a wider sphere, in order to achieve a Southeast Asia cooperating in different fields, especially in the economic, technical and cultural field.

Indonesia was headed towards forging a friendly climate of Southeast Asia by advancing regional cooperation.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 17.

¹¹⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 111.

¹¹⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 119.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Government of Indonesia, *Government Statement Before the Gotong-Royong House of Representatives on 16th August, 1966* (Jakarta: Department of Information, 1966), 48, quoted in Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 119.

The Forming of ASEAN – An Expression of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship

The idea of regional cooperation had been a key agenda of Tun Razak-Adam Malik peace talks in Bangkok in May 1966.¹²¹ Both parties agreed that closer regional cooperation was necessary to ensure the peace of Southeast Asia.¹²² During the same period, the member states of ASA (Association of Southeast Asia) – Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines – were on the path to revive the regional organisation.¹²³ ASA had been suspended since 1963 when the Philippines broke diplomatic ties with Malaysia because of its claim to Sabah.¹²⁴ Adam Malik, nevertheless, proposed during the peace talks that a new regional association of Southeast Asia should be formed.¹²⁵

Indonesia was in need of a new regional association. It had previously accused ASA of threatening the Third World solidarity.¹²⁶ Becoming a member of ASA would thus create an impression of Indonesia's capitulation.¹²⁷ Adam Malik therefore wrote a secret letter to Tun Razak in June 1967, proposing the forming of a bigger ASA.¹²⁸

Malaysia initially would prefer Indonesia to join ASA.¹²⁹ Yet, it understood that it needed Indonesia's strategic cooperation in order to create a friendly regional climate of Southeast Asia, which essentially reflected the Malay way of life. Malaysia accepted

¹²¹ Interview with Tun Abdul Razak, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 63. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 110.

¹²² Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 49-50.

¹²³ Ibid. 45. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 63.

¹²⁴ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 74-75, 88. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 93-94, 118-119. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 63, 72-73.

¹²⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 49-50.

¹²⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 83-84, 102-103.

¹²⁷ Ibid. 112-113.

¹²⁸ "Malik Sends Secret Note to Razak," *Straits Times*, June 5, 1967, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 113.

¹²⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 50. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 110-113. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 100.

Indonesia's proposal of establishing a new regional body.¹³⁰ Both appreciated that they were central to the creation of a friendly order of Southeast Asia.¹³¹ They knew that the desired regional environment would be basically in place, if they could demonstrate that both were able to sort out their conflict, and cooperate with one another.¹³² Other Southeast Asian states were bound to be influenced by the cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia.¹³³ They would follow suit.¹³⁴

On 8th August 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines co-founded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bangkok.¹³⁵ The name ASEAN was coined by Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik.¹³⁶ On 31st August 1967, diplomatic ties between Indonesia and Malaysia were officially established, which was after the general election had been held in Sabah.¹³⁷ Sarawak's general election, however, was postponed.¹³⁸

The basic purpose of ASEAN was to promote harmonious ties among its member states through regional cooperation.¹³⁹ The 1967 Bangkok Declaration – which established ASEAN – meanwhile, stated that Southeast Asian states were determined to ensure the stability and security of their region with no external interference.¹⁴⁰ ASEAN was to embrace the notion of regional autonomy.

While the creation of a friendly regional climate in ASEAN was to allow its member states to immerse in their internal developments, the creation was also prompted by the

¹³⁰ Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman, 27 December 1982, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 65.

¹³¹ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 175. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 112-113.

¹³² Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967. See <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration> (accessed 5th December 2013)

¹³⁶ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 54. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 150-151.

¹³⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 109. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 340.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967. See <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration> (accessed 5th December 2013)

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

surge of communism in Indochina.¹⁴¹ The US had escalated its war against the communists in Vietnam since 1965 with an increasing cost and casualties.¹⁴² Communism was a common threat to the five non-communist ASEAN member states.¹⁴³ The creation of a peaceful and stable ASEAN served to demonstrate its member states' solidarity against the communists in Indochina.

Essentially, ASEAN is a security regime with its social and economic functions remain un-definitive.¹⁴⁴ The behaviours of ASEAN member states are restrained by a set of norms aims at avoiding armed conflicts between the states concerned.¹⁴⁵ The member states refrain from the use of force to resolve their disputes.¹⁴⁶ They strive not to interfere in their counterparts' domestic affairs, so that they would not become a threat to their counterparts' internal security.¹⁴⁷ Central to these war avoidance norms is the ASEAN Way, which the member states deem to be the distinctive character of interstate relations in ASEAN.¹⁴⁸ ASEAN Way denotes a decision making process based upon consultation and consensus.¹⁴⁹ Such a process emphasizes on extensive informal negotiations with a shared commitment to moderation and accommodation, which inhibits the majority to prevail over the minority.¹⁵⁰ The establishment of

¹⁴¹ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 68-69, 72, 74.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 99, 105-109, 304. Also see Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 191. Also see Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore: A Regional Security Core?" in *Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon W. Simon (New York and London, England: NBR: Armonk, 1996), 34.

¹⁴⁵ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 47. Also see Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball, 185-186.

¹⁴⁶ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 48-51.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 57-60. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 134.

¹⁴⁸ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 107-108, 128-129, 304.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 64-70.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

ASEAN had led to the creation of a friendly atmosphere among the member states of this regional body.¹⁵¹

It was the shared belief of Indonesia and Malaysia that they – the Malay World – were the dominant force in the newly formed ASEAN.¹⁵² The two states aimed for regional autonomy of Southeast Asia. Their strategic thinking of the Malay World, which apprehended archipelagic Southeast Asia as one entity, formed the basis for their longing for regional autonomy.¹⁵³ “When the chips are down”, the Tunku argued, “the Americans and the British would not be able to defend the region effectively. The *Rumpun Melayu* of which is an integral part should defend themselves.”¹⁵⁴

Among the five member states of ASEAN, only Indonesia and Malaysia aimed for an autonomous regional security framework.¹⁵⁵ Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, on the other hand, insisted that Western security guarantees were vital to their respective survival as well as the security of their region.¹⁵⁶ They host US military facilities on their soil.¹⁵⁷ The three are the allies of the US.¹⁵⁸

During the negotiations leading up to the founding of ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia emphasized that foreign military bases should be removed from the member states of the prospective regional body.¹⁵⁹ Singapore would not accept such a position.¹⁶⁰ A compromise, however, had been reached.¹⁶¹ The 1967 Bangkok

¹⁵¹ Amitav Acharya, “A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?” in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 176. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 199. Also see Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 159. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 180, 201. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 164-165. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 99, 128.

¹⁵² Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012.

¹⁵³ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 98-99, 149. Also see Interview 1002, Singapore, 2nd October 2012.

¹⁵⁴ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order*, 388.

¹⁵⁵ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, 54-56.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, 36-37, 161-162. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 37-41. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges*, 98-100.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 113.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Declaration affirmed that all foreign bases in ASEAN member states were temporary in nature.¹⁶² Nevertheless, Major Benny Murdani of Indonesia later asserted that, “it seemed inevitable...that one day Malaysia and Indonesia would come together and Singapore would need to adjust its relations with Malaysia and Indonesia in order to fit in with the circumstances of the region.”¹⁶³

The essence of ASEAN as a security regime was created and sustained by the special relationship of Indonesia and Malaysia. Within ASEAN, only Indonesia and Malaysia defused their defence against one another. The security posture of ASEAN member states vis-à-vis their counterparts – apart from that between Indonesia and Malaysia – were undoubtedly competitive.

The Chinese-dominated Singapore had strived to maintain its strong military deterrence against Indonesia and Malaysia since the first years of its independence.¹⁶⁴ Singapore was alarmed by its exclusion from the peace talks between Indonesia and Malaysia in ending Confrontation.¹⁶⁵ It was troubled by the pace of the rapprochement of the two Malay states, and their stressing of their Malay blood-brotherhood following the end of Confrontation.¹⁶⁶ The Indonesia-Malaysia rapprochement prompted a Malaysian minister to claim that Singapore “was now a nut in a nutcracker”.¹⁶⁷

Confronted with such a prospect, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore announced, “Our long-term survival demands that there is no government in Malaysia that goes with Indonesia. Life would be very difficult if I found myself between Malaysia and Indonesia.”¹⁶⁸ Singapore was worried about being encircled by its two

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967. See <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration> (accessed 5th December 2013)

¹⁶³ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 115.

¹⁶⁴ Andrew Tan, *Intra-ASEAN Tensions* (Great Britain: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 9-14. Also see Bilveer Singh, “Singapore’s Management of Its Security Problems,” *Asia Pacific Community*, no.29 (Summer 1985): 77-79.

¹⁶⁵ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 149.

¹⁶⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 115. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 123.

¹⁶⁷ “What Comes after Confrontation,” *Canberra Times*, July 5, 1966, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 105.

¹⁶⁸ *The Observer*, August 15, 1965, quoted in Michael Leifer, *Singapore’s Foreign Policy – Coping with Vulnerability* (London: Routledge, 2000), 58.

immediate Malay neighbours.¹⁶⁹ It viewed the two Malay states as its primary security concerns.¹⁷⁰ Singapore was not convinced that the newly formed ASEAN was meant to ensure the friendly coexistence of its member states.¹⁷¹ War-like tensions occasionally emerged between Singapore and Malaysia, and Singapore and Indonesia in the early years of ASEAN.¹⁷² Only low-level Singaporean officials had been sent to attend ASEAN meetings during these years.¹⁷³

Singapore, meanwhile, began to develop its armed forces based on the model of the Israel Defence Forces – a model which emphasized on air superiority, armour and pre-emptive defence.¹⁷⁴ The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) was always in a high state of combat-readiness.¹⁷⁵ By 1972, Prime Minister Lee declared: Singapore “had made the transition from military impotence to combat-readiness, thus achieving the goal of a defence state.”¹⁷⁶

A few decades later – on Singapore’s national day (9th August 1991) – Malaysia and Indonesia jointly conducted a military exercise code name “Total Wipe Out” which ended with paratroopers’ landing in southern Johor.¹⁷⁷ The landing site was Malaysia’s territory 18km north of Singapore.¹⁷⁸ Singapore immediately executed its highly publicized “Operation Trojan”, aiming to deter the Malaysian and Indonesian armed forces.¹⁷⁹ The SAF was put on full alert and Singapore’s reserve forces had been mobilized.¹⁸⁰

¹⁶⁹ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 149.

¹⁷⁰ Bilveer Singh, “Singapore’s Management of Its Security Problems,” *Asia Pacific Community*, no.29 (Summer 1985): 77-79.

¹⁷¹ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 35.

¹⁷² Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 48.

¹⁷³ Seah Chee Meow, “Singapore’s Position in ASEAN Co-Operation,” in *Singapore’s Position in ASEAN Cooperation*, ed. Lim, Seah and Shaw (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1979), 62, quoted in Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, 35.

¹⁷⁴ Andrew Tan, *Intra-ASEAN Tensions* (Great Britain: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000), 9-14.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 22.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

The Philippines continued to challenge Malaysia's sovereignty over Sabah after the formation of ASEAN. It was found in March 1968 that the Philippines had been training a group of militants tasked to infiltrate into Sabah.¹⁸¹ The mission was a part of the Philippines' plan to take over Sabah by force.¹⁸² Meanwhile, a bill was signed into law in the Philippines declaring that Sabah belonged to the Philippines.¹⁸³

Malaysia responded with a show of force. Six British Hunter jets – upon Malaysia's request under AMDA – flew over Sabah's capital, Kota Kinabalu, while on their way back to Singapore from Hong Kong.¹⁸⁴ The British warships around the same period sailed through the Sibutu Passage – the territorial waters of the Philippines.¹⁸⁵ The British Commander-in-Chief Far East, General Sir Michael Carver, declared in September 1968:¹⁸⁶

The British Government fully supports Malaysia's view that Sabah is a part of Malaysia and I affirm that Britain will honour its obligations under AMDA if fighting breaks out.

Malaysia and the Philippines suspended their diplomatic ties by the end of 1968 as a result of the Sabah dispute.¹⁸⁷

The Malaysia-Thailand relations, on the other hand, were strained by their rivalries, and the activities of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand.¹⁸⁸ Malaysia was uneasy about its supposed Thai toleration of the CPM rebels operating in Southern Thailand.¹⁸⁹ A certain degree of arms race existed between Thailand and Malaysia.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸¹ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 73-74. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 169.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 133-134.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 169.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ *The Times*, September 20, 1968, quoted in Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 134.

¹⁸⁷ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970*, 73-75. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 169.

¹⁸⁸ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 59-60, 199.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

It was clear that the war avoidance norms of ASEAN were largely a consequence of the existence of a security regime between Indonesia and Malaysia. The two states' commitment to defuse their defence against each other served as an established norm within ASEAN which shaped, and was shaped by, the conception of self of the ASEAN member states. The shared war avoidance norms of Indonesia and Malaysia spawned the ASEAN-Five's habit to avoid violent conflicts between them. Overtime, ASEAN war avoidance norms became established, which had a life of their own.¹⁹¹

By 1976, it was the intersubjective recognition of the five ASEAN member states that they formed a common region which was peaceful and stable.¹⁹² There was no armed conflict in the region since the formation of ASEAN in 1967.¹⁹³ Confronted with the communist victory in Indochina, especially a military powerful and potentially hostile Vietnam, the five ASEAN states organized their first summit in Bali in February 1976.¹⁹⁴ The summit was to demonstrate the solidarity of the ASEAN member states and their determination to preserve the peace and stability of the ASEAN region.¹⁹⁵ The five states came to view that the security of any of their counterpart directly affected that of their own.¹⁹⁶

While the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship was essential to the existence of ASEAN as a security regime, the two states did not possess the power that would result in their dominance in ASEAN. The strategic cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia ensured the friendly coexistence of the states within ASEAN. Indonesia and Malaysia, however, were unable to establish their preferred autonomous regional order of Southeast Asia through their strategic partnership.

¹⁹¹ Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 159.

¹⁹² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 160-164. Also see Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, 159. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 151-153, 159-161.

¹⁹³ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 5, 204.

¹⁹⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 160-164. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 152. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order*, 151-153, 159-161.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 152. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 175. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 80-81.

The two states declared their “Kuantan Principle” in March 1980, aiming to bring an end to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia that took place since December 1978.¹⁹⁷ “Kuantan Principle” stressed that “for Southeast Asia to be a region of peace, Vietnam must be freed from Soviet and Chinese influence.”¹⁹⁸ Indonesia and Malaysia deemed that Vietnam’s aggression was a reaction against China’s dominance, and sustained by the rivalries between two extraregional great Powers – the Soviet Union and China.¹⁹⁹ The exclusion of external influence, that was the creation of Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy – as Indonesia and Malaysia saw it – would be the way to end Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia.²⁰⁰

Indonesia-Malaysia strategic cooperation expressed through their declaration of Kuantan Principle carried no impact on the development of the crisis in Indochina.²⁰¹ Thailand went ahead to consolidate its informal alliance with China in the face of the direct military threat from Vietnam.²⁰² Thailand – which was dealing with an existential threat from Vietnam – dominated ASEAN’s policy towards the Vietnamese invasion.²⁰³ ASEAN chose to stand up against Vietnam.²⁰⁴ It forged a partnership with China, aiming to force Vietnam out of Cambodia.²⁰⁵ Indonesia and Malaysia had to follow suit to prevent the disintegration of ASEAN.²⁰⁶

The Width and the Depth of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship

Indonesia and Malaysia began to share a relationship with various special characters after the abortive coup in Indonesia in September 1965.

They had worked together to claim ownership of the Straits of Malacca.

¹⁹⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 129-131. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 166-169. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 174-175.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 188. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 80-81.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

Shortly after the end of Confrontation, Malaysia decided to adopt Indonesia's measurement of territorial waters, which was codified in Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine.²⁰⁷ A Bill was introduced by the Tunku administration in 1967 stipulating the extension of Malaysia's territorial waters based upon Indonesia's measurement – that was the adoption of the straight baseline system, and the extension of Malaysia's territorial waters from 3 to 12 miles.²⁰⁸ The Bill was passed by Malaysia's parliament in 1969, paving the way for an agreement reached between Indonesia and Malaysia in March 1970.²⁰⁹ The agreement delimited the continental shelves between the two states.²¹⁰

Indonesia and Malaysia had essentially declared their sovereignty over the Straits of Malacca through the signing of the 1970 agreement. The 12 miles delimitation of territorial sea meant that the two states possessed the jurisdictions over the straits.²¹¹ Indonesia and Malaysia sought to revoke the existing international status of the straits. Both – in a joint public statement on 16th November 1971 – asserted that the Straits of Malacca were “not international straits, while fully recognising their use for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage.”²¹²

Claiming ownership of the Straits of Malacca was an effort of Indonesia and Malaysia to strengthen the presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia. In the two states' strategic thinking of the Malay World, waters always unite them. For Indonesia and Malaysia, the Straits of Malacca is not a divider between them, but a bridge that unites them.²¹³ Tun Dr. Ismail in his capacity as Malaysia's deputy Prime Minister said in July 1972: “...we have the Straits of Malacca as our common border. Even though the Straits separates the two countries physically but in my view, the straits is a bridge that ties up the two nations of *serumpun*. In order to safeguard this bridge, both countries have agreed to defend it, not just to ensure that it is freed from threats,

²⁰⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 122-123. Also see Dino Patti Djalal, *The Geopolitics of Indonesia's Maritime Territorial Policy* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 29.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ “*Indonesia-Malaysia: Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves between the Two Countries*,” in *Malaysia and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Selected Documents*, ed. Hamzah Ahmad (Kuala Lumpur: Heng Lee Stationery and Printing, 1983), 295-296.

²¹¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 122-123.

²¹² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 144.

²¹³ Interview 919, Kuala Lumpur, 19th September 2012.

but also to enhance our cooperation and to protect national sovereignty.”²¹⁴ In the eyes of Indonesia and Malaysia, the Straits of Malacca was a part of the Malay World which bound them together; both needed to own and protect the straits, so that their existence as states built around the Malay way of life would be secured.

Singapore did not recognize Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s statement that denied the international status of the Straits of Malacca.²¹⁵ It suspected that such a move was the two Malay states’ attempt to corner Singapore.²¹⁶ Indonesian and Malaysian officials had been reported to have been trying to omit Singapore from negotiations over the legal status of the Straits of Malacca.²¹⁷

The two Superpowers firmly opposed Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s challenge to the existing status of the Straits of Malacca. The US and the Soviet navies sailed through the straits to affirm the longstanding international status of the straits.²¹⁸ Consequently, Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s assertion of their sovereignty over the Straits of Malacca was nothing more than a declaration.²¹⁹

On 13th May 1969, clashes broke out between Malays and Chinese in Malaysia following the general election held in Malaysia two days before.²²⁰ The racial riots were a result of the belief among the Malays that their supremacy in Malaysia was being threatened by the Chinese.²²¹ The setback of the Alliance led by UMNO – the Malay nationalist ruling party – in the general election was a trigger for the clashes.²²² It was the first time since independence that the Alliance lost its two-thirds majority in Malaysia’s parliament.²²³ The Alliance also lost two states – Penang and Kelantan – in the state-level election.²²⁴ Violence began to spread when the Malays reacted to the

²¹⁴ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 5.

²¹⁵ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 144.

²¹⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 122-123.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 145.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 105-106. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 115.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 2-4, 49-50, 98, 105-106.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

Chinese-based opposition party's celebrations of its achievements in the 1969 general election.²²⁵

In the midst of the racial riots, General Yoga of Indonesia was sent by President Suharto to meet with Ghazali Shafie – Permanent secretary of Malaysia's ministry of foreign affairs – informing him that Indonesia was ready to help the Malaysian government.²²⁶ General Tjokropranolo – a close aide to Suharto – indicated that Indonesia felt obliged to assist the Malays in Malaysia in their struggle against the Chinese.²²⁷ The Malays, meanwhile, believed that Indonesia would always have their back in fighting the Chinese.²²⁸ Ghazali Shafie was moved by Indonesia's support expressed through General Yoga's visit. He revealed years later, "it was an extraordinary gesture which I can never forget."²²⁹

The chaotic situation in Malaysia was quickly brought under control.²³⁰

The Tunku had to step down from power as a consequence of the 13 May racial riots.²³¹ He was succeeded by Tun Abdul Razak, who had been in power few days after the start of the riots.²³² The new Razak administration had brought about a fundamental change to Malaysia's domestic politics. It worked vigorously to consolidate the Malay supremacy in Malaysia.²³³ The administration implemented the New Economic Policy, aiming to uplift the social economic position of the Malays.²³⁴ The Malays were entitled to massive government assistance under the new policy.²³⁵ The Razak administration also introduced its National Culture policy.²³⁶ The policy was to create a Malaysian

²²⁵ Ibid. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 115.

²²⁶ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 394.

²²⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 116.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order*, 394.

²³⁰ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 105-106. Also see Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Muhammad Haji Salleh, Abd. Ghapa Harun, *A Biography of Tun Abdul Razak – Statesman and Patriot* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2012), 258.

²³¹ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 106, 130-131, 136-137.

²³² Ibid. Also see Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Muhammad Haji Salleh, Abd. Ghapa Harun, *A Biography of Tun Abdul Razak – Statesman and Patriot*, 258.

²³³ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 126-127, 138.

²³⁴ Ibid. 123, 127, 141-144.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

culture based upon Malay culture, Islam and suitable elements from other cultures.²³⁷ In 1970, Razak made a decision that the Malay language would replace English as the main medium of instruction in Malaysia's education system.²³⁸

The Razak administration, on the other hand, began to encourage Indonesians to migrate to Malaysia.²³⁹ The move was to expand the Malay population, while being the largest ethnic group in Malaysia.²⁴⁰ Such an expansion would underpin the Malay supremacy in Malaysia.²⁴¹ The policy of making the Malay language as the main medium of instruction in Malaysia's education system further enhanced the closeness between Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia supplied Malaysia with teachers and lecturers to help mitigate Malaysia's difficulties in implementing its language policy.²⁴² Malaysia did not have the volume of teachers and experts needed for the creation of a nationwide education system that used the Malay language as its main medium of instruction.²⁴³ Meanwhile, the text books in Malaysia were still not all written in Malay.²⁴⁴ Indonesia assisted Malaysia to overcome the challenge by providing Malaysia with its expertise in producing text books in Malay.²⁴⁵ Abdul Rahman Yaakub – Malaysia's Education Minister in the Razak administration – confided that, without Indonesia's assistance, the implementation of the National Education Policy and the Malay language into Malaysia's schools and universities would have failed.²⁴⁶

The Razak administration provided firm support for Indonesia's decision to annex East Timor in 1975.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.128-129.

²³⁹ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 103. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 48.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 110-111, 120, 152. Also see Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Muhammad Haji Salleh, Abd. Ghapa Harun, *A Biography of Tun Abdul Razak – Statesman and Patriot* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2012), 293.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ K. Muniandy, *Malaysia-Indonesia Relations 1957-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1996), 267, quoted in Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 110-111. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 128-129.

The prospect of East Timor's emergence as an independent state began to surface following Portugal's move to decolonize its possession of East Timor that took place since 1974.²⁴⁷ The New Order Regime in Indonesia was alarmed by such a prospect.²⁴⁸ It could not tolerate an independent East Timor.²⁴⁹ In the eyes of the regime, an independent state situated at the periphery of the Indonesian archipelago constituted a threat to the integrity of Indonesia.²⁵⁰ The regime believed that East Timor which was independent might become a base for hostile forces to spread separatist movements in Indonesia.²⁵¹ Most importantly, the possibility of East Timor becoming a democracy posed a direct threat to the New Order Regime, which was undemocratic.²⁵² The Indonesian public would be exposed to a democratic alternative functioning within the sphere of the Indonesian archipelago if East Timor had eventually become a democracy.²⁵³

Indonesia annexed East Timor in December 1975 to prevent it from becoming an independent state.²⁵⁴ Malaysia provided full diplomatic support for Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. The integrity of Indonesia as an archipelagic state was crucial to Malaysia's security. Malaysia needed the existence of Indonesia as together they formed the Malay World – a shield that protected Malaysia's existence as a Malay nation-state. Shortly before the invasion, Prime Minister Razak publicly declared Malaysia's support for the integration of East Timor into Indonesia.²⁵⁵ He also told the Australian media that "he did not see how Portuguese Timor could survive as an independent country and criticized Portugal for not being sensitive enough to Indonesia's feelings on the Timor issue".²⁵⁶ Malaysia voted against a UN resolution that called for Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor.²⁵⁷ When Indonesia was confronted with an increasingly harsh

²⁴⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 154-156.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 154-156, 159.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

²⁵² Clinton Fernandes, *Reluctant Saviour – Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor* (Australia: Scribe Publications, 2004), 14.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 154-158.

²⁵⁵ Clinton Fernandes, *The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism* (Brighton, Portland and Toronto: Sussex Academic Press, 2011), 41.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 158-159.

international criticism of its military operations in East Timor, Prime Minister Razak publicly asserted that “the obvious future for Portuguese Timor is for the territory to become part of Indonesia”.²⁵⁸

After six years of their border security cooperation, Indonesia and Malaysia moved to establish a General Border Committee (GBC) on 23rd July 1972.²⁵⁹ The two states broadened and deepened their existing border security cooperation through GBC. The committee was co-chaired by Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s security officers at the highest level – either Minister of Defence or Minister of Home Affairs.²⁶⁰ Previously, it was the Indonesian and Malaysian brigade commanders that were taking charge of the two states’ border security cooperation.²⁶¹

Indonesia-Malaysia security cooperation was to be expanded as a result of the forming of GBC. Apart from their common border in Borneo, the two states would also undertake their security cooperation along their shared borders at the straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.²⁶² GBC was the principal body that oversaw Indonesia-Malaysia security cooperation at these three border regions.²⁶³

The newly-established committee inherited the two defining roles of the existing border security cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia in Borneo. The committee was an outcome of the two states’ war avoidance norms. GBC functioned as a mechanism between Indonesia and Malaysia that allowed them to sort out their border disputes via negotiations.²⁶⁴ From 1973 onwards, Indonesia and Malaysia made use of the committee to jointly measure and delimit their common border in Borneo.²⁶⁵ GBC was also the body tasked to carry out development projects in areas around this shared border.²⁶⁶ The attempt to develop the border areas was meant to avoid war between Indonesia and Malaysia by generating socio-economic progress in these areas for the

²⁵⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 127.

²⁵⁹ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 29.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 31, 39.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² *Ibid.* 29, 31, 39, 45, 51-52.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 140-143, 166, 173-174, 179.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 16, 69, 105, 150, 170, 174.

common good of the two states.²⁶⁷ Such an idea of avoiding war was originated from the proposal put forward by OPSUS and its Malaysian counterparts back then in the final years of Confrontation.

GBC, on the other hand, furnished a framework for the military cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia. One of the main tasks of GBC is to handle Indonesia-Malaysia military operations along their shared borders against their common enemy.²⁶⁸ The committee has the authority to form a joint task force that involves the armies, navies and air forces of the two states.²⁶⁹

The immediate task of GBC was to organize joint military operations of Indonesia and Malaysia to eradicate the communist insurgents operated along the two states' common border in Borneo.²⁷⁰ The committee also worked to establish coordinated patrols of the navies and air forces of Indonesia and Malaysia in their respective territories along the Straits of Malacca.²⁷¹ Through GBC, Indonesia and Malaysia had jointly developed plans to conduct surveillance on the movements of foreign ships in the Straits of Malacca.²⁷² The patrols and the surveillance plans were meant to assert Indonesia's and Malaysia's ownership over the Straits of Malacca, which both the Malay states regarded as a vital part of the Malay World. A decision had been made by GBC that any problem or dispute in the Straits of Malacca should and will be resolved by the sovereign states bordering the straits without the interventions of outsiders.²⁷³

GBC over time had put in place nearly all of the regular joint military exercises that existed between Indonesia and Malaysia.²⁷⁴ These exercises involved the armies, navies and air forces of the two states.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid. 23.

²⁶⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 144.

²⁷⁰ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 31, 41, 57, 75.

²⁷¹ Ibid. 51-52, 77.

²⁷² Ibid. 159.

²⁷³ Ibid. 102.

²⁷⁴ Ibid. 125. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, 143-146. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 129. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 148.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

A joint exercise code name “Elang Malindo IV” was performed by the Indonesian and Malaysian air forces in November 1978.²⁷⁶ It was an exercise organized by GBC.²⁷⁷ The exercise pretended that the Indonesian Army in Natuna Island was confronted with attacks from enemy forces and had retreated into the jungle of the island.²⁷⁸ The air forces of Indonesia and Malaysia quickly formed an Air Joint Task Force to recapture the airport in Natuna Island.²⁷⁹

“Elang Malindo IV” had crucial meaning for both Indonesia and Malaysia. It indicated the two states’ determination to execute their strategic thinking – that of the Malay World functioned as a shield for their respective existence. Natuna is an Indonesian island in the South China Sea located between the East and West Malaysia. It is the strategic frontline of the perceived Malay World. In December 1984 – at the 13th GBC meeting – it was decided that Indonesia and Malaysia would jointly use the facilities at Natuna Island for training and emergency purposes.²⁸⁰

The Indonesian and Malaysia air forces performed their Elang Malindo series joint exercise every year.²⁸¹ In these exercises, the two air forces practiced air defence, combat air patrol, tactical and photographic reconnaissance, pre-planned air strikes, close air support and search-and-rescue operations on land and at sea.²⁸² The Indonesian and Malaysian air forces managed to familiarize themselves with each other’s operating procedures through the Elang Malindo series joint exercise.²⁸³

In 1978, the Indonesian and Malaysian armies carried out for the first time their combined command-post exercises.²⁸⁴ The exercises were designed to familiarize the two armies with each other’s doctrine, tactics and staff procedures.²⁸⁵ The Indonesian and Malaysian navies, on the other hand, regularly performed their Malindo series joint

²⁷⁶ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 144-145.

²⁷⁷ Ibid. Also see Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 125.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia*, 122.

²⁸¹ JIO Study No.12/76 issued November 1979.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

exercise, which was organized by GBC.²⁸⁶ They too from time to time carried out their combined patrol, minesweeping and amphibious exercises in the northern part of the Straits of Malacca.²⁸⁷

GBC had succeeded in institutionalizing the military cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia. The two states had come to identify their regular joint military exercises as a norm that they share. The communist insurgents in Borneo were no longer a credible threat to Indonesia and Malaysia by the early 1980s.²⁸⁸ They had been eliminated by Indonesia-Malaysia military operations, which were performed within the framework of GBC.²⁸⁹ Regular joint exercises of the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces since then serve to sustain the military cooperation between the two states.²⁹⁰ GBC has been able to ensure the continuous implementation of these exercises.²⁹¹

The military tie between Indonesia and Malaysia became the most intimate one among the bilateral security ties that existed within ASEAN.²⁹² It was in fact the Indonesia-Malaysia *de facto* security alliance that formed the core of ASEAN security cooperation, which was characterized by a series of bilateral military cooperation between ASEAN member states.²⁹³ The ties between the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces were remarkably close. The two together could easily form a single command and control structure for a military mission if necessary.²⁹⁴ Crucially, Malaysia featured prominently in Indonesian defence thinking.²⁹⁵ Indonesia's participation in defensive operations in Malaysia was openly discussed at the

²⁸⁶ Ibid. Also see Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 125.

²⁸⁷ JIO Study No.12/76 issued November 1979.

²⁸⁸ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia*, 35, 103, 107, 142, 169-170.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. 107, 125, 142, 169-170. Also see "Indonesia, Malaysia to Increase Security Maintenance in Border," *Antara News*, July 5, 2011. Also see <http://www.tniad.mil.id/?p=2063> (accessed Feb 4, 2014)

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Donald E. Weatherbee, "ASEAN Security Cooperation and Resource Protection," in *The Invisible Nexus Energy and ASEAN's Security*, ed. Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (Singapore: Executive Publications, 1984), 119-121. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 142-151, 158-159.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 393.

²⁹⁵ JIO Study No.12/76 issued November 1979.

Indonesian Army Command and Staff College.²⁹⁶ Indonesia and Malaysia also cooperated closely in military trainings.²⁹⁷ The Indonesian armed forces provided training for their Malaysian counterparts, which included the training of parachutist, commando, frogmen, special forces, infantry and pilot.²⁹⁸ Each year Malaysia's military officers were enrolled in various Indonesia's staff colleges.²⁹⁹ The Malaysian armed forces, on the other hand, provided training for Indonesian helicopter pilots and air-traffic-control personnel.³⁰⁰ It had become a belief that Indonesia-Malaysia security relations had the potential of advancing "from *de facto* alliance to *de jure* alliance".³⁰¹

Indonesia's and Malaysia's assertions of their sentimental bonds were salient throughout the course of the military cooperation between them. The Indonesian Joint-Chairman of GBC (1972-1977), General Maraden Panggabean, described his experience of cooperating with Malaysia: "it is felt as if Malaysia is part of us as much as we are a part of them...I can say that Malaysia is a member of our family..."³⁰² Two decades later, the Malaysian Joint-Chairman of GBC, Najib Razak, asserted that the abilities of the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces to operate together served to showcase to other Southeast Asian states, as well as to the world, the brotherhood and the unity between Indonesia and Malaysia.³⁰³

General Benny Murdani – the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces – announced in November 1983 that Indonesia was ready to provide military assistance to Malaysia if the latter was being attacked.³⁰⁴ The announcement was made during the 12th GBC meeting held in Kuala Lumpur.³⁰⁵ Specifically, General Murdani promised that the Indonesian Armed Forces would come to Malaysia's assistance if Layang-

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Donald E. Weatherbee, "ASEAN Security Cooperation and Resource Protection," in *The Invisible Nexus Energy and ASEAN's Security*, ed. Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (Singapore: Executive Publications, 1984), 121.

³⁰² Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 136.

³⁰³ Ibid. 175.

³⁰⁴ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 145-146. Also see Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia*, 46-47, 152-157.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

layang Island was under attack.³⁰⁶ Layang-layang is an island of Malaysia which both China and Vietnam have also claimed to be theirs.³⁰⁷ It is an island of the disputed Spratly Islands group situated in the South China Sea. General Murdani was firm on his pledge. He emphasized, “When Malaysia is pinched, Indonesia feels the pain.”³⁰⁸

Indonesia’s readiness to help defend Malaysia revealed the mutual strategic dependence between the two states. The Indonesia-Malaysia strategic cooperation was rooted in the idea that together they constituted a shield – that was the Malay World – which safeguarded their existence as states built around the Malay way of life. An attack on Malaysia – as Indonesia saw it – would thus mean an attack on the shield that was protecting Indonesia’s survival. Indonesia was bound to throw its weight behind Malaysia if Malaysia was being attacked.

Malaysia’s strategic judgement, on the other hand, was no different from that of Indonesia. Ghazali Shafie – as being the Malaysian Joint-Chairman of GBC – declared at a GBC meeting:³⁰⁹

It is a fact that whatever serves as a threat to any of the two countries [Indonesia and Malaysia] will also be regarded as so by the other...Let the understanding and cooperation now closely binding the two countries serve as a warning to any power that has ill intentions towards us. We will act together to oppose this threat completely and we shall never tolerate any nonsense from anywhere ...Let this joint stand of ours be understood by all, particularly by those who have designs on us.

The institutionalization of Indonesia-Malaysia military cooperation, in the meantime, strengthened the war avoidance norms shared by the two states. Through the collaborations between the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces – mainly in the form of regular joint exercises – contacts and friendships had been established between military officers of the two states at all levels.³¹⁰ These collaborations were carried out

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Utusan Melayu, September 18, 1979, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 131.

³¹⁰ Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 65, 107, 125, 142, 173. Also see Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

within the framework of GBC.³¹¹ Leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia described the nurturing of the friendships between Indonesian and Malaysian military officers as confidence building measures.³¹² Positive identifications as well as the mutual understanding between the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces were being enhanced as a result of these personal friendships.³¹³ These friendships, consequently, contributed to the two states' commitment to adhere to their war avoidance norms. Indonesia and Malaysia were able to resolve several of their border disputes peacefully through GBC largely due to the good rapport that existed between the armed forces of the two states.³¹⁴

It was the shared understanding of Indonesia and Malaysia that both played a central role in ensuring a friendly regional environment in ASEAN.³¹⁵ Both were aware that they were the only two states within ASEAN that had eased their defence against each other through their security cooperation implemented in the form of GBC.³¹⁶ Both understood, the existence of such cooperation sustained the essence of ASEAN as a security regime – that was the friendly coexistence of the ASEAN member states.³¹⁷

ZOPFAN – Competitive Cooperation for Regional Autonomy

A special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia was undoubtedly in place. Both intersubjectively recognized that they shared a close relation – closer than other bilateral ties that either of them enjoyed. Both, however, did not share a collective-self understanding. They were entrenched in egoistic understanding of one another. The reordering of the strategic landscape in Southeast Asia revealed such basic qualities of Indonesia-Malaysia relations.

In February 1966, the British government published its Defence White Paper declaring Britain's intention to reduce its military commitments east of Suez.³¹⁸ A final

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Government of Malaysia and Government of Indonesia, *GBC MALINDO Malaysia-Indonesia – 25th Anniversary General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri Malaysia, 1997), 142-143, 148-149, 173-175, 179.

³¹³ Ibid. 148-149, 173, 179.

³¹⁴ Ibid. 166, 173-174, 179.

³¹⁵ Ibid. 14, 33, 150, 172, 179.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 92. Also see Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia's Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 125.

decision was made in January 1968.³¹⁹ Britain would withdraw its military presence from east of Suez, which included its military bases in Singapore and Malaysia.³²⁰ The withdrawal would be completed by the mid-1970s.³²¹ On the other hand, President Nixon introduced his Guam Doctrine in July 1969, signalling the impending US withdrawal from its war in Vietnam.³²² The implementation of the Guam Doctrine would allow the US – Britain’s closest ally – to reduce its military presence in Southeast Asia.³²³ The doctrine ruled out the involvement of US ground forces in any future armed conflict in Asia.³²⁴

The military disengagement of Britain and the US from Southeast Asia meant that Malaysia would lose its security umbrella provided by the two Great Powers.³²⁵ Britain’s military bases in Singapore and Malaysia were crucial to Malaysia’s fight against Indonesia during the years of Confrontation.³²⁶

Malaysia was to make fundamental adjustments so that it could still survive without Britain’s protection.

The Tunku began to seek ways to ensure that a certain degree of AMDA would remain in place even after the British armed forces had left Southeast Asia. He lobbied for a five-Commonwealth nation conference since July 1967.³²⁷ A Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) was reached between Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand in April 1971 as a result of the conference.³²⁸ FPDA would replace the

³¹⁹ Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 12. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), xvi.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 92.

³²² Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, xvii, 3. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 12.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 52-53.

³²⁵ Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 12. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, xvi, 65.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Abdullah Ahmad, *Tengku Abdul Rahman and Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1963-1970* (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985), 132.

³²⁸ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 92, 159-160. Also see Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers and Daljit Singh, “Introduction,” in *Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty*, ed. Ian Storey, Ralf Emmers and Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), xvi.

existing Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) by November 1971.³²⁹ The essential aim of FPDA – from Malaysia’s point of view – was to check any possible ill intention that Indonesia had on Malaysia.³³⁰ Malaysia continued to be apprehensive of Indonesia’s armed attacks because of Confrontation that happened in the past.³³¹ It wanted to prevent such armed incursions from happening again. FPDA stipulated that in the event of an external attack or the threat of such attack on Malaysia and Singapore, the five Powers concerned would immediately consult together, deciding on measures that should be taken jointly or separately with regard to the attack or threat.³³²

Malaysia, in the meantime, proposed the neutralization of Southeast Asia. In September 1970 – shortly before becoming the new Prime Minister of Malaysia – Tun Razak revealed Malaysia’s proposal of neutralization at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting held in Lusaka.³³³ He stated:³³⁴

It is my hope that in reaffirming the right of self-determination and non-interference in the Indo-China area, the Non-Aligned Group would at the same time take a positive stand in endorsing the neutralization of the area and possibly of the entire region of Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the three major powers, the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Embracing neutralism was to become Malaysia’s central response to the West’s massive detachment from Southeast Asia.³³⁵

Malaysia was confronted with the hard reality that it could no longer rely on Britain – and Britain’s allies in general – for basic security. It realized that regional autonomy

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Ibid. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 148.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 159-160.

³³³ Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 14. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 3. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 136-137.

³³⁴ “Speech by Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Malaysian Delegation, at the Third Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka, Zambia on 9 September 1970,” *Foreign Affairs Malaysia* 3, no. 2 (December 1970): 16, quoted in Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 14.

³³⁵ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 91-93, 105, 119-120, 143, 149, 154-155.

was the ultimate solution for Malaysia's long-term survival.³³⁶ The apprehension was derived from the notion of the Malay World. Malaysia perceived Southeast Asia as basically one entity, which was rooted in the Malay way of life, constituting a protection for Malaysia's existence as a Malay nation-state. Malaysia sought to establish an autonomous Southeast Asia through neutralization. Malaysia's idea of neutralization was a result of the Cold War. It was derived from the concept of non-alignment, which meant a state would not choose sides between the West and the Communist camps.³³⁷

The neutralization of Southeast Asia – as proposed by Malaysia – entailed both internal and external levels.³³⁸ It first addressed the relations among the states within Southeast Asia. The proposal called for Southeast Asian states to agree on non-aggression and non-interference between them, which were premised on respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.³³⁹ Also, foreign Powers should be excluded from Southeast Asia, and the states in the region should cooperate with one another to ensure the peace of the region.³⁴⁰

As for the external level, Malaysia proposed that the neutrality of Southeast Asia should be guaranteed by three major external Powers – the United States, the Soviet Union and China.³⁴¹

Malaysia's idea of neutralization essentially contained two key purposes. It aimed for the establishment of an autonomous Southeast Asia while seeking to secure Malaysia from the threat of being attacked by its neighbouring states, notably Indonesia.

Malaysia believed that a neutral Southeast Asia guaranteed by the three Great Powers would ensure the absence of foreign Powers in the region. Under the guarantee, any

³³⁶ Ibid. 91-93, 119-120, 144, 149, 155, 158, 167.

³³⁷ Ibid. 122.

³³⁸ Ghazali Shafie, "The Neutralization of Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community* 3, no. 1 (October 1971): 110-117, quoted in Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 14-15. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 119-120. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 124-125. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 12-15. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 3-6.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

external Power would be barred from struggling for power in Southeast Asia.³⁴² In the event that a Southeast Asian state was being attacked by a Power – hence its neutral status being violated – either of the three guarantor states would have to come to the state’s assistance to defend its neutral status and territorial integrity.³⁴³ On the other hand, the neutralized Southeast Asian states were obliged not to be an ally of other states and should not host foreign military facilities on their soils.³⁴⁴ Put simply, such neutralization of Southeast Asia – as Malaysia saw it – would lead to an autonomous order of the region.

The three Great Powers’ guarantee of Southeast Asia’s neutrality as well as the peace deal – non-aggression and non-interference – between Southeast Asian states would, in the meantime, serve as Malaysia’s insurance against any possible attack from Indonesia. It was an established suspicion of Malaysia that Indonesia – as being the largest state in Southeast Asia – might want to dominate its neighbouring states.³⁴⁵ The suspicion was reinforced by Malaysia’s memory of Confrontation.³⁴⁶

Malaysia adamantly spearheaded the move to neutralize Southeast Asia following Razak’s introduction of the idea in Lusaka.³⁴⁷ It launched a series of diplomatic efforts striving to secure the widest possible support for its neutralization proposal.³⁴⁸ Malaysia met with the UN members, talked to the Third World states, discussed with its Commonwealth partners, and consulted with its ASEAN colleagues, lobbying for their support for the proposal.³⁴⁹ Of all these actors, ASEAN was the key to the success of Southeast Asia’s neutralization.

Malaysia was confronted with the push back from Indonesia while pressing for the neutralization of ASEAN. Indonesia interpreted Malaysia’s proposal of neutralization as

³⁴² Ghazali Shafie, “The Neutralization of Southeast Asia,” *Pacific Community* 3, no. 1 (October 1971): 110-117, quoted in Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 14-15. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 5-6.

³⁴³ Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, 10-15.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 48, 136, 174-175, 180, 182.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, 19, 22-25, 66-67. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 15.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

an attempt to dominate ASEAN.³⁵⁰ Specifically, it was a challenge to Indonesia's aspiration – to become the strategic center for regional security.³⁵¹ The three Great Powers would be the ultimate guarantors of Southeast Asia's security if the region was being neutralized based upon Malaysia's proposal.³⁵² Indonesia was determined to curb Malaysia's press for Southeast Asia's neutralization.

Adam Malik – Indonesia's Foreign Minister – expressed Indonesia's rejection of Malaysia's neutralization proposal in September 1971.³⁵³

...neutralization that is the product of "one-way" benevolence on the part of the big Powers, at this stage, would perhaps prove as brittle and unstable as the interrelationship between the major Powers themselves...

I strongly believe that it is only through developing among ourselves an area of internal cohesion and stability, based on **indigenous** sociopolitical and economic strength, that we can ever hope to **assist in the early stabilization of a new equilibrium in the region** that would not be the exclusive "diktat" of the major Powers...I think there is and there should be scope for an **indigenous** Southeast Asian component in the **new, emerging power balance of the region**...

It is only through such a **Southeast Asian presence in the power equation** that we can ever hope to persuade the major Powers to take into account our wishes and aspirations and the directions and forms in which we want to develop. **At this transitional stage, in which the international constellation of forces is moving towards new balances of accommodation, we are afforded an opportunity to contribute our concepts into the mainstream of the thinking and searching that is going on...**

...the nations of Southeast Asia should consciously work towards the day when security in their own region will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Not through big Power alignments, not through the build up of contending military pacts or military arsenals...

³⁵⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), xiv-xv, 149.

³⁵¹ Ibid. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 105. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 125.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Far Eastern Economic Review, September 25, 1971, 32-33, quoted in Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 52-55.

It is here that the importance of such an organization as ASEAN comes to the fore, as basically reflecting **the determination of its member countries to take charge of their own future and to reject the assumption that the fate of their region is to continue to be determined by outside Powers.** (Author's emphasis)

Just like Malaysia, Indonesia believed that regional autonomy was the answer for its basic security. Indonesia's strategic thinking of the Malay World – which was a region-wide existence – formed the basis of its understanding of regional autonomy. Both Indonesia and Malaysia – either called for neutralization or rejected it – respectively stressed that their proposed autonomous order of Southeast Asia was in essence indigenous.³⁵⁴

Nonetheless, Indonesia's desire to become the strategic center of an autonomous Southeast Asia was palpable. It was apparent in Malik's statement that he repeatedly emphasized the need for Southeast Asia's indigenous forces to fill the power vacuum created by the vast reduction of Western military presence in the region. Indonesia was well aware that it was the largest and most populous state in Southeast Asia. Militarily, it was the most powerful one in ASEAN, if there was no foreign military presence in the region.³⁵⁵ Indonesia would be a dominant force in Southeast Asia with the said power vacuum filled by the indigenous forces of the region. That was why it rejected the Great Powers' guarantee and called for a Southeast Asian presence in the new emerging power balance of the region.

Meanwhile, Indonesia saw the presence of foreign Powers in Southeast Asia as a threat to its survival.³⁵⁶ It was just a recent memory for Indonesia that the PRRI rebel movement had been supported by foreign Powers. Indonesia was not convinced that Malaysia would commit to neutrality.³⁵⁷ Malaysia was advocating the neutralization of Southeast Asia and at the same time worked with its Commonwealth partners to put in

³⁵⁴ Ibid. Also see "Speech by Tun Dr. Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, in Bonn on 9 December 1971," *Foreign Affairs Malaysia* 4, no. 4 (December 1971): 82-83., quoted in Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 6-7.

³⁵⁵ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 174-175.

³⁵⁶ Ibid. 134-135. Also see Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 8.

³⁵⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 125. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 122.

place the Five Power Defence Arrangement. FPDA was basically a military alliance. It was well understood that the purpose of the alliance was to check Indonesia. A neutralized state was not allowed to forge any military alliance with any state.

The general withdrawal of the West from Southeast Asia had put Indonesia and Malaysia into a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they would need each other's cooperation to create an autonomous Southeast Asia that ensured their basic security. On the other hand, they wanted to balance against one another to safeguard their respective survival. Indonesia and Malaysia were entangled in a situation of competitive cooperation.

A meeting was held between the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur two months after Indonesia's declaration of its rejection of Malaysia's call for neutralization.³⁵⁸ The ministers had to meet in Kuala Lumpur to discuss ASEAN's response to the changing strategic landscape in Southeast Asia, which was illuminated by US President Nixon's announcement of his visit to China and the impending admission of China – replacing Taiwan – to the UN.³⁵⁹

Malaysia pressed hard for the acceptance of its neutralization proposal by ASEAN during the meeting.³⁶⁰ Thailand and the Philippines would not even consider to forswear their military alliances with the US.³⁶¹ Singapore remained steadfast in its support for the US military presence in Southeast Asia.³⁶² The three states did not support Malaysia's call for neutralization.³⁶³ They rallied around Indonesia to reject the neutralization proposal.³⁶⁴

Indonesia, nevertheless, was restrained by its special ties with Malaysia. It after all understood that Malaysia was its only ASEAN partner that aspired for regional autonomy. Malaysia no longer sought to host foreign military bases after the withdrawal

³⁵⁸ Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 24-25, 65. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 176-177. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 12-17.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 16-17.

³⁶¹ Ibid. 15. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, 69, 71, 73.

³⁶² Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, 83-84. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 15.

³⁶³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 149-150. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia*, 68-75, 78-84. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 15-17.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

of British armed forces from its territory which took place since 1968.³⁶⁵ Indonesia essentially needed Malaysia – and vice versa – to strive for a Southeast Asia that was truly autonomous. The two states' aspiration for regional autonomy was rooted in their strategic understanding of the Malay World – a shield that protected their survival. Understandably, Indonesia was to accommodate Malaysia while pressing for an end to its move to neutralize Southeast Asia.

Indonesia made a stand in the meeting that a neutral Southeast Asia as proposed by Malaysia was a long-term objective.³⁶⁶ Consequently, under the leadership of Indonesia – backing up by Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore – the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a Kuala Lumpur Declaration:³⁶⁷

We...Agreeing that the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization...Do hereby state:

1. That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers...

The declaration was a compromise reached between the ASEAN states; at the core of it: it was the competitive cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Malaysia was forced to give up its idea of Great Powers' guarantee in the face of the opposition of all its ASEAN partners to the idea, with Indonesia in command of the opposition.³⁶⁸ In the meantime, Indonesia worked with Malaysia to incorporate some elements of Malaysia's idea of neutrality into the declaration amidst strong objection from Singapore and the

³⁶⁵ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 92, 115.

³⁶⁶ Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 17. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 126.

³⁶⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 149-150. Also see Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 1971, quoted in Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 161-162.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

Philippines.³⁶⁹ The concept of neutrality in the declaration had come to mean a zone free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers, which was the notion of regional autonomy stated in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration – the founding document of ASEAN.³⁷⁰ Thereafter, the concept of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) became the framework for ASEAN's strive for regional autonomy.³⁷¹

Malaysia remained adamant despite being forced to forswear its idea of Great Powers' guarantee in its proposal to neutralize Southeast Asia. Shortly after the issuing of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, Malaysia embarked on its plan to establish diplomatic ties with China.³⁷² Malaysia had erstwhile voted in support of China's membership in the UN while Indonesia abstained.³⁷³ In May 1974, Prime Minister Razak made his landmark visit to Beijing to officially establish Malaysia's diplomatic ties with China.³⁷⁴ Malaysia was the first ASEAN state to establish official ties with China.³⁷⁵

By establishing diplomatic relations with China, Malaysia aimed to associate China with the idea that Southeast Asia was a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).³⁷⁶ China was one of three Great Powers in which Malaysia had proposed for their guarantee of Southeast Asia's neutrality. China had voiced its support for the concept of ZOPFAN after it was being introduced by ASEAN.³⁷⁷ The other two Great Powers – the US and the Soviet – did not officially respond to the idea.³⁷⁸ Indonesia was

³⁶⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 126. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 17.

³⁷⁰ Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 18. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 93. Also see The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967. See <http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration> (accessed 5th December 2013)

³⁷¹ Ibid. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 177-180.

³⁷² Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 125-126.

³⁷³ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 148.

³⁷⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 127.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 123. Also see Dick Wilson, *The Neutralization of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 67.

³⁷⁷ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 120. Also see Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept*, 40.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

irritated by Malaysia's move to establish diplomatic ties with China.³⁷⁹ The New Order Regime had suspended Indonesia's diplomatic relations with China since October 1967 due to alleged China's complicity in the abortive coup of September 1965 in Indonesia.³⁸⁰ The regime remained deeply suspicious of China.³⁸¹

The elements of Malaysia's neutralization proposal had been further integrated into the regional cooperation of ASEAN in the subsequent years.

At their first summit in 1976, the five ASEAN member states endorsed several historic documents in response to the communist threat from the north.³⁸² Most important of all, the five states signed their first ever treaty since the formation of ASEAN – the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).³⁸³ The treaty was in essence founded on a crucial part of the neutrality proposal of Malaysia – that was the states in Southeast Asia should agree on non-aggression and non-interference, which were premised on respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. By signing the treaty, ASEAN member states had agreed to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity.³⁸⁴ They had agreed not to interfere in each other's internal affairs.³⁸⁵ They too had agreed to renounce threat or the use of force, and settle their disputes via peaceful means.³⁸⁶ In other words, an agreement of non-aggression and non-interference – previously introduced by Malaysia to prevent Indonesia's armed attacks – had been reached between ASEAN member states through the signing of the TAC. The treaty provides a legal basis for ASEAN war avoidance norms.³⁸⁷ It therefore strengthened the existing war avoidance norms shared among ASEAN member states in general, and shared by Indonesia and Malaysia in particular.

³⁷⁹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 153.

³⁸⁰ Ibid. 113, 126-127. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 109.

³⁸¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 127.

³⁸² Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 160-163. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 171.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ <http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3> (accessed 25th February 2014).

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Amitav Acharya, "A Regional Security Community in Southeast Asia?" in *The Transformation of Security in The Asia/ Pacific Region*, ed. Desmond Ball (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 186. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 129-130.

The signing of the TAC was aimed at institutionalizing the friendly coexistence among the ASEAN member states.³⁸⁸ It was enshrined in the treaty that the ASEAN member states “shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience...which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia”.³⁸⁹ The ASEAN member states had come together as a region in the face of a potentially hostile and military powerful communist Vietnam, which had just won the Vietnam War.³⁹⁰ They intended to adopt TAC as a basis to engage with Vietnam.³⁹¹ The signing of TAC was being understood as “the first step towards the realization of ZOPFAN”.³⁹²

The Presence of Power Balance and the Absence of a Security Community

The hypothesis of this thesis has been confirmed by Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1966-1984.

The presence of power balance between Indonesia and Malaysia furnished a basis of order between them which resulted in them to coexist peacefully. The power balance also led to the establishment of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, which was also a security regime between them.

However, while Indonesia and Malaysia identified positively with each other due to their special ties, their understanding of one another remained fundamentally egoistic.

The presence of power balance between Indonesia and Malaysia meant that no one was in a dominant position vis-à-vis one another. Both, as a consequence, competed with each other for dominance while aiming to balance against one another, all of which to safeguard their respective survival. Such a state of relationship was evidenced by Malaysia’s press for Southeast Asia’s neutralization and Indonesia’s efforts to put an

³⁸⁸ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 160-163. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 129-130. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 297.

³⁸⁹ <http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3> (accessed 25th February 2014).

³⁹⁰ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 160-163. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order* (Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 2000), 151-153, 159-161.

³⁹¹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy*, 160-163. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 129-130. Also see Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia, ASEAN and the New World Order*, 151-153, 159-161.

³⁹² Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and The ZOPFAN Concept* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 39-40.

end to the move. It was also evidenced by Malaysia's embrace of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), which was to prevent Indonesia's armed incursions.

In other words, Indonesia's and Malaysia's egoistic understanding of one another had been sustained by the power competition between them. The presence of power balance between the two states was a cause for their competition. Despite the establishment of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia – in which they began to be bound by their intimate ties – the two states did not share a collective-self understanding. That said, Indonesia and Malaysia did not constitute a pluralistic security community, they were at most a security regime. War between them was unlikely, not unthinkable.

CHAPTER 7

NO MORE *SERUMPUN*? – INDONESIA-MALAYSIA RELATIONS, 1985-2009

This chapter reveals the double-edged effects of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship.

By the mid-1980s, a solid foundation had been established in Indonesia's and Malaysia's domestic politics as well as in their regional affairs. The unmistakable political supremacy of the indigenous people over the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as ASEAN's proven ability to function as a shield for its member states, revealed that the Malay World had taken root in archipelagic Southeast Asia. In other words, the strategic cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia – forming the Malay World – was well established. Indonesia's and Malaysia's respective nationhoods too had become entrenched. Consequently, the two states each began to venture into a new stage of economic development that would transform their respective economy and national identity.

By the late 1980s, the transformation of Indonesia's and Malaysia's economies had ushered in an era of high economic growth in the two states. With their new found economic might, Indonesia and Malaysia were looking beyond ASEAN, striving to expand the space for their respective survival. As the Malay World was well in place and their respective nationhood had been consolidated, Indonesia and Malaysia began to view their region as related to their economies rather than seeing it predominantly in security terms. It was as if the solid presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia had become a given for both Indonesia and Malaysia. They had shifted their attention away from emphasising the presence of the Malay World.

Indonesia and Malaysia competed with each other amidst their endeavours to expand their respective influence abroad. The competition was enhanced by the mismatch of expectation between them; and mutually reinforced with their respective assertion of their superiority over the culturally similar counterpart.

Indonesia affirmed its superiority over Malaysia in the form of the big-little brothers complex. In the eyes of Indonesians, Malaysia's culture was provided by Indonesia hence Indonesia was the big brother of Malaysia. Indonesians believed that their culture was superior when compared to Malaysia's. They expressed their disdain for the

perceived shallowness of Malaysia. Indonesians for example would argue that Malaysia had not fought for its independence.

Malaysia, on the other hand, believed that it was sophisticated when compared to Indonesia even though Malaysia was a small nation-state vis-à-vis Indonesia. The defining feature of Malaysia being sophisticated – Malaysians would think – was that it was economically more superior than Indonesia. Malaysia's sense of being sophisticated vis-à-vis Indonesia was a continuation of its erstwhile sense of wisdom in relation to Indonesia. The evident technological and industrial advancement of Malaysia during Mahathir's rule transformed Malaysians' sense of wisdom into their belief that they were sophisticated, when they were to think of Indonesia.

The intertwined three sources of conflict – their competition in the international arena; mismatch of expectation; and the assertion of their superiority over the counterpart – gave rise to substantial conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia forged closer military ties with Singapore, specifically designed to weaken Malaysia's military standing.

The same three sources of conflicts were embedded in the territorial disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and the issue of Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia. The three sources of conflicts reinforced one another. Anti-Malaysia sentiments emerged in Indonesian society as a result – which were the substantial conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Because of the war avoidance norms that existed in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship, the substantial conflicts between them had not been able to turn into violent ones. The absence of power imbalance in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship means that the relationship remains as a security regime, not a security community. Indonesia-Malaysia relations are fundamentally competitive. The two states continue to understand each other in egoistic terms. War between them was unlikely, not unthinkable.

The Solid Presence of the Malay World and the New Stage of Economic Development

By the mid-1980s, it was evident that a solid foundation had been established in Indonesia's and Malaysia's domestic politics as well as in the regional affairs of ASEAN.

The political supremacy of the indigenous people in Indonesia and Malaysia over the ethnic Chinese in the two states was obvious and robust.¹ The political and economic power of the Indonesian and Malaysian Chinese had been effectively subdued by the policies of the two states.² The Indonesian and Malaysian indigenous people by then no longer perceived the local Chinese as a credible threat to their survival.³ Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad – who had been in power since 1981 – wrote in 1986 that the Malays had emerged from a long period of backwardness.⁴ Mahathir's writing implied that the political and economic status of the Malays in Malaysia had been secured. In other words, in the eyes of the Malays, the perceived Chinese economic hegemony in Malaysia had been overcome.⁵ Back in the 1960s and 1970s, Mahathir was a strong advocate that the Malays' backwardness was largely caused by the Chinese domination of Malaysia's economy.⁶

The concern for the local Chinese was further weakened by a steady decline of China's interest to exert its influence on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.⁷ By the late 1980s, China's dwindling support for the Chinese-led communist insurgencies in Malaysia and Indonesia had come to an end with the end of the Cold War.⁸ In 1989, China had officially severed its political ties with the overseas Chinese through the passing of the Law on Citizenship.⁹

The dissipation of the perceived threat of the domestic Chinese meant that the presence of the Malay World was well in place in archipelagic Southeast Asia.

¹ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 108. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 161-162. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 193, 238.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 155-156. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 33-34.

⁴ Mahathir Mohamad, *The Challenge* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1986), Introduction.

⁵ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 26-34.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Balancing, Banwagoning, or Hedging?: Strategic and Security Patterns in Malaysia's Relations with China, 1981-2003," in *China and Southeast Asia – Global Changes and Regional Challenges*, ed. Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 287, 302. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership*, 108.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

Consequently, while keeping in check the Chinese influence in their respective communities, the Indonesian and Malaysian indigenous people had shifted their attention away from stressing the dominance of the Malay World over the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia.¹⁰

Externally, Indonesia and Malaysia had jointly created a friendly regional climate in the form of ASEAN, which essentially functioned as a shield that secured the two states from external threats. Since the first ASEAN summit held in 1976, it had become clear that the ASEAN member states saw themselves as constituting a common region that was peaceful and stable.¹¹ They were determined to preserve such a climate of ASEAN.¹²

ASEAN's solidarity had effectively prevented Vietnam's invasion of Thailand after Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia since December 1978.¹³ Vietnam launched repeated cross-border incursions into Thailand following its occupation of Cambodia.¹⁴ ASEAN was quick to declare that such incursions directly affected the security of the ASEAN member states.¹⁵ To confront the military threat of Vietnam, ASEAN sponsored the anti-Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and forged a *de facto* alliance with China.¹⁶ ASEAN, meanwhile, became a political force in the international arena that pressed for Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia.¹⁷

Because of the increasing cost of occupying Cambodia largely resulted from sustained international pressure, Vietnam had declared in 1985 that it would withdraw its troops from Cambodia by 1990.¹⁸

¹⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 155-156. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 108. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 238.

¹¹ For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 255.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 79-83. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 188.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 90.

Vietnam's decision to withdraw from Cambodia reflected ASEAN's ability in ensuring the peace and stability of its region. The decision illuminated the fact that ASEAN functioned as a shield for all its member states. The security of an ASEAN member state was being viewed by its counterparts as directly affected that of their own.¹⁹ At the core of the shield, however, lay the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship. The friendly regional climate of ASEAN was created and sustained by the special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia.²⁰ The two states created their friendly coexistence to ensure their strategic cooperation in constituting the Malay World – a shield that secured their existence as states built around the Malay way of life. In other words, by the mid-1980s, the Malay World's function as a shield for Indonesia and Malaysia was soundly in place manifested in the form of ASEAN.

The unmistakable political supremacy of the indigenous people over the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as ASEAN's proven ability to function as a shield for its member states, revealed that the Malay World had taken root in archipelagic Southeast Asia. The strategic cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia was well established. The two states by the mid-1980s no longer needed to allocate much of their attention in emphasising the presence of the Malay World.

While having solidified the presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia had also succeeded in consolidating their respective nationhood after decades of independence. By the mid-1980s, Indonesia and Malaysia each had emerged as a stable sovereign state with sound economic foundations.²¹ The respective GDP per capita of Indonesia and Malaysia had increased substantially in the past one and a half decade. (See Figure 7.1) Most notably, people living below the poverty line in Indonesia had reduced from 40 percent of its population in 1980 to 21 percent in 1987.²² Indonesia was one of the most populous states in the world.²³

¹⁹ For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 255.


²⁰ For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 252-255.

²¹ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 235-236, 242-243. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 187. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 276. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 134.

²² Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 58.

As their respective nationhood had become entrenched and the Malay World was well in place, Indonesia and Malaysia each was confident enough to venture into a new stage of economic development that would transform their respective economy and national identity.²⁴

Figure 7.1: GDP per capita of Indonesia and Malaysia, 1970-1985



Source: World Development Indicators

By 1981, oil and gas accounted for 82 percent of Indonesia's total export revenue.²⁵ Indonesia's economy was heavily dependent on its oil and gas exports.²⁶ Largely fuelled by the earnings from oil and gas, Indonesia's annual GDP growth rate was as high as 8.1% in 1981.²⁷ The plummeting of oil price which began to take place from 1982 revealed the fundamental weakness of Indonesia's economy.²⁸ Indonesia's export

²³ By 1990, Indonesia became the fourth most populous state in the world. See Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 36.

²⁴ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 246. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 276.

²⁵ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 34-35.

²⁶ Ibid. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 246.

²⁷ Ibid. Also see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=6> (accessed 28th March 2014).

²⁸ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 246. Also see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 38-39.

revenue had fallen sharply because of the oil price crisis.²⁹ By 1985, the annual GDP growth rate of Indonesia had dropped to 3.5%.³⁰ Indonesia was forced to embrace reforms in order to sustain its economic growth.³¹

In 1986, Indonesia began to diversify the range of its exports and move to liberalize its tightly state-controlled economy.³² The economic reforms – which were essentially aimed to ensure Indonesia's economic growth – were to serve two key purposes: to ensure the survival of the New Order regime in Indonesia; and to allow Indonesia to expand its influence abroad.

Ensuring continuous economic development was the source of legitimacy for Suharto's New Order regime.³³ Suharto had to ensure Indonesia's economic growth through economic reforms to perpetuate his political survival in Indonesia. Furthermore, the economic reforms were linked to Suharto's broader strategy of ensuring his political survival. Suharto intended to promote himself as an international statesman by positioning Indonesia as a leader of the Third World.³⁴ The leadership claim was based on the idea that Indonesia was a model of development for the developing states.³⁵

For Suharto, his role as an international statesman was characterized by the New Order regime's ability in delivering impressive economic progress in one of the largest and most populous states in the world – Indonesia – coupled with a degree of openness exhibited by Indonesia.³⁶ By the mid-1980s, the New Order regime had begun to face

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 38. Also see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?page=5> (accessed 28th March 2014)

³¹ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 38-40. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 246-247.

³² Ibid.

³³ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 45. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 246, 253.

³⁴ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 34-35, 180-184. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 235, 254. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 174-177.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 34-36, 165, 174, 180-183. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 234-235, 254, 258, 262.

with the rise of the new social forces that sought for political change in Indonesia.³⁷ The call for a change of leadership in Indonesia had also started to emerge.³⁸ Suharto was already in power for nearly two decades. Making use of his political dominance in Indonesia, Suharto had been preparing the grounds for his re-election as Indonesia's five-year term president for the fifth time.³⁹ The largely symbolic presidential election would be held in 1988.⁴⁰ The New Order regime attempted to demonstrate its openness to change, aiming to address the demand for political change in Indonesia.⁴¹ It therefore partially liberalized Indonesia's economy and began to tolerate a certain degree of political debate in Indonesia.⁴²

More profoundly, Suharto needed nationalism to strengthen his power base in Indonesia.⁴³ By projecting himself as an international statesman, Suharto attempted to instil a belief among Indonesians that Indonesia was a leader of the Third World, underpinned by Indonesia being a model of development for the developing states.⁴⁴ The sense of national pride was a continuation of Indonesia's nationalism advanced by Sukarno during his time as President of Indonesia. Both Sukarno and Suharto believed that Indonesia was a leader of the Third World, only that the justification for that leadership had changed from Indonesia being a champion for the worldwide revolutionary struggles against colonialism-imperialism to Indonesia being a model of development for the Third World states. In either case, the conviction that Indonesia was an international leader had its root in the enduring sense of greatness held by Indonesians.

³⁷ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 258, 267. Also see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 165-167.

³⁸ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 5, 59, 182. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 257-262.

³⁹ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 234, 236, 245, 256-258, 262. Also see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 25.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 165. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 234, 258.

⁴² Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 165. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 246-247, 270.

⁴³ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 182-184.

⁴⁴ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 180-181.

Scholars and a senior advisor to Malaysia's government had pointed out that the souls of Indonesians were bound by their shared conviction that Indonesia was a great nation.⁴⁵ It was great because it was huge – a wide archipelago – and it was a civilization that had lasted for two thousand years.⁴⁶ The civilization was underpinned by Javanese culture which viewed Java as the centre of the world.⁴⁷ The greatness of Indonesia – as Indonesians saw it – was evidenced by its ability to become a history maker. In the Malay World – Indonesians would argue – Indonesia was the first and only nation-state that had achieved an independence which was truly authentic.⁴⁸ It was authentic because Indonesians had fought for it through a bloody revolution against Dutch colonial rule.⁴⁹ In the international arena, Indonesia was a founder of the 1955 Asian-African conference, which marked the rise of the Third World as a stand-alone force in global politics.⁵⁰ Indonesia was also a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a movement that represented the Third World, a movement that was built on the Third World solidarity brought about during the 1955 Asian-African conference.⁵¹ In short, Indonesia saw itself as a creator of the Third World unity.

The image of Suharto as an international statesman who was full of wisdom was directly linked to Indonesians' sense of greatness, that Indonesia was a leader of the Third world.⁵² In other words, by establishing his status as an international statesman, Suharto evoked the sense of national pride among Indonesians. The domestic support

⁴⁵ Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012. Also see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 181. Also see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN – Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 284.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Also see "Build The World Anew," in *The New Emerging Forces: Documents on the Ideology of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, ed. George Modelski (Australia: The Australian National University, 1963), 19. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 184-185.

⁴⁷ Ibid. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 37.

⁴⁸ For more discussion see Chapter 5 pg 178-179, 183-184, 200-201, 208-209.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid. pg 169-170. Also see Ali Alatas, *Politik Luar Negeri Bebas-Aktif dan Peranannya Di Masa Mendatang* (Yogyakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2nd September 1988), 15, quoted in Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 177.

⁵¹ Ibid. For more discussion see Chapter 5, pg 212-213.

⁵² R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 265. 268.

for Suharto as being the President of Indonesia, therefore, had been enhanced, because supporting him meant illuminating the greatness of Indonesia.⁵³

On the other hand, the New Order regime's attempt to sustain Indonesia's economic growth through economic reforms served to maintain and strengthen Indonesia's existing sound economic foundations. The regime needed the foundations to function as the basis for it to strive for Indonesia's leadership role in the Third World, aiming to expand Indonesia's political and economic influence abroad.⁵⁴ Indonesia's aim to become a leader of the Third World boosted, and was boosted by, the nationalist sentiments of Indonesia.

Indonesia's success in doubling its rice production within fifteen years and achieving the goal of rice self-sufficiency by 1984 had attracted worldwide recognition.⁵⁵ The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) invited Suharto to address its fortieth anniversary commemoration held in Rome in November 1985 to honour Indonesia for its achievement of rice self-sufficiency.⁵⁶ It was an important achievement considering that Indonesia was one of the most populous states in the world.⁵⁷

Suharto took great pride in being recognized by FAO.⁵⁸ The invitation strengthened his conviction that Indonesia was a leader of the Third World. He spoke of the event years later: "Out of all the developing countries, Indonesia was chosen to relate its experiences...I spoke at the meeting as a representative of the South in the context of the North-South Dialogue...Our knowledge of agricultural development was sought after by a number of other countries...they had voluntarily collected 100,000 tons of unmilled rice. I was requested by the Indonesian farmers to donate this rice to the FAO for distribution among fellow farmers in countries suffering from famine, especially those on the African continent."⁵⁹ Obviously, Suharto during the FAO commemoration

⁵³ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 184.

⁵⁴ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 14, no.4 (March 1993): 357. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 174-179.

⁵⁵ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 235.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Also see Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography as Told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H.* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 1-4.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid. Also see Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 182.

⁵⁹ Soeharto, *My Thoughts, Words and Deeds: An Autobiography as Told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H.*, 1-3.

saw Indonesia as representing the force of the Third World, capable of providing its expertise and material assistance to the fellow members of the Third World.

In July 1986, the director-general of FAO visited Jakarta. He presented Suharto with two gold medals to pay tribute to Indonesia's success in achieving rice self-sufficiency.⁶⁰ The director-general announced that President Suharto was the symbol of international agricultural progress.⁶¹ One of the medals bore an image of Suharto, inscribed with the words, "President Soeharto, Indonesia".⁶² The medals had been replicated.⁶³ It was clear for Indonesians: Suharto was an international statesman; he was the embodiment of Indonesia – a leader of the Third World.

The sense of being a leader of the Third World bolstered Indonesia's resolve to acquire the leadership position in the Third World. From September 1986 onwards, Indonesia began to vie for the chairmanship of NAM.⁶⁴ The New Order regime had made it clear that Indonesia's role was "to help solve world problems based on the spirit of the Bandung Principles".⁶⁵ Bandung Principles were produced by the 1955 Asian-African conference held in Bandung, Indonesia – the conference that marked the rise of Indonesia as a Third World leader.

As in Malaysia, the Malaysian government was beginning to work relentlessly towards achieving its goal of transforming Malaysia into a fully developed nation-state.

Dr. Mahathir came to power as the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia in July 1981. His thought was crystal clear right from the start of his tenure. He wanted to turn Malaysia from being a developing state into a developed one in the shortest time possible.⁶⁶ Mahathir described the early days of his prime ministership: "Malaysia was beginning to experience a swift and sharp change from an agricultural to an industrial economy."⁶⁷ The recounting reflected Mahathir's determination to make Malaysia a

⁶⁰ Ibid. 4.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 174-175.

⁶⁵ Arnican Aziz (ed.), *Empat GBHN: 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988* (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 1990), quoted in Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 177.

⁶⁶ Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 326-328. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 276.

⁶⁷ Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad*, 328

developed state. Immediately after becoming prime minister, Mahathir went ahead to establish Malaysia's own heavy industries.⁶⁸ He asserted that possessing such industries was "a necessary step towards becoming a developed country."⁶⁹

Mahathir's obsession with turning Malaysia into a fully developed state was meant to achieve a more fundamental goal: to modernize the Malays in Malaysia in particular, and the Malaysian people in general.⁷⁰ The Mahathir administration was to transform Malaysians' national identity as a result of this goal.

Through the process of developing Malaysia on a massive scale and at a demanding pace, Mahathir sought to instil a belief among the Malays in Malaysia that they were a group of people defined by their capability.⁷¹ The Malays as capable people – Mahathir argued – was evidenced by their skills in administering and developing a multiracial state – Malaysia – which was peace and stable buttressed by sustained economic progress.⁷² Mahathir believed that it was a historical tradition of the Malays that they were capable, a tradition dated back to the pre-colonial Malay sultanates.⁷³ Building the national car served to demonstrate the capabilities of the Malays. It was the most important heavy industry which the Mahathir administration had chosen to develop.⁷⁴ Malaysia's heavy industries were mostly run by the Malays – a design of the Malaysian government in compliance with the New Economic Policy.⁷⁵

The Mahathir administration, in the mean time, introduced its "Look East" policy, which looked to Japan as the main model of development for Malaysia.⁷⁶ Malaysia under the Look East policy would emulate the Japanese way of industrialization to

⁶⁸ Ibid. 326-328.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 328.

⁷⁰ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 72, 186, 201, 207. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 32-35.

⁷¹ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 189, 192-193. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 186, 276. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 29-30, 38.

⁷² Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad*, 29-30, 38.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 177.

⁷⁵ Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad*, 328-333.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 369-371. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 175-178, 184.

achieve its own industrialization.⁷⁷ Japan would become the main source of technology, managerial expertise and investment for Malaysia.⁷⁸

The central purpose of looking East was to ensure that Malaysia would become a developed state in its own way.⁷⁹ Not only did Malaysia aim to become a fully developed state, it also wanted to be truly independent.⁸⁰ By emulating and cooperating with Japan, Malaysia sought to reduce its traditional economic reliance on the West, aiming to move towards becoming a developed state on its own terms.⁸¹ As Mahathir had made it clear to Malaysia's senior government officials in June 1983:⁸²

“Looking East does not mean begging from the East or shifting the responsibility for developing Malaysia to them. Responsibility towards our country is our own and not that of others.”

Henceforth, Malaysians' national identity was characterized by the belief that Malaysia – which specifically meant Malay – was capable, capable of becoming a developed nation-state in its own way. Having the only national car industry in Southeast Asia and possessing the third longest bridge in the world – the Penang Bridge – were the concrete expressions that Malaysia was on course to become a developed state in its own way.⁸³ Years later, Mahathir introduced a nationalist slogan: “*Malaysia Boleh*” – Malaysia is Able. “*Malaysia Boleh*” had instilled a real sense of confidence among Malaysians.⁸⁴

To further strengthen the conviction that Malaysia was capable, the Mahathir administration strived to make Malaysia a leader of the Third World. Malaysia was a

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 180, 184, 194-195. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 369-371.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 161, 175-176, 184.

⁸² Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 188.

⁸³ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 186. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 211.

⁸⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 135. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 270.

leader of the Third World – the Mahathir administration believed – because Malaysia was a model of development for the developing world, vindicated by its ability – as being a developing state – to put itself on track towards becoming a developed state on its own terms.⁸⁵ To become truly independent, free from any form of hegemony, was always the goal of the Third World.⁸⁶

Apart from transforming Malaysia's national identity, Mahathir simultaneously made use of that new identity to consolidate his standing within his party – UMNO – and among the Malaysian people as a whole.⁸⁷ In other words, Mahathir used nationalism to solidify his power base at home.

Generating economic growth through extensive economic development was essential in ensuring Mahathir's political survival in successive party as well as general elections. However, the discernible advancement of Malaysia under Mahathir's leadership manifested in the form of new industries and massive scale of new infrastructures induced a sense of national pride among Malaysians which enhanced the domestic support for Mahathir as a result.⁸⁸ Mahathir, in the meantime, consistently criticized the hegemony of the West and pursued anti-Western policies – such as Buy British Last – making him being widely recognized as a champion of the causes of the Third World.⁸⁹ By ensuring robust developments in Malaysia and by daring to stand up against Western dominance, Mahathir triggered Malaysians' sense of pride and patriotism.⁹⁰ They embraced Mahathir's leadership, because he was being perceived as leading Malaysia towards becoming a developed state in a truly independent way.

Malaysia's nationalist sentiments mutually reinforced with its will to expand its political and economic influence abroad by claiming the leadership role of the Third

⁸⁵ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 184, 195, 213.

⁸⁶ Ibid. For more discussion see Chapter 5, pg 175-176.

⁸⁷ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 171-172, 175, 186, 213.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 189, 193.

⁸⁹ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 34, 160-163, 195, 202, 205-208. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 202. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 211-212.

⁹⁰ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation*, 189, 193, 206-207. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 34.

World.⁹¹ The desired expansion was to serve the goal of transforming Malaysia into a developed state.⁹²

Malaysia's sense of being a leader of the Third World – a model of development to be followed by other developing states – bolstered its determination to play a leadership role in the Third World.⁹³ Malaysia attempted to champion the causes of the developing world by speaking up against the perceived Western hegemony.⁹⁴ It strived to become a leader in the Third World organizations – such as NAM and OIC – by setting the agenda of these bodies.⁹⁵ Malaysia, meanwhile, spearheaded the establishment of new Third World bodies such as the G-15.⁹⁶ Overtime, Malaysia had won the reputation as the “Hero of the South” and “Champion of the Poor”.⁹⁷

Such resolve to become a leader of the Third World simultaneously boosted the conviction among Malaysians that they were capable.⁹⁸ Mahathir later proclaimed that: “Malaysia is modestly proud to be regarded as a model for economic development...”⁹⁹

After the mid-1980s, the transformation of Indonesia's and Malaysia's economy had ushered in an era of high economic growth in the two states. From 1988 to 1990, the average annual GDP growth rate of Indonesia and Malaysia was as high as 8.1% and 9.3% respectively.¹⁰⁰

By the late 1980s, Malaysia under the leadership of Mahathir had succeeded in transforming from an agricultural economy into a manufacturing-based and export-oriented one.¹⁰¹ In 1981, the manufacturing sector accounted for 20.9% of Malaysia's GDP and the agricultural sector at 21.4%.¹⁰² By 1990, the manufacturing sector's share

⁹¹ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 74, 195, 199, 202, 205-208, 210-211, 249, 251.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid. 184.

⁹⁴ Ibid. 198-199, 202, 208.

⁹⁵ Ibid. 195-199.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 204.

⁹⁸ Ibid. 204.

⁹⁹ Mahathir Mohamad, Speech titled “Regional Business Collaboration” delivered at the opening of the Pacific Rim Business Collaboration Symposium at Kuala Lumpur on December 5, 1994, quoted in Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 209.


¹⁰⁰ <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 15th April 2014)

¹⁰¹ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 188, 192-193. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 74.

¹⁰² <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 15th April 2014)

in Malaysia's GDP had increased to 24.2%, while that of the agricultural sector had reduced to 15.2%.¹⁰³ (See Figure 7.2) From 1981 to 1990, Malaysia's exports had increased from 52% to 74.5% of its GDP.¹⁰⁴ By 1990, Malaysia had earned the status as a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC).¹⁰⁵

Figure 7.2: Contribution of Manufacturing and Agricultural Sectors to Malaysia's GDP in 1981 and 1990



Source: World Development Indicators

Indonesia, on the other hand, had been recognized as a nascent NIC since the late 1980s.¹⁰⁶ The New Order regime had succeeded in diversifying the range of Indonesia's exports.¹⁰⁷ The economic reforms launched by the regime had led to the creation of a substantial manufacturing base in Indonesia.¹⁰⁸ In 1986, 16.7% of Indonesia's GDP was contributed by its manufacturing sector, while the agricultural sector at 24.2%.¹⁰⁹ By 1990, the contribution of the manufacturing sector had increased to 21% of Indonesia's GDP, whereas that accounted for by the agricultural sector had dropped to 19.4%.¹¹⁰ (See Figure 7.3) Meanwhile, Indonesia's export had begun to bounce back from 1987

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 95.

¹⁰⁶ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 40, 58, 165.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 40.


¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 45-46, 174-175.

¹⁰⁹ <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 15th April 2014)

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

onwards after its steady drop since 1983 due to the oil price crisis.¹¹¹ In 1986, Indonesia's export was at its record low since 1973 – 19.5% of Indonesia's GDP.¹¹² It had then begun to increase up to 25.3% in 1990.¹¹³ Such a rise was largely attributed to the expansion of Indonesia's non-oil exports, within which the manufactures export had continued to grow substantially.¹¹⁴

Figure 7.3: Contribution of Manufacturing and Agricultural Sectors to Indonesia's GDP in 1986 and 1990



Source: World Development Indicators

Because of their significant economic success, Indonesia and Malaysia each became more determined to expand their respective political and economic influence abroad by aiming to lead the Third World. Indonesia was more confident than ever before that it was a model of development for the Third World. Its vibrant economy stood in stark contrast to the ailing economies of many of the Third World states, especially those in Latin America.¹¹⁵ Suharto confidently declared in August 1990: “Indonesia was

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 40-41, 45-46. Also see “Indonesia,” in *The Statesman's Year-Book – Statistical and Historical Annual of The States of The World For the Year 1990-1991*, ed. John Paxton (Great Britain: The Macmillan Press, 1990), 705. Also see <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 15th April 2014)

¹¹⁵ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change*, 45.

economically strong enough to begin playing a responsible role in world affairs.”¹¹⁶ Malaysia, on the other hand, began to view ASEAN in economic terms.¹¹⁷ As it was now an export-oriented economy, Malaysia needed as big a market as possible for its products.¹¹⁸ It actively involved itself in international affairs, aiming to expand its market in ASEAN and beyond.¹¹⁹

Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s focus had been well beyond ASEAN.¹²⁰ The friendly regional climate of ASEAN was well established. The respective nationhood of Indonesia and Malaysia had taken root. The political supremacy of the indigenous people in Indonesia and Malaysia over the local Chinese, meanwhile, remained unchallenged. These were the basis upon which Indonesia and Malaysia began to shift their attention from viewing their region in terms of security to seeing it as related to their economies.¹²¹ It was as if the solid presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia had become a given for both Indonesia and Malaysia. While the Malay World continued to function as a shield that safeguarded the existence of Indonesia and Malaysia, the two states, with their new found economic might, were looking beyond ASEAN, striving to expand the space for their respective survival.

Looking Beyond Southeast Asia

On 28th February 1991, Mahathir presented a policy speech titled “Malaysia: The Way Forward” at the first meeting of the Malaysian Business Council.¹²² This speech was to have a decisive impact on the future of Malaysia.

Mahathir revealed in the speech the “ultimate” goal for Malaysia.¹²³ He declared that Malaysia would aim to become a fully developed country by the year 2020.¹²⁴ The goal

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 182.

¹¹⁷ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 214-215, 218, 266.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 74, 218.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 210-211, 214-215, 218, 266.

¹²⁰ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 177, 187. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 195, 199, 210-211, 215, 218.

¹²¹ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 214-215, 218, 226, 266. Also see Interview 1002, Singapore, 2nd October 2012.

¹²² Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 188. Also see Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 220. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 597.

was later known as the Vision 2020 – *Wawasan 2020* – of Malaysia.¹²⁵ To realize this vision – Mahathir explained – Malaysia's GDP by the year 2020 should become eight times larger than that in 1990.¹²⁶ Such an expansion would require Malaysia to grow at an average annual GDP growth rate of 7% for the next 30 years.¹²⁷ During the speech, Mahathir once again reaffirmed Malaysia's commitment to become a developed nation-state in its own way.¹²⁸

Do we want to be like any particular country of the present 19 countries that are generally regarded as 'developed countries'? ...Without being a duplicate of any of them we can still be developed. We should be a developed country in our own mould.

Aiming at realizing the Vision 2020 necessitated Malaysia to maximize its reach to overseas markets in order to sell its products, also to seek for sources of investments, technologies and expertise which were crucial for advancing Malaysia's economy.¹²⁹ Malaysia was faced with real challenges amidst its attempt to extend its reach to the markets abroad.

The emergence of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Community (EC) at the turn of the 1980s increasingly signified the existence of trade blocs in these regions.¹³⁰ Because of the preferential treatments that each of these agreements provided to its members, the states in the two regions had shown a

¹²³ Mahathir Mohamad, *Malaysia: The Way Forward*, <http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=page&page=1904> (accessed 25th April 2014)

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 220.

¹²⁶ Mahathir Mohamad, *Malaysia: The Way Forward*, <http://www.pmo.gov.my/?menu=page&page=1904> (accessed 25th April 2014)

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Karminster Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 218. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, "The Impact of a Changing World on ASEAN-European Community Relations," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 103-104. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN in the 1990s and Beyond," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 147-148.

¹³⁰ Linda Low, "The East Asian Economic Grouping," *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 375, 377. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 219-220.

growing tendency to trade and invest among themselves.¹³¹ The reunification of Germany that began to take place in 1989 pointed to the possibility that the states of Eastern Europe might also join the EC.¹³² NAFTA and EC, therefore, posed a serious challenge to Malaysia's economy. They would weaken Malaysia's exports to Europe and North America and divert the investments from the two regions away from Malaysia.¹³³ In 1990, the US was the second largest export market for Malaysia, which accounted for 16.9% of Malaysia's total export.¹³⁴

Apart from NAFTA and EC, Malaysia's economic expansion abroad was too restrained by the failure of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations and the ASEAN member states' inability to forge substantial economic cooperation between them.¹³⁵ Because of the Vision 2020, the Mahathir administration viewed this combination of restrictions as a matter of survival for Malaysia.¹³⁶ Shortly before announcing Malaysia's Vision 2020, Prime Minister Mahathir introduced Malaysia's response to the restrictions that it faced in international trade.

During the state banquet held on 10th December 1990 for the visiting Chinese Premier Li Peng, Mahathir announced that "the countries of the region should strengthen further their economic and market ties so that eventually an economic bloc would be formed to countervail the other economic blocs."¹³⁷ The proposed economic grouping was known

¹³¹ Mahathir Mohamad, "The Impact of a Changing World on ASEAN-European Community Relations," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 102-103. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN in the 1990s and Beyond," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 150-152.

¹³² Ibid. Also see Linda Low, "The East Asian Economic Grouping," *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 375. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 215.

¹³³ Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN in the 1990s and Beyond," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 147-148, 151-152.

¹³⁴ Exports by Country of Destination, 1990-1999, <http://www.epu.gov.my/en/external-trade> (accessed 25th April 2014)

¹³⁵ Linda Low, *The East Asian Economic Grouping*, 375. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 190.

¹³⁶ Ibid. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 179, 192. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 232-233.

¹³⁷ Mahathir Mohamad, speech presented at state banquet for the visiting Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, Kuala Lumpur, 10 December 1990, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 140.

as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) which should include Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Indo-China states and ASEAN.¹³⁸

A combination of factors led to Mahathir's proposal of the EAEG.

While the US and Europe each alone was one of Malaysia's largest export markets, the East Asian states combined, on the other hand, constituted the largest export market for Malaysia.¹³⁹ In 1990, the East Asian States – Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the five ASEAN partners – together accounted for 56.9% of Malaysia's total export.¹⁴⁰ Further, the intra-regional trade in East Asia was growing faster than its extra-regional trade, and that expansion of trade within East Asia would accelerate in the coming years.¹⁴¹ Crucially, the top investors in Malaysia since the mid-1980s had been from the East Asian states.¹⁴² In 1990, the East Asian states – Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea – combined was the largest investor in Malaysia, which accounted for 67% of the total foreign direct investments in Malaysia.¹⁴³ It was therefore clear for the Mahathir administration that the future of Malaysia's economy lay in the region of East Asia. Malaysia proposed the creation of the EAEG as a trade bloc, aiming to secure a huge market – comparable to the size of NAFTA and EC – for Malaysia's economy.¹⁴⁴ The EAEG as an economic grouping – Malaysia maintained – could, in the meantime, work to balance against Western dominance expressed in the

¹³⁸ Linda Low, "The East Asian Economic Grouping," *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 375.

¹³⁹ Exports by Country of Destination, 1990-1999, <http://www.epu.gov.my/en/external-trade> (accessed 25th April 2014)

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 220. Also see Linda Low, *The East Asian Economic Grouping*, 378-379, 382.

¹⁴² International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development (ICSEAD) Symposium, Kitakyushu, 1990, 93, quoted in Linda Low, *The East Asian Economic Grouping*, 378.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Linda Low, *The East Asian Economic Grouping*, 375-377. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN and the World Economy: The Challenge of Change," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 122. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN: Good Return of Growth and Stability," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 126-127. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN in the 1990s and Beyond," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 156. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 190.

form of NAFTA and EC, ensuring a free multilateral trading system worldwide, hence enabling Malaysia to maximize its reach to the markets across the globe.¹⁴⁵

Malaysia's determination to ensure its economic space by proposing the EAEG boosted, and was boosted by, its sense of nationalism.

Prime Minister Mahathir believed that Malaysia should stand up against Western hegemony by embracing the EAEG so that Malaysia could become a fully developed nation-state on its own terms.¹⁴⁶ Years later, when discussing about the issue of the EAEG, Mahathir expressed his discontent at Indonesia and Singapore for being – he alleged – “influenced by the Americans” in the face of Western dominance.¹⁴⁷ “I don’t want to be influenced by anybody,” he asserted.¹⁴⁸ Mahathir intended to affirm Malaysia’s credentials as a Third World leader by introducing the EAEG. Having a group of developing states in a powerful economic grouping like EAEG – Mahathir argued – would serve to uplift the economic status of the developing world as a whole.¹⁴⁹

Mahathir announced his proposal of the formation of the EAEG without consulting his ASEAN partners.¹⁵⁰ Several reasons led to his decision to do so. Given the steady increase of trade within East Asia, Malaysia believed that East Asia becoming a *de facto* trading group was inevitable.¹⁵¹ It thus made no difference – Malaysia concluded – if Malaysia chose to discuss the EAEG concept with its ASEAN counterparts before officially calling for its formation.¹⁵² The EAEG, on the other hand, was a matter of survival for Malaysia. East Asia – with its sizable market, considerable technologies and knowledge, its capacity to invest, and the continued expansion of its intra-regional trade – was the key market for Malaysia, if it was to transform into a developed state by

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 130.

¹⁴⁶ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 232-233. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir*, 130. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 209.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. Also see Interview with Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 9 May 2007, quoted in Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 233.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Mahathir Mohamad, “ASEAN and the World Economy: The Challenge of Change,” in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 122.

¹⁵⁰ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 209.

¹⁵¹ Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic Grouping,” *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 377.

¹⁵² Ibid.

the year 2020, especially in the face of the emerging trade blocs in Europe and North America.¹⁵³ Malaysia, as a consequence, lost its patience to consult its ASEAN partners about the EAEG as it needed the East Asian market dearly so as to realize its Vision 2020. Mahathir years later explained why he went ahead to propose the forming of the EAEG without consulting his ASEAN counterparts: “there was really no diplomatic way of facing up to the inequalities that loomed ahead,” Mahathir argued.¹⁵⁴

Malaysia decided to take the lead in forming the EAEG after it had officially introduced this concept.¹⁵⁵

The EAEG proposal was immediately opposed by the US.¹⁵⁶ The forming of the EAEG would pose a direct challenge to the US dominance in East Asia, particularly in view of the fact that it had been excluded from the grouping.¹⁵⁷ The US exerted pressure on Japan to prevent Japan from joining the grouping.¹⁵⁸ Within its immediate neighbourhood, Malaysia was faced with Indonesia’s opposition to the creation of the EAEG.

Forming the EAEG had the effects of weakening the power of Indonesia. Malaysia’s proposal of the EAEG and its decision to spearhead the formation of the grouping posed a challenge to Indonesia’s perceived leadership status in ASEAN.¹⁵⁹ Indonesia viewed

¹⁵³ Mahathir Mohamad, “ASEAN and the World Economy: The Challenge of Change,” in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 122. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, “ASEAN in the 1990s and Beyond,” in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 156. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 179, 192.

¹⁵⁴ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 232. Also see Interview with Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 9 May 2007, quoted in Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 232-233.

¹⁵⁵ Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic Grouping,” *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 375.

¹⁵⁶ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 191.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 141. Also see Linda Low, *The East Asian Economic Grouping*, 377.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 209.

¹⁵⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 141, 164. Also see Interview 1017, Jakarta, 17th October 2012. Also see Interview 1002, Singapore, 2nd October 2012. Also see Michael Vatikiotis, “Stormy Weather: Tension Behind the Smiles at Mahathir-Suharto Talks,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29th July 1993: 18-19. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 73.

itself as the *primus inter pares* in ASEAN.¹⁶⁰ Crucially, the creation of the EAEG would threaten the growth of Indonesia's economy. Half of Indonesia's development budget was financed by the aid from Western states and Japan.¹⁶¹ It was the influence of the US that had ensured the flow of this aid to Indonesia.¹⁶² This foreign aid played a vital role in stabilizing Indonesian currency in the face of the massive debt that Indonesia had incurred.¹⁶³ Indonesia's economy was largely relying on its foreign aid. Supporting the EAEG would antagonize the US hence might lead to the reduction of foreign aid to Indonesia.¹⁶⁴

Also, Malaysia's call for the formation of the EAEG ran counter to Indonesia's expectation.

In Indonesia's understanding, any regional initiative that involved ASEAN was a matter of strategic partnership between Indonesia and Malaysia. When the idea of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) was first being proposed by Australia in 1989, it was Indonesia and Malaysia that had together resisted the proposal due to the fear that ASEAN might be dominated by the US and Japan through APEC.¹⁶⁵ Such a concerted resistance – as Indonesia saw it – was the strategic cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia. They had worked together, striving to uphold an autonomous ASEAN – an aspiration rooted in their strategic thinking of the Malay World.¹⁶⁶ Indonesia, therefore, expected Malaysia to consult with Indonesia when it came to the matter of the EAEG, as indicated by both a former Malaysian policy advisor and a former Indonesian diplomat.¹⁶⁷ The EAEG was similar to APEC. It would have an impact on ASEAN on a scale similar to that of APEC. The forming of the EAEG – Indonesia would think – without doubt entailed the strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto – Order, Development and Pressure For Change* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 46-47, 188.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 156-157.

¹⁶⁵ APEC is a consultative, non-negotiating economic body first consisting of the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the ASEAN 6. Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 208-209. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 128.

¹⁶⁶ For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 251-252, 255-256, 270-277.

¹⁶⁷ Interview 1017, Jakarta, 17th October 2012. Also see Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012.

Malaysia's unilateral move to push for the creation of the EAEG did not match with Indonesia's expectation that it should be consulted. President Suharto felt insulted because of the mismatch of expectation.¹⁶⁸

Meanwhile, it was clear that Malaysia's endeavour in proposing and creating the EAEG served to showcase Malaysia's ability in making an international impact, enabling its transformation into a developed state with no capitulation to Western dominance.¹⁶⁹ Malaysia was putting itself on the world map. Because of the close similarities between Indonesia and Malaysia owing to their common identities – the Malay way of life – Indonesia had been provoked to stress its difference vis-à-vis Malaysia, so as to illuminate its existence in the world of nations amidst Malaysia's activism in international politics.

The differentiation was expressed in superiority sense – an outcome of the combination of Indonesia's sense of uniqueness in relation to Malaysia, and its power politics with Malaysia, in which power politics equipped the two states with a mindset of comparison. Indonesia asserted its superiority over Malaysia in the form of the big-little brothers complex.

In the eyes of Indonesians, they were the big brother of Malaysia.¹⁷⁰ Indonesians believed that Indonesia was a great nation.¹⁷¹ The sense of greatness was derived from the understanding of the sheer size of Indonesia and a few thousand years of existence of its culture.¹⁷² Scholars have pointed out, in view of the fact that most of the Malays in Malaysia had their roots in Indonesia, Indonesians would think that Malaysia's culture was provided by Indonesia.¹⁷³ Indonesians believed that their culture was superior when

¹⁶⁸ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 208-209.

¹⁶⁹ Michael Vatikiotis, "Stormy Weather: Tension Behind the Smiles at Mahathir-Suharto Talks," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29th July 1993: 18-19.

¹⁷⁰ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 69. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

¹⁷¹ For more discussion see pg 289-290.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012. Also see Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 356, 360. Liow has stated that most Malays in Malaysia have their roots in Sumatra, Indonesia. See Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 40.

compared to Malaysia's, a former Malaysian policy advisor noted.¹⁷⁴ Indonesians expressed their disdain for the perceived shallowness of Malaysia. As indicated by a senior policy advisor of Malaysia, Indonesians for example would argue that Malaysia had no Borobudur – a ninth century Buddhist temple located in Central Java, Indonesia – and that Malaysia had not fought for its independence.¹⁷⁵ Indonesians were proud of their culture, when they thought of Malaysia, the advisor maintained.¹⁷⁶ A former Indonesian diplomat too stressed the cultural pride of Indonesians when discussed about the issue of Indonesia-Malaysia common culture with author.¹⁷⁷ Because Indonesia perceived itself as the provider of culture to Malaysia, it thus saw itself as the big brother of Malaysia.

Owing to its big brother sentiment, Indonesia was always helpful to Malaysia, a former Malaysian Foreign Minister explained.¹⁷⁸ Indonesia was keen to supply Malaysia with its teachers, lecturers and expertises to help establish a Malay language-based national education system in Malaysia during the 1970s.¹⁷⁹ “We [Indonesia] sent many of our teachers and lecturers to Malaysia. Indonesia was helping Malaysia like a big brother. Being Indonesia's younger sibling, Malaysia was learning from us,” said one prominent Indonesian journalist.¹⁸⁰ The efforts to supply Malaysia with teachers, lecturers and expertise strengthened Indonesia's sense of superiority as Malaysia's big brother. The big brother sentiment was also reinforced by the fact that the Malays in Malaysia looked to Indonesia as a source of inspiration.¹⁸¹ The Malays' nationalism and their political thinking had been and continued to be inspired by Indonesia.¹⁸²

Indonesia affirmed its status as the big brother of Malaysia, believing that Malaysia should show deference to Indonesia by consulting with Indonesia first before it went ahead to introduce and spearhead the formation of the EAEG.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁴ Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012.

¹⁷⁵ Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Interview 1016, Jakarta, 16th October 2012

¹⁷⁸ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

¹⁷⁹ Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 259-260.

¹⁸⁰ Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

¹⁸¹ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence – From Sukarno to Soeharto* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976), 199.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Interview 1002, Singapore, 2nd October 2012. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin*,

The mutual reinforcements of the three sources of conflict – the challenge to Indonesia’s power; the mismatch of expectation; and Indonesia’s assertion of its status as Malaysia’s big brother – resulted in Indonesia’s decision to oppose Malaysia’s attempt to establish the EAEG.

At the ASEAN Senior Economic officials’ Meeting held in February 1991, the Indonesian delegation had moved to block Malaysia’s motion to include the EAEG proposal on the agenda of the meeting.¹⁸⁴ They had succeeded in doing so.¹⁸⁵ One month later, during his speech at the ASEAN conference held in Bali, President Suharto essentially declared Indonesia’s opposition to the forming of the EAEG.¹⁸⁶ Suharto in his speech stressed that Indonesia was not in favour of a closed trade bloc.¹⁸⁷

Malaysia was confronted with the opposition from Indonesia and several Western Powers – the US, Australia and Canada – to its idea of EAEG.¹⁸⁸ It moved to refine the concept, attempting to defuse the opposition. Prime Minister Mahathir emphasized in his speech at the same ASEAN conference that the EAEG was “not intended to be a trade bloc”.¹⁸⁹ The EAEG, he argued, would be a formal grouping that facilitated consultation and consensus between the states of East Asia, allowing them to speak with one voice to preserve a worldwide free trade system.¹⁹⁰ Mahathir, nevertheless, remained steadfast to strive for the formation of the EAEG.¹⁹¹ Such a determination was toughened by Malaysia’s sense of superiority over Indonesia.

Malaysia emphasized its difference from Indonesia based on their commonalities to confirm its unique existence in the world. The differentiation was expressed in superiority sense as it entailed Malaysia’s power politics with Indonesia which led them

Two Nations (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 132. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 69.

¹⁸⁴ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 141.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership*, 73. Also see Mahathir Mohamad, “ASEAN and the World Economy: The Challenge of Change,” in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 111.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. Also see Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic Grouping,” *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 377.

¹⁸⁹ Mahathir Mohamad, “ASEAN and the World Economy: The Challenge of Change,” in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin, 120.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. 121-123.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

to compare with one another. Malaysia's superiority over Indonesia – Malaysians opined – was evidenced by the fact that Malaysia was sophisticated.

Malaysia believed that it was sophisticated when compared to Indonesia even though Malaysia was a small nation-state vis-à-vis Indonesia.¹⁹² The defining feature of Malaysia being sophisticated – Malaysians would think – was that it was economically more superior than Indonesia.¹⁹³ Since independence, Malaysia's GDP per capita was evidently higher than that of Indonesia.¹⁹⁴

Malaysia's sense of being sophisticated vis-à-vis Indonesia was a continuation of its erstwhile sense of wisdom in relation to Indonesia.¹⁹⁵ Unlike previous administrations, the Mahathir administration's nation-building programme involved modernization on a big scale which was characterized by Malaysia's technological and industrial advancement.¹⁹⁶ Such advancement would become more obvious in the following years. Malaysia for example began to possess the world's tallest buildings – Petronas Twin Towers – in the mid-1990s.¹⁹⁷ It meanwhile began to embark on developing its IT industry by creating a high-tech area – Multimedia Super Corridor – aiming to turn Malaysia into a global IT hub.¹⁹⁸ The evident technological and industrial advancement of Malaysia transformed Malaysians' sense of wisdom into their belief that they were sophisticated, when they were to think of Indonesia. Mahathir expressed his sense of superiority – that Malaysia was sophisticated vis-à-vis Indonesia – decades later:¹⁹⁹

Of all the ethnic Malays in the region [Southeast Asia], the Malays in this country [Malaysia] are today widely recognised as the most successful...Today there is a Malay presence everywhere in the world...They have expanded their skills so greatly

¹⁹² Michael Vatikiotis, "Stormy Weather: Tension Behind the Smiles at Mahathir-Suharto Talks," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29th July 1993: 18-19.

¹⁹³ Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012. Also see Interview 1016, Jakarta, 16th October 2012. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 157.

¹⁹⁴ <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 8th May 2014)

¹⁹⁵ For more discussion see Chapter 5, pg 193-196.

¹⁹⁶ Cheah Boon Keng, *Malaysia – The Making of a Nation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 189, 192-193. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges*, 157.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 186.

¹⁹⁹ Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 27-30.

that now Malays drill for and produce oil, build roads and power plants, and manage multinational corporations and industries, including those involved with sophisticated engineering and high technological content all over the world.

In the meantime, the fact that Indonesians had been and continued to be inspired by Malaysia's economic advancement strengthened the conviction of Malaysians that they were sophisticated when compared to Indonesia.²⁰⁰

Mahathir later apologized to President Suharto for not consulting with Indonesia before introducing the idea of EAEG.²⁰¹ He apologized to Suharto for being "a little bit brash on this matter", "a little less controlled, less Javanese" and less "indirect than Suharto".²⁰²

Mahathir's apology perhaps reflected his sense of superiority over Indonesia. Compared to Indonesia – as might have implied by Mahathir – Malaysia was forthright and straight to the point – an indication that Malaysia was sophisticated. Mahathir subsequently made plain Malaysia's determination to spearhead the establishment of the EAEG. He declared in his speech in September 1991: "Malaysia and ASEAN will press on for the formation of the EAEG. We assure you that we have no intention of becoming a trade bloc or to commit economic suicide."²⁰³ Malaysia lobbied vigorously for its ASEAN partners' support for the formation of the EAEG.²⁰⁴

Indonesia would not budge in its opposition to the creation of the EAEG.²⁰⁵ Under Indonesia's leadership, ASEAN during its summit held in Singapore in January 1992 had officially espoused Indonesia's recommendation about the EAEG.²⁰⁶ The EAEG

²⁰⁰ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 157.

²⁰¹ Michael Vatikiotis, "Stormy Weather: Tension Behind the Smiles at Mahathir-Suharto Talks," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29th July 1993: 19.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Mahathir Mohamad, "ASEAN in the 1990s and Beyond," in *Reflections on ASEAN – Selected Speeches of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia*, ed. Hashim Makaruddin (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 2004), 145, 157.

²⁰⁴ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 231-232. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 73. Also see Linda Low, "The East Asian Economic Grouping," *The Pacific Review* 4, no. 4 (1991): 376.

²⁰⁵ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership*, 73. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 141.

²⁰⁶ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 209. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-*

had been downgraded to the status of a caucus – East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) – functioning as a forum within APEC.²⁰⁷ It was a victory for Indonesia. Malaysia had failed to create an East Asian economic grouping which would be a stand-alone body rather than being a unit within APEC.

Creating the EAEC within APEC was an insult to Malaysia. One of the proposed purposes of the EAEG was to confront the hegemony of the West. Regionally, EAEG was to be the alternative to APEC.²⁰⁸ Malaysia was always worried about being dominated by the US through APEC.²⁰⁹ ASEAN's decision to downgrade the EAEG to a caucus within APEC triggered Malaysia's anti-Western sentiments. Prime Minister Mahathir as a result decided not to attend the first APEC summit which would be hosted by the US in Seattle in November 1993.²¹⁰ The decision boosted Malaysia's sense of superiority over Indonesia. Malaysia asserted that Indonesia should accept and tolerate the fact that Malaysia had something more to offer – namely the idea of the EAEG.²¹¹

Indonesia on the contrary chose to embrace APEC. President Suharto had attended the APEC summit in Seattle.²¹² Meanwhile, Indonesia would take up the chairmanship of APEC for the year 1994.²¹³

The decision to become APEC chairman was part of Indonesia's efforts to expand its economic and political influence abroad by striving to represent the Third World.²¹⁴ Indonesia had been actively promoting the cause of the Third World in the international arena since becoming the Chairman of the NAM in 1992.²¹⁵ Representing the Non-Aligned Movement, President Suharto proposed in the UN the restructuring of the UN

Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations, 141-142. Also see Interview 1017, Jakarta, 17th October 2012. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership*, 73.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 129.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 220.

²¹⁰ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 180. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir*, 130. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 209.

²¹¹ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

²¹² Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership*, 180-181.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 179-181.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

Security Council in which Third World would have representations in the new Security Council.²¹⁶ Suharto met with the Japanese Prime Minister and the US president, attempting to promote the North-South dialogue – a dialogue aiming at preventing the economic marginalization of the Third World.²¹⁷ By holding the chairmanship of APEC, Indonesia's influence as a Third World leader would understandably be enhanced.²¹⁸ In the mean time, the chairmanship consolidated Suharto's standing as an international statesman at home.²¹⁹ Being the chairman of APEC strengthened Indonesians' conviction that Indonesia had been widely recognized as a model of development for the developing states – hence a Third World leader – because of its openness and impressive economic performance delivered by President Suharto.²²⁰

Indonesia had committed itself to host the second APEC summit in Bogor in November 1994.²²¹ Indonesia's outright support for APEC and its decision to bring the summit to Southeast Asia constituted a rebuff to Malaysia's antagonism towards APEC.²²² Malaysia had been put under pressure to choose whether to challenge the unity of ASEAN or to attend the APEC summit in Bogor.²²³

Indonesia's decision to host the APEC summit boosted its sense of superiority over Malaysia. President Suharto made clear that he "expected" Mahathir to attend the summit.²²⁴ It was essentially a gesture of being the big brother of Malaysia: the little brother – Malaysia – should show deference to Indonesia – the big brother – by taking part in the APEC summit. Prime Minister Mahathir attended the APEC summit in Bogor.²²⁵ Mahathir, however, emphasized decades later that his decision to attend the

²¹⁶ Ibid. 178-179.

²¹⁷ Ibid. Also see Ali Alatas, *A Voice For A Just Peace – A Collection of Speeches by Ali Alatas* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2001), 216-218.

²¹⁸ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 179-181.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 283.

²²¹ Ibid. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 209-210.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 130.

²²⁴ Peter Searle, "Recalcitrant or Realpolitik? The Politics of Culture in Australia's Relations with Malaysia" in *Pathways To Asia – The Politics of Engagement*, ed. Richard Robison (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996), 67.

²²⁵ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 209-210. Also see R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, *Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir*, 130.

summit had little to do with Indonesia's supposed big-brother status. "...I went [APEC Summit in Bogor] because I felt it was a decision made by the group [APEC], not just by President Suharto," Mahathir wrote.²²⁶

The rivalries between Indonesia and Malaysia amidst their endeavours to expand their respective influence abroad were also evident in other areas of international politics which involved the Third World. While Indonesia had succeeded in being elected as the Chairman of NAM from 1992 to 1995, Malaysia had been at the forefront in shaping the agenda of the movement, aiming to create a new basis for the movement's existence in the post-Cold War era.²²⁷ Malaysia in consequence had won the recognition as being the "new voice for the Third World".²²⁸ Indonesia was particularly irritated by Prime Minister Mahathir stealing "much of the thunder" at the 1992 NAM conference held in Jakarta.²²⁹ Indonesians described Mahathir as "a little Sukarno" because of Mahathir's outspokenness and assertiveness that defined his endeavours in championing the causes of the Third World.²³⁰

Calling Mahathir "a little Sukarno" was a consequence of Indonesia's sense of superiority over Malaysia. For Indonesians, Sukarno – their first President – was a founding father and a pioneer of the Third World movement. It was Sukarno's charismatic personalities and great oratory skills that distinguished his leadership role in the Third World. Such qualities had become an example of the leadership style of a Third World leader. Mahathir the "little" brother – as Indonesians saw it – was indeed learning from Sukarno – Indonesia, the big brother – in how to lead the Third World.

Malaysia's attempt to play a leadership role in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was being perceived by Indonesia as a challenge to its standing in

²²⁶ Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 615.

²²⁷ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 176. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 204. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 137.

²²⁸ Far Eastern Economic Review, August 20, 1992.

²²⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 137. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 204.

²³⁰ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 137. Also see Michael Vatikiotis, "Clash of Styles – High Profile Diplomacy Upsets Neighbours," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20th August 1992: 19. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 202-204.

the Muslim World.²³¹ Indonesia's standing – as Indonesians saw it – was based on the fact that Indonesia was the state with the largest Muslim population in the world.²³² Indonesia believed that its status in the Muslim World was also being challenged by Malaysia's activism in calling for international action to halt the atrocities committed against Bosnian Muslims.²³³ Indonesia and Malaysia were the only Southeast Asian states that had participated in the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²³⁴ Malaysian troops in Bosnia – 1500 men – however, clearly outnumbered that of Indonesia – 200 men.²³⁵ In October 1993, President Suharto surprised the world by having a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Jakarta in his capacity as the chairman of NAM.²³⁶ One month earlier, it was Yasser Arafat that had met with President Suharto in Jakarta to brief him about the peace accord reached between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel.²³⁷ Suharto's meeting with Israeli Prime Minister served to weaken Malaysia's influence in the Palestinian issue. Malaysia had been trying to involve itself in the Palestinian issue.²³⁸ It was the second state in the world – after Pakistan – to accord full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization.²³⁹ The organization had established its embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1981.²⁴⁰ Malaysia, meanwhile, was well known for its anti-Zionist and anti-Western stands along its support for the Palestinian cause.²⁴¹ It had no diplomatic relations with

²³¹ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 195.

²³² Ibid. Also see Interview 1016, Jakarta, 16th October 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 138.

²³³ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 230-231. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 240-241. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 138, 209.

²³⁴ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 251.

²³⁵ Ibid. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 167-168.

²³⁶ Michael Leifer, "Expanding Horizons in Southeast Asia?" *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1994): 9.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 227-229.

²³⁹ Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysia Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997), 206-207.

²⁴⁰ Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development*, 227-229.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

Israel.²⁴² Malaysia had made clear that it treated the 1993 Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement with caution.²⁴³

The competition between Indonesia and Malaysia in the international arena – which was enhanced by the mismatch of expectation between them; and mutually reinforced with their respective assertion of their superiority over the culturally similar counterpart – resulted in Indonesia's move to balance against Malaysia in the area of security.

Indonesia forged closer military ties with Singapore, aiming to curtail Malaysia's regional as well as international influence.²⁴⁴ Singapore had been allowed to maintain its military training facilities in Sumatra since 1988.²⁴⁵ It was the only state that had a military presence in Indonesia.²⁴⁶ The deepening of military cooperation between Indonesia and Singapore was contradicted with Malaysia's expectation. Malaysia expected that its relations with Indonesia should be closer when compared to their respective ties with Singapore, since Indonesia and Malaysia shared a special relationship. Malaysia's main newspaper expressed its disgruntlement towards Indonesia owing to the mismatch of expectation:²⁴⁷

Although Indonesia had the right to establish relations with another country, it should take into account the special ties between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta which encompassed all aspects of life.

The Malaysian Government too indicated its discontent with Indonesia, stressing that it regarded Singapore's military presence in Sumatra as a threat to Malaysia.²⁴⁸

The bad feelings towards Indonesia ignited Malaysia's resolve to strengthen its own military standing. From 1988 to 1991, the military expenditure of Malaysia had been on

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 155-156.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Utusan Melayu, February 10, 1990, quoted in Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 140.

²⁴⁸ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 71.

an upward trend.²⁴⁹ In 1988, Malaysia's military expenditure accounted for 2.43% of its GDP.²⁵⁰ In 1991, it was at 3.2%.²⁵¹

Despite the conspicuous rivalries between Indonesia and Malaysia since the late 1980s, strategic cooperation between the two states, however, remained well in place. Indonesia and Malaysia had protested against Singapore's decision in 1990 to offer itself as the military hub for the US military in Southeast Asia.²⁵² Both Indonesia and Malaysia viewed the US military presence in Singapore as a challenge to their desired autonomous order of Southeast Asia, which was in essence a threat to the presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia.²⁵³ Both the Malay states conducted their largest ever joint military exercise shortly after.²⁵⁴ The exercise was conducted in August 1991 in the state of Johor of Malaysia.²⁵⁵ It ended with the landing of paratroopers in southern Johor – 18km north of Singapore – on 9th August 1991.²⁵⁶ The code name of the landing was "Total Wipe Out" and the day of the landing was on Singapore's National day.²⁵⁷ Apparently, the joint military exercise was meant to send a message to Singapore: do not challenge the fact that archipelagic Southeast Asia is the Malay World. Together Indonesia and Malaysia formed the Malay World – a shield that protected their existence as states built around the Malay way of life. Singapore in response launched a large scale military exercise, aiming to deter both the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces.²⁵⁸

The Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship produced double-edged effects between them.

The joint military exercise revealed the substantial cooperation that existed between the two Malay states. They had maintained their strategic cooperation to protect their

²⁴⁹ <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 15th May 2014)

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation* (New York: An East Gate Book, 1990), 162. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 100-101.

²⁵³ Ibid. For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 251-252, 255-256, 270-277.

²⁵⁴ Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges*, 157.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 234-235. For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 253.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. Also see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges*, 157.

respective survival. Such cooperation were salient when Indonesia and Malaysia deemed that they were confronted with a threat posed by culturally different others.

On the other hand, Indonesia's move to forge close military ties with Singapore represented a substantial conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. The move was designed specifically to weaken Malaysia's military standing in response to the obvious power competition between Indonesia and Malaysia in the international arena.

The intertwined three sources of conflict that were embedded in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship – power competition; the assertion of the superiority of national identity; and the mismatch of expectation – bred and enhanced the negative identifications between the two states. Indonesia and Malaysia were entrenched in their egoistic understanding of one another as a consequence.

Indonesia was well aware that Malaysia needed the FPDA to prevent Indonesia's armed attacks on Malaysia.²⁵⁹ Indonesia proposed in 1990 a Three Power Defence Arrangement (TPDA) between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to replace the existing FPDA.²⁶⁰ It was suspected that Indonesia intended to establish its military dominance over Malaysia through the TPDA.²⁶¹ Malaysia rejected such a proposal and continued to embrace the FPDA.²⁶²

Sipadan and Ligitan

Shortly after Mahathir came into office, he made a decision that Malaysia would claim sovereignty over the Layang-Layang Island – a submerged reef 300km northwest of Kota Kinabalu, Sabah.²⁶³ Layang-Layang is part of the Spratly Islands located in the South China Sea.²⁶⁴ These islands are well known for their unexplored oil and gas reserves. In 1983, Prime Minister Mahathir together with senior officers from the

²⁵⁹ Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore: A Regional Security Core?" in *Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon W. Simon (New York and London, England: NBR: Armonk, 1996), 71-72. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 139.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Mahathir Mohamad, *A Doctor in the House – The Memoirs of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad* (Malaysia: MPH Group Publishing, 2011), 343-344.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

Malaysian navy visited the Layang-Layang Island after a makeshift hut had been built on that island.²⁶⁵

Mahathir later described that claiming the Layang-Layang Island was one of the most important decisions that he had made as the Prime Minister of Malaysia.²⁶⁶ He explained: “In the past Malay states lost many islands simply because they had no means to survey and oversee their domains...islands such as these are very important as their natural beauty or access to resources may generate income.”²⁶⁷ Oil and gas had been the main source of income for the Malaysian government.²⁶⁸ Owing to its goal of turning Malaysia into a developed state in the shortest time frame, the Mahathir administration had been obliged to seek for more resources to finance Malaysia’s expansion into a developed state.

It was against this background that rumours had emerged in Indonesia in 1982 that Malaysia had stationed troops on Sipadan Island.²⁶⁹

Sipadan and nearby Ligitan are two small islands located near Sabah’s northeastern coast, off the land border between the Malaysian state of Sabah and Indonesia’s East Kalimantan province.²⁷⁰ It was understood that there were potential oil and gas reserves in areas around the two islands.²⁷¹ The issue of sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan emerged in 1969 when Indonesia and Malaysia were negotiating on the delimitation of the continental shelves between the two states.²⁷² Indonesia and Malaysia had decided to put aside their dispute over the two islands during the negotiations.²⁷³

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid. 344-345.

²⁶⁸ In 2005, oil-related revenue accounted for RM 30.8 billion, 29.1% of Malaysia’s Federal Government’s total revenue. In 2006, it had increased to 37.3%, RM45 billion. See <http://www.thestar.com.my/Story/?sec=ecoreport2007&file=%2F2006%2F9%2F2%2Fecoreport2007%2F15288987> (accessed 29th May 2014)

²⁶⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 144.

²⁷⁰ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 139. Also see Michael Vatikiotis, “Isle of Contention – Tiny Sipadan Becomes an Object of Rival Claims,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17th March 1994: 32.

²⁷¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 144.

²⁷² Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 139. For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 256-257.

²⁷³ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 144.

Tension arose between Indonesia and Malaysia as a result of the rumour about Sipadan Island.²⁷⁴ The two states' response to each other, however, had been anchored around their shared war avoidance norms. To avoid escalation of tension, both parties reaffirmed their commitment to preserving peaceful ties between them, in the belief that the counterpart would reciprocate. Indonesia and Malaysia decided to start discussing their sovereignty dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan in GBC (General Border Committee) – the existing mechanism that allowed Indonesia and Malaysia to talk through their territorial disputes.²⁷⁵

Tensions over Sipadan and Ligitan re-emerged in June 1991 when Indonesia discovered that Malaysia had been building tourists facilities on Sipadan Island.²⁷⁶ Malaysia subsequently assured Indonesia that no more development projects would be carried out on the island until the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan was determined.²⁷⁷

The two states' respective assertion of sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan was firm. Malaysian government officials visited the islands in June 1991 and publicly declared that "for all intents and purposes, they are Malaysian islands."²⁷⁸ Indonesian air force planes made low passes over Sipadan and Ligitan which usually coincided with senior Malaysian officials' visit to the islands.²⁷⁹ A flotilla of Indonesian naval warships circled Sipadan from time to time.²⁸⁰ The Indonesian army had conducted several landings on the island.²⁸¹ Malaysia in turn stepped up its military presence in south eastern Sabah.²⁸²

It appeared that the use of force had become an option for Indonesia and Malaysia to resolve their dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan. Flexing their military muscles, however, illuminated the presence of power balance between them. A basis of order

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Ibid. 144-145. Also see R. Haller-Trost, *Boundary and Territory Briefing – The Territorial Dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan in the Celebes Sea: A Study in International Law* (UK: International Boundaries Research Unit, 1995), 4.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 145.

²⁷⁹ Michael Vatikiotis, "Isle of Contention – Tiny Sipadan Becomes an Object of Rival Claims," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17th March 1994: 32.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 139.

remained firmly established between Indonesia and Malaysia. Each of them did not have the military capacity to prevail over one another, yet each was able to defend itself against the attack of the counterpart. When discussing about the issue of Sipadan and Ligitan, Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak maintained: “We are not too worried when the Indonesians sail their ships in the area.”²⁸³ Indonesia and Malaysia each was determined to defend their respective sovereignty over the contested Sipadan and Ligitan islands through the show of force, yet both were not ready to resolve their dispute over the islands by using force.

It had become clear that the GBC was unable to defuse the growing tension between Indonesia and Malaysia that arose from their contestation over Sipadan and Ligitan.²⁸⁴ Malaysia – which occupied Sipadan – refused to accept Indonesia’s recommendation that the two states could jointly develop the islands.²⁸⁵ Malaysia’s refusal in effect had decided on the outcome of the dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan. It would be a zero-sum outcome – either Malaysia or Indonesia would own the two islands. As tension continued to rise, Indonesia and Malaysia nevertheless remained restrained by their tendency to avoid war between them. The two states had decided to set up a joint commission in October 1991 to resolve the Sipadan and Ligitan disputes.²⁸⁶ More intense talks at the political level about the two islands would be carried out in the joint commission.²⁸⁷

A joint commission had already been established between Malaysia and Thailand earlier on.²⁸⁸ It was created in response to a series of violent incidents involving Malaysia’s and Thailand’s security forces that had erupted along the common land and maritime border of the two states.²⁸⁹ These incidents were usually related to the

²⁸³ Michael Vatikiotis, “Isle of Contention – Tiny Sipadan Becomes an Object of Rival Claims,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17th March 1994: 32.

²⁸⁴ Michael Vatikiotis, “Let’s Clear the Air,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1st August 1991: 10-11. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 145.

²⁸⁵ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 87. Also see Michael Vatikiotis, “Isle of Contention – Tiny Sipadan Becomes an Object of Rival Claims,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17th March 1994: 32.

²⁸⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 145.

²⁸⁷ Ibid. Also see Michael Vatikiotis, “Let’s Clear the Air,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1st August 1991: 10-11.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid. Also see Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 199.

territorial disputes between Malaysia and Thailand.²⁹⁰ The two states needed the commission to sort out their border disputes that were intertwined with violence.²⁹¹ The decision of Indonesia and Malaysia to create their joint commission therefore indicated the deterioration of the ties between them. They needed the commission to prevent an armed conflict between them which seemed increasingly likely.

Still, despite having a joint commission, Indonesia and Malaysia had not been able to call off their combat readiness posture directed at each other in areas around Sipadan and Ligitan. The Indonesian and Malaysian naval fleets continued to routinely carry out their respective patrols around the two islands even though the two states were conducting talks in their joint commission.²⁹² Malaysia staged a series of military exercises in the vicinity of the two islands.²⁹³ In 1994, the Indonesian navy launched a large-scale exercise involving 40 naval vessels and 7000 troops in areas near to the two islands.²⁹⁴

While each side had been trying to exert pressure on one another through the show of force, both parties remained convinced that they would not go to war over Sipadan and Ligitan. President Suharto in fact had issued an order to his administration to settle the Sipadan and Ligitan disputes through “negotiations between two brothers”.²⁹⁵ Suharto was convinced that Indonesia and Malaysia as special partners – that of the two brothers – would want to resolve their differences via peaceful means.

After six consecutive meetings of the joint commission, Indonesia and Malaysia remained unable to agree on a solution for the issue of Sipadan and Ligitan.²⁹⁶ In September 1994, during their Four-Eyes Meeting, Mahathir suggested to Suharto that Indonesia and Malaysia should refer their disputes over the two islands to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).²⁹⁷ It was an attempt to put an end to the possibility of a military clash between Indonesia and Malaysia in areas around Sipadan and Ligitan,

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 260.

²⁹² Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 146.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 280.

²⁹⁵ Interview 1016, Jakarta, 16th October 2012.

²⁹⁶ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 146.

²⁹⁷ Ibid. 212.

considering that the disputes over the two islands had not been able to be resolved through the joint commission of the two states.²⁹⁸ Suharto had rejected Mahathir's proposal.²⁹⁹ Malaysia, meanwhile, would not accept Indonesia's idea that they could let the ASEAN High Council to rule on the sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligitan.³⁰⁰ The High Council is a mechanism provided for in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of ASEAN.³⁰¹ It would be made up of representatives from all the ASEAN member states.³⁰² There were unresolved territorial disputes between Malaysia and all its other ASEAN partners.³⁰³ Malaysia therefore would think that representatives in the ASEAN High Council were bound to have conflict of interests in the judgment to be made on Sipadan and Ligitan.³⁰⁴

Once again, President Suharto and Prime Minister Mahathir met in October 1996 for their Four Eyes Meeting.³⁰⁵ Suharto during the meeting had at last accepted the proposal of resolving the Sipadan and Ligitan disputes once and for all through the ICJ.³⁰⁶ Both the head of state agreed that the ICJ's verdict on the two islands would be final and binding.³⁰⁷

The joint decision to bring the case of Sipadan and Ligitan to the ICJ reflected the strength of Indonesia-Malaysia war avoidance norms. Despite the growing likelihood that armed clashes might break out between the two states because of their contested claims over the two islands, the commitment to avoid war prevailed in relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. When the disputes over Sipadan and Ligitan began to

²⁹⁸ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 286.

²⁹⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 212.

³⁰⁰ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 269. Also see Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 72.

³⁰¹ <http://www.asean.org/news/item/treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976-3> (accessed 25th February 2014).

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 269.

³⁰⁴ Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership*, 72.

³⁰⁵ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 139. Also see Kadir Mohamad, *Malaysia's Territorial Disputes – Two Cases at the ICJ: Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) & Ligitan and Sipadan [and the Sabah Claim] (Malaysia/Indonesia/Philippines)* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 2009), 36-37.

Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 146.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

strain their relationship, Indonesia and Malaysia sought to deescalate their tension by making use of the GBC to start discussing about the disputes. When GBC proved unable to ease their respective drive to compete for sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan through the show of force, the two states created a joint commission, aiming to resolve the disputes via more intense talks. As the commission too was unable to resolve their differences over the two islands, which seemed growingly likely to be the cause of a military clash between them, Indonesia and Malaysia decided to permanently end the conflict by letting the ICJ to decide on the sovereignty of the two islands. Both parties had consistently adhered to their shared war avoidance norms. A possible armed conflict between them had been avoided.

The decision to bring their disputes to the ICJ, meanwhile, was the strategic cooperation of Indonesia and Malaysia. It was the first time in Southeast Asia's history that two states had agreed to peacefully resolve their territorial dispute through the verdict of a third party.³⁰⁸ Such a move strengthened the existing friendly regional climate of ASEAN – the shield that protected the existence of Indonesia and Malaysia. It represented Indonesia's and Malaysia's determination to preserve the friendly climate of their region.³⁰⁹ It also became a new model of peaceful settlement of disputes for ASEAN as well as the world.³¹⁰

Strong leadership, however, had been a key factor that underpinned Indonesia's and Malaysia's ability to embrace ICJ as a way to resolve their dispute. The New Order regime was essentially an authoritarian regime.³¹¹ The Mahathir administration, on the other hand, had converted Malaysia into a semi-democracy by the late 1980s.³¹² Power in Indonesia and Malaysia was centralized in the hands of the head of state.³¹³ It was

³⁰⁸ Kadir Mohamad, *Malaysia's Territorial Disputes – Two Cases at the ICJ: Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) & Ligitan and Sipadan [and the Sabah Claim] (Malaysia/Indonesia/Philippines)* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 2009), 35, 49.

³⁰⁹ Ibid. Also see Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 146-147, 160-161, 163-165, 183-190, 204, 208, 221, 223-228, 232-234, 236, 238-240, 244-245, 253, 256-257, 262-263, 271-274, 275-277.

³¹² Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 40-48.

³¹³ Ibid. Also see R.E. Elson, *Suharto – A Political Biography*, 275-277.

effectively the personal decision of Suharto and Mahathir that had resulted in Indonesia and Malaysia willing to refer the Sipadan and Ligitan disputes to the ICJ.³¹⁴

The government of Indonesia and Malaysia were well aware of the consequence of resorting to the ICJ. The verdict of the ICJ would be a zero-sum one. One would win, and the other would lose. Either Indonesia or Malaysia would own the two islands. The two governments had agreed that no one would celebrate for being the winner of the court case.³¹⁵ It was to prevent triggering the anger of the losing party.³¹⁶ Both would accept the decision of the ICJ in silence.³¹⁷

Ambalat

The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis had led to the collapse of the New Order Regime in Indonesia.³¹⁸ The ruling coalition led by UMNO in Malaysia, however, had survived the crisis and continued to be in power.³¹⁹

Indonesia began to democratize after the fall of Suharto and had transformed into a liberal democracy.³²⁰ In 1999, Indonesia held its first free and fair parliamentary election since 1955.³²¹ It was followed by Indonesia's first direct presidential election held in 2004.³²² From 2005 onwards, all the governors, bupatis and mayors in Indonesia had to be directly elected by the people.³²³ In 2006, Indonesia was the only Southeast Asian state that had been ranked by the Freedom House as a free state.³²⁴

After experiencing a severe economic downturn brought about by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the economies of Indonesia and Malaysia had begun to bounce back since around 1999 and 2000. (See Table 7.1)

³¹⁴ Ibid. Also see Interview 1016, Jakarta, 16th October 2012.

³¹⁵ Interview 1016, Jakarta, 16th October 2012.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 32-33. Also see Karminder Singh Dhillon, *Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), 46-51.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009), 291.

³²¹ Patrick Ziegenhain, *The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 179. Also see J.D. Legge, *Sukarno – A Political Biography* (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1972), 260-267.

³²² Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, 291-293, 331-332.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid. 303.

Table 7.1: GDP per capita of Indonesia and Malaysia, 1997-2002

Year	Indonesia GDP per capita (constant 2005 US\$)	Malaysia GDP per capita (constant 2005 US\$)
1997	1235	4879
1998	1057	4409
1999	1050	4569
2000	1086	4862
2001	1110	4784
2002	1143	4941

Source: World Development Indicators

The ICJ delivered its judgment on the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan on 17th December 2002.³²⁵ The court had decided that the sovereignty over the two islands belonged to Malaysia based upon the fact that the islands had been controlled and administered by Malaysia.³²⁶

Losing the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan was a serious blow to Indonesian national pride.³²⁷ It was especially humiliating for Indonesia to have lost the two islands to its supposed little brother – Malaysia.³²⁸ In the eyes of Indonesia, Malaysia all along had been learning from Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesians' sense of weakness which stemmed from the separation of East Timor was reinforced by the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan.³²⁹ East Timor had just separated from Indonesia in 1999.³³⁰ The ICJ's granting of the ownership of Sipadan and Ligitan to Malaysia was at odds with Indonesians' expectation. A senior policy advisor of Malaysia had pointed out, many Indonesians

³²⁵ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 268-269.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 35. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 147.

³²⁸ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 145.

³²⁹ Ibid. Also see Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005) (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), 2-3. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

³³⁰ Damien Kingsbury, "Indonesia in 2006 – Cautious Reform," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 1 (January/February 2007): 159.

believed that Malaysia had chosen to take away the two islands of Indonesia at a time when Indonesia was weak.³³¹ Malaysia should not take advantage of a weak Indonesia since they share a special relationship, many Indonesians would think. The anger triggered by the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan had been deepened by this mismatch of expectation. Indonesians, as a result, accused Malaysia of “stealing” Sipadan and Ligitan from Indonesia or maintained that Malaysia “robbed” Indonesia of the two islands.³³² Since then, Indonesians generally shared a perception that Malaysia intended to extend its territory into Indonesian soil.³³³

The Indonesian government was confronted with a nationalist backlash at home after the ICJ had announced its verdict on Sipadan and Ligitan.³³⁴ The Indonesian Parliament – DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat – quickly demanded an explanation from Indonesia’s President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, on the loss of the two islands.³³⁵ House Speaker Akbar Tandjung declared: “We are all shocked and disappointed by the results [the decision of the ICJ].”³³⁶ The Indonesian government immediately moved to strengthen Indonesia’s presence at the remaining disputed islands situated along its borders.³³⁷

A few years later, the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia was once again strained by their territorial disputes.

In February 2005, Malaysia granted oil exploration concessions in two deep-water blocks named ND6 and ND7.³³⁸ The two blocks are close to Sipadan and Ligitan, situated in the region south of the two islands.³³⁹ The possession of the ownership of

³³¹ Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

³³² Ibid. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 145.

³³³ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

³³⁴ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 139-140.

³³⁵ “House Asks Government to Explain ‘loss of Islands’ to Public,” *The Jakarta Post*, December 19, 2002.

Also see “DPR Akan Panggil Presiden Soal Pulau Sipadan-Ligitan,” *Tempo*, June 24, 2003.

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 140.

Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 145-146.

³³⁸ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia’s Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 281. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 141.

³³⁹ Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005) (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), 1. Also see Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 31.

Sipadan and Ligitan undoubtedly served as a basis for Malaysia to justify its sovereignty over the two deep-water blocks.³⁴⁰

ND6 and ND7, however, are part of the maritime area known as Ambalat which Indonesia claims to be its territory.³⁴¹ It is an oil and gas-rich area located in the Sulawesi Sea, off the eastern coast of Kalimantan.³⁴² Indonesia had earlier on awarded exploration concessions in Ambalat.³⁴³ Essentially, Malaysia's claim over ND6 and ND7 was based on its official territorial sea and continental shelf map published in 1979.³⁴⁴ Indonesia's claim over Ambalat, on the other hand, was based on the Anglo-Dutch Convention of 1891.³⁴⁵ The claims of both sides were equally strong.³⁴⁶

The Indonesian government immediately lodged a protest against Malaysia's decision to grant exploration concessions in ND6 and ND7.³⁴⁷ It insisted that such a move had violated Indonesia's sovereignty.³⁴⁸ The Indonesian Navy sent three warships to the disputed area – ND6 and ND7 – to assert Indonesia's sovereignty over Ambalat.³⁴⁹ Four F-16 fighter jets of Indonesia had also been sent to Ambalat a few days later to join the Indonesian warships in patrolling the area.³⁵⁰ On 8th March 2005, Indonesia's President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, visited Sebatik Island – an Indonesian island near to Ambalat.³⁵¹ He declared that the purpose of the visit was to inspect the readiness of the

³⁴⁰ Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005) (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), 1

³⁴¹ Ibid. Also see Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 31, 35.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 147. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 281.

³⁴⁴ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 141. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 147.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ "Borneo Maritime Territorial Dispute Tests Indonesian-Malaysian Ties," June 1, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA929.html> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁴⁷ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration*, 35. Also see "RI Awaits Shell's Response Over Ambalat," *The Jakarta Post*, March 26, 2005. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 343.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ "Warships Deployed Close to Disputed Territory," *The Jakarta Post*, March 2, 2005.

³⁵⁰ "F-16s Deployed Ahead of Susilo's Visit to Sebatik," *The Jakarta Post*, March 7, 2005.

³⁵¹ Ibid. Also see "Presiden Mambantah Berkonfrontasi Dengan Malaysia," *Liputan 6*, March 8, 2005, <http://news.liputan6.com/read/97134/presiden-membantah-berkonfrontasi-dengan-malaysia> (accessed

Indonesian armed forces in protecting Indonesia's borders with Malaysia.³⁵² Malaysia in response strengthened its military presence in area around Ambalat.³⁵³

In early April 2005, minor skirmishes broke out between the Indonesian and Malaysian navies in Ambalat. Indonesian warship *KRI Tedung Naga* collided with Malaysian warship *KD Rencong* when *KD Rencong* was trying to disrupt Indonesia's efforts to build a light house on Malaysia's Karang Unarang reef – a reef situated within ND6 and ND7.³⁵⁴ Since the collision the free media in Indonesia reported extensively on the Ambalat disputes.³⁵⁵ Very quickly, Ambalat became an issue of nationalism for Indonesians which was suffused with their anger.³⁵⁶ Street protests against Malaysia's claim on Ambalat erupted in many Indonesian cities which involved the burnings of Malaysian flags.³⁵⁷ Such protests had also been staged outside the Malaysian Embassy in Jakarta.³⁵⁸ The Indonesian media termed the Ambalat disputes as "Kofrontasi 2.0".³⁵⁹ Some Indonesians had initiated a movement titled "Front Ganyang Malaysia" – Crush

8th June 2014). Also see "Presiden Bertolak Ke Blok Ambalat Kaltim," *Indosiar*, March 8, 2005, http://www.indosiar.com/fokus/presiden-bertolak-ke-blok-ambalat-kaltim_30180.html (accessed 8th June 2014).

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 149. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 141. Also see Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 343.

³⁵⁴ "RI, Malaysia Navies Make Peace Following Ambalat Incident," *The Jakarta Post*, April 16, 2005. Also see "RI, KL Warships Collide in Ambalat," *The Jakarta Post*, April 10, 2005. Also see "Close Encounters of the Worrying Kind in Sulawesi Sea," *Singapore Institute of International Affairs*, April 12, 2005, <http://www.siiiaonline.org/page/insightsDetails/id/2833/ArticleCategoryId/KeepSessionAlive.aspx#.U5a8x8x--70> (accessed 9th June 2014). Also see "Pembinaan Di Laut Sulawesi Jejaskan Rundangan 22 Mac," *Utusan Malaysia*, March 12, 2005. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy*, 142.

³⁵⁵ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 148. Also see Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005) (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), 1-2. Also see Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 369-371.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007*, 343.

³⁵⁹ Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005), 2.

Malaysia Front – to recruit volunteers across Indonesia, aiming to launch the Confrontation 2.0 against Malaysia.³⁶⁰

The situation in Malaysia by contrast had been calm owing to the restraint observed by the Malaysian media.³⁶¹ The government-controlled Malaysian media were following the official order that they should not provoke further tension between Indonesia and Malaysia.³⁶²

It appeared that Indonesia had become ever more nationalistic and assertive in the face of territorial disputes with Malaysia.³⁶³ Such responses were attributable to a combination of factors.

After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia was facing serious challenges in maintaining its territorial integrity. It had lost East Timor and was plagued by the independent movements in West Papua and Aceh.³⁶⁴ In the meantime, Indonesia had failed to defend its claim over Sipadan and Ligitan in the ICJ. Indonesians had become highly sensitive to the issue of territorial integrity of Indonesia.³⁶⁵ They were afraid of losing more territories.³⁶⁶ As a result, Indonesia was adamant that it would not lose Ambalat this time around.³⁶⁷ Such resolve was reinforced by Indonesians' shared perception that Malaysia intended to expand into their soil.

³⁶⁰ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 148. Also see Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Jacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 371. Also see "Makassar Bentuk Front Ganyang Malaysia," *Tempo*, March 5, 2005.

³⁶¹ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 148-149. Also see Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Jacob, *Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors*, 358, 372-373. Also see "Malaysians Downplay Maritime Tensions with Indonesia," June 15, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KUALALUMPUR483&q=kuala%20lumpur> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ "Malaysians Downplay Maritime Tensions with Indonesia," June 15, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KUALALUMPUR483&q=kuala%20lumpur> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁶⁴ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, *Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations*, 146. Also see Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005) (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), 3.

³⁶⁵ Ibid. Also see Rizal Sukma, "Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities," in *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant*, ed. Anthony Reid, (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012), 88.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

Most importantly, Indonesia wanted to secure its access to the untapped oil and gas resources in Ambalat.³⁶⁸ Petroleum was vital for financing Indonesia's development. Indonesia's oil and gas production had been in consistent decline.³⁶⁹ By 2008, Indonesia was no longer qualified to be a member of OPEC.³⁷⁰

Ambalat, in the meantime, was an issue of national pride for Indonesia.³⁷¹ In the eyes of Indonesians, the issue of Ambalat was inextricably intertwined with their loss of Sipadan and Ligitan.³⁷² It was humiliating to have lost the two islands to Indonesia's little brother – Malaysia. Indonesia as Malaysia's big brother – Indonesians maintained – had provided all the assistance that Malaysia was needed for its nation building, and Malaysia in return had taken away Sipadan and Ligitan that belonged to Indonesia.³⁷³ The humiliations which stemmed from the loss of Sipadan and Ligitan fortified Indonesia's determination to defend its alleged sovereignty over Ambalat. Indonesians asserted that Malaysia had seized Sipadan and Ligitan from Indonesia, it would not again lose Ambalat to Malaysia.³⁷⁴

The nature of Indonesia's domestic politics led to a further intensification of nationalist sentiments in Indonesia over the issue of Ambalat.

Politicians in the new democracy of Indonesia constantly sought to establish their nationalist credentials by stirring up nationalist sentiments in order to win popular support at home.³⁷⁵ Indonesian politicians therefore saw the need to foment the

³⁶⁸ "Indonesia to Fight Malaysia's Ambalat Oil Claims," *Jakarta Globe*, October 22, 2009.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ "Indonesia to withdraw From OPEC," *BBC News*, May 28, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7423008.stm> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁷¹ Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012. Also see Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

³⁷² Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 35. Also see "Indonesian Political Tensions Surge in Border Disputes with Malaysia," June 8, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA974.html> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁷³ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

³⁷⁴ Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

³⁷⁵ Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012. Also see Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012. Also see "Indonesian Political Tensions Surge in Border Disputes with Malaysia," June 8, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA974.html> (accessed 9th June 2014). Also see "Borneo Maritime Territorial Dispute Tests Indonesian-Malaysian Ties," June 1, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA929.html> (accessed 9th June 2014).

Indonesian public's nationalist feelings towards the Ambalat disputes, aiming to translate such emotions into their respective domestic support.³⁷⁶

Meanwhile, the free media in Indonesia had been liberally expressing strong nationalist sentiments through their reporting, which included the reporting of the Ambalat disputes.³⁷⁷ The press freedom in Indonesia – which came into being after the fall of Suharto – had engendered the emergence of a highly competitive media industry in Indonesia.³⁷⁸ The Indonesian media in consequence embraced the nationalistic style of reporting, aiming to stimulate the demand for their papers or programs.³⁷⁹ The nationalist feelings of the Indonesian public therefore had always been evoked and intensified by the reporting of the local media.

The Indonesian Military also made use of nationalism to promote its own interests. In the midst of the talks between the DPR and Indonesia's government on the budget for the military operations in Ambalat, Indonesia's Defense Minister intentionally revealed the proposed amount of the budget to the media, understandably trying to create public pressure on the DPR to ensure that it would ratify the proposed budget.³⁸⁰ Indonesian legislators had criticized the Defence Minister for making such a move, arguing that the talks were meant to be confidential.³⁸¹

On the other hand, the Indonesian Military had been trying to instigate Indonesians' nationalist emotions through the media. It had reported to the local media about the "aggressiveness" of the Malaysian navy, claiming that Malaysia's warships had frequently intruded into Indonesian waters in Ambalat, and Indonesia's navy was moments away from firing on a Malaysian warship which had encroached deep into

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 369-371. Also see Yang Razali Kassim, *ASEAN Cohesion: Making Sense of Indonesian Reactions to Bilateral Disputes* (IDSS Commentaries, 15/2005) (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University), 1-2. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 148.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ "Legislators Criticize Juwono Over Ambalat Disclosure," *The Jakarta Post*, March 20, 2005. Also see Patrick Ziegenhain, *The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 182. Also see Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009), 318.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

Ambalat.³⁸² The revelation triggered Indonesians' anger against Malaysia.³⁸³ Malaysia was surprised by the Indonesian Military's tendency to escalate their navies' routine encounters in Ambalat into a crisis in Indonesia.³⁸⁴ It was an exaggeration that Indonesia's navy was on the brink of firing at a Malaysian warship.³⁸⁵ The two navies had been adhering to their agreed upon standard operating procedures during their encounters in Ambalat.³⁸⁶ It was understood that Indonesia's Military had been trying to foment Indonesians' patriotic sentiments as it needed popular support for the increase in Indonesia's defence budget.³⁸⁷ The increase was needed for the modernization of Indonesian armed forces.³⁸⁸ Since 2004, the Indonesian Military had been lobbying for a substantial increase in Indonesia's defence budget.³⁸⁹

In a nutshell, the democratization of Indonesia gave rise to strong nationalism in its society, which in turn intensified Indonesians' nationalist emotions towards Ambalat. The Indonesian government in consequence had to be nationalistic if it was to secure its popular support at home.

Indonesia's resolve to defend its supposed sovereignty over Ambalat was further toughened by its resentments towards Malaysia, which stemmed from its loss of Sipadan and Ligitan. Indonesia's officials had revealed to their Malaysian counterparts about why Indonesians were emotional about Ambalat.³⁹⁰ It was because Indonesians were bound by a sentiment: they would not forgive Malaysia for taking away Sipadan and Ligitan.³⁹¹ This sentiment was an outcome of the mismatch of expectation.

³⁸² "Ambalat Waters Row Must Be Resolved," *Jakarta Globe*, May 31, 2009. Also see "Malaysia Enters Ambalat Again," *Jakarta Globe*, June 4, 2009.

³⁸³ "Malaysians Downplay Maritime Tensions with Indonesia," June 15, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KUALALUMPUR483&q=kuala%20lumpur> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁸⁴ Ibid. Also see "Borneo Maritime Territorial Dispute Tests Indonesian-Malaysian Ties," June 1, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA929.html> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁸⁵ "Borneo Maritime Territorial Dispute Tests Indonesian-Malaysian Ties," June 1, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA929.html> (accessed 9th June 2014).

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009), 312.

³⁸⁸ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, 306.

³⁸⁹ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, 312.

³⁹⁰ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

Indonesia and Malaysia shared a special relationship. Malaysia – as Indonesians saw it – hence should not choose to take possession of Sipadan and Ligitan when Indonesia was weak.

The exploration activities in Ambalat had to be suspended as both Indonesia and Malaysia were regularly flexing their respective military muscles in the disputed waters.³⁹²

It was clear that Indonesia's and Malaysia's sovereignty dispute over Ambalat was more intense than their territorial disputes in the past. Nonetheless, the war avoidance norms shared by the two states remained strong enough to prevent them from plunging into an armed conflict between them. Shortly after the surface of the Ambalat disputes, Indonesia and Malaysia reaffirmed their commitment to preserving their friendly coexistence by creating a joint technical committee, beginning to negotiate for a solution to the disputes.³⁹³ Both parties had reassured one another that the Ambalat disputes would be resolved through discussions.³⁹⁴

When minor skirmishes broke out between Indonesian and Malaysian warships in Ambalat in early April 2005, top political and military leaders of the two states intervened immediately to put an end to the skirmishes.³⁹⁵ President Yudhoyono expressed Indonesia's aspiration for peace with Malaysia, asserting that such clashes should not happen again in the future.³⁹⁶ The two states had pledged better communications to prevent a clash in Ambalat between their armed forces from happening again.³⁹⁷ The two armed forces subsequently established their standard operating procedures, designed to prevent any physical clashes between them during

³⁹² Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 141. Also see "Petronas Urges Governments to Solve Ambalat Issue," *Bernama*, June 8, 2009. Also see "Indonesia To Fight Malaysia's Ambalat Oil Claims," *Jakarta Globe*, October 22, 2009.

³⁹³ "Malaysia and Indonesia Agree to Continue Talks," *The Star*, May 7, 2005. Also see "No Talks on Ambalat Block At Malindo Meeting," *The Star*, December 11, 2008. Also see "KL and Jakarta Will Do More To Fight Transborder Crime," *Asiaone*, December 12, 2008, <http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Malaysia/Story/A1Story20081212-107220.html> (accessed 13th June 2014). Also see "Ambalat Issue: 'No Official Protest From Indonesia'," *The Star*, June 15, 2009.

³⁹⁴ "DPM: Don't Retaliate Against Anti-Malaysia Protests," *The Star*, May 10, 2005.

³⁹⁵ "RI, KL Warships Collide in Ambalat," *The Jakarta Post*, April 10, 2005. Also see "RI, Malaysia Navies Make Peace Following Ambalat Incident," *The Jakarta Post*, April 16, 2005.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

their encounters in Ambalat.³⁹⁸ Once again – like the disputes of Sipadan and Ligitan – Indonesia and Malaysia each was determined to defend their overlapping claims over a maritime zone in Ambalat through the show of force, yet they were not ready to take possession of the territory by using force.

However, Indonesia's utter rejection to refer the Ambalat disputes to the ICJ reflected its intense resolve in defending its claim over the disputed waters. Malaysia had proposed to let the ICJ to decide on the sovereignty of Ambalat.³⁹⁹ Indonesia was perfectly clear: it would never bring the disputes to the ICJ or any other third-party arbitration.⁴⁰⁰

Such vigorous resolve boosted Indonesians' sense of superiority over Malaysia. The Chief of Malaysian Armed Forces, Abdul Aziz Zainal, visited Jakarta in June 2009.⁴⁰¹ It was at a time when extensive reporting had been given by the Indonesian media about an allegation that Indonesia's navy was moments away from firing on a Malaysian warship that had intruded deep into Ambalat.⁴⁰² The Indonesian media perceived Zainal's visit as a Malaysian representative rushing to Jakarta to deal with the reported crisis.⁴⁰³ Indonesians deemed that Malaysia was trying to pay deference to its big brother – Indonesia – in an effort to resolve the recent crisis between them in Ambalat. In fact, Zainal's visit to Jakarta had already been scheduled long before the date of the reported crisis.⁴⁰⁴ He was scheduled to be there to attend a conference.⁴⁰⁵ Zainal,

³⁹⁸ Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

³⁹⁹ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 150.

⁴⁰⁰ Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 142.

⁴⁰¹ "Malaysians Downplay Maritime Tensions with Indonesia," June 15, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KUALALUMPUR483&q=kuala%20lumpur> (accessed 9th June 2014). Also see "Ambalat Dispute And Manohara Saga Not Related, Indonesian Media Told," *The Star*, June 13, 2009.

⁴⁰² "Borneo Maritime Territorial Dispute Tests Indonesian-Malaysian Ties," June 1, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09JAKARTA929.html> (accessed 9th June 2014). Also see "Malaysians Downplay Maritime Tensions with Indonesia," June 15, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KUALALUMPUR483&q=kuala%20lumpur> (accessed 9th June 2014).

⁴⁰³ "Malaysians Downplay Maritime Tensions with Indonesia," June 15, 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KUALALUMPUR483&q=kuala%20lumpur> (accessed 9th June 2014).

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

however, did meet with his Indonesian counterpart during the visit to discuss about the Ambalat issue.⁴⁰⁶

It should be noted that the observations on the Indonesian media's perception of Malaysia and its way of reporting with regard to the alleged crisis that had erupted in Ambalat were made by the American diplomats based in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The diplomats put on record the observations in classified cables that had been sent to the US state department. WikiLeaks had recently disclosed the cables. As can be observed from the cables, apart from their own understandings – which were a third party's perspective – the American diplomats' confidential communications with the policy makers of Southeast Asian states formed a critical basis of their observations on the Indonesian media. Hence, the observations of the American diplomats perhaps provide an accurate insight into how the Indonesian media viewed Malaysia with regard to the Ambalat disputes.

Indonesia and Malaysia remained unable to work out a solution for their sovereignty dispute over Ambalat.⁴⁰⁷ Both sides' dealings with the disputes, nevertheless, were effectively restrained by their shared war avoidance norms. Intense and regular negotiations had been going on between the two states, aiming to resolve the disputes.⁴⁰⁸ Both sides were of the view that armed conflict between them over Ambalat would not occur.⁴⁰⁹ They recognized that peace prevailed in their relationship.⁴¹⁰ Both shared an understanding that their talks over the Ambalat disputes could go on indefinitely, until they had reached an agreement.⁴¹¹ “We have achieved a level of sophistication in solving our disputes peacefully,” said one former Secretary General of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid. Also see “KL Confident Over Ambalat,” *The Star*, June 10, 2009. Also see “Ambalat Dispute And Manohara Saga Not Related, Indonesian Media Told,” *The Star*, June 13, 2009.

⁴⁰⁷ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 142. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

⁴⁰⁸ Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

⁴¹⁰ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁴¹¹ Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012. Also see Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

⁴¹² Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

In other words, Indonesia and Malaysia shared reasonable expectations of peaceful change. Each was convinced that the counterpart will not use force to settle their disputes, yet no one was certain about it. Indonesia's and Malaysia's navies continued to conduct their respective patrols in the disputed waters in Ambalat.⁴¹³ War between the two states was unlikely, not unthinkable.

Migrant Workers

The sustained expansion of Malaysia's economy and its rapid industrialization since the early 1980s resulted in the dramatic increase of Indonesian labour migration to Malaysia.⁴¹⁴

Malaysia's absorption of Indonesian workers was an outcome of the mutual dependence between the two states.

As most of the Malaysian workers had moved to industrial sectors amidst Malaysia's industrialization, Malaysia needed to import foreign workers especially Indonesian workers to address the problem of labour shortage in its plantation sectors.⁴¹⁵ Given the proximity of Indonesia to Malaysia and the Malay way of life shared by the two states, it had been most cost effective to recruit Indonesian workers when compared to foreign workers of other nationalities.⁴¹⁶ It was very easy for Malaysia's employers to communicate with Indonesian workers.⁴¹⁷ Crucially, Indonesian workers could easily be converted into Malays in Malaysia hence ensured the Malays' supreme electoral power vis-à-vis the non-Malays in Malaysia.⁴¹⁸

Indonesia, on the other hand, due to its huge population and chronic poverty, had always wanted to export its workforce, aiming to reduce the unemployment rate at home

⁴¹³ Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia – The Struggle for Autonomy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 142. Also see "Zahid's Trip to Ease Ambalat Tension," *The Star*, July 1, 2009.

⁴¹⁴ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 619. Also see Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 47.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid. Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 152-153.

⁴¹⁶ Alexander R. Arifianto, *The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia*, 617-619. Also see Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 47. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 46-47.

and promote its economic growth through the inflow of remittances.⁴¹⁹ Malaysia became the most appropriate place for Indonesian migrant workers to seek for employments as it was evidently wealthier than Indonesia, also because of geographical proximity and their cultural commonalities.⁴²⁰

Specifically, Indonesian labour working in Malaysia was an economic cooperation between the two states. It mainly served the respective economic interests of Indonesia and Malaysia.

Because of Malaysia's high economic growth, the number of Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia had continued to rise in the 1990s.⁴²¹ Indonesian labour by the 1990s had also entered into the construction and domestic service sectors in Malaysia.⁴²² Overtime, the construction and plantation sectors in Malaysia had become heavily dependent on workers from Indonesia.⁴²³ By the late 1990s, Indonesian workers accounted for 63.9 % of the total number of documented migrant workers in Malaysia.⁴²⁴ By 1997, Malaysia became the main destination for Indonesian migrant workers which accounted for 63.2% of the total Indonesian workers working in overseas.⁴²⁵

The majority of Indonesian workers, however, chose to migrate to Malaysia through illegal channels.⁴²⁶ By 1997, there were around 1.9 million Indonesian migrants working in Malaysia.⁴²⁷ More than half of them were illegal.⁴²⁸ The sheer size of illegal Indonesian workers in Malaysia had created a series of challenges for Malaysia. One of them was the presence of illegal Acehnese migrants in Malaysia.

⁴¹⁹ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 619.

⁴²⁰ Ibid. 617. Also see Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 47.

⁴²¹ Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 47.

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Ibid. 52. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

⁴²⁴ P. Ramasamy, "International Migration and Conflict: Foreign Labour in Malaysia," in *International Migration in Southeast Asia*, ed. Aris Ananta and Evi Nurvidya Arifin (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2004), 275.

⁴²⁵ Sukamdi, Elan Satriawan and Abdul Haris, "Impact of Remittances on the Indonesian Economy," in *International Migration in Southeast Asia*, ed. Aris Ananta and Evi Nurvidya Arifin, 144-145.

⁴²⁶ Alexander R. Arifianto, *The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia*, 619.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

Facilitated by porous maritime borders and weak law enforcement, the rebels of the Acehese independent movement and Acehese refugees had been able to flee to the peninsula of Malaysia illegally throughout the unrest that broke out in Aceh since 1989.⁴²⁹ Malaysia had become a place of asylum and hideout for Acehese.⁴³⁰ Malaysia's government did not provide political asylum for the rebels from Aceh and had upheld its policy of non-involvement in Indonesia's domestic affairs.⁴³¹ Indonesian authorities did not suggest that Malaysia's government was involved in the separatist movement in Aceh.⁴³² Nonetheless, Acehese rebels – as being illegal migrants – had been able to operate in Malaysia and occasionally conduct underground military trainings in Malaysia.⁴³³ The ties between Indonesia and Malaysia in consequence were sometimes strained by the presence of Acehese rebels and refugees in Malaysia.⁴³⁴ With the signing of a peace accord between Indonesia's government and the GAM (Aceh Independence Movement) in August 2005, Aceh unrest was no more an issue between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁴³⁵

The huge inflow of illegal Indonesian migrants to Malaysia had also contributed to the increase of crime rates in Malaysia.⁴³⁶ It was found out that undocumented Indonesian migrants were often engaged in serious criminal activities – rape, robberies

⁴²⁹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 150-151, 212. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 154-155. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 280. Also see "Indonesia Keeps Troops in Rioting Province," *The New York Times*, September 3, 1998.

⁴³⁰ Ibid. Also see Michael Vatikiotis, "Aceh Unrest Leads to Mounting Death Toll – Troubled Province," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24th January 1991: 20.

⁴³¹ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 280. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 150.

⁴³² Michael Vatikiotis, "Aceh Unrest Leads to Mounting Death Toll – Troubled Province," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24th January 1991: 21.

⁴³³ Ibid. 20. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 150-151.

⁴³⁴ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 280. Also see Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 150-151.

⁴³⁵ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia – From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009), 300. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism*, 280.

⁴³⁶ Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 48-49.

and murders – in Malaysia.⁴³⁷ In 1987, around 36% of prison inmates in Malaysia were Indonesian illegals.⁴³⁸ Meanwhile, between 1985 and 1991 – as indicated in the unpublished records of Malaysia’s police – illegal foreign workers were responsible for between 14.7% and 18.2% of all murders committed in Malaysia, and between 32.7% and 48.2% of all robberies occurred in Malaysia.⁴³⁹ This pattern of criminal activities persisted well into the mid-1990s.⁴⁴⁰

Despite the challenges brought about by the presence of illegal Indonesian workers, Malaysia’s handling of Indonesian illegals was largely shaped by an understanding of cooperation between two brothers. It perceived the large influx of Indonesians to Malaysia as cousins coming from the archipelago.⁴⁴¹ Legalizing the status of the undocumented Indonesian migrants had been the main approach of Malaysia’s government in regulating illegal immigration from Indonesia.⁴⁴² From 1992 to 1995, around 147,000 illegal Indonesian migrants had been deported from Malaysia.⁴⁴³ Yet, around 403,500 Indonesian illegals had obtained their legal status from Malaysia’s government during the same period, which was more than double the number of those who had been deported.⁴⁴⁴ The comment made by the Indonesian Army Daily in September 1994 reflected the cooperative sentiments that existed between Indonesia and Malaysia with regard to Indonesian migrant workers: “Perhaps in Malaysia there is still a lot of illegal immigrants. If this is true, it will be very good should these people be recruited and are given the legal status. If more is needed, then Malaysia could recruit directly from Indonesia.”⁴⁴⁵

Confronted with economic recession following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia began to take a tougher action in reducing the number of illegal migrants,

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 148.

⁴³⁹ Azizah Kassim, “Illegal Alien Labour in Malaysia: Its Influx, Utilization, and Ramifications,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 25, no.71 (1997): 73.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations*, 149.

⁴⁴² Alexander R. Arifianto, “The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 619-620, 623.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ “Tajuk Rencana,” *Angkatan Bersenjata*, September 19, 1994, quoted in Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto – Aspiring To International Leadership* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 72.

aiming to mitigate the pressure of local unemployment in Malaysia.⁴⁴⁶ Indonesian illegals in Malaysia would no longer be legalized; they would have to leave Malaysia immediately.⁴⁴⁷ Large-scale deportations of illegal migrants – mainly Indonesian workers – were regularly conducted by Malaysia's authorities since 1998.⁴⁴⁸

The deportation campaign was also encouraged by the Malay communities' call for the repatriation of Indonesian illegals in Malaysia.⁴⁴⁹ Since the mid-1990s, the Malays in Malaysia had begun to realize that Indonesian migrants were basically different from them.⁴⁵⁰ It was difficult to assimilate these migrants into Malay society.⁴⁵¹ Indonesian migrants had established their own communities throughout Malaysia which were separated from the local Malays.⁴⁵² The Malays in Malaysia as a result began to view Indonesian migrants as undoubtedly Indonesians.⁴⁵³ They thought that Indonesian illegals had to be repatriated to prevent Indonesian migrants – a huge presence in Malaysia – from becoming a threat to the Malays' existence in Malaysia.⁴⁵⁴ The Malaysian government had to deport illegal Indonesian migrants to address the concern of the Malay communities.⁴⁵⁵

In the meantime, Indonesian illegals continued to undertake serious criminal activities in Malaysia.⁴⁵⁶ Most disturbing was that weapons had been discovered by Malaysia's authorities in illegal immigrant squatters throughout Malaysia.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁴⁶ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 620. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 157. Also see Patrick Pillai, "The Malaysian State's Response to Migration," *Sojourn* 14, no.1 (1999): 187. Also see Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 52.

⁴⁴⁷ Alexander R. Arifianto, *The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia*, 619-620, 623.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid. Also see Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 50-51. Also see Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 366.

⁴⁴⁹ Azizah Kassim, "Illegal Alien Labour in Malaysia: Its Influx, Utilization, and Ramifications," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 25, no.71 (1997): 74-75.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid. Also see Alexander R. Arifianto, *The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia*, 622.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 49.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

The combination of three factors – the need to reduce the local unemployment in Malaysia; the resolve to ensure Malaysia’s existence as a Malay nation-state; and the need to curb the serious crimes committed by Indonesian illegals – resulted in Malaysia’s decision to amend its Immigration Act, aiming to eradicate the presence of illegal migrants in Malaysia. In March 2001, Malaysia’s government began its move to amend the existing Immigration Act in Malaysia.⁴⁵⁸ The Act’s amendments involved the incorporation of harsh punishments against illegal migrants which included large fines, a mandatory jail term, and caning.⁴⁵⁹

Successive large-scale riots launched by Indonesian workers in different parts of Malaysia between October 2001 and January 2002 only hardened Malaysia’s determination to expulse illegal migrants from Malaysia.⁴⁶⁰

Malaysia embarked on a large-scale deportation of illegals – in which most of them were Indonesians – in response to the riots.⁴⁶¹ It temporarily halted the recruitment of Indonesian workers and announced a “Hire Indonesians Last” policy.⁴⁶² From August 2002 onwards, Malaysia began to enforce its newly amended Immigration Act.⁴⁶³ During the four months of amnesty provided for illegals before the enforcement of the Act, around 400,000 Indonesian migrant workers had left Malaysia.⁴⁶⁴ The enforcement of the new Immigration Act marked the end of an era where the issue of Indonesian migrant workers was predominantly characterized by the cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Malaysia’s resolve to expulse Indonesian illegals from Malaysia boosted, and was boosted by its sense of superiority over Indonesia. The mutually reinforcing dynamics were manifested through the mass repatriation of illegal migrants carried out by Malaysia’s authorities.

A few decades of interactions with Indonesian migrant workers – who were mainly plantation and construction workers or household maids – had further consolidated

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid. 50.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 155.

⁴⁶⁰ Joseph Liow, “Malaysia’s Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 49-52.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

⁴⁶² Ibid. Also see Alexander R. Arifianto, “The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 620-621.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

Malaysians' sense of being sophisticated vis-à-vis Indonesia. Because of the superior-subordinate relationship between Malaysians and Indonesian migrants, coupled with fact that Indonesian migrants were working in the sector that was dirty, dangerous and demeaning, Malaysians – especially the Malays – had over time begun to refer to Indonesians as *Indon*.⁴⁶⁵ *Indon* was a derogatory term.⁴⁶⁶ It carried the hidden meaning that Indonesians were inferior when compared to the Malays, who were economically more superior.⁴⁶⁷

In October 2007, members of RELA – Malaysia's volunteer security force – had the brazenness to detain the wife of the Indonesian Embassy's Education and Culture Attaché amidst their operation to arrest illegal migrants in Kuala Lumpur.⁴⁶⁸ In the eyes of the RELA members, Muslianah Nurdin – the name of the lady – was an *Indon*, who was inferior; their resolve to detain her had been strengthened as a result.⁴⁶⁹ The RELA members refused to recognize Muslianah's diplomatic identity card – which had been presented to them – and remained adamant in their decision to detain her.⁴⁷⁰ Muslianah had been detained for two hours.⁴⁷¹ She was being arrested while shopping in Kuala Lumpur.⁴⁷²

RELA was Malaysia's volunteer security force with approximately 500,000 members.⁴⁷³ Since February 2005, Malaysia's government had made use of RELA – together with Malaysia's police and immigration department – to enforce the newly

⁴⁶⁵ Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 367. Also see Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 629.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Ooi Kee Beng, *Lost in Transition – Malaysia Under Abdullah* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 68. Also see "Indonesia, Malaysia Row Over Diplomat's wife 'detention'," *Asiaone*, October 10, 2007, <http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Story/A1Story20071011-29499.html> (accessed 25th June 2014).

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Christine B.N. Chin, "'Diversification' and 'Privatisation': Securing Insecurities in the Receiving Country of Malaysia," *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 9, no.4 (December 2008): 294-295. Also see "Volunteer Security Force Defies Critics in Malaysia," *Asiaone*, October 10, 2007, <http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Story/A1Story20071011-29537.html> (accessed 25th June 2014).

amended Immigration Act.⁴⁷⁴ In 2006, RELA had arrested a total of 25,000 illegal migrants.⁴⁷⁵

Indonesia was surprised by the major shift in Malaysia's treatment of Indonesian illegal migrants.⁴⁷⁶ Malaysia's harsh policy against Indonesian workers – mass deportations of Indonesian illegals; Hire Indonesians Last policy; the new Immigration Act – resulted in intense anger among Indonesians towards Malaysia.⁴⁷⁷

Indonesia and Malaysia shared a special relationship. Migration from the Indonesian archipelago to Malaysia had always been a symbol of closeness between the two states.⁴⁷⁸ Indonesians therefore expected Malaysia to always treat Indonesian migrant workers with friendly measures, let alone becoming the main reason for Malaysia to enact harsh immigration policies, and being the prime target of such policies. This mismatch of expectation produced Indonesians' resentments towards Malaysia. The chairman of Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), Amien Rais, stressed that Malaysia's decision to cane Indonesian illegals had hurt Indonesia deeply.⁴⁷⁹ "Frankly, I feel disappointed, angry, and unable to accept the fact that Malaysia, a modern country which belongs to the same Malay ethnic group (as Indonesia), has resorted to punishing Indonesian illegal workers in a way that is really inhuman," he said.⁴⁸⁰

In the meantime, the implementation of Malaysia's new policy against Indonesian illegals constituted a direct challenge to Indonesians' pride.

The media and politicians in Malaysia had been trying to associate Indonesian illegal migrants with violence and crime.⁴⁸¹ The Malaysian authorities' crackdown on illegal migrants received wide media coverage in Malaysia with photos showing large groups

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid. Also see Pranom Somwong and Marie Huberlant, *Undocumented Migrants and Refugees in Malaysia: Raids, Detention, and Discrimination* (Kuala Lumpur and Paris: FIDH-Suaram, 2008), 11.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁶ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 624.

⁴⁷⁷ Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 54.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid. 45.

⁴⁷⁹ "Amien Warns KL not to Play with Fire," *The Jakarta Post*, August 19, 2002.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 50, 54. Also see Alexander R. Arifianto, *The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia*, 622, 624-625. Also see Frederik Holst, *(Dis-) Connected History – The Indonesia-Malaysia Relationship* (Germany: Regiospectra, 2007), 334-335.

of illegal Indonesian migrants being forced to squat down with security personnels standing around them.⁴⁸² The Indonesian illegals were being detained in unhygienic environments and being shipped back to Indonesia in overcrowded vessels.⁴⁸³

Obviously, the mass ill treatment of Indonesians illegals that came with the execution of Malaysia's new immigration policies hurt Indonesians' dignity as human. Yet, fundamentally, it offended Indonesians' national pride.

In the eyes of Indonesians, Malaysia was Indonesia's little brother, which was culturally inferior, when compared to Indonesia.⁴⁸⁴ It was difficult for Indonesians to accept that their people – the Indonesian illegals – had been treated poorly by Malaysians whom they considered as inferior in relation to Indonesia.⁴⁸⁵ The perceived challenge to Indonesians' sense of superiority over Malaysia stirred up Indonesians' will to confront Malaysia, which was suffused with resentments. Amien Rais criticized Malaysia's stern punishment on Indonesian illegals as "inhumane", asserted that it was an insult to Indonesia.⁴⁸⁶ He warned Malaysia "not to play with fire by caning illegal Indonesian workers".⁴⁸⁷ Leaders of the DPR – the Indonesian Parliament – urged President Megawati "to withdraw all Indonesian workers, both legal and illegal, from Malaysia to teach Malaysia a lesson over its harsh treatment of Indonesian workers".⁴⁸⁸

The Indonesian people launched a series of street protests against Malaysia in response to Malaysia's harsh action against Indonesian illegals that had taken place since early 2002.⁴⁸⁹ Indonesia's politicians, in the meantime, issued strong political statements to protest against such new measures on Indonesian illegals.⁴⁹⁰ The attempt of the Indonesian media and politicians to foment nationalist sentiments in Indonesia's

⁴⁸² Ibid. Also see Interview 924-002, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012. Also see Interview 926-002, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012.

⁴⁸³ Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 48.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid. 54. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁶ "Government to Pay for Lawyers for Workers in Malaysia," *The Jakarta Post*, August 23, 2002.

⁴⁸⁷ "Amien Warns KL not to Play with Fire," *The Jakarta Post*, August 19, 2002.

⁴⁸⁸ "60,000 Indonesian Workers Have Returned to Malaysia," *The Jakarta Post*, August 30, 2002.

⁴⁸⁹ Joseph Liow, *Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions*, 54. Also see Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 625.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

society further exacerbated Indonesians' anger against Malaysia.⁴⁹¹ A demonstration had been staged in front of Malaysia's embassy in Jakarta shortly after Malaysia began to enforce its new immigration law.⁴⁹² The protestors burned the Malaysian flag as a reaction to Malaysia's decision to cane and deport Indonesian illegals.⁴⁹³ They broke down the gate of the embassy.⁴⁹⁴ The Indonesian police did not take action to stop the protestors from doing so.⁴⁹⁵

It was unmistakable that Indonesians' resentments towards Malaysia prompted by Malaysia's crackdown on illegals were evidently more intense than that expressed by other states, in which their people were also part of the illegals.⁴⁹⁶ Migrants of other nationalities – such as Indians, Bangladeshis and Filipinos – accounted for roughly less than 20% of the total number of illegals in Malaysia.⁴⁹⁷ Such higher intensity of resentments were the results of the perceived challenge to Indonesia's superiority over Malaysia, and the mismatch between Indonesians' expectation and Malaysia's action. Other states did not share common identities with Malaysia, and they did not have a special relationship with Malaysia.

The subsequent repeated cases of ill treatment of Indonesian workers by Malaysian employers, especially the abuses of Indonesia maids, only served to reinforce Indonesians' resentments towards Malaysia. These abuses involved serious inhumane tortures.

The Indonesian media reported extensively on these maid abuse cases, stirring up Indonesians' nationalist sentiments.⁴⁹⁸ The people throughout Indonesia were infuriated

⁴⁹¹ Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, "Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 12 (2012): 371. Also see Marshall Clark, "The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 397. For more discussion see pg 329-330.

⁴⁹² "Stop political row with Malaysia: Megawati," *The Jakarta Post*, August 28, 2002. Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 158.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 54.

⁴⁹⁷ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 282.

⁴⁹⁸ Khadijah Md. Khalid and Shakila Yacob, *Managing Malaysia-Indonesia Relations in the Context of Democratization: The Emergence of Non-State Actors*, 371. Also see Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 397. Also see "Indonesian President Yudhoyono's

by the abuses.⁴⁹⁹ They reacted by launching furious demonstrations against Malaysia with the burning of Malaysian flags.⁵⁰⁰ Indonesia's president issued strong representations, protesting against these abuses.⁵⁰¹

Observers from both states acknowledged that while Indonesians were also enraged by the abuses of Indonesian maids happening in other states, the degree of their anger expressed towards these states was always lesser than that expressed towards Malaysia when it came to such abuses.⁵⁰² The abuses of Indonesian maids occurred in Saudi Arabia for example did not result in Indonesians burning the Saudi flag. The greater degree of anger towards Malaysia was attributable to Indonesians' expectation not being met by Malaysia, and the sense that Indonesia's status as Malaysia's big brother was being challenged by Malaysia. In the minds of Indonesians, it was a daring act for Malaysians – Indonesia's little brother – to abuse the Indonesian maids – the people of Malaysia's big brother.⁵⁰³ Also, Indonesians expected Malaysia to treat the maids like family members – rather than abusing them – since the two states shared a special relationship.⁵⁰⁴

Visit to Malaysia," November 19, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09KUALALUMPUR935.html> (accessed 28th June 2014). Also see "Death of Indonesian Maid Highlights Continuing Migrant Worker Problems in Malaysia," November 10, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KUALALUMPUR908_a.html (accessed 28th June 2014). Also see Lim Jiet, "Maid Abuse in Malaysia – A Legal Analysis" *Academia.edu*: 12, http://www.academia.edu/3437442/Maid_Abuse_In_Malaysia_-_A_Legal_Analysis (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁴⁹⁹ Lisa Thomas, "Indonesia Pushes for Better Migrant-Worker Protection," *Time*, 28th July 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1913134,00.html> (accessed 28th June 2014). Also see Matthew Moore, "Vow of Protection for Mistreated Indonesian Maids," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 22nd July 2004, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/21/1090089223202.html?from=storyrhs> (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵⁰⁰ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 159. Also see *Antara News*, 2007, quoted in Mario Pandu.D, "Non-Traditional Security Issue and International Conflict – A Case Study of Indonesian Migrant Labor in Malaysia" (Master diss., Lund University, 2007), 28. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 282. Also see Lim Jiet, "Maid Abuse in Malaysia – A Legal Analysis" *Academia.edu*: 12, http://www.academia.edu/3437442/Maid_Abuse_In_Malaysia_-_A_Legal_Analysis (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012. Also see Interview 1019, Jakarta, 19th October 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁵⁰³ Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

⁵⁰⁴ Interview 1019, Jakarta, 19th October 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

The issue of Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia had experienced a transformation since 2002. It had transformed from an issue that largely reflected the close cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia into one that exhibited the double-edged effects of Indonesia-Malaysia special ties. The migration of Indonesia's labour to Malaysia became the cooperation as well as conflicts between the two states.

Indonesian labour working in Malaysia persisted as a crucial economic cooperation between the two states. The construction and plantation sectors in Malaysia were unable to continue their operations once Malaysia had begun enforcing its new immigration law in 2002.⁵⁰⁵ They had to suspend their operations because of labour shortage.⁵⁰⁶ The Malaysian government had to expedite the recruitment of more than three hundred thousand legal foreign workers to address the shortage.⁵⁰⁷ In fact, Malaysia had to quickly call off its "Hire Indonesians Last" policy as its construction sector was heavily dependent on Indonesia's workforce.⁵⁰⁸ Indonesia too had to endure great economic cost as a consequence of Malaysia's crackdown on illegals. The enforcement of the new immigration law in Malaysia – which took place since 2002 – had contributed to the increase of unemployment in Indonesia. Indonesia's unemployment rate had risen from 9% in 2002 to 11% in 2005.⁵⁰⁹

It was clear for Indonesia and Malaysia that they were relying on one another with regard to Indonesian migrant workers. The two states since 2004 had come together to establish clearer and more comprehensive rules and procedures for recruiting Indonesian migrant workers.⁵¹⁰ One-stop processing centers were being set up in Indonesia to speed up the process of recruiting legal Indonesian workers for jobs in Malaysia.⁵¹¹ Meanwhile, in March 2006, Indonesia and Malaysia had jointly signed a

⁵⁰⁵ Frederik Holst, (*Dis-*) *Connected History – The Indonesia-Malaysia Relationship* (Germany: Regiospectra, 2007), 333-334.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 212. Also see Joseph Liow, "Malaysia's Illegal Indonesian Migrant Labour Problem: In Search of Solutions," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no.1 (April 2003): 52.

⁵⁰⁹ <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx#> (accessed 29th June 2014)

⁵¹⁰ Alexander R. Arifianto, "The Securitization of Transnational Labor Migration: The Case of Malaysia and Indonesia," *Asian Politics & Policy* 1, no.4 (2009): 625.

⁵¹¹ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 161. Also see "Malaysia Widens Recruitment for Foreign Workers," May 26, 2005, <http://www.mtuc.org.my/msia-widens-recruitment-for-foreign-workers/> (accessed 30th June 2014)

memorandum of understanding (MOU) in response to the recurrent abuses of Indonesian maids in Malaysia.⁵¹² The MOU provided legal protection for Indonesian workers in Malaysia, protecting them from being abused by their employers.⁵¹³ In November 2008, the Malaysian court had sentenced the former employer of Nirmala Bornat to 18 years in jail after she was found guilty of inflicting horrific wounds on Nirmala.⁵¹⁴ Nirmala Bornat – an Indonesian maid – was being tortured by her Malaysian employer in 2004.⁵¹⁵ The Malaysian police came to her rescue after a security guard had reported the abuse to the police.⁵¹⁶ Nirmala's case received wide media coverage both in Malaysia and Indonesia.⁵¹⁷ By 2009, there were 1.7 million Indonesian migrants working in Malaysia, which was 68% of the total number of foreign workers in Malaysia.⁵¹⁸ Foreign workers during the same period accounted for around 23% of the total workforce in Malaysia.⁵¹⁹

Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia, on the other hand, almost became a source of Indonesians' resentments towards Malaysia. Indonesians reacted strongly every time Indonesia's media had reported extensively on a case of an Indonesian maid being abused by her Malaysian employer. In June 2009, Indonesia's government decided to temporarily ban the sending of Indonesian maids to Malaysia in response to the revelation of an Indonesian maid named Siti Hajar being seriously tortured by her Malaysian employer.⁵²⁰ Hajar's case sparked outrage throughout Indonesia.⁵²¹ Officials

⁵¹² Claudia Derichs, "Malaysia in 2006 – An Old Tiger Roars," *Asian Survey* 47, no.1 (January/February 2007): 153. Also see "RI, Malaysia Ink MOU on Protection Workers," *The Jakarta Post*, May 15, 2006.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ "Maid Abuse Draws 18-Year Sentence – Malaysian Mother of Four Found Guilty of Vicious Attacks on Indonesian Domestic Worker," *Aljazeera*, 28th November 2008, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2008/11/200811281524738743.html> (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵¹⁵ "Malaysian Maid Abuse Shocks PM," *BBC News*, 21st May 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3734695.stm> (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵¹⁶ "Maid Abuse Case Shocks Malaysia," *BBC News*, 20th May 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3732241.stm> (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵¹⁷ "Malaysian Maid Abuse Shocks PM," *BBC News*, 21st May 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3734695.stm> (accessed 28th June 2014). Also see Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, "Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations" (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 159-160.

⁵¹⁸ "Indonesian President Yudhoyono's Visit to Malaysia," November 19, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09KUALALUMPUR935.html> (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. Also see Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy – The First Fifty Years – Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), 295.

⁵²⁰ Lisa Thomas, "Indonesia Pushes for Better Migrant-Worker Protection," *Time*, 28th July 2009, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1913134,00.html> (accessed 28th June 2014). Also see "Death of Indonesian Maid Highlights Continuing Migrant Worker Problems in Malaysia," November

from both states had since begun to negotiate for a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).⁵²² Indonesia aimed to improve wages and legal protection for Indonesian maids working in Malaysia through the negotiation.⁵²³

Anti-Malaysia

Three sources of conflict were embedded in the issue of Indonesian migrant workers and the Ambalat disputes – Indonesia's and Malaysia's competitive behaviours against one another; their respective sense of superiority over the other; and the mismatch of expectation between them. They reinforced one another. Anti-Malaysia sentiments began to emerge in Indonesia's society as a result.

Some Indonesians had chosen to embrace tit for tat measures against Malaysia. It was an outcome of Indonesians' intense resentment towards Malaysia, which was produced by the combination of the mismatch of expectation and the perceived challenge to Indonesia's superiority over Malaysia.

The Front Ganyang Malaysia movement that had been created in reaction to the Ambalat disputes was an example of such tit for tat measures. The movement sought to recruit volunteers across Indonesia with the goal of launching the Confrontation 2.0 against Malaysia. It was a direct response to Malaysia using its volunteer security force (RELA) – apart from using its official security forces – to crackdown on illegals. RELA had been accused of adopting heavy-handed tactics during their large-scale operations to arrest illegals in Malaysia.⁵²⁴ There were reports which indicated that some migrants had been verbally and physically assaulted by RELA members.⁵²⁵ Front Ganyang Malaysia entailed the intention to retaliate against the alleged RELA's attacks on Indonesian illegals by using the perceived same tactic – which was to recruit volunteers across Indonesia to confront Malaysia.

10, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KUALALUMPUR908_a.html (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵²¹ Ibid.

⁵²² Ibid. Also see "Malaysia, Indonesia Mending Fences Over Maid Abuse," *The Jakarta Post*, November 12, 2009.

⁵²³ Ibid.

⁵²⁴ "Indonesia, Malaysia Row Over Diplomat's wife 'detention'," *Asiaone*, October 10, 2007, <http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest+News/Story/A1Story20071011-29499.html> (accessed 25th June 2014).

⁵²⁵ Christine B.N. Chin, "'Diversification' and 'Privatisation': Securing Insecurities in the Receiving Country of Malaysia," *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 9, no.4 (December 2008): 295.

Likewise a group called Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat (Bendera) – the People’s Democratic Front – was also active in recruiting volunteers in Indonesia, talking of waging a war against Malaysia.⁵²⁶ Bendera was being formed by a small group of Indonesians in 2009.⁵²⁷ Armed with bamboo spears, Bendera’s volunteers set up roadblocks in Jakarta in September 2009, trying to search for Malaysians passing by and aiming to detain them.⁵²⁸ “If we had caught them [Malaysians], we would have sent them home,” Bendera’s coordinator said.⁵²⁹ It was clear, Bendera’s approach was its tit for tat response to Malaysia using its volunteer security force to arrest and deport Indonesian illegals. The Indonesian police had removed Bendera’s volunteers from the streets.⁵³⁰ Bendera later alleged that it had 1500 volunteers who were ready to go to war with Malaysia.⁵³¹

A survey indicated that Indonesians’ perception of Malaysia had been moving towards a negative direction. In 2006, Malaysia was ranked by Indonesians as the state that they felt closest to.⁵³² It had dropped to 11th position in 2012.⁵³³ A survey conducted in five Indonesian major cities in 2009 revealed that the majority of respondents perceived Malaysia as threatening Indonesia’s sovereignty – which was 60.5% of the total number of respondents.⁵³⁴ This was followed by Singapore, in which only 20.4% of the respondents deemed that Singapore was a threat to Indonesia’s sovereignty.⁵³⁵ There were numerous anti-Malaysia columns and editorials in Indonesia’s media.⁵³⁶

⁵²⁶ “Indonesian Vigilantes Prepare For Battle in Malaysia,” *JakartaGlobe* September 25, 2009. “Malaysia and Indonesia Try to Mend Ties,” *BBC News*, November 12, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8355417.stm> (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ Ibid. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours?’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no.1 (2012): 3.

⁵²⁹ “Indonesian Vigilantes Prepare For Battle in Malaysia,” *JakartaGlobe* September 25, 2009.

⁵³⁰ Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours?’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” 3.

⁵³¹ Ibid. Also see “Indonesian Vigilantes Prepare For Battle in Malaysia,” *JakartaGlobe* September 25, 2009.

⁵³² “Indonesians Grow Cool Towards Malaysia,” *ABC Radio Australia*, March 21, 2012, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2012-03-21/indonesians-grow-cool-towards-malaysia/482528> (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ Guido Benny, “The Indonesian Nationalism and Perceived Threats of Neighbouring Countries: Public Opinion toward the ASEAN Community,” *International Journal on Social Science Economics & Art* 2, no.3 (2012): 40, 43.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Marshall Clark, “The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 397.

Some Indonesian politicians called for boycotts of Malaysian goods.⁵³⁷ A prominent Indonesian journalist had pointed out that Indonesians generally chose not to go to Petronas petrol station to refuel their vehicles.⁵³⁸ Petronas – Malaysia’s national oil company – was an obvious symbol of Malaysia, specifically Malay-Malaysia.

With the proliferation of anti-Malaysia sentiments in Indonesia’s society, the common culture of Indonesia and Malaysia emerged as a new issue of contention between the two states. Indonesians since 2006 began to assert that Malaysia had been trying to steal Indonesia’s cultural heritage.⁵³⁹ The notion of “steal” had its origins in Indonesia’s loss of Sipadan and Ligitan. As Indonesians saw it, Malaysia had “stolen” or “robbed” the two islands from Indonesia. The humiliation and resentments which stemmed from the loss of the two islands almost certainly contributed to Indonesians’ view that Malaysia attempted to steal their culture.

Indonesians before long started to call Malaysia as *Malingsia*, meaning “Malaysia thief”.⁵⁴⁰ *Malingsia* was derived from the word *malang* – a Javanese word meaning “thief”.⁵⁴¹ A series of culture had been stolen by Malaysia from Indonesia, Indonesians maintained.⁵⁴² The folk song *Rasa Sayang* – Indonesians argued – was originated from Indonesia’s Moluccan Islands; same with the *Reog Ponorogo* dance which was originated from East Java.⁵⁴³ Indonesians stressed that Malaysia had stolen the two cultural forms from them.⁵⁴⁴ *Rasa Sayang* and *Reog Ponorogo* had been featured in Malaysia’s tourism commercials as part of its 2007 tourism promotion campaign termed as *Malaysia Truly Asia*.⁵⁴⁵

Later, Indonesians alleged that the melody of *Negaraku* – Malaysia’s national anthem – was plagiarised from an Indonesian song called *Terang Bulan*, which was first

⁵³⁷ “Asia: No Brotherly Love; Indonesia and Malaysia,” *The Economist*, 13th October 2007: 77.

⁵³⁸ Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁵³⁹ Marshall Clark, “The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 406. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁵⁴⁰ Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 401, 406.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid.

⁵⁴² Ibid. 398-400. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours?’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no.1 (2012): 2-3.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 398-400, 406. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours?’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” 2. Also see “Hopping Mad Indonesians Demonstrate Against Malaysia,” November 30, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07JAKARTA3289_a.html (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

recorded in Indonesia in 1956.⁵⁴⁶ It was later found out that *Negaraku* and *Terang Bulan* were in fact adaptations of a nineteenth century French composition called *La Rosalie*.⁵⁴⁷

Indonesians too protested strongly against the alleged stealing of the Balinese temple dance – *pendet* – by Malaysia.⁵⁴⁸ In August 2009, Discovery Channel broadcasted a documentary on Malaysia featuring a *pendet* dance performed by two Balinese dancers.⁵⁴⁹ Demonstrations were being staged in front of Malaysia's embassy in Jakarta to protest against the alleged appropriation with protesters chanting "*Ganjang Malaysia!*" – Crush Malaysia – and pelting the embassy with rotten eggs and rocks.⁵⁵⁰ Discovery Networks Asia-Pacific subsequently issued an official apology to Indonesia, explaining that the *pendet* dance clip used in the documentary was sourced from a third party.⁵⁵¹

It was essentially a combination of Indonesians' desire to compete with Malaysia and their sense of superiority over Malaysia that prompted Indonesians' assertion that their culture had been stolen by Malaysia.

Most of the cultural forms that Indonesians deemed to have been stolen by Malaysia were ones that had been used to promote Malaysia's tourism industry. Malaysia utilized these cultural forms to generate income. Understandably, Indonesians wanted to prevent Malaysia from doing so as they themselves could make use of those cultural forms to create wealth for Indonesia. In November 2007, around one thousand Indonesians launched a demonstration outside Malaysia's embassy in Jakarta in protest of Malaysia

⁵⁴⁶ Marshall Clark, "The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 399. Also see Candra Malik, "Malaysian Anthem Actually Indonesian, Says Record Company," *JakartaGlobe*, August 29, 2009.

⁵⁴⁷ Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 399. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, "'Mine, Yours or Ours?': The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage," *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no.1 (2012): 11-12.

⁵⁴⁸ Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 399-400. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, "'Mine, Yours or Ours?': The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage," 1-3. Also see "Hopping Mad Indonesians Demonstrate Against Malaysia," November 30, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07JAKARTA3289_a.html (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid. Also see "Storm Over 'Stealing' of Balinese Dance," *Malaysiakini*, September 2, 2009, <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/111938> (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵⁵¹ Chong Jinn Winn, "'Mine, Yours or Ours?': The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage," 1-2.

using *Rasa Sayang* and *Reog Ponorogo* in its tourism commercials.⁵⁵² “We want the Malaysian government to stop copying our cultural heritage,” one of the protesters told the media.⁵⁵³ In other words, the protesters wanted Malaysia’s government to stop using what supposed to be Indonesia-Malaysia common culture to generate wealth for Malaysians. “Malaysia thief!” the protesters shouted.⁵⁵⁴ *Malingsia* – Malaysia thief – could also be understood as “*maling asal Asia*”, meaning Asia’s thief.⁵⁵⁵ Indonesians employed the notion of “Asia’s thief”, aiming to undermine Malaysia’s tourism promotion campaign known as *Malaysia Truly Asia*.⁵⁵⁶

Indonesians’ desire to prevent Malaysia from using their common culture to promote Malaysia’s economic growth strengthened, and strengthened by, their sense of superiority over Malaysia.

In the eyes of Indonesians, Malaysia’s culture was provided by Indonesia. Malaysia was culturally inferior, when compared to Indonesia. In response to the issue of *Rasa Sayang* and *Reog Ponorogo*, Indonesians asserted: “Malaysians don’t have their own culture so they steal Indonesia’s...They should find their own identity!”⁵⁵⁷

Indonesia’s assertion of its ownership over batik – a traditional wax-resistant dyeing technique – also reflected the mutually reinforcing dynamics of its will to compete with Malaysia and its sense of superiority over Malaysia.

Indonesia accused Malaysia of appropriating batik that belonged to Indonesia.⁵⁵⁸ The Indonesian government moved to lodge a claim with UNESCO for batik to be listed as a distinctly Indonesian intangible heritage item, aiming to curb the development of the batik industry in Malaysia, especially Malaysia’s efforts to market its batik products

⁵⁵² “Hopping Mad Indonesians Demonstrate Against Malaysia,” November 30, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07JAKARTA3289_a.html (accessed 30th June 2014). Also see Marshall Clark, “The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 399-400. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no.1 (2012): 2.

⁵⁵³ “Hopping Mad Indonesians Demonstrate Against Malaysia,” November 30, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07JAKARTA3289_a.html (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 406.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁷ “Hopping Mad Indonesians Demonstrate Against Malaysia,” November 30, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07JAKARTA3289_a.html (accessed 30th June 2014).

⁵⁵⁸ “Rivals of the East: Battle for Batik,” *The Independent*, September 28, 2009. Also see Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 398.

abroad.⁵⁵⁹ In September 2009, UNESCO announced its decision to recognize batik as a distinctly Indonesian intangible cultural heritage.⁵⁶⁰ The decision was being treated as a victory in Indonesia.⁵⁶¹ To celebrate the “victory”, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono called for all Indonesians to wear batik on 2nd October 2009, the day when UNESCO officially announced the recognition.⁵⁶²

The success in winning the recognition of UNESCO boosted Indonesians’ sense of superiority over Malaysia. Indonesia’s Culture and Tourism Minister, Jero Wacik, emphasized: “Malaysia could no longer claim batik as its cultural heritage because Indonesia has proven its case...If Malaysia still wants to challenge UNESCO’s decision, go ahead. But, it would be better if it tried its own creation.”⁵⁶³ In the eyes of Indonesians, Malaysia was lack of culture or at least Malaysia’s culture was inferior to Indonesia’s.

Indonesians’ sense of superiority over Malaysia, in the meantime, toughened their resolve to compete with Malaysia. Jero Wacik asserted: “We will keep fighting for our heritage one tradition at a time.”⁵⁶⁴ Batik was the third cultural forms that Indonesia had secured UNESCO’s recognition as a distinctly Indonesia’s cultural heritage after *Wayang Kulit* and *Kris*.⁵⁶⁵ All together there were four cultural forms – *Kris*, *Wayang Kulit*, *Batik* and *Angklung* – in which Indonesia had brought to UNESCO to seek for its

⁵⁵⁹ “Indonesians Tell Malaysians ‘Hands off Our Batik’,” *The Telegraph*, October 5, 2009. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours?’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no.1 (2012): 28-29, 31-32. Also see Marshall Clark, “The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 411.

⁵⁶⁰ “Score One for Indonesia in the War over Batik,” *The New York Times*, September 14, 2009. Also see Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 400, 411.

⁵⁶¹ “Indonesians Tell Malaysians ‘Hands off Our Batik’,” *The Telegraph*, October 5, 2009. Also see Chong Jinn Winn, “‘Mine, Yours or Ours?’: The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage,” 31-32.

⁵⁶² “Indonesians Tell Malaysians ‘Hands off Our Batik’,” *The Telegraph*, October 5, 2009. Also see “Score One for Indonesia in the War over Batik,” *The New York Times*, September 14, 2009. Also see “Administration Calls for All-in Batik Day This Friday,” *The Jakarta Post*, September 29, 2009.

⁵⁶³ “UNESCO: Batik is Indonesian Heritage,” *Waspada Online*, October 2, 2009, http://waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55879:-unesco-batik-is-indonesian-heritage&catid=30:english-news&Itemid=94 (accessed 3rd July 2014).

⁵⁶⁴ “Batik Selected for UNESCO Cultural Heritage List,” *The Jakarta Post*, September 8, 2009.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

recognition.⁵⁶⁶ The four items were all the common culture of Indonesia and Malaysia.⁵⁶⁷

Malaysia's batik industry, however, is not threatened by UNESCO's decision.⁵⁶⁸ UNESCO's intangible heritage listing of batik "neither puts a patent on batik's production nor grants intellectual property right protection".⁵⁶⁹

An author's comment on Malaysia's batik reflects Malaysians' sense of being sophisticated vis-à-vis Indonesia – that Malaysia was technologically and industrially more advanced than Indonesia:⁵⁷⁰

More often they [Malaysia's batik] are creations that display all the characteristics of works of art – originality of composition and design, effective use of colour, a high level of technical expertise and, above all, a flair for working in the medium of batik...the old system of anonymous artisans is giving way before a new style and organization of the batik industry that encourages individual talent and promotes recognized batik designers and artists.

The Malaysian government was actively promoting Malaysia's batik industry.⁵⁷¹ It required all the government servants to wear batik once a week.⁵⁷² The Chief Secretary to Malaysia's government, however, issued an order with regard to the wearing of batik: "it will have to be Malaysian batik, of course."⁵⁷³

No More *Serumpun*?

It had become increasingly common for Indonesians to assert that: no more *serumpun* between Indonesia and Malaysia.⁵⁷⁴ For decades, people of the two states had been

⁵⁶⁶ Chong Jinn Winn, "'Mine, Yours or Ours?': The Indonesia-Malaysia Disputes over Shared Cultural Heritage," *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 27, no.1 (2012): 31-32.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁸ Marshall Clark, "The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 407.

⁵⁶⁹ "Indonesia Cut From a Different Cloth," *Asia Times Online*, October 3, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KJ03Ae02.html (accessed 3rd July 2014).

⁵⁷⁰ Azlina Yunus Noor, *Malaysian Batik: Reinventing a Tradition* (Singapore: Tuttle Publishing, 2011), 10, quoted in Marshall Clark, "The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 41, no.121 (2013): 410-411.

⁵⁷¹ Marshall Clark, *The Politics of Heritage: Indonesia-Malaysia Cultural Contestations*, 407.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ "Thursday is Batik Day," *The Star*, January 16, 2008.

⁵⁷⁴ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Interview 924-001, Kuala Lumpur, 24th September 2012.

using the *serumpun* concept to describe the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship. The rise of the anti-Malaysia sentiments in Indonesia since the early 2000s gave birth to Indonesians' willingness to advocate that no more special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia.

The Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship, nonetheless, continues to exist. Anti-Malaysia sentiments in Indonesia reflect precisely the presence of substantial conflicts in a special relationship. The hypothesis of this thesis points out that a special relationship produces substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts between the two states involved. The conflicts are produced by the intertwined three sources of conflict that are embedded in such a relationship.

Indonesia and Malaysia share a sense of a basis that exists between them, which – in their view – emerged after the Confrontation.⁵⁷⁵ That basis is the existence of the strategic cooperation – substantial cooperation – between them. Indonesia and Malaysia rely on each other to ensure that the Malay World continues to function as a shield that protects their existence as states build around the Malay way of life. The shield is manifested in the form of ASEAN. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are of the view that they are the central force in ASEAN.⁵⁷⁶ Former Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, argued in his speech in December 2009: "...both governments [Indonesia and Malaysia] with a combined population of about 280 million, could reach decisions in ASEAN without being questioned."⁵⁷⁷ In 2011, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments had jointly proposed to turn *Bahasa Indonesia-Melayu* – the Malay Language – into an ASEAN language on the basis that the majority population in ASEAN use the language.⁵⁷⁸ When discussed about the proposal, Malaysia's Information, Communications and Culture Minister, Dr. Rais Yatim, emphasized that *Bahasa Indonesia* and *Bahasa Melayu* were "rich and complete just like American English and British English".⁵⁷⁹ The Anglo-American Special Relationship is a famous and prominent bilateral tie in international politics.

⁵⁷⁵ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁵⁷⁶ Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁵⁷⁷ "Look at Big Picture, Dr. M Advises Both Countries," *New Straits Times*, December 9, 2009.

⁵⁷⁸ "Bahasa Indonesia-Melayu As ASEAN Language," *Bernama*, November 17, 2011.

⁵⁷⁹ "Strive for Bahasa Melayu and Indonesia to Become Respected Languages," *Bernama*, September 23, 2011.

The military tie between Indonesia and Malaysia remains the closest among all other bilateral security ties in ASEAN.⁵⁸⁰ The Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces maintains all levels of collaborations between them.⁵⁸¹ The two states' armies, navies, and air forces continue to carry out their regular joint exercises within the framework of GBC.⁵⁸² The former Secretary General of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned earlier described the closeness between the Indonesian and Malaysian armed forces: "An Indonesian army general will say 'We must defend Ambalat!'; the next day you will see him enjoying a drink with his Malaysian counterparts in Kota Kinabalu [Sabah, Malaysia]."⁵⁸³

Indonesia's and Malaysia's governments continue to emphasize the closeness between the two states. Indonesia's President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, made Malaysia his first trip abroad after being re-elected as Indonesia's President in 2009.⁵⁸⁴ He declared during the visit: "Malaysia is the closest friend to Indonesia."⁵⁸⁵ The top leaders of the two states maintain a very close relationship.⁵⁸⁶ When asked which world leaders did he has a good relationship with, former Malaysia's Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, said: "I had good relations with everyone. But one of those I was particularly close to was Indonesia's Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono."⁵⁸⁷

Observers from both sides confirmed that there is a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, acknowledging the coexistence of the two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – in the relations.⁵⁸⁸

When asked whether Indonesia and Malaysia share common strategic interests, the reply of the former Secretary General of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was: "Definitely, definitely, we [Indonesia and Malaysia] share common strategic interests,

⁵⁸⁰ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.

⁵⁸² For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 262-266.

⁵⁸³ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

⁵⁸⁴ "Indonesian President Yudhoyono's Visit to Malaysia," November 19, 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09KUALALUMPUR935.html> (accessed 28th June 2014).

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid. Also see Interview 926-001, Kuala Lumpur, 26th September 2012. Also see "RI, Malaysia Navies Make Peace Following Ambalat Incident," *The Jakarta Post*, April 16, 2005.

⁵⁸⁷ Abdullah Badawi, "Doing the Invisible: A Conversation with Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi," in *Awakening – The Abdullah Badawi Years in Malaysia*, ed. Bridget Welsh and James U.H. Chin (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2013), 20.

⁵⁸⁸ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012. Also see Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012. Also see Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012.

just look at how we formed ASEAN.”⁵⁸⁹ The forming of ASEAN was an expression of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship.⁵⁹⁰ An Indonesian diplomat, on the other hand, said: “We [Indonesia and Malaysia] are more than neighbours; we are brothers.”⁵⁹¹

The observers, however, recognized the importance of power in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship. The Indonesian diplomat explained: “It’s different from Singapore; the only larger neighbour that we [Indonesia] have is Malaysia. That’s why this [ties with Malaysia] is special for us.”⁵⁹² The prominent Indonesian journalist mentioned earlier, meanwhile, opined: “It is still a special relationship [Indonesia-Malaysia relations]. We are closer than our respective ties with Singapore and Australia. We can’t find this kind of relationship [Indonesia-Malaysia relations] with others. Maybe with Brunei, but Brunei is small.”⁵⁹³

The hypothesis of this thesis indicates that each of the two states sharing common identities needs to own a necessary amount of power before they could share a special relationship. The amount of power owned by Malaysia – unlike that of Singapore and Brunei – has surpassed a level that secures Indonesia’s recognition of its special ties with Malaysia.

In fact, there was no special relationship between Brunei and Indonesia or Brunei and Malaysia even though the three states were bound by their common Malay way of life.⁵⁹⁴ Brunei is always wary of being dominated by Indonesia or Malaysia.⁵⁹⁵ It maintains a competitive security posture against Malaysia. Brunei forges extremely close military ties with Singapore in the face of the perceived threat from Malaysia.⁵⁹⁶ Instead of maintaining a competitive security posture, two states that share a special relationship will defuse their defence against one another, which is an outcome of their shared war avoidance norms that come with the emergence of the relationship.

⁵⁸⁹ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

⁵⁹⁰ For more discussion see Chapter 6, pg 248-256.

⁵⁹¹ Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012.

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Interview 1011, Jakarta, 11th October 2012.

⁵⁹⁴ Anthony Reid, “*Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities*,” in *Contesting Malayness – Malay Identity Across Boundaries*, ed. Timothy P. Barnard (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), 2-3.

⁵⁹⁵ Interview 917, Kuala Lumpur, 17th September 2012.

⁵⁹⁶ Tim Huxley, “Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance?” *The Pacific Review* 4, no.3 (1991): 209-210.

While Indonesia and Malaysia share a special relationship, each of them, however, has a closer economic tie with Singapore when compared to that between them. In 2008, Singapore accounted for 9.4% of Indonesia's total export, and Malaysia was at 4.7%.⁵⁹⁷ In that same year, Singapore accounted for 14.6% of Malaysia's total export, and Indonesia was at 0.31%.⁵⁹⁸ Singapore was the largest foreign investor in Indonesia in 2012.⁵⁹⁹

One, however, has to remember that China is Japan's biggest trading partner.⁶⁰⁰ Yet, Japan-China relations are characterized by their explicit strategic competition, rather than mutual strategic dependence. In other words, close economic ties between two states do not necessarily mean that the two states are strategically dependent on each other or sharing a sense of closeness towards one another.

Obviously, Indonesia's and Malaysia's respective relations with Singapore have been defined by their respective strategic competition with Singapore, not strategic cooperation. Singapore had repeatedly made it clear to Malaysia that it would not hesitate to go to war with Malaysia if Malaysia's government threatens to cut off Singapore's water supply from Johor.⁶⁰¹ When enraged by a series of Singapore's behaviours in 2000, Indonesia's President, Abdulrahman Wahid, during his speech at the Indonesian embassy in Singapore accused Singaporeans of underestimating the Malays and suggested that Indonesia and Malaysia could cut off water supplies to Singapore.⁶⁰²

The economic ties between Indonesia and Malaysia had become closer over the years. Malaysia's export to Indonesia, for example, had increased by 166% between 2000 and

⁵⁹⁷ http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/indonesia/export-import.html (accessed 3rd July 2014).

⁵⁹⁸ Exports by Country of Destination, 1990-2014, <http://www.epu.gov.my/en/external-trade> (accessed 25th April 2014)

⁵⁹⁹ <http://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/bkpm-japan-replaced-singapore-as-the-biggest-investor-in-indonesia-in-2013/item1551> (accessed 3rd July 2014).

⁶⁰⁰ "Could Asia Really Go to War Over These?" *The Economist*, 22nd September 2012: 11.

⁶⁰¹ Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy 1957-2007* (Singapore: Talisman Publishing, 2007), 225-226.

⁶⁰² Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *Singapore in the Malay World – Building and Breaching Regional Bridges* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 164.

2009.⁶⁰³ During the same period, Malaysia's export to Singapore had increased by just 12.3%.⁶⁰⁴ Malaysia was the fourth largest foreign investor in Indonesia in 2008.⁶⁰⁵

The hypothesis of this thesis has pointed out that the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary, if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. Because of the absence of an overwhelmingly powerful one between the two, the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship remains as a security regime, not a security community. Indonesia-Malaysia relations are fundamentally competitive. The two states continue to understand each other in egoistic terms. Each of them is convinced that the counterpart will not use force to settle their disputes, yet no one is certain about it. Indonesia and Malaysia continue to carry out their respective regular military exercises and patrols in the disputed area in Ambalat.

Observers from both sides acknowledged the existence of substantial conflicts in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship. "The Indonesia-Malaysia relationship is special because there is conflict. It doesn't happen between Malaysia and Thailand," said the former Secretary General of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁰⁶ "Conflict between brothers sometimes is worse than their respective conflict with other people. This is always the case," said the Indonesian diplomat.⁶⁰⁷

The Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship – like other special relationships – produces double-edged effects – substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts. The US-Canada Special Relationship, on the one hand, is one of the closest military alliances in the world; yet on the other, anti-Americanism remains as the premise of Canadian Nationalism.⁶⁰⁸ The Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship has the same quality. A Malaysian commentator described the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia: "*benci tapi rindu*" – we hate each other yet we miss each other.⁶⁰⁹ An

⁶⁰³ Exports by Country of Destination, 1990-2014, <http://www.epu.gov.my/en/external-trade> (accessed 25th April 2014)

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ http://www.kln.gov.my/web/idn_jakarta/history (accessed 3rd July 2014).

⁶⁰⁶ Interview 920, Kuala Lumpur, 20th September 2012.

⁶⁰⁷ Interview 1008, Jakarta, 8th October 2012.

⁶⁰⁸ Srdjan Vucetic, M.A, "The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations" (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008), 182.

⁶⁰⁹ Noraini Razak, "Hubungan Benci Tapi Rindu Tiada Kesudahan," *Utusan Malaysia*, June 26, 2012.

Indonesian analyst revealed his appreciation of Malaysia: “Sometimes I see Malaysia as my brother; sometimes I see it as my enemy.”⁶¹⁰

⁶¹⁰ Interview 1012, Jakarta, 12th October 2012.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis has provided an explanation of what is a special relationship, its dynamics, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community.

Through reviewing the existing literature, the thesis had identified the essence of a special relationship, the relationship's expressions, and the circumstances in which such a relationship will emerge. It had also – through the review of literature – confirmed that a special relationship and a pluralistic security community are essentially interlinked. The thesis had then developed a theoretical framework based upon the constructivist theory in order to establish an explanation of the dynamics of a special relationship, and its transformation into a pluralistic security community. The histories of Anglo-American and US-Canada relations from the 1850s to the 1960s are the historical evidences that have been used by the framework to substantiate its explanation.

The hypothesis of the thesis had been verified through the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1957 to 2009.

The following section outlines the key findings of this thesis. The chapter is subsequently ended with its discussion of the thesis's contributions to the study of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations.

8.1 Summary of Key Findings

As discussed in Chapter 2, a special relationship between two states emerges when two sources of closeness coexist in their relations – that of the two states' common identities and shared strategic interests. The two states concerned identify positively with each other owing to their two sources of closeness which result in them sharing an understanding that their relationship is closer than their other bilateral relations. The shared understanding in turn stirs up the two states' respective expectation that their relationship should be closer than other bilateral ties either of them enjoys.

Chapter 2 had revealed that a certain condition needs to be in place before two states bound by their common identities could share common strategic interests.

A state's identities give birth to its strategic understanding. Common identities of two states, therefore, produce their similar strategic understandings. Yet, having similar

strategic apprehensions do not necessarily mean the two states concerned share common strategic interests. In other words, two states sharing similar strategic understandings rooted in common identities might not rely on each other for survival. The two states concerned each needs to own a necessary amount of power, in order to shape their similar strategic apprehensions into their common strategic interests. That said, in a special relationship, common strategic interests of the two states concerned are founded on their similar strategic understandings rooted in common identities, and created by their necessary amount of power. Viewed in this light, a special relationship is produced – that is the coexistence of common identities and shared strategic interests in a bilateral tie – when, at the very least, power balance exists between the two states involved.

Chapter 2 subsequently moved to define the meaning of a pluralistic security community constituted by two sovereign states. A pluralistic security community is a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain *dependable expectations of peaceful change*. Dependable expectations of peaceful change means the ability of the actors concerned to know that neither of them would prepare or even consider to use violence as a means to resolve their disputes. Two states sharing an understanding of collective self maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change among them. Because they understand each other as part of self, the two states concerned identify each other's needs, goals and fate as those of their very own; hence, they view violent conflict between them as unthinkable, for waging a war against each other means threatening their own identity.

Two elements have been identified by existing literature of security communities as crucial for triggering the emergence of a pluralistic security community – that of the power of the states involved and their common identities. Such an observation points to the fact that a special relationship and a pluralistic security community are essentially interrelated. Both the concepts represent a relationship of common identities as well as power between two states.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 combined constitute the theoretical framework of a special relationship.

A special relationship is characterized by its double-edged effects. It produces substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts between the two states involved.

Substantial cooperation in a special relationship are strategic partnerships between the two states involved. Both rely on each other for survival.

Strategic cooperation between two states sharing special ties are the outcomes of the combination of the three sources of cooperation in the relationship – that of the two states' common identities, shared strategic interests, and the matching of their mutual expectation with their respective intention. The coexistence of common identities and shared strategic interests between two states sharing a special relationship gives rise to their mutual need for strategic cooperation. Both expect the other's move for such cooperation. The expectation is matched by the counterpart's intention to collaborate, substantial cooperation between the two states as a result ensued.

Substantial conflicts in a special relationship, on the other hand, are the outcomes of the intertwined three sources of conflict in the relationship.

Three sources of conflict are embedded in a special relationship: power competition between the two states involved; their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart; and the mismatch of expectation between them. The three sources of conflict, through their mutual reinforcements, produce substantial conflicts between two states sharing a special relationship.

The presence of power balance between two states sharing a special relationship is a cause for power competition between them. When power balance exists in a special relationship, no one in the relationship is in a dominant position. Hence, the two states concerned compete with each other for dominance, prevent its counterpart from becoming a dominant power, so as to ensure their respective survival.

On the other hand, as the respective national identity of two states bound by a special relationship is founded on their pre-modern common ethnic/cultural identities, there are inevitable similarities in the national identities of the two states concerned. The two states, therefore, need to emphasize their difference based on their common ethnic/cultural identities, so as to ensure their respective distinctive existence in the world of nations. In other words, because they are similar, they need to enhance their difference.

The differentiation is expressed in terms of a sense of superiority. The power politics between two states with special ties, combined with the sense of uniqueness of their

respective national identity vis-à-vis the counterpart, create the two states' sense of superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart. The superiority complex has the element of power politics because it is founded on the power politics-induced mindset of comparison.

The respective determination of two states with special ties to compete with one another strengthened, and strengthened by their drives to assert the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart.

Also, power competition between two states sharing a special relationship leads to the mismatch of expectation between them.

The expression of competitive behaviours by one of the states in a special relationship towards its counterpart is at odd with the counterpart's expectation that it should not be treated in such a way since they share a close relation, which is closer than their other bilateral ties. The mismatch of expectation produces the resentments of the state – who is being treated competitively by its counterpart – towards its counterpart, and its tit for tat measures to bolster its power ensued.

The intertwined three sources of conflict that are embedded in a special relationship, breed and enhance the negative identifications between the two states involved. As a result, the two states understand each other in egoistic terms, hence, sharing conflictual intersubjective understandings. In other words, while two states sharing a special relationship identify positively with each other, their understanding of one another remains fundamentally competitive.

A special relationship constitutes a security regime. A security regime refers to the war avoidance norms around which expectations of the states involved converge. Each of the states observes the norms in the belief that others will reciprocate.

A security regime is built on the existence of power balance between the states involved. The presence of power balance between states serves as a basis of order among them. A basis of order means the states concerned coexist peacefully. There is no war between them in a significant period of time. Because of the presence of power balance between states, the states concerned find it very costly to turn their conflicts into violent ones. Each of them does not possess the military capacity to prevail over the others, yet each has the capacity to defend itself against the attack of the counterparts.

The power balance hinders the states concerned from plunging into a war against one another, hence they coexist peacefully.

The war avoidance norms – namely a security regime – in a special relationship are produced by the two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – of the two states involved. The two sources of closeness generate the two states' mutual aspiration for peace, which are strong enough to give birth to their shared war avoidance norms. A special relationship – a security regime – therefore is more than a basis of order between the two states involved. States in a special relationship or security regime based upon their peaceful coexistence observe their shared war avoidance norms, which are interweaved with their mutual aspiration for peace, namely, positive identifications between them. The order engendered by a balance of power entails no positive identifications between the states involved.

The two states in a special relationship are committed to avoiding war between them while expecting the counterpart to have the same commitment. In other words, the two states' mutual expectations – that the counterpart would commit to avoiding war between them – have been persistently matched by their respective intention to ensure the absence of war between them. A special relationship – as being a security regime – therefore engenders the convergence of expectations of the two states involved around their shared war avoidance norms. The convergence of expectations means that two states with special ties share reasonable expectations of peaceful change: war between them is unlikely, not unthinkable; each of them is convinced that the counterpart will not use force to settle their disputes, yet no one is certain about it. That said, while a special relationship produces substantial conflicts between the two states concerned, their respective commitment to adhere to their shared war avoidance norms serves to prevent such conflicts from easily turning into violent ones.

War avoidance norms in a special relationship lead to reasonable expectations of peaceful change between the two states involved. Apart from generating constitutive effects on the two states' respective understanding of self vis-à-vis the other, the norms are also interwoven with the two states' mutual positive identifications, as two states with special ties identify positively with each other. The presence of war avoidance norms in a special relationship therefore marks the beginning of the consolidation of peaceful change between the two states concerned, into dependable expectations of

peaceful change between them. States involved maintain among them dependable expectations of peaceful change, when they share a collective-self understanding, which emerges through their positive identifications. Viewed in this light, a special relationship – which constitutes a security regime – serves as the basis for the two states involved to transform into a pluralistic security community. Dependable expectations of peaceful change is the defining feature of a pluralistic security community. States in a pluralistic security community share an understanding of collective-self.

The presence of power imbalance in a special relationship is necessary if it is to transform into a pluralistic security community. Two states with special ties share an understanding of collective-self, namely, they constitute a pluralistic security community, when one of them has become overwhelmingly powerful.

The weaker state in a special relationship views its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart as part of self as it will become fundamentally dependent on its mighty counterpart for survival, namely, for securing its way of life. The immense power of the strong state in a special relationship protects its way of life, which covers that of its weaker counterpart. The two states share similar way of life, which is derived from their common identities. Their similar way of life continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics.

On the other hand, the overwhelmingly powerful state in a special relationship will also view its weaker counterpart as part of self due to two reasons. First, it is able to express its dominance over its weaker counterpart, owing to its role as the weaker counterpart's security guarantor; consequently, such dominant behaviours will not turn into confrontational ones. In other words, its negative associations with its weaker counterpart have been prevented. The weaker state in a special relationship has to accept the dominance of its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart, and cease its confrontational behaviours against the counterpart, as it is counting on the immense power of its counterpart to safeguard its survival.

The second reason that results in the overwhelmingly powerful state in a special relationship to view its weaker counterpart as part of self is that it is strategically dependent on its weaker counterpart. The overwhelmingly powerful state in a special relationship relies on its weaker counterpart to constitute its international strategic

preponderance, which ultimately protect its own survival, namely, its way of life. Such preponderance continues to be challenged by culturally different Powers.

In a nutshell, the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship produces the collective-self understanding of the two states involved. The power imbalance also functions as a basis of peace between the two states. The weaker state in a special relationship ceases its confrontational behaviours against its overwhelmingly powerful counterpart. On the other hand, the dominant behaviours of the overwhelmingly powerful one in the relationship have been mostly accepted by its weaker counterpart, and partially defused by its strategic reliance on the weaker counterpart; hence, its confrontational behaviours against its weaker counterpart have been prevented. The power imbalance in a special relationship, therefore, ensures the absence of confrontation between the two states involved.

With them viewing each other as part of self, shielded by the absence of confrontation between them, the reasonable expectations of peaceful change shared by the two states in a special relationship consolidates into their mutual dependable expectations of peaceful change. In the eyes of the two states concerned, armed conflicts between them are no longer unlikely; such conflicts have become impossible, for an attack on the counterpart means an attack on itself. The power imbalance in a special relationship transforms the shared war avoidance norms of the two states involved, into their shared intersubjective appreciation that war between them is unthinkable. Because of the presence of power imbalance in a special relationship, the mutual aspiration for peace of the two states involved, generated by their two sources of closeness, have been converted into their capacity to maintain peace between them – that of their ability to know that neither side would even consider using force against one another. In other words, the two states maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change between them. They constitute a security community, sharing cooperative intersubjective understandings.

Chapter 4, meanwhile, had vindicated the general observation in the existing literature – as revealed in Chapter 2 – that power of a strong state becomes a magnet for weaker states, when they share common identities. Among the states who share common identities, the power of the overwhelmingly powerful one protects its way of life, which covers those of its weaker counterparts. The weaker states – among the

states concerned – therefore, rally around their immensely powerful counterpart to secure their ways of life – which is to safeguard their survival – in the face of culturally different Powers, which seek to impose their own values in international politics. The weaker states – among the states sharing common identities – are attracted by the immense power of their mighty counterpart. The immense power of a strong state becomes a magnet for weaker states, because these states share similar way of life, which is derived from their common identities.

Chapter 4 had also confirmed that power imbalance among states serves as a basis of peace between them, when they share common identities. As explained earlier, because of their mutual strategic reliance in safeguarding their survival – that of their similar way of life, there is no confrontation between states sharing common identities when power imbalance exists between them. States bound by common identities share similar way of life. The presence of power imbalance in Anglo-American, US-Canada, and US-Western Europe relations functions as a basis of peace in each of the ties, because the two parties in each of the relations share common identities. The fact that those states in which power imbalance between them serves as an accelerator of war among them do not share common identities further vindicated the observation where power imbalance becomes a basis of peace only when the states concerned share common identities. Finland had been unyielding in its struggle against Russia's dominance – its overwhelmingly powerful neighbour – to protect the Finnish way of life, namely, to safeguard Finland's survival. The Finnish and the Russian ways of life are different. In other words, they do not share common identities.

The hypothesis of this thesis has been substantiated through the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1957 to 2009.

Chapter 5 had revealed that there was no special relationship between the Sukarno-led Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia, which was from 1957 to 1965. Indonesia and Malaysia are bound by their pre-modern common ethnic identities rooted in the Malay way of life. The Malay way of life forms the central character of the two states' respective national identity. Indonesia's and Malaysia's common identities gave birth to their similar strategic understandings of the regional order of archipelagic Southeast Asia. The two states viewed archipelagic Southeast Asia as one entity which reflected the Malay way of life – that of the Malay Archipelago or Malay World. For the

Indonesian and Malayan/Malaysian leaders, the Malay World served as a shield which safeguarded the survival of their respective state which were built around the Malay way of life.

While sharing similar strategic understandings, Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia did not share common strategic interests. Indonesia aimed for its strategic preponderance over Malaya/Malaysia; whereas Malaya/Malaysia desired for its mutual strategic dependence with Indonesia. Malaya did not possess the necessary amount of power that would engender Indonesia's recognition of its strategic reliance on Malaya. Whereas the amount of power owned by Indonesia had surpassed a level that produced Malaya's realization of its strategic dependence on Indonesia. Indonesia, meanwhile, did not immediately realize its mutual strategic dependence with Malaysia, during the period when Malaya had expanded into Malaysia. In short, the similar strategic understandings of Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia had not been shaped into their common strategic interests by the power owned by Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia. The two states were yet to rely on each other for survival. Two sources of closeness – common identities and common strategic interests – did not coexist in Sukarno-led Indonesia-Malaya/Malaysia relations. In other words, there was no special relationship between the two states.

The absence of special ties between Sukarno-led Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia meant that the two states did not constitute a security regime. They were not bound by their shared war avoidance norms. Indonesia wanted to dominate Malaya/Malaysia while Malaya/Malaysia believed that power balance existed between the two states. A basis of order did not exist between Sukarno-led Indonesia and Malaya/Malaysia. Consequently, Indonesia had shown no restraint to launch military attacks on the newly established Malaysia. It executed its policy of confrontation against the creation of Malaysia, which entailed continuous military incursions into Malaysia by the Indonesian armed forces. Indonesia wanted to prevent Malaya's expansion into Malaysia through its Confrontation campaign, aiming to strengthen its perceived preponderance in archipelagic Southeast Asia. The perceived preponderance reflected Indonesia's strategic understanding of viewing archipelagic Southeast Asia as the Malay World, which was a shield that protected Indonesia's survival. Indonesia strived for such preponderance to safeguard its integrity as a state.

Chapter 6 examined Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1966 to 1984. It had showed that a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia had emerged shortly after the fall of the Sukarno-regime.

Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia had been effectively defeated by Malaysia. Indonesia had subsequently come to the conclusion that the Confrontation campaign should be ended. Malaysia's power had succeeded in halting Indonesia's tendency to launch military attacks on it. Indonesia began to share the same understanding held by Malaysia that power balance existed between the two states. A basis of order had emerged between Indonesia and Malaysia. The two states began to coexist peacefully.

The presence of power balance between Indonesia and Malaysia was more than a basis of order between them. By the time where power balance existed between Indonesia and Malaysia, each of the two states began to possess the necessary amount of power that produced their mutual need for strategic cooperation, and consequently, generated positive identifications between them.

The two states acknowledged the need to establish a special relationship between them while they were moving towards ending Confrontation. Both by then shared a consensus that they should stand united so as to form the Malay World – a shield that protected their existence as states built around the Malay way of life. Indonesia and Malaysia needed each other's power to ensure that archipelagic Southeast Asia was the Malay World. Henceforth, two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – coexisted in Indonesia-Malaysia relations.

The official ending of Confrontation marked the establishment of a special relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia. Almost immediately after the ending of Confrontation, Indonesia and Malaysia moved to defuse their defence against one another. The easing of their defence against each other was an outcome of their shared war avoidance norms that had emerged with the emergence of their special ties. It was also a result of the two states' gesture of moving closer to one another. Very quickly, strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia ensued. The two states cooperated with each other to form the Malay World with the goal of securing their respective survival.

While Indonesia and Malaysia identified intimately with one another because of their special ties, the relationship between the two states was fundamentally competitive. Malaysia remained apprehensive of a possible armed attack from Indonesia on Malaysia. Because of the presence of power balance in their relations, Indonesia and Malaysia continued to compete with each other to secure their respective survival. The two states' egoistic understanding of one another in consequence had been sustained by the power competition between them. In other words, Indonesia and Malaysia did not share an understanding of collective-self. They were a security regime, not a security community. The prospect of an armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia had been reduced, not eliminated.

Chapter 7 examined Indonesia-Malaysia relations from 1985 to 2009. It had disclosed the double-edged effects – substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts – of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship.

By the mid-1980s, the unmistakable political supremacy of the indigenous people over the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as the Malay World's proven ability to function as a regional shield – in the form of ASEAN – for Indonesia and Malaysia, revealed that the Malay World had taken root in archipelagic Southeast Asia. Indonesia-Malaysia strategic cooperation – forming the Malay World – had become well established. It was as if the solid presence of the Malay World in archipelagic Southeast Asia had become a given for both Indonesia and Malaysia.

On the other hand, the intertwined three sources of conflict that were embedded in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship – their power competition; the assertion of the superiority of their respective national identity over that of their culturally similar counterpart; and the mismatch of expectation between them – bred and enhanced the negative identifications between the two states, which culminated in the proliferation of anti-Malaysia sentiments in Indonesia's society.

However, because of the war avoidance norms that existed in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship, the substantial conflicts between them had not been able to turn into violent ones. The two states had consistently adhered to their shared war avoidance norms when dealing with their territorial disputes. While Indonesia and Malaysia each had resorted to the show of force to demonstrate their respective resolve in defending

the territories claimed by both of them, the two states' war avoidance norms remained strong enough to prevent them from plunging into an armed conflict between them.

The absence of power imbalance in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship means that the relationship is unable to transform into a pluralistic security community. It remains as a security regime.

Table 8.1 in the following page provides an understanding of the conceptual relations between a security regime, a special relationship and a pluralistic security community.

Table 8.1: The Conceptual Relations between a Security Regime, a Special Relationship and a Pluralistic Security Community

Types of Bilateral Relations				Key Features	Key Factors				Examples of Bilateral Relations
					Common Identities	Common Strategic Interests	Power Balance	Power Imbalance	
A Basis of Order				Absence of War			√		France-Germany (1871-1914) China-India (since 1963)
Subset	Security Regime			War Avoidance Norms; War unlikely, but not unthinkable	√		√		Brazil-Argentina
	Subset	Special Relationship (a type of Security Regime)		Closer than their other bilateral ties, with substantial cooperation and substantial conflicts	√	√	√		US-Britain & US-Canada (began to emerge since the 1860s)
					√	√	√		Indonesia-Malaysia (since 1965)
	Subset	Pluralistic Security Community		Sharing a collective-self understanding; War is unthinkable	√	√		√	US-Britain & US-Canada (since the late 1930s)

Note √ = Yes

8.2 The Thesis's Contributions to the Study of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations

Through developing an understanding of a special relationship with theoretical foundations, this thesis aims at advancing better appreciation of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. It strengthens the existing understanding of Indonesia-Malaysia relations by not only explaining the bilateral tie through the lens of common identity, but explaining it through the lens of the interplay of power and common identity in the relationship.

Specifically, this thesis makes three substantive contributions to the study of Indonesia-Malaysia relations.

First, it has addressed the fundamental puzzle that has continued to plague the existing studies of Indonesia-Malaysia relations: that of why the supposedly special nature of Indonesia-Malaysia relations did not prevent the two states from plunging into armed conflict between them during the 1960s? This thesis explains that Indonesia and Malaysia had resorted to force in sorting out their dispute during their confrontation in the 1960s simply because there was no special relationship between them. The thesis's literature review has helped clarify the puzzle.

As the literature review has pointed out, two states sharing common identities each needs to own a necessary amount of power before they could share a special relationship. The fact that Malaya (later Malaysia) – from 1957 to 1965 – did not possess the necessary amount of power that would produce Indonesia's strategic reliance on Malaya meant that there was no special ties between the two states. Two sources of closeness – common identities and shared strategic interests – did not coexist in their relations. As pointed out earlier, a special relationship is produced when, at the very least, power balance exists between the two states concerned. The absence of special ties between Indonesia and Malaysia indicated the absence of power balance – hence a basis of order – between them. As a result, Indonesia and Malaya were unable to coexist peacefully. Indonesia had shown no restraint in launching military attacks on Malaya/Malaysia, aiming to prevent Malaya's expansion into Malaysia.

The focus of the existing studies of Indonesia-Malaysia relations on the factor of identity has led them to overlook the crucial role of power in the relations. As a consequence, their understandings of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship are bound to be problematic.

The second substantive contribution of this thesis is that it points out that conflict is not a dominant feature in Indonesia-Malaysia relations but rather a part of the double-edged effects of this special relationship.

The existing studies of Indonesia-Malaysia relations generally share the view that the bilateral tie is largely characterized by the conflicts between the two states. Liow argues that the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has been largely defined by their rivalries.¹ Yaakub, meanwhile, maintains that the post-Cold War Indonesia-Malaysia relations “have been defined more by conflict and rivalry”, rather than cooperation between the two states.² Clark and Peitsch, on the other hand, question the supposedly inherent closeness between Indonesia and Malaysia, pointing out that on many occasions the two states are beset by intense conflicts between them.³

The theoretical framework of this thesis brings forth a clearer understanding of the conflicts in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The framework reveals that the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship – like other special relationships – is in fact characterized by its double-edged effects. Not only does the special relationship result in substantial conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia, it also produces their substantial cooperation. In other words, while there have been apparent conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia, cooperation between them are also solid. As pointed out in Chapter 7, on the one hand, the anti-Malaysia sentiments are prevalent in Indonesia’s society; on the other hand, the strategic cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia in constituting the Malay World manifests in the form of ASEAN remains a central feature of their foreign policies. The double-edged effects of the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship are the outcomes of the interplay of power and common identity in the relations. It is the thesis’s theoretical framework that has enabled such observations.

Finally, this thesis has contributed to the understanding of Indonesia-Malaysia relations’ essence as a security regime, which is, both states are committed to avoid armed conflict between them. The existing literature of this bilateral tie acknowledges Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s commitment to avoid war between them, namely, they are

¹ Joseph Chinyong Liow, *The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations- One Kin, Two Nations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005)

² Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2009), 1.

³ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 17.

restrained by their war avoidance norms. The literature, however, remains unable to explain why Indonesia and Malaysia share such norms. Clark's and Juliet's study argues that the existence of ASEAN enables the two states to avoid war between them as they aim to preserve the stability of this regional body.⁴ The authors do not explain why ASEAN has such effects on Indonesia and Malaysia. The theoretical framework of this thesis has given rise to the understanding that it is the two sources of closeness in the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship that produce the two states' war avoidance norms; and subsequently, Indonesia's and Malaysia's commitment to avoid war between them creates and sustains the war avoidance norms of ASEAN.

The hypothesis of the thesis's theoretical framework has further illuminated the fact that the Indonesia-Malaysia Special Relationship constitutes a security regime – namely they share war avoidance norms – not a security community. The framework points out that the presence of power imbalance between Indonesia and Malaysia is necessary if this special relationship is to transform into a pluralistic security community. The absence of power imbalance – meaning the presence of power balance – between Indonesia and Malaysia indicates that the two states will continue to compete with each other for dominance. In other words, the ties between Indonesia and Malaysia are fundamentally competitive. They do not view each other in collective-self terms; armed conflict between them is unlikely, although not impossible. By incorporating the factor of power – apart from the factor of common identity – in the examination of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, this thesis has provided a clearer realization of Indonesia-Malaysia relations' essence as a security regime.

⁴ Marshall Clark and Juliet Pietsch, *Indonesia-Malaysia Relations – Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 17.

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LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interviewee	Position	Venue	Date
Interview 917	A former Assistant Director-General in a prominent Malaysian think tank that regularly provides policy advice to Malaysia's government; and also an academic who has in depth knowledge of Indonesia-Malaysia relations	Kuala Lumpur	17 th September 2012
Interview 919	A prominent Malaysian columnist for Malaysia's and Indonesia's mainstream newspapers, who specializes in the study of politics in Indonesia and Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	19 th September 2012
Interview 920	A former Secretary General of Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Kuala Lumpur	20 th September 2012
Interview 924-001	The Chairman in a prominent Malaysian think tank that regularly provides policy advice to Malaysia's government	Kuala Lumpur	24 th September 2012

Interviewee	Position	Venue	Date
Interview 924-002	The Chairman in a mainstream newspaper in Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	24 th September 2012
Interview 925	A former Malaysian diplomat	Kuala Lumpur	25 th September 2012
Interview 926-001	A former Malaysian Foreign Minister	Kuala Lumpur	26 th September 2012
Interview 926-002	A former Malaysian diplomat	Kuala Lumpur	26 th September 2012
Interview 1002	An academic who specializes in Indonesia-Malaysia relations	Singapore	2 nd October 2012
Interview 1008	An Indonesian diplomat	Jakarta	8 th October 2012
Interview 1011	A senior editor in a mainstream newspaper in Indonesia	Jakarta	11 th October 2012
Interview 1012	A senior researcher in Indonesia's parliament – The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI)	Jakarta	12 th October 2012
Interview 1016	A former Indonesian diplomat	Jakarta	16 th October 2012
Interview 1017	A former Indonesian diplomat	Jakarta	17 th October 2012

Interviewee	Position	Venue	Date
Interview 1019	An Indonesian member of parliament	Jakarta	19 th October 2012

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